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Abstract	
	
A	Very	Political	Project:	Charles	Haughey,	Social	Partnership	and	
the	pursuit	of	an	“Irish	economic	miracle”,	1969-92	
By	Philip	O’Connor			 The	 social	 partnership	 model	 initiated	 in	 Ireland	 in	 1987	 was	 a	 key	 factor	enabling	the	transformation	of	the	Irish	economy	and	society	from	one	of	West	Europe’s	poorest	to	one	of	its	top	performers	in	little	over	a	decade.	This	policy	paradigm	shift,	as	profound	as	that	of	1959-63,	recast	the	economy	within	a	few	years	to	a	new	model,	its	future	defining	characteristics	established	by	1991.		 The	 strategy	 involved	 exploiting	 emerging	 opportunities,	 particularly	 global	finance,	 to	drive	a	 transformation,	but	also	encompassed	comprehensive	 social	and	 institutional	 reform,	 employment	 growth,	 state	 industries,	 and	 a	 radical	remodelling	 of	 social	 and	 educational	 provision.	 The	 combined	 approach	 was	consciously	 conceived	 as	 an	 alternative	 route	 to	 economic	modernity	 to	 solely	“monetarist”	or	social	state	dismantling	approaches	adopted	elsewhere.			 Social	 state	 innovations	 under	 partnership,	 however,	 rapidly	 became	 its	central	concern	as	job	creation	failed	to	keep	pace	with	the	attrition	in	declining	industries.	But	the	dual	social/economic	strategy	of	partnership	made	it	a	model	of	international	significance,	not	least	in	being	instituted	just	as	most	states	were	retreating	from	“corporatism”	or	abandoning	it	altogether.			 Central	to	the	Irish	transformation	was	a	circle	led	by	Charles	Haughey,	who	engineered	it	through	tight	control	over	government	and	a	working	alliance	with	key	forces	among	the	social	partners.	In	this	Haughey,	a	modernising	nationalist,	realised	a	long-conceived	policy	approach	he	had	previously	attempted.		 Social	 partnership	 was	 neither	 primarily	 an	 emergency	 response	 to	 the	immediate	debt	crisis	nor	a	conforming	to	a	supposed	European	“norm”.	Rather	it	 was	 a	 strategy,	 long	 conceived	 by	 key	 groups,	 to	 resolve	 fundamental	institutional	problems	at	the	root	of	Irish	economic	underdevelopment.			 Social	partnership,	established	in	1987-92,	endured	with	some	modifications	for	over	twenty	years,	during	which	Ireland	underwent	its	most	dramatic	socio-economic	 transformation	 in	 a	 century.	 Partnership	 was	 only	 partially	 and	formally	 dissolved	 in	 2010,	 many	 of	 its	 practices	 and	 legacy	 institutions	continuing	to	shape	Ireland’s	socio-economic	development	a	decade	later.		
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Introduction		 This	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 political	 dynamic	 of	 social	 partnership,	 and	 in	 so	doing	 fills	 an	 important	 gap	 in	 the	 literature.	 What	 studies	 of	 comparable	systems	across	Europe	 invariably	conclude	 is	 that	 the	many	 features	unique	 to	Ireland’s	“social	partnership”	make	it	a	difficult-to-categorize	“outlier”	and	that	it	is	the	domestic	political	factors	accounting	for	this	“exceptionalism”	rather	than	similarities	with	patterns	elsewhere	that	require	elucidation.1			 Studies	of	Irish	partnership	often	focus	on	industrial	relations	–	an	important	but	far	from	its	only	aspect	–	or	structural	aspects	or	interest	conflicts	within	it	in	 its	 later	 period.	 As	 regards	 its	 origins,	 there	 is	 a	 near	 consensus	 that	 it	emerged	 in	1987	due	 to	 the	 immediate	debt	 crisis.	This	 thesis	 contends	 that	 it	was	neither	industrial	relations	nor	the	immediate	crisis	that	primarily	account	for	it.	Rather	it	resulted	from	a	coalition	of	forces	united	by	a	long-term	strategy	to	 overcome	 the	 fundamental	 problem	 of	what	 Jim	 Larkin	 jnr.	 called	 Ireland’s	“underdevelopment”	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 standards	 of	 living	 and	 development	 of	other	small,	economically	more	affluent	European	states.	Few	studies	analyse	the	profoundly	 political	 project	 it	 was,	 or	 its	 pre-history	 or	 the	 dynamics	 of	 its	implementation	 in	 its	 critical	 formative	 period,	 1987-91.	 Many	 erroneous	conclusions	are	drawn	due	to	the	paucity	of	the	historical	evidential	base	used,	which	this	thesis	seeks	to	redress,	much	from	sources	hitherto	little	examined.	A	core	 contention	 is	 that	 the	 immediate	 economic	 crisis	was	 less	 a	 cause	 than	 a	contingent	event	providing	a	“window	of	opportunity”	to	effect	a	major	and	long	advocated	institutional	change	in	Irish	socio-economic	governance.			 This	thesis	argues	that	social	partnership	in	1987	represented	an	institutional	rupture	 in	 how	 policy-making	 had	 hitherto	 occurred,	 and	 that	 the	 dramatic	economic	 transformation	 achieved	 in	 the	 1990s	 “Irish	 miracle”	 cannot	 be	explained	without	the	key	role	played	by	social	partnership	in	enabling	it.	It	does	not	claim	that	partnership	per	se,	or	alone,	caused	the	economic	take-off,	but	does	contend	 that	 the	 two	 processes	 were	 inextricably	 interlinked	 and	 mutually	reinforcing,	 with	 key	 elements	 of	 the	 latter	 enabled	 through	 the	 framework																																																											1		 The	salient	literature	is	assessed	in	Chapter	1	
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provided	by	the	former.	It	also	argues	that	in	the	short	period	1987-91	virtually	all	 major	 socio-economic	 policy	 innovations	 of	 the	 later	 “Celtic	 Tiger”	 were	initiated,	 their	 course,	 trajectory,	 and	 even	 many	 of	 their	 details,	 clearly	established.	 In	 arguing	 this,	 the	 thesis	 reveals	 key	 policy-making	 events	 that	shaped	 initiatives	 such	as	 the	 IFSC	and	urban	 renewal	programmes,	 the	astute	strategy	towards	the	EU,	as	well	as	the	policy	decisions	shaping	the	indigenous	and	 FDI	 industries	 that	 would	 drive	 the	 take-off.	 It	 also	 traces	 how	 the	 social	state	 formed	 through	 partnership	 was	 an	 essential	 corollary	 of	 its	 economic	aspect.	With	these	contentions	the	thesis	challenges	many	orthodoxies.		 Following	the	3-year	Programme	for	National	Recovery	(PNR)	of	1987-90,	the	1991	 successor	 Programme	 for	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Progress	 (PESP)	 set	 a	 10-year	 framework	 –	 as	 agreed	 at	 the	 NESC	 -	 that	 was	 largely	 successfully	implemented	over	 the	 following	decade	 through	a	series	of	3–year	agreements	subordinate	to	and	derivative	of	it.	Partnership	institutions,	so	contended	at	the	time	 of	 their	 establishment	 and	 continually	 challenged	 up	 to	 1991,	 were	 thus	successfully	 consolidated,	 only	 being	 tweaked,	 refined	 or	 tinkered	 with	thereafter.	The	policy	innovations	of	1987-91	set	Ireland	on	course	to	become	a	comparatively	rich	nation	in	contrast	to	what	it	had	been,	doubling	its	workforce,	creating	a	progressive	developmental	social	state	and	driving	living	standards	to	well	 above	 EU	 averages	 by	 2004.	 A	 strategy	 of	 European	 “catch-up”	 was	successfully	 over-achieved.	 Fatal	 policy	 choices	 by	 governments	 after	 1997	would	magnify	 the	 impact	 of	 the	2008	global	 financial	 crisis	 but,	 as	 this	 thesis	asserts,	 these	were	 not	 inherent	 in	 the	 policy	 paradigm	 of	 1987-91	 but	 arose	from	departures	from	that	paradigm	in	key	policy	areas	after	1997.			 Politics,	 i.e.	history,	develops	 in	a	 linear	process	of	cause	and	effect.	Leopold	von	Ranke,	the	father	of	modern	source-based	history,	argued	that	the	purpose	of	historical	analysis	is	to	establish	“what	exactly	happened”.	This	thesis	adopts	a	multiple-streams	narrative-historical	approach	to	trace	the	origins,	development	and	politics	of	the	various	strands	of	the	economic/social	partnership	idea,	from	its	 emergence	 in	 the	 1940s,	 several	 attempts	 to	 realise	 it	 up	 to	 1982,	 its	 final	adoption	in	1987,	and	the	constraints	and	dynamics	of	the	system	that	emerged	by	1991,	by	when	its	future	contours	were	clearly	established	and	it	achieved	a	
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certain	 equilibrium.	 It	 identifies	 the	 factors	 that	 converged	 in	 1987-91	 that	allowed	the	realisation	of	a	hitherto	frustrated	development	programme.2		 At	the	centre	of	the	1987-91	social	partnership	project	was	a	group	of	policy	innovators	 who	 on	 several	 occasions	 previously	 had	 sought	 unsuccessfully	 to	realise	it.	The	central	figure	of	Charles	Haughey	looms	ever	larger	the	closer	this	process	is	examined,	not	only	in	attempts	from	as	early	as	1969	to	1982,	but	also	when	in	1987-91	as	Taoiseach	he	provided	the	central	political	factor	driving	the	strategy,	intervening	even	to	shape	many	of	its	details.	His	role	in	the	economic/	partnership	 transformation	 initiated	 from	 1987	 was	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	Lemass	 in	 the	earlier	1958	paradigm	shift.	 Yet	while	Lemass’s	Programmes	for	
Expansion	 enjoy	 a	 near	 iconic	 paradigm-changing	 status	 in	 the	 socio-economic	literature,	the	equally	transformative	Programme	for	National	Recovery	and	PESP	are	 ignored.	Lemass	and	Whitaker	are	credited	as	 the	 innovators	of	 the	earlier	departure,	 but	 no	 such	 credit	 is	 accorded	 to	 Haughey,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 and	 others	central	to	the	1987	paradigm	shift.	This	thesis	argues	why	this	should	change.		 Haughey	 drove	 the	 1987	 paradigm	 shift	 and	 there	 was	 a	 considerable	consistency	 in	 his	 views	 since	 the	 1950s	 on	what	 an	 economic	 take-off	would	entail,	 including	 a	 partnership	 concept	 similar	 to	 that	 eventually	 achieved	 in	1987-91.	 In	 political	 terms	 Haughey	 portrayed	 himself	 as	 the	 third	 significant	activist	Fianna	Fáil	Taoiseach.	As	he	 told	his	 first	Árd	Fheis	as	 leader,	while	de	Valera	 had	 definitively	 established	 Irish	 national	 sovereignty	 and	 intellectual	independence,	Lemass	had	created	the	state-building	and	policy	instruments	to	achieve	the	socio-economic	success	that	was	the	substance	of	that	independence.	Haughey’s	own	role	would	be	to	finally	realise	the	potential	of	the	structures	and	instruments	Lemass	had	created.	He	once	said	that	politics	would	have	been	less	attractive	for	him	if	the	state	had	not	faced	that	development	challenge.3			 Haughey’s	views	were	 formed	by	adopting	 reform	proposals	 from	economic	and	social	innovators,	notably	among	business	and	union	circles	and	like-minded	national	leaders	elsewhere,	which	decisively	shaped	the	concept	implemented	in	1987-91,	 and	 this	 thesis	 traces	 this	 process	 of	 communication	 and	 strategy	formation	from	the	1960s.	Central	to	it	was	a	concept	of	the	productive	potential																																																											2	 “wie	es	eigentlich	gewesen	ist”,	von	Ranke	1886					3		 Árd	Fheis	speech	1980,	in	Mansergh,	ed.	1986:	327;	“had	not	needed”,	Keena	2001:	6		
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not	only	of	entrepreneurs	but	also	of	organisations	such	as	trade	unions,	as	not	primarily	 negative	 factors	 to	 be	 contained	 –	 a	 then	 predominant	 view	 –	 but	rather	 as	 productive	 forces	 in	 themselves	 if	 enabled	 to	 pursue	 their	 interests	within	a	common	national	strategy.	What	united	the	alliance	Haughey	assembled	was	in	essence	a	nationalist	programme	for	socio-economic	modernisation.		 Haughey	 wrote	 no	 memoirs	 and	 gave	 few	 legacy-building	 interviews.	 It	 is	therefore	notable	that	the	one	issue	on	which	he	insisted	in	recording	his	views	in	some	detail	before	his	death	was	social	partnership	as	the	key	enabling	factor	in	the	subsequent	economic	take-off,	providing	“the	essential	bedrock	on	which	sound	public	finances	and	progressive	fiscal,	social	and	economic	policies	could	be	firmly	based”.	In	his	view	it	provided	the	framework	for	an	essentially	social	democratic	 transformation	 strategy,	 based	on	 the	 economic	plan	developed	by	his	close	planning	circle	in	1982,	The	Way	Forward.	He	extolled	the	central	role	played	by	creative	exchange	at	the	NESC,	producing	the	consensus	between	the	social	partners,	and	praised	both	the	coordinating	role	at	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	and	as	 chair	of	 the	NESC	of	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn	and	 the	 “decisive	but	difficult	role”	of	union	leaders.	He	also	cited	the	influence	on	his	views	of	German	social	 democratic	 chancellor,	 Helmut	 Schmidt,	 his	 closest	 political	 ally,	 at	European	level.	This	thesis	confirms	Haughey’s	assertions	on	many	such	points.4			 Haughey	is	a	controversial	figure	in	Irish	politics.	He	left	office	in	1992	in	his	late	 sixties	 but	 was	 soon	 again	 a	 centre	 of	 attention	 as	 state	 tribunals	investigated	his	rather	bizarre	personal	finances.	A	popular	historical	literature,	including	memoirs	by	political	opponents,	began	to	 impute	the	major	decisions	of	 his	 career	 to	 allegedly	 corrupt	 relationships	with	 some	wealthy	 individuals,	but	 few	 if	 any	 such	 policy	 linkages	 have	 ever	 been	 convincingly	 established.	Speculation	on	 this	 issue	has	 led	 to	a	 serious	dearth	of	objective	 studies	of	his	political	role	and	impact.	Even	academic	analysts	have	succumbed	to	such	views,	Aiden	 Regan	 claiming	 that	 the	 1987-92	 governments	were	 “dominated	 by	 the	political-economic	interests	of	senior	Fianna	Fáil	ministers,	particularly	Charles	J	Haughey”,	and	attributing	innovative	policy	shifts	of	the	period	to	civil	servants.		
																																																										4		 Haughey	2014	
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	 This	 thesis	 disputes	 such	 assertions.	 But	 it	 does	 not	 interrogate	 Haughey’s	personal	affairs,	though	nor	does	it	explore	his	other	policy	innovations,	such	as	in	foreign	and	Northern	affairs	or	the	arts,	except	where	relevant	to	the	central	theme	of	his	policy	on	social/economic	partnership.	This,	 it	 finds,	 is	quite	 fully	explicable	in	political	process	and	policy	decision-making	terms.5			 The	 thesis	 also	 traces	 the	 fundamental	 divide	 over	 corporatist	 approaches	characterising	the	dominant	political	parties,	Fianna	Fáil	and	Fine	Gael,	and	the	competing	experimental/conservative	social	democratic	models	of	development	they	offered.	It	also	seeks	to	account	for	the	peculiar	hostility	to	“corporatism”	of	the	 Labour	 Party,	which	made	 it	 an	 outlier	 among	 its	 sister	 parties	 in	 Europe.	This	 forced	 the	 national-oriented	 element	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 leadership,	 who	otherwise	had	a	socialist	orientation,	into	downgrading	their	links	to	the	party	in	favour	of	 an	alliance	with	Haughey,	 as	previously	with	Lemass.	The	 thesis	also	reveals	 the	 stark	 divide	 in	 economic	 policy	 between	 the	 Haughey	 and	 Lynch	factions	 within	 Fianna	 Fáil,	 never	 previously	 satisfactorily	 elucidated.	 This	explains	both	the	fortunes	of	Haughey’s	various	partnership	initiatives	between	1970	 and	 1987	 as	 well	 as	 the	 collapse	 of	 cooperative	 institutionalism	 in	 the	1960-70s	 due	 to	 Lynch’s	 institutional	 conservatism,	 which	 allowed	 minor	sectional	 conflict	 in	 industry	escalate	with	disastrous	consequences.	The	 thesis	also	 explores	 the	 conflicts	 over	 corporatist	 cooperation	within	 the	main	 social	interests,	establishing	their	political	rather	purely	interest-driven	character.				 While	focusing	on	the	politics	and	political	economy	of	social	partnership,	and	restoring	 the	 role	 of	 political	 leadership	 and	 agency	 to	 it,	 this	 thesis	 does	 not	discount	 structural	 or	 other	 co-determinants.	 The	 economy	 and	 social	 factors	had	 powerful	 autonomous	 dynamics	 of	 their	 own.	 But	 agency	 remains	 a	 key	variable,	and	the	tendency	in	the	literature	to	grossly	understate	it	is	challenged.	Economists	 explaining	 the	 take-off	 of	 the	 1990s	 often	 do	 so	 without	 even	mentioning	Haughey,	the	political-social	alliance	he	created,	or	any	other	aspect	of	political	agency	as	in	any	way	important.	This	thesis	challenges	this	economic	primacy,	re-asserting	the	centrality	of	political	agency	and	politics	itself.6																																																												5		 For	personal	finances	determining	Haughey’s	decision-making,	esp,	Connolly,	F.	2014	and	O’Toole	2009;	relevant	memoirs	include	Quinn	2005	and	Brady,	C.	2005;	quote	from	Regan,	A.	2012:	115			6		 These	analyses	are	examined	in	Chapter	1		
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	 The	 thesis	builds	on	 lengthy	 interviews	with	 leading	actors	 from	the	period,	including	 two	 former	 Taoisigh,	 as	well	 as	 public	 servants,	 union	 and	 business	leaders	 and	others.	While	 these	 are	 only	 sparsely	 referenced,	mostly	 for	 space	reasons,	 they	 provided	 insights	 into	 the	 period	 and	 into	 what	 central	 players	believed	 they	 were	 doing.	 They	 also	 helped	 clarify	 events	 and	 illuminate	relationships,	 agendas	 and	 conflicts.	 Such	 retrospective	 subjective	 testimony	must	necessarily	be	treated	with	caution	and	employed	only	in	an	ancillary	role.	It	is	therefore	extensive	archive	sources,	many	never	before	accessed,	as	well	as	contemporary	media,	 that	 form	 the	 thesis’s	main	source-base.	These	were	 first	and	 foremost	 the	 comprehensive	 records	 of	 the	 “Central	 Review	 Committee”	(CRC)	of	social	partnership,	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn’s	papers	and	other	material	in	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	archive.	Besides	minutes	of	meetings,	these	contain	much	 internal	 correspondence,	 government	 communications	 and	 extensive	hand-written	notes	of	meetings,	phone	calls	and	events.	Similarly	rich	archives	of	the	NESC,	ICTU	and	other	bodies	not	previously	used	were	also	examined.	Older	records	were	sourced	from	the	National	Archives	and	other	collections,	and	use	was	also	made	of	some	private	papers	made	available.			 Finally,	 the	 current	 writer’s	 own	 experience	 of	 social	 partnership	 since	 the	1980s	 through	 both	 political	 and	 trade	 union	 involvement	 and	 as	 director	 for	fourteen	years	of	a	large	partnership	project,	Dublin	Employment	Pact,	meant	he	had	an	acquaintance	with	many	key	figures	involved,	which	facilitated	access	to	records	and	interviewees	and	helped	inform	judgements	reached	in	this	thesis.7		 The	 thesis	 reveals	 much	 never	 before	 considered	 regarding	 the	 origins,	establishment	and	development	not	only	of	the	social	partnership	system,	but	of	the	decisions	that	shaped	the	1990s	economic	take-off,	the	forging	of	a	radically	new	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 in	 1988-90,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Irish	developmental	 state.	 In	 so	doing	 it	 hopes	 to	make	a	 significant	 contribution	 to	understanding	 the	 paradigm	 shift	 that	 occurred	 in	 Ireland’s	 socio-economic	governance	and	fortunes	in	the	crucial	decisions	made	in	the	1987-91	period.	
	 																																																											7		 On	Dublin	Employment	Pact,	www.dublinpact.ie;	for	a	previous	non-academic	assessment	of	social	partnership	by	the	current	writer,	O’Connor,	P.	2007	
	 14	
Chapter	1	
	
Theoretical	contentions	and	competing	
literatures		
Contentions		 The	main	contentions	of	 this	 thesis,	 its	 sources	and	 its	methodology,	are	set	out	 in	 the	 Introduction.	 It	 is	 a	 controversial	 thesis,	 challenging	 common	assumptions	 and	 academic	 orthodoxies	 regarding	 the	 subject	 it	 is	 treating.	 It	asserts	 that	social	partnership	was	a	key	 institution	 in	the	economic	and	social	transformation	of	Ireland	that	occurred	from	the	early	1990s,	and	identifies	the	driving	role	in	that	of	key	political	and	interest	leaders.	In	so	doing,	it	argues	the	primacy	of	political	agency,	 leadership	and	ideas	 in	that	paradigm	shift,	 though	without	 neglecting	 structural	 and	 exogenous	 factors	 and	 also	 without	overstating	what	might	be	misconstrued	as	a	“great	man”	interpretation.				 This	 chapter	 firstly	 seeks	 to	 locate	 the	 contentions	 of	 the	 thesis	 within	 the	literature	analysing	political-economic	paradigm	shifts,	or	institutional	ruptures,	which	it	asserts	the	1987-91	period	in	Ireland	represented.	It	also	argues	for	the	detailed	 linear	 historical-narrative	 approach	 it	 takes	 to	 elucidate	 the	 various	strands	of	cause-and-effect	explaining	what	led	to	that	paradigm	shift,	as	well	as	its	socio-economic,	political	and	institutional	consequences	and	its	dynamics	as	it	consolidated	 as	 an	 altered	 policy-making	 system.	 This	 multiple-streams	approach	illuminates	how	specific	factors	converged	in	1987	to	enable	the	policy	paradigm	 shift,	 which	 had	 been	 unsuccessfully	 attempted	 on	 several	 previous	occasions	and	often	involving	the	very	same	actors.	It	establishes	the	roles	in	this	process	 of	 the	 failure	 and	 success	 of	 innovative	 pro-active	 leaders	 on	 the	 one	hand,	and	conservative	or	reactive	leaders	on	the	other.		 The	chapter	then	examines	the	main	contentions	of	the	existing	economic	and	political	literature	on	the	origins,	establishment	and	importance	–	or	otherwise	-	of	the	social	partnership	departure	in	Ireland,	challenging	orthodoxies	in	relation	to	 it.	 It	also	reviews	the	wider	comparative	 literature	on	European	partnership	systems	which	has	attempted	to	locate	and	account	for	the	Irish	development	in	
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that	 framework.	 By	 identifying	 the	 endogenous	 political	 drivers	 of	 Ireland’s	social	partnership,	the	thesis	presents	much	new	material	to	assist	future	studies	more	accurately	locate	the	Irish	case	within	such	a	comparative	framework.		
The	political	economy	of	policy	change		 The	central	contention	of	this	thesis,	that	social	partnership	and	government	policy	 decisions	 of	 1987-91	 represented	 an	 institutional	 paradigm	 shift	 that	enabled	 the	 economic	 transformation	 achieved	 in	 the	 1990s,	 challenges	 a	dominant	 narrative	 that	 emphasises	 external	 factors	 -	 such	 as	 pressures	 to	conform	 to	EC	policy	or	globalisation	–	 in	explaining	 the	1990s	 take-off.	 In	 the	literature	 the	 turning	 point	 accounting	 for	 the	 transformation	 largely	 remains	indeterminate	 and	 the	 roles	 of	 political	 agency	 -	 particularly	 of	 the	 Haughey	governments	-	and	of	institutional	innovation	-	particularly	of	social	partnership	–	are	 largely	 ignored	as	 irrelevant.	The	Oxford	historian	of	 Ireland,	Roy	Foster,	articulated	a	widespread	view	when	he	wrote	that	“the	Irish”	simply	“got	lucky”.1		 Political	 scientists	 grapple	with	 policy	 and	 institutional	 “paradigm	 shifts”	 in	democracies.	The	Irish	 institutional	upheaval	of	1987-91	certainly	represents	a	test	case	for	this.	They	contend	that	the	institutions	of	democratic	states	tend	in	“normal	times”	to	follow	an	incremental,	structure-determined	course,	but	when	a	 crisis	 induces	 institutional	 “uncertainty”,	 at	 whatever	 level,	 various	 factors	combine	 in	adjusting	 the	 system	 to	 the	new	circumstances,	 resolving	 the	 crisis	and	restoring	equilibrium,	or	not,	as	the	case	may	be.			 Positivists	 argue	 that	 institutions	 respond	 to	 crisis,	 or	 sudden	 uncertainty,	through	 an	 “objective”	 process	 of	 “risk	 reduction”,	 with	 institutional	 “supply”	increasing	to	meet	institutional	“demand”,	as	“agents”	act	to	“realize	their	given	interests	in	a	risky	environment”.	Marc	Blythe	counters	by	showing	that	at	times	of	crisis	and	hence	policy	uncertainty,	when	full	knowledge	of	its	details	can	only	be	available	in	retrospect,	influential	actors	cannot	know	how	best	their	interests	are	served	and	have	little	to	guide	them	in	identifying	those	interests	apart	from	ideas.	Both	the	diagnosis	of	a	“crisis”	as	a	crisis,	as	well	as	the	proffered	solutions	are	 necessarily	 constructed	 ideas	 vying	 for	 plausibility.	 During	 non-crisis																																																											1		 Lee,	J.	1989,	Barry,	F.	ed.	1999,	Fitz	Gerald,	J.	2000,	Garvin	2004,	“got	lucky”,	Foster	2007,	also	David	McWilliams,	‘The	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	led	to	the	rise	of	Ireland’,	Irish	Times,	09/03/19	
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periods,	ideas	tend	to	a	mundane	reflection	of	perceived	interest	but	at	moments	of	 “institutional	 uncertainty”	 they	 can	 emerge	 as	 “causal	 factors”,	 as	 “causally	powerful	constructions	that	allow	agents	to	define	a	crisis	as	a	 ‘crisis’	and	both	plan	 and	 politic	 their	 way	 forward”.	 Where	 such	 ideas	 prove	 successful,	 they	achieve	hegemony	and	form	the	equilibrium	of	a	new	institutional	paradigm.2			 Baumgartner	 and	 Jones	 similarly	 explain	 how	 “stability	 is	 the	 rule	 for	most	issues	 most	 of	 the	 time”,	 with	 the	 equilibrium	 of	 relatively	 autonomous	subsystems	 and	 the	 defensive	 actions	 of	 powerful,	 constructed	 interests,	reinforcing	system	inertia	and	acting	against	prospective	innovators	to	maintain	the	status	quo.	Policies	 in	periods	of	equilibrium	are	“framed”	by	an	“image”	of	coherence	and	plausibility,	founded	ultimately	on	belief.	But	in	periods	of	crisis	that	equilibrium	is	destabilised	–	or	“punctuated”	-	and	alternative	policies	must	gain	plausibility	and	be	“framed”	in	a	new	coherent	“image”.	This	occurs	through	attritional	 “conflict	 expansion”	 as	 opposing	 parties	 and	 interests,	 in	 seeking	 to	shape	 and	 frame	 a	 new	 consensus,	 mobilise	 the	 actors	 “discontented”	 by	 the	crisis	until	a	critical-mass	constituency	is	formed	for	a	dominant	solution.3			 Ideas,	 however,	 can	 also	 be	 wrong.	 Extrapolating	 from	 Polanyi’s	 Great	
Transformation,	 Blythe	 contends	 that	 how	 institutions	 are	 constructed	 and	 the	external	 pressures	 under	 which	 they	 arise	 determines	 why	 some	 states	 were	able	 to	 adopt	 successfully	 to	 the	 1920s	 Great	 Depression	 by	 an	 institutional	paradigm	 shift	 towards	 “embedded	 liberalism”,	 as	 in	 the	 US	 “New	 Deal”	 or	Swedish	 social	 democracy,	 while	 others	 stagnated	 or	 opted	 for	 the	 ultimately	destructive	course	of	militarist	fascism.	While	Blythe	was	examining	an	epochal	ideational	 conflict,	 his	 insights	 are	 nevertheless	 relevant	 to	 our	 case.	 Scholars	argue	 that	 authoritative	 ideas	 that	 achieve	 plausibility	 involve	 many	 political-historical	 factors	 such	 as	 institutions’	 historical	 formation,	 constructed	 social	interests	and	problem-solving	propensities	under	the	pressures	of	 internal	and	external	constraints,	in	on-going	competition	for	influence	and	hegemony.4		 Innovative	ideas	or	policies,	in	whatever	interpretation,	are	not	disembodied	causal	 forces,	 but	 are	 introduced	 at	 moments	 of	 uncertainty	 by	 political																																																											2		 Blythe	2002			3		 Baumgartner	and	Jones	1993			4		 Polanyi	1944;	“ideas”,	Bythe	2002;	“autonomous	constructs”,	Zehfus	2002;	“critical	realists”,	Archer	2003;	“influence”,	Phillips	and	Jorgensen	2002;	“hegemony”,	Gramsci	1971	
	 17	
innovators	who	build	credibility	and	plausibility	for	them.	At	times	of	crisis,	the	process	 of	 change	 through	 the	 interaction	 of	 structure	 and	 agency	 becomes	acute,	with	institutional	change	traceable	through	both	this	interplay	and	that	of	contending	 narratives	 for	 resolving	 crises	 of	 uncertainty.5	As	 noted,	 analysing	institutional	 change	 can	 be	 differentiated	 from	 analysing	 how	 preceding	 and	resulting	institutions	are	sustained.	Systems	in	equilibrium	follow	a	more-or-less	path-determined	 course,	 whose	 dynamic,	 as	 Pierson	 put	 it,	 is	 “amenable	 to	structural	 explanations”,	 while	 at	 crisis	moments	 the	 intervention	 of	 “political	entrepreneurs”	proposing	new	ideas	is	decisive,	with	such	critical	junctures	best	examined	 through	 an	 agent-centred	 approach.	 At	 times	 of	 significant	 change,	therefore,	political	agency	and	ideas	play	a	critical	role.6			 This	 thesis	 establishes	 how	 the	 social	 partnership	 idea,	 with	 an	 economic	transformation	rather	than	a	mere	industrial	relations	or	economic	crisis-solving	formula	 its	central	purpose,	had	a	 long	gestation	in	the	Irish	political-economic	system.	 From	 first	 being	 proposed	 by	 policy	 innovators	 in	 the	 1940s,	 through	several	attempts	at	realising	it	-	interspersed	by	periods	of	reactive-conservative	dismantling	 and	 withdrawal	 from	 it	 -	 it	 was	 finally	 implemented	 successfully	from	1987.	The	question	arises	as	to	how	this	process	should	best	be	observed.	A	case	 study	 might	 apply	 innovation	 theory	 or	 a	 “diffusion	 of	 innovation”	approach,	 or	 apply	 a	 “multiple	 streams	 framework”	 as	 proposed	 by	 Kingdon,	which	offers	greater	scope	for	narrative	conflict	and	social	power	factors.7				 In	 Kingdon’s	 model,	 an	 identified	 problem	 in	 any	 policy	 system	 results	 in	varied	proposals	to	solve	it,	with	the	dominant	solution	emerging	and	achieving	critical	acceptance	when	the	policy	innovator	has	organised	the	political	factors	necessary	 to	 implement	 it.	 This	 occurs	 when	 a	 contingent	 event,	 or	 “crisis”,	provides	 a	 “window	 of	 opportunity”	 for	 the	 innovator,	 who	 has	 assiduously	aligned	 those	 political	 factors,	 to	 implement	 the	 proposed	 solution.	 The	convergence	 of	 these	 elements	 of	 problem,	 solution	 and	 political	 organisation,	with	the	window	of	opportunity	provided	by	a	contingent	event,	thus	enables	the	resolving	 of	 the	 problem,	 whereafter	 a	 new	 system	 equilibrium	 results.	 The																																																											5		 On	“policy	innovators”,	Hall	and	Thelen	2009	and	Hogan	and	Feeney	2012;	on	the	interplay	of	structure	and	agency,	Berger	and	Luckmann	1966,	Zehfus	2002,	Jørgensen	and	Phillips	2002,	Weiss	and	Wodak,	eds.	2007,	Wendt	1992,	1999,	Onuf	and	Klink	1989,	and	Kratochwil	1991			6		 Paul	Pierson	quoted	in	Bennett	and	Ellmann	2006:	464			7		 “diffusion”,	Rogers		2010;	“multiple	streams”,	Kingdon	2003		
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timing	and	flow	of	policy	actions	is	critical.	Resistance	to	the	idea	or	alternative	solutions	must	be	overcome	or	compromised	with,	though	will	often	continue	to	operate	in	policy	“sub-systems”	impeding	or	delimiting	the	substantive	change.			 This	multiple	streams	perspective	allows	the	critical	elements	and	processes	of	advocacy,	trial,	contestation,	setbacks	and	ultimate	success	of	a	major	political	project	 to	 be	 traced	 and	 evaluated,	 explaining,	 in	 our	 case,	 why	 what	 finally	succeeded	 in	1987-91	had	not	 in	previous	attempts	over	 the	preceding	 twenty	years.	It	also	accounts	for	how	Charles	Haughey,	as	a	high	risk-taking	rather	than	reactive	 political	 leader,	 first	 secured	 the	 cautious	 buy-in	 of	 opinion-forming	allies	 by	 tailoring	 his	 project	 to	 their	 policy	 preferences	 and,	 once	 the	contingency	of	 the	economic	 crisis	 lent	plausibility	 to	 the	proposed	 solution,	 it	was	 the	 securing	 of	 meaningful	 political	 power	 that	 assured	 the	 project’s	plausibility.	 Such	 an	 analysis	 also	 accounts	 for	 the	 political	 factors	 that	undermined	 its	plausibility	 in	previous	attempts.	Through	 this	perspective,	 the	counter-tendencies	of	alternative	policy	concepts,	system	resistance	and	inertia,	conservative	 or	 reactive	 competing	 leaders	 and	 interests,	 political	 constraints	and	 other	 factors	 that	 accounted	 for	 earlier	 defeats	 and	 that	 impeded	 the	economic	paradigm	shift	until	1987-91,	can	also	be	identified.			 It	 is	 of	 interest	 that	 Haughey	 himself	 –	 the	 key	 political	 innovator,	 among	several,	 in	 the	 central	 thesis	 of	 this	 study	 -	 viewed	 his	 finally	 achieving	convincing	control	of	government	and	the	state	apparatus	in	1987	as	the	turning	point	 that	 assured	 the	 plausibility	 and	 success	 of	 his	 economic/social	 system	proposal.	He	recalled	1987-88	as	the	“happiest”	and	“most	rewarding”	year	of	his	political	career.	Politics	would	have	been	of	less	interest	to	him	had	the	challenge	of	Ireland’s	underdevelopment,	which	had	not	been	resolved	by	the	Lemass-era	reforms,	not	presented	 itself.	Decisive	government,	 and	power	 itself,	 he	 stated,	rested	less	in	party	or	backbench	majorities,	which	can	be	incoherent,	than	in	a	cabinet	united,	led	and	determined	on	a	singular	policy	course.	This	had	evaded	his	and	other	governments	previously,	but	he	achieved	it	in	1987.8			 In	a	paper	jointly	authored	with	his	former	government	secretary,	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn,	a	year	or	so	before	his	death	from	colon	cancer,	Haughey	identified	the	
																																																										8		 Haughey	on	1987	and	cabinet	government,	interview	Haughey	2005;	“of	less	interest”,	Keena	2001:	6	
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economic	agenda,	The	Way	Forward,	 compiled	by	a	 tightly-knit	policy	group	he	formed	in	1981-82,	coordinated	by	Ó	hUiginn,	as	the	programme	that	united	his	1987	cabinet.	Charlie	McCreevy	once	described	Ó	hUiginn	somewhat	colourfully	as	 	 “the	 smartest	 civil	 servant	 I	 ever	 met	 …,	 his	 role	 was	 at	 least	 equal	 to	Whitaker”.	 This	 thesis	makes	 an	 analogous	 claim	 in	 relation	 to	Haughey	 as	 an	innovator	 and	 political	 leader	 of	 a	 similar	 significance	 to	 Lemass.	 The	 Way	
Forward	formed	the	transformative	“idea”	in	our	study,	though	only	half	of	it,	the	other	critical	element	being	its	framing	through	a	social	partnership	system.9			 That	joint	paper	with	Ó	hUiginn	also	identified	the	debt	crisis	of	1986	as	the	immediate	 “near-disastrous”	 contingency,	 or	 window	 of	 opportunity,	 enabling	the	 departure,	 but	 the	 deeper	 structural	 “development”	 problem	 of	 the	 Irish	economy	since	1970	as	the	fundamental	issue	being	tackled.	In	Haughey’s	words,	the	debt	 crisis	 provided	 the	 “stimulus	 and	need”	 for	 the	departure.	This	 thesis	traces	Haughey’s	long	advocacy	of	such	an	economic	departure	and	of	a	alliance	with	business	and	union	interests	as	the	political	means	to	achieve	it.		 In	2005	Haughey	said	social	partnership	had	played	a	central,	integral	role	in	the	economic	take-off.	While	“other	factors	assisted	that	transformation,	…	social	partnership	from	its	inception	and	for	20	years	…	provided	the	essential	bedrock	on	 which	 sound	 public	 finances	 and	 progressive	 fiscal,	 social	 and	 economic	policies	could	be	firmly	based.”	This	thesis	tests	this	hypothesis	through	a	close	analysis	of	many	of	the	factors	social	partnership	contributed.10	
	
Policy	and	partnership	in	the	economic	transformation			 That	a	paradigm	shift	occurred	in	Ireland’s	economic	fortunes	in	the	1990s	is	not	disputed.	A	growth	and	employment	take-off	is	clear	from	1993,	continuing	for	a	decade	 to	double	GDP	and	employment	and	eliminate	unemployment	by	2003.	A	pattern	of	weak	performance	had	characterised	the	preceding	1970-86	period,	 punctuated	 by	 growth	 spurts	 and	 turbulence	 through	 “creative	destruction”	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 by	manufacturing	 and	 FDI	 decline	 in	 the	 early	1980s	 causing	 the	 mass	 closure	 of	 many	 Lemass-era	 industries.	 In	 1985-86	export	 growth	 began	 to	 revive	 to	 its	 modest	 pre-1980s	 level.	 This	 partial																																																											9		 “paper”,	Haughey	2013;	“jointly	authored”,	interview	Ó	hUiginn;	McCreevy	quoted	in	Hastings	et	al.:	34	10		 “most	admired”,	interview	with	Martin	Mansergh	
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recovery	 in	 growth	 -	 though	 not	 employment	 -	 was	 assisted	 by	 deflationary	fiscal	policies	of	the	FitzGerald	coalition.11			 So	 what	 was	 the	 identifiable	moment	 of	 qualitative	 policy	 and	 institutional	change	accounting	for	the	1990s	take-off?	This	thesis	contends	that	it	occurred	in	1987.	Within	a	year,	growth	surpassed	the	recovered	1980-level	of	1986	by	5	per	cent	and,	while	slowing	in	1991-92	due	to	the	Maastricht/currency	market	crisis,	 surged	 from	 1993	 in	 a	 upward	 trajectory.	 The	 new	 growth	 was	 less	 a	“recovery”	than	the	take-off	of	a	new	economy	with	new	growth	drivers.	While	unemployment	 would	 remain	 high	 into	 the	 1990s,	 new-job	 creation	 of	 ca.	20,000	jobs	p.a.	occurred,	in	line	with	PNR	targets,	with	the	new	jobs	striking	in	that	 they	 were	 almost	 wholly	 in	 new-sector	 areas.	 Although	 this	 pattern	 is	widely	 accepted	 for	 the	 1990s,	 the	 precise	 policy	 turning	 point	 is	 rarely	identified,	the	take-off	mostly	being	attributed	to	post-1990	input	factors.12			 Klein	and	Ventura’s	 tracking	of	GDP/output	growth	data	 from	1980	to	2005	indicates	 the	depression	and	modest	recovery	of	1980-86,	and	an	 initial	 surge	from	1988	that	slowed	in	the	Maastricht/currency	crisis	but	took	off	again	from	1993.	They	ascribe	this	to	a	changed	policy-input	paradigm	from	1988:	
	
“GDP	per	working-age	adult	in	Ireland	more	than	doubled	relative	to	the	US	in	25	
years,	increasing	115	per	cent	from	1988	to	2005”.	13			 This	thesis	not	only	agrees	that	the	decisive	policy-input	turning	point	was	in	1987-88	 but	 also	 demonstrates	 that	 all	 essential	 elements	 of	 the	 economic																																																									11		 “growth	from	1993”,	Kennedy,	K.	2001,	Barry,	F.	ed.	1999,	Bielenberg	and	Ryan	2012	12		 “widely	accepted”,	e.g.	Barry,	F.	ed.	1999;	Kennedy,	K.	(ed.)	1997;	FitzGerald,	J.	1999	and	Kennedy,	K.	2001;		13		 Klein	and	Ventura	2019	
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transformation	of	 the	1990s,	 in	 terms	both	of	policy	and	economic	 inputs,	had	occurred	by	1991.	Capital	opening	has	long	been	identified	as	a	key	factor	in	the	take-off,	though	far	too	often	as	its	singular	source.	Other	small	open	European	economies	 benefitted	 from	 the	 same	 EC	 market	 opening	 without	 achieving	 a	remotely	comparable	result.	This	requires	explanation,	and	this	thesis	contends	that	 the	 answer	 lies	 in	 the	 series	 of	 policy	 choices	 developed	 through	 social	partnership	and	implemented	from	1987.	These	included	decisions	to	pre-empt	and	exploit	single	market	reforms,	almost	before	they	occurred,	to	get	ahead	in	the	nascent	competitive	European	economy,	and	a	strategy	of	alliance-building	in	 Europe	 to	 exploit	 EC	 structural	 funds	 as	 a	 lever	 to	 development.	 A	 further	factor	was	a	deferral	of	input	costs	–	also	provided	by	social	partnership	-	which	enabled	a	dramatic	capital	inflow	and	a	surge	of	new	sectors,	even	before	1990.			 Asserting	 a	 central	 role	 for	 social	 partnership	 in	 the	 economic	 turn-around	contradicts	 what	 many	 studies	 assume,	 that	 it	 was	 peripheral.	 This	 thesis	contends	that,	while	not	necessarily	the	singular	cause,	it	provided	the	essential	framework	for	a	negotiated	opening	of	the	economy,	tracing	the	processes	that	brought	 the	 opening	 about.	 It	 also	 ensured	 that	 government’s	 tight	monetary	adjustment	 was	 accompanied	 by	 expansive	 industrial	 policy,	 mixed-economy	initiatives	 and	 a	 substantial	 reshaping	 of	 the	 welfare	 state.	 These	 strategies	were	framed	within	a	debt/	GDP	ratio-reduction	formula	that	included	deferring	social	and	wage	costs	though	offsetting	them	by	a	wage/tax	approach	growing	real	 incomes	and	programmes	of	social	 investment.	 It	was	this	set	of	 formulae	that	soon	gave	Ireland’s	social	partnership	its	international	significance.		 Social	partnership	also	provided	a	range	of	“intangible	capital”	inputs	such	as	wage	and	policy	 certainty,	 industrial	peace	 through	both	pay/tax	 strategy	and	institutional	 reform,	 co-ordinated	 mid-term	 planning	 systems	 across	departments	 and	new	human	 resource	programmes	 in	welfare,	 education	and	social	policy.	These	inputs	delivered	value	growth	in	the	human	resource	factors	critical	to	the	reconfigured	higher-value	economic	model	being	pursued.	These	various	factors	enhanced	what	is	termed	total	factor	productivity	(TFP),	forming	the	critical	input	this	thesis	groups	as	the	social	partnership	effect.	Indeed,	even	without	 the	 opportunities	 exploited	 in	 global	 economic	 opening,	 some	 studies	contend	 a	 less	 dramatic	 but	 nonetheless	 substantial	 economic	 improvement	
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would	 still	 have	 been	 achieved	 due	 to	 the	 1987-91	 policy	 departure.	What	 is	also	 seldom	 realized	 is	 the	 paradigmatic	 quality	 of	 the	 second	 partnership	agreement,	 the	 PESP	 of	 1991,	 which	 involved	 a	 template	 for	 an	 institutional	transformation	 towards	 a	 developmental	 state,	 framed	 as	 a	 10-year	 reform	programme	as	advised	by	the	NESC.	Subsequent	agreements	of	the	1990s	were	merely	subsets	of	this	overall	decade-long	framework.	This	again	illustrates	the	formative	quality	of	the	policy	choices	of	the	1987-91	period.	14		
Ireland’s	social	partnership	in	comparative	analyses		 Studies	of	Irish	social	partnership	often	analyse	it	in	the	framework	of	trends	in	 European	 systems	 of	 state/capital/labour	 industrial	 relations	 and	 economic	policy	 coordination,	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 “neo-corporatism”.	 While	 such	systems	 had	 their	 origins	 in	 the	 command	 economies	 of	 World	War	 One	 and	even	older	corporatist	traditions,	they	are	mostly	examined	in	their	role	during	the	so-called	“Keynesian	consensus”	of	1945-75,	a	“golden	age”	of	unprecedented	economic	 growth,	 cooperation	 and	welfare	 expansion.	 The	 Irish	 system	 is	 also	sometimes	 compared	 with	 how	many	 of	 these	 systems	mutated	 as	 they	 were	down-graded,	or	again	revived,	reconfigured	as	“competitive	corporatism”,	in	the	economically	less	optimistic	period	1993-2005.	But	in	such	paradigms,	the	very	initiation	 of	 Irish	 social	 partnership	 represents	 an	 outlier,	 in	 that	 it	 occurred	precisely	between	these	 two	“classic”	periods	of	European	corporatist	systems.	The	 same	 applies	 to	 the	 Irish	 pattern	 of	 economic	 performance,	which	 during	these	periods	ran	directly	counter	to	that	of	the	usual	comparator	countries.15			 During	 the	 Keynesian	 era,	 different	 models	 of	 neo-corporatism	 evolved	 in	different	states	and	groups	of	states	along	a	spectrum	of	what	is	called	“varieties	of	 capitalism”,	 the	 variations	 determined	 by	 differing	 economic	 structures	 and	their	endogenous	politico-cultural	and	economic-institutional	 traditions.	By	 the	1980s,	 party	 political	 exchange	 in	 most	 states	 determined	 much	 of	 the	redistributive	 dynamic,	 with	 corporatist	 systems	 –	 increasingly	 commonly																																																									14		 Key	role	of	“TFP”	factors,	Klein	and	Ventura	2019	15		 On	WW1	command	economies	and	state/industry/labour	coordination,	e.g.	for	the	British	“Whitley	system”,	ILO	1973,	and	Germany,	Feldman	1966.	For	literature	on	“neo-corporatism”,	McGinley	1998;	on	revived	“competitive-corporatist”	pacts	of	the	1990s,	Ebbinghaus	2002,	Ebbinghaus	and	Manow	2004,	Grote	and	Schmitter	1999,	Donaghey	and	Teague	2005,	Baccaro	and	Simoni	2008,	Avdagic,	Rhodes	and	Visser	2011,	Compston	2003,	and	Natali	and	Pochet	2009;	on	“competitive	corporatism”	also	Rhodes	2001,	Hemerijck	2013,	Kirby/Murphy	2011	
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referred	 to	 as	 “social	 partnership”	 -	 largely	 confined	 to	 wage	 determination,	industrial	relations,	and	labour	market	and	social	security	policy.16		 The	 Irish	 social	 partnership	 system	 established	 from	 1987	 combined	 both	redistributive	and	competitive	policy	elements	and	entailed	a	far	greater	policy	range	 than	 comparable	 contemporary	 European	 systems,	 encompassing	monetary	strategy	and	EU	integration,	 industrial	policy	and	 industrial	relations	reform,	 tax	 policy,	 welfare	 state	 configuration,	 liberal-social	 reform	 and	 a	transformation	 of	 local	 development	 structures.	 In	 its	 pre-determining	 of	Programmes	 for	Government	 it	was	even	accused	by	 its	detractors	of	usurping	parliamentary	democracy.	The	power-sharing	element	of	 it	entailed	senior	civil	servants	and	other	state	officials,	for	the	first	time	in	the	state’s	history,	having	to	answer	to	and	collaborate	with	the	interest	coalition.	Its	establishment	in	1987	thus	 represented	by	any	standard	a	major	 institutional	 innovation	and	historic	departure,	in	terms	both	of	domestic	policy	and	comparable	European	practice.		 Social	 Partnership	 presents	 something	 of	 a	 puzzle	 for	 historians,	 political	scientists	 and	 political	 economists	 alike,	 in	 that	 it	 was	 counter-intuitive	 at	 a	number	 of	 levels:	 it	 was	 instituted	 with	 only	 a	 minimal	 prior	 history	 of	corporatist	 governance,	 by	 an	 ostensibly	 “centre-right”	 government,	 while	corporatist	arrangements	elsewhere	were	built	on	 long-standing	traditions	and	were	initiated	mostly	by	and	identified	with	the	political	 left;	 it	was	introduced	as	 corporatism	 was	 being	 discarded	 elsewhere	 across	 the	 OECD;	 it	 combined	monetarist	adjustment	with	a	redistributive	strategy,	a	combination	considered	contradictory;	 and	 it	 remained	 highly	 contested	 as	much	 in	 the	 party	 political	sphere,	 the	civil	 service	and	general	expert	economic	opinion	as	by	substantial	minorities	 within	 the	 interest	 organisations	 themselves.	 Despite	 its	 unifying	element	as	a	strategy	for	consensus	policy	development,	a	political	consensus	on	it	 as	 a	new	 system	 for	 socio-economic	 government	would	 continue	 to	 elude	 it.	The	 conclusions	 invariably	 drawn	 in	 comparative	 studies	 is	 that	 the	“exceptionalist”	 domestic	 political	 factors	 shaping	 or	 impeding	 Irish	 social	
																																																								16		 Hall	1997;	Lehmbruch	1984;	Hall	and	Soskice	2003;	Hall	and	Gingerich	2009	
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partnership,	 and	 characterising	 its	 divergence	 from	 European	 “norms”,	 rather	than	its	compatibility	with	them,	are	what	require	elucidation.17			 As	 the	 formative	 period	 of	 Irish	 social	 partnership	 presents	 such	 an	asymmetric	 pattern	 to	 contemporary	 developments	 elsewhere,	 a	 comparative	study	 based	 on	 partnership	 “norms”	 could	 not	 but	 fail	 to	 identify	 meaningful	events	 determining	 it.	 In	 identifying	 the	 ideational	 development,	 relationship-building,	agency/structure	dynamic	and	political	conflict	that	shaped	it,	this	case	study	 therefore	 adopts	 a	 deep-description	 narrative-historical	 approach.	 This	allows	the	linear	processes	of	cause	and	effect	and	the	causal	chains	explaining	the	 institutional	 innovation	 of	 1987-91	 to	 be	 traced,	 and	 the	 agency/structure	interactions	shaping	the	1987-91	institutional	outcomes	to	be	identified.18			 Later	 periods	 of	 Irish	 social	 partnership,	 after	 it	 had	 achieved	 institutional	equilibrium,	are	certainly	amenable	to	study	in	a	framework	based	on	the	norms	of	other	established	systems.	But	that	seems	an	inappropriate	framework	for	its	formative	 period	 in	 1987-91,	 on	which	 this	 study	 focuses.	 Future	 comparative	studies	 might	 usefully	 compare	 this	 formative	 period	 with	 similar	 formative	rather	 than	equilibrium	periods	of	comparable	systems,	such	as	early	post-war	Denmark	 or	 Austria,	 or	 West	 Germany	 in	 1949-54,	 when	 a	 unique	 political	departure,	 combined	with	 the	 dramatic	 contingent	 events	 of	 the	Marshal	 Plan	and	the	Korean	War,	similarly	framed	a	radical	social	partnership	initiative	few	would	dispute	was	a	key	element	in	Germany’s	subsequent	“economic	miracle”.	
	
Other	literature		 Many	 studies	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 Irish	 partnership	 “model”	 focus	 on	 its	later	 period	 as	 a	 “hybrid”,	 “advocacy	 coalition”	 or	 “networked”	 policy	 system.	Many	 examine	 particular	 aspects,	 such	 as	 unions	 or	 industrial	 relations,	 the	autonomy	of	the	economy,	the	wage/tax	bargaining	formula,	the	role	of	the	third	sector,	or	its	institutional	weakness	as	a	policy	vehicle	in	the	2008	crisis.	Even	as	it	 was	 being	 instituted	 in	 1987,	 informed	 opinion	was	 highly	 sceptical.	 Niamh	Hardiman,	 a	 respected	 and	 sympathetic	 analyst,	 was	 just	 one	 of	 many	 who																																																									17		 Baccaro	and	Lim	2007;	on	Ireland	as	a	European	corporatist	“outlier”,	also	Bacarro	and	Simoni	2008	and	Carey	2007;	on	Irish	“exceptionalism”,	Mjøset	1992,	Breen,	Hannan	and	Rottman	1990	18		 On	“thick	description”	historical	case	studies	and	causal-process	observations,	Box-Steffensmeier	2008,	Gerring	2006,	Clifford,	G.	1973;	Mahoney		2010,	Bennett	and	Elman	2006	
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doubted	that	Ireland	had	the	 institutional	prerequisites	 for	 it	 to	succeed.	There	are	few	studies	of	the	politics	behind	its	formation,	only	one	partial,	journalistic	history	of	it	has	ever	appeared,	and	the	motivation	of	those	who	conceived	it	or	the	 strategies	 that	underlay	 it	 are	 seldom	examined.	There	 is	 also	 a	 consensus	that	 it	appeared	in	1987	as	a	crisis	strategy	in	response	to	an	immediate	debt/	unemployment	 problem,	 or,	 less	 benignly,	 as	 a	 cynical	 stratagem	 to	 exploit	 a	crisis	“opportunistically”	for	political	gain,	views	this	thesis	challenges.19			 But	in	most	analyses	from	whatever	perspective,	Irish	social	partnership	has	tended	to	be	stripped	of	its	ideational	history	and	identity.	Some	go	so	far	as	to	dismiss	it	as	merely	a	local	expression	of	a	dominant	policy	approach	at	EC	level,	even	David	Begg,	a	leading	union	figure,	concluding	that	it	was	“not	a	coincidence	that	 it	 followed	 hot	 on	 the	 heels	 of	 Delors’	 1986	 institutionalising	 of	 social	dialogue	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Single	 Market	 construct”.	But	 this	 thesis	 contests	 this,	arguing	 that	 partnership	 was	 primarily	 a	 product	 of	 domestic	 politics	 and	 a	political	 project	 which,	 although	 influenced	 by	 events	 elsewhere,	 preceded	Delors’	 initiatives	 which	 of	 themselves	 were	 limited	 in	 their	 achievement	 and	influence.	 It	was	 for	 this	 very	 reason	 of	 an	 absence	 of	 “models”	 to	 follow	 that	Irish	partnership	assumed	a	form	and	dynamic	unique	to	it.	20			 Influential	economic	studies	of	the	Irish	economic	take-off	already	referred	to	make	little	or	no	reference	at	all	to	social	partnership,	or	only	to	dismiss	it	as	a	coincidental,	peripheral	or	 inconsequential	occurrence.	They	equally	refer	 little	to	 any	 role	 of	 political	 agency	 in	 engineering	 the	 turnaround,	 in	 particular	avoiding	attributing	any	positive	role	in	it	to	Haughey,	although	as	Taoiseach	he	presided	over	what	 this	 thesis	 identifies	as	 the	critical	period	of	policy	change.	The	destruction	of	Haughey’s	previous	 reputation	as	 a	 gifted	and	able	political	innovator	in	the	quasi-judicial	tribunals	of	1996-2006	enabled	this	depoliticised	
																																																										19		On	institutional	innovation,	O’Donnell	2001,	Hardiman	2002,	2006,	Ó	Riain	2004;	“third	sector”,	Kirby	2002,	Adshead	2011;	on	later	institutional	weaknesses,	Avellaneda	and	Hardiman	2010;	“prerequisites	to	succeed”,	Hardimann	1988;	Apart	from	theoretical	studies,	the	only	actual	history	of	social	partnership	to	appear	is	the	journalistic	treatment	by	Hastings	et	al.	2007.	On	the	1986	debt	crisis	precipitating	partnership,	inter	alia	Regan	2012.	On	the	1987	partnership	agreement	as	an	“opportunistic”	political	manoeuvre,	Roche	2009.			20		Begg	2014	
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framing	 of	 the	 Irish	 economic	 “miracle”	 to	 persist	 into	 later	 studies,	 which	remain	wedded	to	functionalist	interpretations.21			 Even	where	 political	 agency	 is	 allowed	 for,	 it	 sometimes	 assumes	 a	 form	of	near	 caricature.	 A	 2009	 study	 by	 leading	 industrial	 relations	 scholar,	 William	Roche,	 dismissed	Haughey	as	 a	 “political	 adventurer”	who	 in	1987,	 “more	 as	 a	political	 opportunist	 than	 a	 monetarist	 or	 corporatist	 visionary”,	 adopted	monetary	adjustment	only	because	expert	economists	pressed	the	need	for	it	on	him,	and	“embraced”	social	partnership	because	a	senior	civil	servant	urged	him	to	do	 so	as	 a	means	 to	quiet	 the	unions.	This	 thesis	 challenges	 this	dismissive,	indeed	contemptuous,	view	of	Haughey’s	role.22			 The	 fact	 is	 that	 Haughey	 staked	 his	 political	 reputation	 and	 career	 on	achieving	an	economic	turnaround	framed	by	a	social	partnership	system.	This	was	 an	 extremely	 high-risk	 political	 strategy,	 as	 the	 dramatic	 processes	 of	ratifying	the	PNR	by	the	partner	organisations	in	1987	demonstrated.	Following	nearly	 a	 year	 of	 intense	 political	 exchange,	 the	 PNR	 barely	 survived	 these	multiple	challenges.	If	even	one	“partner”	had	withdrawn,	as	several	nearly	did,	the	 strategy	 would	 have	 collapsed,	 fatally	 undermining	 Haughey	 politically.	Haughey	 benefitted	 from	 the	 acquiescence	 of	 the	 political	 opposition	 to	 his	monetary	 adjustment,	 but	 that	 accommodation	 did	 not	 extend	 to	 his	 social	partnership	 initiative,	 which	 they,	 including	 the	 Labour	 Party,	 vociferously	rejected.	 Haughey’s	 high-cost	 pursuit	 of	 a	 partnership	 agreement	 –	 while	alternative	strategies	were	constantly	urged	on	him	–	is	thus	a	classic	puzzle,	but	at	least	it	clearly	establishes	how	for	him	the	economic	strategy	and	partnership	structures	he	was	determined	to	establish	formed	an	indivisible	whole.			 Misinterpretation	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 social	 partnership	 is	 compounded	 by	misinterpretations	as	to	its	purpose.	Contemporary	politicians	who	lauded	it,	or	were	involved	in	its	development,	were	wont	to	praise	it	rather	patronisingly	for	having	 delivered	 “social	 peace”,	 thus	 contributing	 something	 to	 economic	success.	 This	 has	 misled	 analysts	 to	 over-emphasise	 its	 purely	 industrial	relations	aspect	as	 the	problem	 it	was	addressing.	Some	who	have	approached	
																																																										21		Kennedy,	K.	1991;	Frank	Barry	ed.	1999;	Nolan,	O'Connell,	and	Whelan,	eds.	2000;	FitzGerald,	J.	1999	and	2000;	Sweeney,	P.	1999;	Hardiman	2000;	Honohan	1999;	Kirby	2002				22	 Roche	2009:	194-5	
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partnership	from	a	critical	theory	aspect	additionally	see	it	as	a	mere	conforming	to	global	“neo-liberal”	capitalism	camouflaged	with	a	veneer	of	an	illusory	social	democracy.	Even	the	nuanced	study	by	Aidan	Regan	postulates	it	as	primarily	an	adaptation	 to	globalisation,	 although	he	 then	 reaches	 some	similar	 conclusions	to	 this	 thesis.	These	notably	 include	 identifying	 the	 centralising	of	 government	power	 in	 the	 Department	 of	 the	 Taoiseach	 under	 Haughey	 to	 achieve	 it,	 and	elevating	the	partnership	policy	body,	the	NESC,	as	a	mechanism	for	formulating	solutions	 to	 dysfunctionalities	 of	 the	 Irish	 electoral	 system	 and	 the	 “silo”-structured	nature	of	public	policy-making.23			 An	 important	 corrective	 to	 apolitical	 analyses	 is	 provided	 by	 Baccaro	 and	Simoni,	who	establish	that	corporatist	systems	–	including	Ireland’s	-	cannot		“simply	be	ascribed	to	the	industrial	relations	system,	but	[are]	an	eminently	political	 phenomenon	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 framed	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	structural	and	strategic	configuration	of	the	political	system	...	Approaching	it	through	the	prism	of	structural	interest	group	or	industrial	relations	theories,	as	has	often	been	done,	may	imply	missing	most	of	the	action.”24			 This	 thesis	 argues	 that	 Irish	 social	 partnership	was	 conceived	 as	 a	 solution	neither	to	industrial	relations	nor	immediate	economic	problems,	but	rather	that	the	window	of	opportunity	these	problems	presented	was	used	to	implement	a	long-developed	strategy	 to	address	a	deeper	compound	problem,	 that	of	 socio-economic	“underdevelopment”,	of	which	repeated	crises	were	only	symptoms.	In	this	it	was	a	highly	political	project,	engineered	by	a	political	alliance	rather	than	a	confluence	of	interest	groups	engaged	in	simple	“collective	bargaining”.			 Roche	and	Hardiman,	among	others,	admit	to	a	significant	pre-history,	but	are	handicapped	by	a	focus	on	industrial	relations	and	interest	group	pressures.	This	thesis	argues	that	the	1987	partnership	formula	had	developed	in	the	minds	of	key	 actors	 over	 several	 decades.	 Many	 involved	 in	 1987	 had	 experienced	Haughey’s	 initial	 attempt	 at	 such	 a	 departure	 in	 1969-70,	 which	 had	 been	derailed	by	the	“arms	crisis”,	itself	an	event	revealing	the	asymmetric	impact	the	Northern	 conflict	 henceforth	 exercised	 on	 many	 aspects	 of	 Irish	 politics,	including	 social	 partnership.	 But	 the	 key	 question	 that	 remains	 is	 why,	 if	 the																																																									23	 Kirby	2009,	2010;	Kirby	and	Murphy	2011;	Allen,	K.	1997,	2000;	Regan	2012	24		 Baccaro	and	Simoni	2006:	19	
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1987	 socio-economic	 formula,	 including	 its	 partnership	 aspect,	 proved	successful	 in	 resolving	 a	 widely	 accepted	 underlying	 problem	 of	underdevelopment,	did	it	take	so	long	to	gain	political	acceptance?25			 The	ideational	aspect	of	social	partnership	and	the	role	of	political	agency	in	initiating	 it	 at	 a	 pivotal	 moment	 of	 crisis	 are	 of	 central	 importance.	 A	 central	contention	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 its	 specific	 goals,	 which	 gave	 it	 its	 common	purpose,	 were	 to	 overcome	 structural	 underdevelopment	 through	 a	 sustained	industrial	 strategy,	 an	 expansive	 and	 transformed	welfare	 state,	monetary	 and	political	 convergence	with	 the	 core	 EU	 integrationist	 powers,	 and	 an	 on-going	process	of	 liberal-social	 reform.	These	aims	were	often	succinctly	expressed	as	the	 achievement	 of	 both	 “full	 employment”	 and	 “average	 European”	 levels	 of	development	and	standards	of	living.	Ireland	should	become	a	“successful	small	open	 European	 economy”	 like	 others.	 Each	 partnership	 agreement	 reiterated	these	primary	goals,	recording	how	much	closer	Ireland	had	come	to	achieving	them	under	the	previous	one.	Some	astute	analysts	have	described	its	core	deal	on	pay	 and	 tax	 as	 the	 “glue”	 of	 the	 system.	But	 this	 thesis	would	 contend	 that	while	 the	 pay/tax/welfare	 aspect	 was	 important	 in	 the	 political	 exchange	 of	social	partnership,	its	real	“glue”	was	that	broader	common	political	aim	uniting	its	players.	Though	beyond	the	bounds	of	this	study,	it	can	be	observed	that	once	the	 core	problem	–	 “underdevelopment”	 –	 had	been	 resolved	 and	 “average	EU	standards”	not	only	achieved	but	surpassed,	i.e.	after	2002,	partnership	began	to	become	incoherent	as	its	common	purpose	was	lost.26			
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									25		 Roche	2009;	Hardiman	2001	26		 “average	European	levels”,	NESC	1986,	1990,	1992;	“each	partnership	agreement”,	Government	of	Ireland,	1987-1998;	pay/tax	“glue”,	O’Donnell,	R.	and	Thomas	1998	
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Chapter	2		
	
The	quest	for	socio-economic	organisation,	
1945-70		
Irish	politics	and	economic	interests	before	1945				 The	“exceptionalism”	of	Ireland’s	social	partnership	system	in	European	terms	arises	in	part	from	the	distinctive	relationship	between	party	politics	and	interest	organisations.	 This	 party/interest	 relationship	 differed	 from	 then	 mainstream	West	European	 left/right	patterns	and	was	also	distinct	 in	 that	 the	relationship	took	shape	in	its	essential	features	even	before	the	establishment	of	the	state.	An	extensive	 literature	 has	 appeared	 seeking	 to	 account	 for	 these	 party/interest	relations	and	the	consequent	party	political	dynamic	in	Ireland.1		 The	Irish	Parliamentary	Party	(IPP),	focused	on	the	primary	Home	Rule	issue,	combining	diverse	interests	across	a	left/right	spectrum,	as	did	the	rival	Unionist	Party,	with	particular	MPs	and	factions	identified	with	“conservative”	or	“liberal”	approaches	to	land,	housing,	business,	social	or	labour	policy.	The	Unionist	Party	predominated	 in	 the	 North	 East	 and	 the	 IPP	 elsewhere.	 No	 unified,	 cohesive	bourgeois	party	emerged	in	the	area	of	IPP	dominance,	as	the	relatively	small	but	politically	powerful	banking,	 large-farming	and	big-business	elites	were	mostly	unionist	 and	 remained	 aloof	 from	 it,	 while	 rising	 Catholic	 business,	 farming,	trading,	professional	and	 labour	groups	 formed	 its	backbone.	The	 land	reforms	and	modernisation/democratisation	 of	 the	 1890s	 Balfour	 era	 created	 a	 small-property	owning	democracy,	with	 the	 introduction	of	elected	 local	government	generating	interest	organisations	that	would	later	shape	the	Free	State.			 An	evolution	of	the	factions	within	the	Home	Rule	and	Unionist	blocks	into	a	conservative/liberal	 or	 conservative/labour	 party	 divide,	 as	many	 expected	 to	follow	Home	Rule,	failed	to	materialise,	apart	from	in	areas	of	Munster	in	1910-14,	 as	 the	 Home	 Rule	 Crisis,	 partition	 and	 the	 Great	 War	 saw	 Unionism	consolidate	in	the	North	and	led	to	the	eclipse	elsewhere	of	the	IPP	by	Sinn	Féin																																																											1		 Among	the	most	notable,	in	a	large	literature,	being	Mair	1979,	1992;	Chubb	1982;	McGraw	and	O’Malley	2018;	Dunphy	1995;	Puirséil	2007,	2018;	Gallagher	1985;	Gallagher	and	Marsh	2004;	Girvin	and	Murphy	2005;	Murphy,	G.,	2009		
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on	what	the	Lord	Lieutenant	identified	in	1917	as	the	“singularly	frank	issue	of	self-Government	within	the	Empire	versus	an	Independent	Irish	Republic”.2				 Sinn	Féin	 itself	split	 in	1922	over	the	Treaty	and	became	separate	parties	 in	the	ensuing	conflict.	The	split	had	little	socio-economic	content,	again	being	on	a	“singularly	frank	issue”,	of	Dominion	Home	Rule	or	a	“sovereign	Republic”.	Anti-Treaty	Republicanism	predominated	where	Sinn	Féin	had	been	strongest.	But	in	the	 course	 of	 the	 Treaty	war,	 the	 party	 division	 increasingly	 assumed	 a	 socio-economic	form.	As	well	as	the	IRB	element	of	the	IRA	loyal	to	Collins,	former	IPP	“notable”	circles,	the	churches,	and	business	and	unionist	interests	rallied	to	the	Treaty	party,	Cumann	na	nGaedhal,	as	a	force	for	order	or	 lesser	of	two	“evils”.	The	 Catholic	 Church	 declared	 the	 Free	 State	 the	 “constitutionally	 established	authority”	 and	 excommunicated	 Republicans,	 while	 southern	 Unionists	supported	 it	 as	 preventing	 “anarchy”	 and	 the	Treaty	 as	 at	 least	 enabling	 them	“remain	Britons”.3			 Following	the	Republican	defeat,	Cumann	na	nGaedhal	consolidated	 its	base,	restoring	pre-conflict	judicial	and	other	institutions	while	cleaving	to	orthodoxy	on	social	and	economic	questions.	It	moved	from	Collins’s	view	of	the	Treaty	as	a	temporary	 “stepping	 stone”	 to	O’Higgins’	 view	of	 it	 as	 a	 settled	 framework	 for	sovereignty.	Apart	from	some	land	reform	and	industrial	intervention	measures,	notably	the	ESB,	it	defended	the	existing	socio-economic	order.	Republicans,	on	the	 other	 hand,	 sought	 the	 replacement	 of	 the	 “Treaty	 State”	 by	 a	 Republic,	appealing	 to	 small-holders,	 the	 “landless”,	 potential	 entrepreneurs	 and	 urban	workers	 with	 an	 alternative	 “Republican”	 platform	 of	 state	 interventionism,	protectionist	 industrialisation	 and	 land,	 labour	 and	 welfare	 reform.	 A	 party	divide	emerged,	of	orthodoxy	versus	socio-economic	radicalism.	While	impatient	radicals	 on	 the	 Fianna	 Fáil	 side	 tended	 to	 defect	 to	 the	 left,	 to	 the	 Republican	Congress,	Clann	na	Poblachta,	the	IRA	or	even	communism,	defections	from	Fine	Gael	tended	to	be	to	the	right,	to	authoritarian	paramilitarism	and	even	fascism.4			 To	 contend	 that	 Irish	 politics	was	 dominated	 thereafter	 by	 two	 “competing	versions	of	nationalism”	with	an	“absence”	of	“class	politics”	is	thus	a	gross	over-																																																										2		 Wimbourne’s	report	to	Cabinet,	14/07/17,	in	MacLysaght	1978			3		 “remain	Britons”,	Church	of	Ireland	Gazette	09/12/21			4		 Regan,	J.	1999;	O’Connor,	E.	2004;	Manning,	M.	1970	
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simplification,	a	reductio	ad	absurdum	of	governments	since	independence	as	an	illusory,	non-ideological	alternation	between	“tweedledum	and	tweedledee”.	The	reality	was	a	clear	socio-economic	division	which,	 if	not	along	straight-forward	left/right	lines,	represented	rival	constitutional/socio-economic	combinations.5			 Interest	 groups	 developed	 alongside	 this	 party	 reconfiguration.	 Business,	professional	and	industrial	interests	had	consolidated	organisationally	since	the	1890s	 in	 their	 modern	 form,	 in	 chambers	 of	 commerce,	 employer	 federations	and	professional	associations.	Given	the	division	in	such	circles	over	Home	Rule,	they	 remained	 largely	 neutral	 during	 1919-21	 conflict,	 though	 tending	 to	 a	conservative	unionism.	Their	substantial	base,	nevertheless,	was	reflected	in	the	support	 of	 up	 to	 twenty	 per	 cent	 achieved	 by	 “ratepayer”	 and	 “independent”	candidates	 in	 the	 1920	 urban	 district	 elections	 against	 the	 80	 per	 cent	nationalist/republican	 block.	 In	 1922	 and	 1927,	 ratepayer	 and	 farmers’	 party	candidates	won	more	seats	than	Labour,	though	were	later	absorbed	by	Cumann	na	nGaedhal	in	response	to	the	perceived	“communist”	threat	of	Fianna	Fáil.				 The	conservative	nature	of	Cumann	na	nGaedhal	–	and	Fine	Gael	into	which	it	later	 evolved	 –	was	 due	 to	 its	 dominance	 by	 these	 strands,	whether	 ex-IPP	 or	unionist.	But	its	Fenian-Republican	origins	in	the	IRB	and	support	among	Great	War	 and	 Civil	 War-era	 National	 Army	 veterans	 limited	 its	 purely	 bourgeois	character.	While	 generally	 hostile	 to	 unions	 –	 employing	 brute	 force	 to	 break	them	on	the	Shannon	Scheme	in	the	1920s	-	Cumann	na	nGaedhal	in	government	nevertheless	 accepted	 and	 negotiated	 with	 unions	 in	 the	 pubic	 services,	developed	arbitration	systems	 for	resolving	disputes	and	even	 legalised	a	right	to	strike	 in	the	post	office	when	this	was	still	outlawed	in	Britain.	Though	Fine	Gael	would	never	have	more	than	a	marginal	presence	in	the	unions,	it	retained	the	loyalty	of	a	not	insignificant	working	class	following.		 Formal	trade	unionism	in	 its	modern	sense	also	took	shape	in	Ireland	in	the	late	19th	century,	in	its	British	form,	and	within	a	British	parent	structure,	though	confined	to	larger	towns	and	cities,	especially	Belfast,	or	to	networks	such	as	the	railways,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 urban	 Ireland	 accounted	 for	 less	 than	 a	 fifth	 of	 the	population.	 The	 historical	 attention	 trade	 unionism	 attracts	 exaggerates	 its																																																											5		 “competing	nationalisms”,	Breen	et	al	1990,	Ferriter	2005,	Begg	2016;	“tweedledum/tweedledee”,	recent	
Irish	Times	commentaries	by	Ferriter	and	O’Toole	
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significance	at	the	time.	The	1913	Dublin	conflict	shocked	public	opinion,	which,	outside	the	North	East,	had	hitherto	regarded	“class	conflict”	as	a	minor	aspect	of	political	life,	especially	compared	to	the	land	struggles.			 General,	 or	 so-called	 “unskilled”,	 labour	 only	 organised	 after	 1900	 again	largely	through	British	unions	until	the	emergence	in	1909	of	the	initially	small	but	 militant	 Irish	 Transport	 &	 General	Workers	 Union	 (ITGWU),	 which	 broke	from	 the	 British-oriented	 structure	 on	 a	 nationalist	 basis.	 The	 largest	 labour	organisation	 in	 nationalist	 Ireland	 was	 in	 fact	 outside	 the	 formal	 trade	 union	fold.	 This	 was	 the	 Land	 and	 Labour	 Association	 (LLA)	 which,	 beginning	 in	Munster	 and	with	 links	 to	 both	 left-wing	 IPP	 circles	 and	 Fenianism,	 organised	agricultural	and	other	labourers	in	rural	Ireland	–	the	largest	component	of	the	working	 class	 –	 to	 agitate	 for	 housing,	 direct	 council	 employment	 and	plots	 of	land	for	self-sufficiency	to	survive	times	of	under-employment.	From	1914,	and	particularly	 during	1919-21,	 the	 ITGWU	was	 transformed	 as	 it	 absorbed	 these	local	 groups,	 expanding	 from	 a	 hitherto	 urban	 force	 of	 about	 15,000	 into	 a	national	and	predominantly	republican	rural	one	of	over	120,000.6			 ITGWU	members	were	prominent	in	the	1916	Rising	and	the	ensuing	conflict,	providing	many	leading	Sinn	Féin	and	Republican	Labour	activists	and	later	IRA	volunteers.	 Its	 influence	was	apparent	 in	 the	 labour-friendly	programme	of	 the	First	Dáil	–	later	disparaged	by	O’Higgins	-	and	in	the	underground	Department	of	Labour	which,	with	Constance	Markievicz	as	Minister,	ran	industrial	courts	to	resolve	disputes	and	oversee	official	recognition	of	unions	and	“direct	labour”	in	republican	local	authorities.	 ITGWU	leader	William	O’Brien	described	his	union	as	 “the	 industrial	 wing	 of	 the	 national	 movement”.	 In	 addition,	 IRB	 activists,	commanded	 by	 Collins,	 organised	 the	 separation	 of	 craft	 and	 public	 service	unions	from	British	parent	associations.	The	hitherto	staid	all-island	Irish	Trade	Union	Congress	(ITUC),	which	was	simultaneously	the	Labour	Party,	experienced	the	rise	of	this	republican	labour	movement	as	an	institutional	usurpation.7			 The	ITGWU’s	Republicanism	differed	both	from	mainstream	Sinn	Féin	and	the	ITUC	 in	 espousing	 James	 Connolly’s	 “Workers’	 Republic”,	 i.e.	 a	 republic	 in	 the	Sinn	Féin	sense,	but	with	socialist	institutions.	It	supported	and	helped	build	the																																																											6		 Bradley	1988;	O’Connor,	E.	2011;	Lane	1993;	Devine	2017			7		 On	labour	in	the	national	struggle,	Cody	et	al.	1986;	O’Brien,	W.	1969;	Yeates	2008,	2014,	Mitchell	1974	
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Labour	Party	as	a	vehicle	for	this,	but	in	both	party	and	ITUC	often	clashed	with	the	 more	 British-socialist	 oriented	 majority	 outlook.	 An	 added	 division	 in	 the	1920s	 was	 the	Workers	 Union	 (WUI),	 founded	 by	 Jim	 Larkin	 as	 a	 communist	breakaway	and	temporarily	displacing	the	ITGWU	in	Dublin,.	Tensions	between	unions	 shaped	 by	 British	 traditions	 and	 republican	 unions	 such	 the	 ITGWU	formed	a	constant	 fault-line	that	would	continue	to	characterise	 the	movement	down	to	the	social	partnership	era.8			 The	 Labour	 Party	 was	 established	 by	 the	 ITUC	 in	 1912	 to	 represent	 the	“labour	 interest”	 both	 in	 local	 government	 and	 in	 the	 anticipated	 Home	 Rule	parliament.	 But	 the	 extent	 of	 labour	 movement	 involvement	 with	 Sinn	 Féin	limited	 its	 scope	while	 partition,	which	 removed	 its	major	Northern	 industrial	base,	further	handicapped	it.	It	struggled	to	establish	itself	against	republicanism	as	 the	 country’s	 specifically	 “social	 democratic”	 strand.	 Occasionally,	 as	 on	 an	“anti-militarist”	platform	during	the	Civil	War,	 it	would	enjoy	what	would	 later	be	called	a	“Spring	Tide”	in	protest	at	the	misdeeds	of	the	two	main	parties,	but	such	peaks	lacked	an	organisational	basis	and	proved	transitory.			 Nevertheless,	as	long	as	Republicans	were	excluded	from	the	Dáil,	the	Cumann	na	nGaedhal/Labour	divide	assumed	a	 conservative/labour	 form.	Although	 the	still	abstentionist	Sinn	Féin	and	then	Fianna	Fáil	assiduously	cultivated	an	urban	base,	in	the	June	1927	election	Labour	increased	its	14	seats	won	in	1923	to	22.	But	the	illusory	quality	of	this	became	apparent	after	Fianna	Fáil	entered	the	Dáil	in	 1927,	 restoring	 a	 central	 Republican/neo-Redmondite	 conflict	 narrative.	 In	addition,	 in	 a	 concerted	 campaign	 managed	 by	 Lemass,	 Fianna	 Fáil	 targeted	Labour’s	vote,	especially	in	Dublin,	accusing	Labour	of	ambiguity	on	the	“national	question”	and	urging	trade	unionists	to	see	Fianna	Fáil	as	their	true	champions.	Labour	responded	by	attacking	Fianna	Fáil	as	insincere	in	its	social	policies	and	of	being	in	an	“unholy	alliance”	with	“the	communists”.	It	also	refused	a	coalition	offer	from	de	Valera	and	would	watch	from	the	side-lines	as	he	consolidated	his	government	in	part	on	the	basis	of	Labour-type	policies.9		
																																																										8		 O’Connor,	E.	2015				9		 In	general	Dunphy	1995,	Puirséil	2007;	Lemass	campaign,	‘Irish	Labour	Party	Stands	for	Imperialism’,	The	
Nation	02/04/27	and,	on	trade	unionists,	‘A	New	Political	Party?’	The	Nation,	03/08/29;	Labour	response,	“unholy	alliance”	and	“Communists	and	Fianna	Fáil	Combine’,	The	Irishman	12/04/30	
	 35	
	 Protectionism	in	the	1930s	won	for	Fianna	Fáil	an	enduring	base	among	new	industrialists.	 A	 new	 managerial	 and	 entrepreneurial	 class	 emerging	 in	 the	protected	private	 and	 state	 industries	 led	 to	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 Federation	 of	Irish	Manufacturers	(FIM),	which	developed	a	close	relationship	with	the	State.	The	 simultaneous	 expansion	 of	 welfare,	 public	 housing	 and	 industrial	employment	quickly	also	consolidated	the	party’s	working	class	base.		 Fianna	Fáil’s	working	class	 support	would	prove	conditional	 and	volatile,	 as	when	in	1943,	the	late	1940s	and	again	in	the	1980s,	a	significant	proportion	of	it,	discontented	with	government	social	policy,	switched	in	temporary	protest	to	Labour	 or	 left-republican	 parties.	 Fianna	 Fáil	 therefore	 cultivated	 its	 relations	with	the	republican	wing	of	the	trade	unions.	In	the	1930s,	with	ITGWU	support,	it	considered	legislating	to	end	British-based	unions,	though	decided	against	this	to	 avoid	 sparking	 a	 Dublin	 working	 class	 revolt	 and	 also	 for	 wider	 political	reasons.	 Lemass	 compromised,	 licensing	 such	 unions	 once	 they	 credibly	separated	out	their	“Irish	regions”	with	local	headquarters	and	leaderships.10		 Trade	 unions	 enjoyed	 a	 significant	 revival	 in	 the	 de	 Valera	 period,	 growing	from	a	low	of	60,000	ITUC-affiliated	members	in	1929	–	though	that	number	is	likely	 exaggerated	 -	 to	over	110,000	by	1944.	By	1960,	320,000	workers	were	organised,	 or	55	per	 cent	of	 the	employed	workforce,	 a	 rate	high	by	European	standards.	The	movement	retained	 its	 incongruous	32-county	structure	as	well	as	including	“British-based”	unions	in	the	Republic,	and	split	 in	1944	along	this	British/Irish,	 Labour/Nationalist	 fault-line	 into	 the	 ITUC	 and	 CIU	 (Congress	 of	Irish	Unions).	The	ITUC	retained	most	“Irish	regions”	of	British	unions	and	small,	sectional	and	craft	unions,	as	well	as	Larkin’s	WUI,	while	the	CIU	comprised	the	ITGWU	 and	 nationalist-oriented	 groups.	 This	 division	 would	 continue	 in	subdued	but	persistent	form	within	the	re-unified	ICTU,	formed	in	1959.11		 The	organisations	of	business	and	employers	–	an	important	distinction	–	also	changed	under	 protectionism.	Different	 strands	 of	 business	 remained	 separate	until	 the	 1970s.	 While	 elite	 commercial	 circles,	 still	 largely	 Anglo-Irish,	continued	to	relate	closely	to	similar	British	circles,	manufacturing	developed	a																																																									10		 On	FF	and	Labour,	Dunphy	1995,	Púirséal	2018;	on	“British	unions”	conflict,	McCarthy,	C.	1977		11		 Membership,	Nevin	ed.	1994:	372-73;	“exaggerated”	–	against	ITGWU’s	“official”	20,000	members	in	1931,	its	leader	William	O’Brien	recorded	an	actual	12,677	in	his	diary	–	Morrisey	2007:	278;	“British	unions”	conflict,	McCarthy,	C.	1977:	118-34;	229-90	
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dependency	on	the	state.	The	FIM,	a	nationally	oriented	group	formed	to	 lobby	the	 Department	 of	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 for	 licenses	 and	 protectionist	advantage,	arose	as	a	primary	lobby	and	its	close	relationship	with	government	would	 endure.	 Employers,	 organised	 separately	 as	 employers	 in	 response	 to	union	 pressures,	 tended	 to	 associate	 more	 with	 Fine	 Gael.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	national-level	 industrial	 relations	 institutions,	 numerous	 industry-specific	employer	groups	formed	to	deal	with	the	reviving	unions,	the	largest	in	sectors	such	 as	 provisioning,	manufacturing	 and	 construction.	 These	 disparate	 groups	coalesced	in	the	Federated	Union	of	Employers	(FUE)	from	1942.12		 The	 de	 Valera	 governments,	 through	 Lemass,	 conferred	 regularly	with	 both	industrialist	and	union	 interests	and	established	a	number	of	 joint	state	bodies	with	 them.	 Fianna	 Fáil	 confronted	 union	 power	 only	 once	when,	 under	 tightly	disciplined	wartime	conditions,	it	faced	a	revolt	of	Dublin	labour	over	its	wages	“standstill”	order	of	1941.	This	cost	it	dearly	in	the	1943	election,	a	lesson	well	learned	and	not	 repeated.	Lemass	 is	 reported	 to	have	quipped	at	 the	 time	 that	Labour,	in	failing	to	capitalise	on	the	revolt,	had	missed	a	major	opportunity.13			
Fits	and	starts:	“tripartitism”	1945-56	 		 With	economic	dirigisme,	the	welfare	state	and	tripartitism	de	rigeur	in	Allied	states	and	their	planning	for	post-war	Europe,	de	Valera	and	Lemass	discussed	a	similar	course	for	Ireland.	Even	before	the	war,	they	had	taken	a	keen	interest	in	“tripartitism”	 as	 initiated	by	 Irishman	Edward	Phelan	 at	 the	 ILO	 in	Geneva,	 an	institution	with	which	Irish	governments	engaged	from	its	foundation.	When	the	Beveridge	Plan	–	the	blueprint	for	the	post-war	British	welfare	state	-	appeared	in	 1942,	 Irish	 government	 circles	 studied	 it	with	 a	 view	 to	 a	 similar	 initiative.	Allied	 plans	 for	 a	 stimulus	 programme	 to	 rebuild	 a	 shattered	 Europe	 –	 the	European	Recovery	Programme	(ERP)	–	combined	aspects	of	the	American	“New	Deal”,	British	wartime	industrial	planning	and	European	“corporatist”	traditions,	in	 part,	 as	 with	 the	 ILO,	 to	 counter	 the	 attractions	 of	 Soviet	 communism.	 De	Valera’s	 alleged	 “isolationism”	has	been	much	exaggerated,	 as	he	had	been	 the																																																									12		 On	union	development,	McCarthy	C.	1977,	and	business/employers	Chubb	1992,	Hardiman	1988	13		 On	Fianna	Fáil	and	business/labour	interests,	Murphy,	G.	2005,	2009	and	Evans	2011:	207;	Lemass	quoted	in	McCarthy,	C.	1977:	246	
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leading	advocate	of	collective	security	in	the	League	of	Nations	as	President	of	its	General	 Assembly.	 It	 was	 the	 League’s	 refusal,	 at	 great	 power	 insistence	 and	against	 his	 urgings,	 to	 intervene	 against	 Japanese	 and	 Italian	 aggression	 that	determined	him	to	ensure	Irish	neutrality	in	the	1939	war.		Before	WW2	ended,	he	 again	 orientated	 Irish	 policy	 to	 connect	 with	 the	 new	 post-war	 order,	preparing	to	apply	for	membership	of	the	UN	despite	distrusting	its	great-power	domination.	 The	 government	 also	 sought	 engagement	 with	 the	 ERP,	 Lemass	urging	that	“we	make	certain	we	participate	[in	it]	when	it	comes”.14			 Lemass	 endorsed	 the	 tripartite	 aspect	 of	 ERP	 as	 an	 institutional	 departure	Ireland	should	embrace,	telling	the	ITUC	in	1945,	before	it	split,	the	“increasingly	important	part”	he	saw	unions	playing	in	“national	life”	in	“a	democratic	state”,		“not	merely	as	a	guardian	of	the	workers’	interests,	but	as	an	essential	part	of	the	machinery	of	industrial	organisation,	accepting	the	responsibilities	which	relate	 to	 its	 real	 power,	 and	 proceeding	 from	 the	 stage	 of	 negotiating	particular	agreements	with	private	employers	to	…	formulating	and	carrying	into	effect	a	general	policy	for	the	furtherance	of	the	long-term	interests	of	the	workers	as	a	class”.15			 Tripartitism	was	not	foreign	to	Irish	industrial	practice,	with	inherited	wage-setting	 structures	 surviving	 since	 the	 1920s	 through	 a	 government	 labour	inspectorate,	wages	boards	in	some	industries	and	the	arbitration	system	in	the	public	 service,	 but	 Lemass,	 who	 initiated	 Ireland’s	 ERP	 application,	 also	embraced	 its	 tripartite	 agenda.	 He	 viewed	 his	 1946	 Industrial	 Relations	 Act	establishing	 the	 Labour	 Court	 as	 just	 the	 first	 stage	 towards	 such	 a	 system.	 A	leading	 left-wing	 trade	unionist	 called	 it	 the	 “most	 revolutionary	departure”	 in	Irish	industrial	relations	history,	as	it	was	not	just	a	court	to	resolve	disputes,	but	established	“Joint	Labour	Committees”	(JLCs)	of	employer	and	union	nominees,	with	 an	 “independent”	 chair,	 to	 set	 wages	 across	 sectors,	 legally	 enforceable	through	 “Employment	 Regulation	 Orders”	 (EROs).	 Lemass	 had	 envisaged	statutory	powers	for	the	Court	itself,	but,	apart	from	the	EROs,	this	was	opposed	by	both	business	and	unions	 jealous	to	defend	“voluntarist”	bargaining	and	the																																																									14		 On	Lemass	and	Phelan,	preface	and	introduction	to	ILO	2019;	on	Irish	state	and	Beveridge,	Carey	2007,	McCashin	2004;	political	strategy	of	ERP,	Angster	1999;	de	Valera	and	neutrality,	McCullagh	2018;	de	Valera	and	UN/Bretton	Woods,	Dorr	N.	2010;	Lemass	quote	in	Garvin	2004:	85	15		 McCarthy,	C.	1977:	572	
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unions	 intent	on	ensuring	an	 “abstention	of	 the	 law”,	which,	with	 considerable	justification,	they	regarded	as	inherently	class-biased.16		 Lemass	 proposed	 incorporating	 price-and-incomes	 setting,	 economic	 policy	making	 and	 “Joint	Development	 Councils”	 in	 industry,	 using	 the	 price	 surge	 of	the	 post-war	 imports	 boom	 and	 revival	 of	 wage	 bargaining	 following	 the	removal	 of	 wartime	 controls	 to	 initiate	 national	 talks	 on	 wage/price	management.	This	 led	to	the	first	ever	national	agreement	on	broad	“Principles	to	be	Observed	in	the	Negotiations	for	the	Adjustment	of	Wages”.	On	civil	service	advice,	 the	 initial	 1948	 application	 to	 ERP	 made	 no	 reference	 to	 a	 tripartite	approach,	but	when	the	unions	protested	Lemass	incorporated	them.17			 Under	the	Inter-Party	government	this	nascent	tripartite	wage/policy	system	lapsed,	 only	 the	 Labour	 Court	 and	 the	 ERP	 involvement	 surviving.	 Fine	 Gael,	whose	dalliance	with	“corporatism”	in	the	1930s	had	been	solely	with	its	fascist	form,	 was	 hostile	 to	 union	 involvement	 in	 policy	 as	 an	 intrusion	 into	 state	authority.	Labour,	despite	many	of	 its	TDs	being	union	officials,	had	broken	 its	formal	 link	 with	 ITUC	 in	 1930	 specifically	 to	 escape	 “union	 control”	 and	 was	equally	unenthused	by	tripartitism,	focusing	in	government	on	expanding	social	provision.	The	 ITGWU-linked	“National	Labour”	TDs,	who	had	broken	 from	the	Labour	Party	in	1944,	also	did	not	revive	the	idea,	being	hostile	to	the	ITUC	and	preferring	a	return	to	Fianna	Fáil	government.	Government	did	however	act	on	a	proposal	from	ITUC	leader	and	Labour	TD	Jim	Larkin	jnr.,	to	found	the	IDA.18			 Despite	 the	 Inter-Party	 government’s	 disinterest,	 Larkin,	 son	 of	 the	 1913	Lock-out	 leader,	 promoted	 tripartitism	 as	 a	 central	 ITUC	 strategy.	 A	 former	communist,	 he	 was	 unusually	 well	 versed	 in	 the	 debates	 of	 the	 international	labour	movement	and	in	1949	used	his	speech	as	ITUC	President	to	advocate	an	economy-wide	tripartite	system.	He	urged	that	unions	move	beyond	traditional	bargaining	 to	 negotiated	 “productivity”-driven	 industrial	 expansion	 and	managed	 incomes	 growth	 within	 the	 parameters	 of	 a	 planned	 economy,																																																									16		 “radical	departure”	in	Int.	John	Swift;	conflict	over	Labour	Court,	CIU	Central	Council	mtgs.,	24.09-26.11.48,	NAI:	CIU	and	CIU	AC	1946;	“abstention	of	the	law”	Hardiman	1984:	84	17	 Lemass	plans,	Hardiman	1988:	45,	Girvin	1994:	123;	“import-driven	boom”	FitzGerald	1968:	7-8;	‘Principles	to	be	Observed	…’,	D/I&C	1948;	“permanent	institution”	O’Brien,	J.	1981:	9;	incorporation	of	unions,	CIU	NC	mtgs.	24.09-26.11.48,	NAI:	CIU	18		 Labour/ITUC	separation	1930,	constituency	focus,	and	;	“National	Labour”,	Mitchell	1974,	Puirséal	2007	and	McCarthy,	C.	1977;	Larkin	and	IDA,	O’Riordan	2001	
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participation	in	company	management,	and	tripartite	national	economic	policy-setting	to	drive	a	growth-oriented	economy	to	provide	higher	quality	work	and	wages.	 He	 proposed	 that	 the	 ITUC	 adopt	 a	 strategy	 on	 wages	 based	 on	 a	resources/expenditure/productivity	 formula,	 anticipating	 the	 later	 central	 idea	of	 social	 partnership,	 and	 defended	 Irish	 involvement	 in	 the	 ERP	 against	 left-wing	critics	as	a	“development	of	collective	effort	completely	contrary	to	the	very	basis	of	capitalism”.	His	ideas	formed	the	strategic	perspective	of	the	movement	for	 those	 leadership	 circles	 that	 thought	 beyond	 immediate	 wage	 conflict,	 his	speech,	unusually,	being	published	and	widely	disseminated	in	the	movement	as	an	authoritative	statement	of	union	strategy.19			 There	 was	 otherwise	 considerable	 policy	 continuity	 between	 governments.	The	 Inter-Party	 government	 was	 no	 less	 internationalist	 than	 its	 Fianna	 Fáil	predecessor,	 joining	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 where	 Seán	 MacBride	 was	instrumental	 in	 shaping	 the	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	 and	also	 considered	NATO	membership.	 It	 participated	 in	 ERP,	which,	 through	 the	OEEC,	 drove	 an	upgrading	 of	 national	 industrial	 planning,	 though	 given	 the	 innovations	 of	 the	1930s-40s	 period	 Bielenberg’s	 contention	 that	 this	 represented	 “in	 some	respects	 …	 the	 first	 exercise	 by	 an	 Irish	 government	 in	 economic	 planning”,	seems	 exaggerated.	 De	 Valera	 returned	 to	 power	 in	 1951,	 and	 throughout	 the	early	 1950s	 the	 ERP	 brought	 government	 officials,	 employers	 and	 workers	together	with	American	and	European	counterparts	 through	exchange	visits	as	well	 as	 industrial	modernisation	 projects	 at	 home,	 which	 saw	 the	 founding	 of	some	enduring	tripartite	bodies	such	as	the	IPA,	IPC	and	IIRS.20		 De	 Valera	 also	 revived	 Fianna	 Fáil’s	 tripartite	 plans,	 encouraging	 Lemass	against	 conservative	 opponents	 in	 cabinet	 to	 seek	 an	 “Agreement	 on	 Wages	Policy”	for	1952-54,	which	set	parameters	for	wage	bargaining	rather	than	actual	wage	 rates,	 and	 in	 reviving	 Lemass’s	 1947	 proposals	 for	 sectoral	 Industrial	Councils.	But	these	initiatives	predictably	lapsed	when	Fianna	Fáil	lost	power	to	
																																																								19		 “Young	Jim”,	Desmond	2009:	273-83;	speech	ITUC	1949,	on	impact	O’Riordan	2001	20		 MacBride	and	ECHR	and	NATO,	Keane	2007;	“first	exercise”,	Bielenberg	and	Ryan	2013:	17;	implementation	of	ERP,	Murray	2009		
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a	new	Inter-Party	Government	in	1953,	which	returned	to	orthodox	deflationary	measures	to	counter	the	deepening	economic	recession.21	
	
Lemass’s	economic	institutionalism	1957-63		 The	 road	 to	 “opening”	 the	 economy	 is	 much	 debated.	 A	 “world	 economy”	hardly	 existed	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 OECD,	 EEC	 and	 EFTA	 in	 1957-58,	with	the	only	option	for	“internationalisation”	the	politically	unacceptable	one	of	re-integration	with	the	British	economy.	Europe	slowly	re-emerged	through	the	ERP	and	Korean	War	boom,	and	Irish	policy	makers	engaged	with	both	the	OEEC	and	 OECD,	 aligning	 economic	 policy	 with	 their	 prescriptions.	 The	 key	 dispute	was	not	over	whether	but	how	to	effect	an	opening	to	free	trade.	This	was	given	added	urgency	by	the	severity	of	the	Irish	depression	that	followed	the	European	downturn	 on	 the	 ending	 of	 the	 Korean	 War,	 with	 record	 unemployment	provoking	social	unrest.	The	deepening	crisis	did	not	cause	the	change	of	policy	direction,	but	concentrated	minds	on	its	urgency.22		 In	1956	the	coalition’s	“Capital	Investment	Programme	Committee”	proposed	a	 gradual	 opening	 combined	with	 supports	 for	 export-led	 industrial	 expansion	and	 inward	 investment.	 But	 such	 ideas	 remained	 theoretical	 as	 government	wrestled	 with	 the	 monetary	 and	 balance-of-payments	 crisis	 through	contractionary	 budgets.	 Lemass	 in	 opposition	 followed	 the	 international	economic	debate,	having	his	son-in-law,	Charles	Haughey,	purchase	books	on	it	for	 him	 he	 had	 seen	 reviewed	 in	 the	 press.	 When	 the	 EEC/EFTA	 opportunity	arose	 in	1957/58,	 it	was	pursued	vigorously	by	government	with	 little	dissent	internally	or	from	the	opposition.	Lemass	in	his	economic	planning	in	opposition	envisaged	tripartite	structures,	welcoming	an	industrial	plan	proposed	by	ITUC	-	drafted	largely	by	Larkin	and	Donal	Nevin	-	which	proposed	such	a	framework.23	
																																																								21		 “Agreement	…”,	D/I&C	1952;	“resurrect”,	Carey	2008;	“Development	Councils”	CIU	Central	Council	mtg.,	28/03/52,	NAI:	CIU;		22		 On	the	balance-of-payments	crisis,	FitzGerald	1968:	8-9;	1950s	“discourse”	and	“key	dispute”,	McCarthy,	J.	1990:	40,	FitzGerald,	G.	1968:	54-5,	Finn	2012,	Fanning	1990,	Daly,	M.	and	Litton	1997,	and	Bielenberg	and	Ryan	2013;	on	1950s	social	protests,	Kilmurray	1987	23		 Haughey	books,	McCarthy,	John,	1990:	67;	Lemass-union	talks,	PUTUO	1956,	Desmond	2009:	273-83;	on	Larkin/Nevin	role,	PUTUO	EC	mtg.	14.10.1957,	NAI:	PUTUO,	and	McCarthy,	J.F.:	69;	Lemass’s	response	to	union	proposals,	PUTUO	EC	mtgs.1956	passim;	Horgan	1997:	174	
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	 On	 Fianna	 Fáil’s	 return	 to	 power	 in	 1957	 on	 a	 programme	 of	 industrial	expansion,	Lemass	had	Department	of	Finance	 secretary	T.K.	Whitaker	publish	his	 memo,	 ‘Economic	 Development’.	 This	 synopsised	 the	 “open	 economy”	discourse,	 though	 assumed	 an	 agriculture-driven	 growth	 and	 contained	 many	proposals	government	never	accepted,	such	as	withdrawing	from	“unproductive	investment”	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 housing	 and	 health	 to	 fund	 industrial	 expansion.	Lemass	 had	 government	 endorse	 it,	 though	 suggested	 publication	 under	Whitaker’s	 name	 to	 “get	 its	 acceptance	 over	 political	 boundaries”.	 He	simultaneously	 again	 concluded	 a	 “Joint	 Agreement	 on	 Guiding	 Principles	relating	 to	Wages	 Claims	 and	 the	 Present	 Economic	 Situation”	with	 employers	and	the	joint	ITUC-CIU	body,	PUOTO,	providing	for	wage	development	in	1957-59	within	an	overall	expenditure/productivity	assessment	of	the	economy.24			 Civil	service	planning	for	the	Programme	for	Economic	Expansion,	launched	by	Lemass	 as	Taoiseach	 in	1959,	 did	not	 include	 interest	 group	 involvement.	 It	 is	often	claimed,	by	somewhat	sleight	of	hand,	that	Whitaker	initiated	the	tripartite	structures	that	followed,	but	his	original	memo	foresaw	only	an	advisory	council	of	officials,	agency	leaders,	industrialists	and	economic	“experts”.	It	was	Lemass,	who	had	maintained	contact	with	union	leaders	and	encouraged	the	formation	of	a	 united	 ICTU,	 who	 sought	 out	 their	 views	 on	 structures	 to	 accompany	 the	Second	 Programme,	 specifically	 “the	 best	 means	 of	 securing	 the	 maximum	degree	 of	 co-operation	 between	 the	 various	 interests	 concerned	 with	 the	progress	of	 the	National	economy”.	 ICTU	suggested	a	 tripartite	 “national	policy	council”	and	reviving	the	sectoral	councils	he	had	proposed	in	the	late	1940s.25			 The	“Committee	on	Industrial	Organisation”	(CIO)	finally	established	in	1961	to	 oversee	 the	 adaptation	 of	 industries	 in	 preparation	 for	 free	 trade	 and	 EEC	accession	 was	 initially	 composed	 as	 advised	 by	 Whitaker,	 without	 union/	employer	input.	ICTU	protested	and	Lemass,	against	civil	service	advice,	invited	not	 only	 ICTU	 but	 also	 the	 employer	 body	 FUE	 (as	 distinct	 from	 the	 already	involved	FIM)	onto	it.	 ICTU	appointed	its	most	senior	officials,	 including	Larkin	and	ITGWU	leader	John	Conroy.	24	state-industry	sectoral	“Adaptation	Councils”																																																									24		 Whitaker	1958;	“get	its	acceptance	…”	Fanning	1990;	“Joint	Agreement”,	O’Brien,	J.	1981	25		 Whitaker/tripartitism,	Bew	and	Patterson	1982:	145	(who	give	no	source	for	the	assertion),	Roche	2009:	196;	Whitaker’s	actual	proposal,	Whitaker	1958:	III:	10;	“best	means”,	Lemass	to	ICTU	EC	mtg.	06.07.59	
	 42	
were	 established	 to	 report	 into	 the	 now	 tripartite	 CIO,	 with	 Lemass	 requiring	them,	 on	 ICTU’s	 proposal,	 to	 cooperate	 with	 parallel	 “Trade	 Union	 Advisory	Committees”	 it	 had	 established	 for	 each	 sector.	 With	 the	 experience	 of	cooperation	 on	 ERP	 bodies,	 and	 despite	 the	 EEC	 application	 falling	 with	 de	Gaulle’s	 veto	 on	 British	 accession,	 the	 CIO	 and	 Adaptation	 Councils	 were	retained,	largely	proving	effective	agents	of	industrial	modernisation.26		 Lemass	 also	 proposed	 upgrading	 wage	 determination	 from	 “guidelines”	 to	actual	pay	agreements,	establishing	an	“Employer-Labour	Conference”	(ELC)	on	a	 statutory	basis	with	an	 independent	 chair	 as	 the	negotiating	 forum,	with	 the	state	participating	as	public	sector	employer.	The	ELC	was	also	to	be	tasked	with	negotiating	 a	 fundamental	 industrial	 relations	 reform.	 When	 the	 next	 “wage	round”	 began	 in	 1963,	 Lemass	 made	 what	 James	 O’Brien	 called	 “a	 fairly	sustained	effort	to	persuade	Congress	and	…	employers	to	negotiate	at	national	level”	 through	 the	 ELC,	 setting	 wages,	 as	 he	 told	 the	 Dáil,	 “on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	intelligent	 understanding	…	 of	 the	 national	 interest	 rather	 than	 procedures	 of	horse-trading	and	strikes”.27			 The	overall	system	Lemass	envisaged	was	set	out	in	a	White	Paper,	Closing	the	
Gap,	 which	 described	 a	 widening	 discrepancy	 between	 labour	 costs	 and	productivity	growth.	This	went	further	than	previous	plans,	suggesting	involving	the	state,	beyond	its	role	as	public	employer,	in	undertaking	a	biennial	“objective	tripartite	review”	in	a	joint	planning	body	as	the	basis	for	wage	determination	at	the	ELC.	The	only	alternative,	it	stated,	were	statutory	wage/price	controls.28		 The	institution	that	emerged	for	the	“objective	review”	Lemass	proposed	built	on	ICTU’s	suggestion	of	a	national	council.	It	was	finally	established	in	late	1963	as	 the	 “National	 Industrial	 and	 Economic	 Council”	 (NIEC)	 tasked	 “to	 prepare	periodic	 reports	on	principles	 to	be	applied	by	government	and	 the	Employer-Labour	Council	for	the	development	of	the	national	economy	and	the	realisation	and	maintenance	 of	 full	 employment	 at	 adequate	wages	with	 reasonable	 price	stability”.	 Whitaker,	 as	 Department	 of	 Finance	 secretary	 and	 head	 of	 the	 civil																																																									26		 Formation	and	purpose	of	CIO,	Murphy,	G.	2005:	36-8;	ICTU	precipitate	ICTU/FUE	involvement,	FitzGerald	1968:	56-7	and	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	28.07	and	01.12.61;	ICTU	appointees,	ICTU	AR	1962:	94-6;	effectiveness	of	“Adaptation	Councils”	and	TU	committees,	FitzGerald	1968:	57-67	27		 O’Brien,	J.	1981:	10-11	28		 D/Finance	1963b;	O’Brien,	J.	1981:	37-38		
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service,	was	 appointed	 chair,	 though	only	 after	 the	 original	 nominee,	 diplomat	F.H.	 Boland,	 declined	 due	 to	 private	 sector	 commitments.	 Whitaker	 did	 not	initiate	 the	NIEC,	 and	 indeed	 had	 acted	 in	 1960	 on	 his	 own	 preference	 by	 co-founding	a	private	sector-funded	“Economic	Research	Institute”	(later	the	ESRI),	initially	under	SSISI	auspices.	 Its	board	 included	a	minority	of	employer/union	figures,	but	appointed	on	a	purely	individual	rather	than	representative	basis.29			 ICTU/FIM	 objections	 to	 NIEC’s	 purely	 wage-guideline	 function	 enabled	Lemass	tacitly	expand	it	to	a	much	wider	one	of	“supervision	and	review”	of	the	Second	 Programme	 itself.	 Garret	 FitzGerald,	 then	 an	 FIM	 economist,	 described	how	the	NIEC	assumed	ownership	of	the	Third	Programme	as	“its	own	from	the	outset”.	 Lemass	welcomed	 the	 NIEC	 asserting	 itself,	 gladly	 conceding	 to	 it	 the	role	of	developing	a	“consensus”	between	the	state	and	“the	main	sectors	of	the	community”	to	ensure	that	“measures	taken	to	implement	the	Programme	have	the	full	support	of	all	sections	of	the	Community”.	Larkin,	stating	that	“all	of	our	basic	economic	and	many	of	our	social	problems	stem	from	the	same	weakness,	economic	 underdevelopment,	 both	 in	 industry	 and	 agriculture”,	 declared	 the	NIEC	to	be	“planning	as	we	have	conceived	it”.30				 Like	many	Irish	institutions,	the	NIEC	resembled	comparable	bodies	emerging	elsewhere,	 but	 its	 structure	 and	 functions	 were	 shaped	 by	 organic	 factors.	 A	“National	Economic	Development	Council”	had	 just	been	established	 in	Britain,	modelled	in	turn	on	the	French	body,	and	Irish	officials	visited	and	studied	both.	But	the	NIEC	developed	along	lines	of	its	own.		The	British	Council,	for	example,	included	ministers	 as	well	 as	 industry,	 union	 and	 civil	 service	 representatives	and,	under	Harold	Wilson,	was	chaired	by	the	Prime	Minister	himself	and	 later	linked	to	a	network	of	subordinate	sectoral	councils.	This	encouraged	the	ICTU	also	 to	press	Lemass	 to	 revive	 the	 sectoral	 councils	 he	had	 suggested	 in	1947.	NIEC	was	 shaped	 by	 participants’	 experience	 of	 the	 “Adaptation	 Councils”	 and	CIO	 and,	 unlike	 in	 Britain,	 deliberately	 excluded	 politicians	 to	 minimise	clientelist	 pressures.	 Its	 first	 report	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 “National	 Wage	
																																																								29		 NIEC	1966;	on	Whitaker,	the	NIEC	and	ESRI,	FitzGerald	1968:	71,	157-9,	also	Chambers	2014:	155-6	30		 Lemass	in	NIEC	1966:	14;	Larkin	“all	of	our	…”,	WUI	ADC	1963:	11-17;	“conceived	it”,	Girvin	1994:	127-8	
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Recommendation”	agreed	in	1964,	which	set	a	12	per	cent	wage	“guideline”	for	the	period	to	1966	which	negotiating	bodies	were	urged	to	follow.31		 NIEC	 had	 29	 members,	 nine	 from	 Government	 and	 ten	 each	 representing	unions	 and	 the	 employer/business	 interest.	 State	 representation,	 headed	 by	Whitaker	 and	Department	 of	 I&C	 Secretary	 J.C.B.	McCarthy,	 came	mainly	 from	Finance’s	“Economic	Development	Division”	(EDD)	and	agencies	such	as	the	IDA	and	 IAOS.	The	EDD	had	 itself	been	an	 institutional	 innovation	as	both	 the	 first	specific	 civil	 service	 economic	 planning	 unit,	 but	 also,	 in	 the	NIEC,	 the	 first	 to	serve	a	 “non-government”	body.	The	EDD	had	been	created	 to	 fill	 the	 strategic	planning	 policy	 gap	 identified	 during	 the	 First	 Programme	 and	 would	 later	evolve	 into	 the	 Department	 of	 Economic	 Planning	 and	 Development.	 The	absence	 of	 farming	 representatives	 (apart	 from	 IAOS)	 was	 not	 deliberate,	 but	due	 to	 divisions	 among	 farming	 bodies	 preventing	 agreement	 on	 their	representation.	 Such	 divisions	 were	 a	 phenomenon	 plaguing	 all	 interest	representations	due	to	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	economy.32			 The	emerging	collaborative	approach	enthused	all	interests,	with	the	ITGWU,	for	 example,	 even	 proposing	 that	 individual	 companies	 pursue	 growth	 targets	agreed	 through	 a	 joint	 business-union	 effort,	 and	 that	 a	 network	 of	 Regional	Technical	 Colleges	 be	 established	 to	 train	 professional	 workers,	 a	 goal	 later	included	 in	 the	 Third	 Programme.	 Union	 enthusiasm	 was	 further	 reflected	 in	ICTU	 support,	 against	 marginal	 dissent	 from	 some	 craft	 and	 British-based	unions,	 for	 Irish	EEC	accession.	 ICTU	defended	this	on	the	optimistic	basis	 that	cooperative	 planning	 in	 such	 a	 context	 would	 enable	 declining	 industries	 be	replaced	by	new	industries	and	workers	from	weaker	sectors	re-trained	for	new	jobs.	 Larkin	 dismissed	 as	misguided	 left-wing	 critics	who	 rejected	 tripartitism,	Lemass’s	Programmes	and	the	NIEC	as	“political	baits	…	to	ensnare	and	enmesh	trade	unionists	in	the	political	election	manoeuvrings	of	Fianna	Fáil”.33		
	
																																																									31		 British	NEDC	(“Neddy”)	system,	Dell	1997;	Irish	study	visits,	early	NIEC	and	“exclusion”	of	politicians,	FitzGerald	1968;	“Wage	Recommendation”,	O’Brien	1981:	10-11,	37-38	32		 FitzGerald	1968:	158-64;	on	fragmentation,	Hardiman	1988:	48;	on	farmers,	ICTU	EC	mtg.,	28.02.1964	33		 “working	convergence”,	Murphy,	G.	2009;	Horgan	1997:	228;	ICTU	and	state	companies’	role,	ICTU	AR	1962:	64-5;	ITGWU	proposals,	ITGWU	ADC	1962:	72-3,	98-99;	“defended	on	the	basis”,	ICTU	ADC	1962:	227-30;	ICTU	and	EEC,	Murphy,	G.	2003;	“political	baits”	Larkin	in	Bulletin	(WUI)	Sept.-Oct.	1963		
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System	stresses:	from	expansion	to	dissolution	1963-68		 From	1963	Lemass,	absorbed	with	other	issues,	took	an	increasingly	back	seat	in	 relation	 to	 the	 tripartite	 institutions	 he	 had	 initiated,	 leaving	 them	 to	 the	ministers	responsible.	Until	1966	the	industrial	relations	bodies	came	under	Jack	Lynch	 as	Minister	 for	 I&C,	 and	 then	 Patrick	 Hillery	 at	 the	 new	 Department	 of	Labour,	while	 the	NIEC	 remained	under	 Finance	 and	 its	 energetic	 and	 capable	minister,	 James	 Ryan.	 Like	 Lemass,	 of	 whom	 he	 was	 a	 close	 ally,	 Ryan	 was	 a	veteran	 of	 the	 independence	 struggle	 and	 drove	 implementation	 of	 the	 ever	more	detailed	Programmes	for	Expansion	with	considerable	energy.		 During	1963-66,	the	NIEC,	under	Ryan’s	guidance	and	with	Whitaker	as	chair,	flourished,	 pursuing	 the	 mandate	 it	 had	 assumed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Second	Programme	 and	 preparing	 the	 parameters	 for	 its	 successor.	 Despite	 its	 tight	representational	 base	 and	 lean	 bureaucracy	 –	 henceforth	 hallmarks	 of	 Irish	social	 partnership	 –	 its	 output	 was	 prodigious	 and	 authoritative.	 Its	 reports	included	annual	 economic	 reviews	as	well	 as	 studies	of	 individual	 sectors,	 and	aligned	strategy	with	the	international	policy	frameworks	set	by	the	OECD.	The	CIO’s	1965	Survey	of	Industry	provided	the	basis	for	the	NIEC’s	preparations	for	the	Third	Programme.	This	identified	major	constraints	on	expansion	such	as	the	“backwardness”	of	 Irish	 industry,	 inefficiencies,	small	 firm	size,	 low	investment	ratios,	limited	diversification	and	poor	use	of	“modern	management	techniques”.	It	set	an	ambitious	national	aim	of	overcoming	these	to	achieve	both	competitive	advantage	 and	 a	 steady	 increase	 in	 real	 incomes	 through	 a	 productivity-based	formula	 for	 price/wage	 growth	 in	 1966-68,	 a	 national	 prices	 commission	 and	redistributive	 equity	 through	 progressive	 taxation.	 It	 urged	 that	 the	 Third	Programme	 include	 sectoral	 “adaptation”	 plans	 to	 be	 implemented	 through	tripartite	 “Industrial	 Development	 Councils”,	 cooperative	 structures	 within	companies	and	a	thorough	reform	of	industrial	relations	practices.34		 But	 concrete	 initiatives	 by	 Departments	 to	 progress	 NIEC	 proposals	 were	often	 weak	 and	 ineffective.	 William	 Roche	 describes	 Lynch	 at	 I&C	 as	 an	“industrial	 relations	 conservative	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 [Lemass]”.	While	 paying	“lip	 service”	 to	 tripartite	planning,	 he	 saw	 little	need	 to	 change	 “the	prevailing																																																									34		 “prodigious”,	FitzGerald	1968:	158-63;	“Survey”,	CIO	1965;	initial	conclusions,	NIEC	1965:	Pt.	IV,	paras.	50-61,	and	strategy	proposals,	NIEC	1965,	1966a,	1966c	
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system	 of	 collective	 bargaining”,	 preferring	 these	 continue	 autonomously	with	“minimum	 interference	 from	 the	 State”.	 He	 ignored	 suggestions	 for	 reforms	towards	what	Roche	describes	as	a	“Dutch	system”	of	works	councils	and	social	partnership	 as	 “outside	 the	 realm	of	 practical	 politics”.	 It	 is	 notable	 that	 up	 to	1965	all	decisive	 interventions,	 including	those	 initiating	wage	agreements	and	establishing	the	CIO	and	NIEC,	were	Lemass’s	own,	with	Lynch	contributing	little	discernible.	 But	 Lemass	 was	 in	 declining	 health	 and	 these	 initiatives	 now	depended	 on	 Lynch,	 who	 failed	 to	 secure	 a	 successor	 “National	 Wage	Recommendation”	 at	 the	 end	 of	 1965.	 A	 central	 agreement	 was	 not	 to	 return	until	1970.	Although	ICTU	showed	a	willingness	to	return	to	such	a	framework	by	setting	its	own	“maximum	guideline”	and	seeking	equalisation	of	employment	conditions	 -	 which	 Lemass	 welcomed	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 agreement	 -	 wage	determination	reverted	from	1966	under	Lynch	to	“local	bargaining”.35			 The	 drift	 back	 to	 free	 collective	 bargaining	 at	 a	 crucial	 stage	 in	 industrial	expansion	 was	 to	 prove	 disastrous,	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 regulatory	 reform	 saw	industrial	conflict	escalate	to	a	national	crisis.	There	had	been	a	gradual	increase	in	 conflict	 –	 examined	 in	 the	 next	 section	 –	 but	 up	 to	 1966	 this	 had	 been	manageable,	with	ELC-agreed	wage	“guidelines”	generally	implemented	and	the	1965	 CIO	 Survey	 judging	 industrial	 relations	 to	 be	 “fairly	 good”	 apart	 from	“restrictive	practices”	in	a	few	sectors.	Lemass	made	a	final	intervention	in	early	1966	 before	 retiring,	warning	 of	 an	 urgent	 need	 to	 reform	 industrial	 relations	which	 had	 remained	 essentially	 unchanged	 since	 1906.	 Hillery	 at	 the	Department	of	Labour	drafted	a	Trade	Union	Bill	to	reduce	the	number	of	unions	and	 strengthen	 Congress	 authority	 over	 “unofficial	 action”	 and	 ICTU	 gladly	cooperated	 in	 this	 initiative.	 But	 when	 Hillery	 circulated	 the	 heads	 for	 an	Industrial	 Relations	 Bill	 in	 June	 1966,	 proposing	 the	 outlawing	 of	 unofficial	strikes	and	giving	the	Labour	Court	statutory	powers	to	end	disputes,	ICTU	was	outraged	and	the	government-ICTU	talks	on	reforms	stalled	for	three	years.36			 With	 these	 ominous	 failures	 by	 Lynch	 and	Hillery,	 the	whole	 framework	 of	tripartite	 institutionalism	 frayed.	 The	 Adaptation	 Councils	 floundered,	 NIEC																																																									35		 On	Lynch,	Roche	2009:	190;	failure	of	wage	agreement,	O’Brien	1981:	12-13;	Lemass	health/retirement,	Horgan	1997:	326-3;	ICTU	position	and	Lemass	welcome,	ICTU	ADC	1966	36		 Lemass	IR	reform	initiative,	McCarthy,	C.	1973:	184-98;	Hillery	proposals,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.,	21.06.1965,	25.02	and	06.05.1966;	reaction	to	IR	Bill,	Hardiman	1988:	47	
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lamenting	the	poor	level	of	 implementation	of	their	proposals	at	 industry	level,	the	 CIO	 was	 disbanded	 and	 the	 “Industrial	 Development	 Councils”	 never	materialised,	 formally	 because	 of	 FUE’s	 refusal	 to	 countenance	 sectoral	 union	involvement	but	principally	because	government	showed	little	interest.	Progress	on	industrial	relations	reform	came	to	a	halt,	the	joint	working	group	ceasing	to	meet	 in	1967,	and	neither	Hillery’s	 initial	proposals	nor	any	alternatives,	apart	from	 a	 1969	 bill	 modifying	 secondary	 Labour	 Court	 functions,	 were	 enacted.	Relations	became	so	strained	that	ICTU	accused	Hillery	of	lying	to	the	Dáil	when	he	claimed	to	have	received	no	requests	from	ICTU	to	consult	on	it.37			 Even	 the	 NIEC	 became	 fractious.	 Following	 17	 unanimously	 agreed	 reports	since	 1963,	 a	 major	 study,	 Planning	 for	 Full	 Employment,	 begun	 in	 1965,	 was	delayed	for	two	years	over	Whitaker’s	insistence	on	including	a	competitiveness	principle	 of	 maintaining	 incomes	 below	 British	 levels,	 by	 statutory	 means	 if	necessary.	ICTU,	which	clashed	continually	with	the	bullish	NIEC	chair,	accused	him	of	trying	to	impose	a	“one-sided”	incomes	policy,	and	only	acquiesced	to	the	report’s	publication	once	its	dissent	on	its	wage	formula	was	formally	noted.38			 With	a	new	Minister	for	Finance,	Charles	Haughey,	just	establishing	himself	in	office	 after	 already	 being	 embroiled	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 farmers’	 association	(NFA),	 government	 disengagement	 from	 the	 council	 continued	 as	 the	 civil	service	re-asserted	its	autonomy.	But	Haughey	soon	began	to	make	his	presence	felt,	 reviving	 engagement	 with	 the	 NIEC.	 Larkin	 described	 the	 1967	 full	employment	report	as	reflecting	a	revival	of	the	NIEC	after	two	“difficult	years”.	Another	 NIEC	 report,	 which	 used	 an	 OECD	 critique	 to	 propose	 a	 radical	expansion	of	second-level	educational	access,	was	opposed	by	the	Department	of	Education	 until	 its	 own	 Minister,	 Donogh	 O’Malley,	 intervened	 in	 its	 favour,	leading	 to	 his	 famous	 initiative	 freeing	 secondary	 education	 to	 general	 access.	Yet	 another	 report,	 which	 proposed	 replacing	 Social	 Welfare’s	 antiquated	“labour	exchanges”	with	a	semi-state	manpower	training	agency,	was	rejected	by	
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a	 civil	 service	 committee,	 though	 NIEC	 influence	 at	 least	 ensured	 a	 semi-autonomous	service	overseen	by	the	Department	of	Labour	did	emerge.39		 The	decay	of	tripartitism	was	compounded	by	Labour	Party	negativity.	Larkin,	who	had	 affiliated	 his	 union,	 the	WUI,	 to	 the	 party	 in	 1964	not	 least	 to	 create	some	political	distance	 to	government,	 faulted	Labour	politicians	who	 “in	 their	natural	anxiety	 to	 criticise	and	expose	 the	 faults	and	 failings	of	 the	Fianna	Fáil	government	…	appeared	to	be	in	opposition	to	the	whole	…	[tripartite]	exercise”.	He	regretted	their	“cool	and	detached	interest”	in	the	NIEC,	their	dismissal	of	it	as	mere	“Fianna	Fáil	propaganda”,	and	their	failure	to	“make	[its]	reports	…	the	basis	of	a	continuing	positive	criticism	of	government	policies	and	 failings”.	He	pleaded	with	the	party	 to	“distinguish	between	the	NIEC	and	the	Fianna	Fáil	…	government”	 and	work	 “to	 strengthen	 the	whole	 concept	 of	 planned	 economic	development	 and	 the	 leading	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 its	 realisation”.	 Calling	 on	Labour	 to	 support	 the	Programme,	 he	 said	 its	 seven-year	plan	and	central	 role	for	 the	 NIEC	 would	 have	 seemed	 like	 “an	 election	 slogan	 of	 the	 labour	movement”	just	a	few	years	previously.	Despite	Labour’s	adherence	to	“national	planning”,	 its	 wariness	 of	 tripartitism	 as	 a	 Fianna	 Fáil	 “three-card	 trick”,	 as	Larkin	described	 their	negative	view	of	 it,	was	 resonant	of	 their	 resentment	of	Fianna	Fáil	usurping	their	position	since	the	1920s,	and	would	persist.40		 The	 flowering	 of	 tripartite	 institutionalism	 under	 Lemass	 thus	 went	 into	reverse	under	Lynch.	Instead	of	being	consolidated,	the	NIEC/ELC	planning	and	wage	 guidance	 system	 collapsed,	 sectoral	 councils	 disappeared,	 industrial	relations	 reform	 was	 shelved	 and	 the	 NIEC	 weakened,	 its	 policy	 consensus-building	 function	 side-lined	 as	 civil	 service	 policy	 primacy	 returned.	 Lemass’s	tripartitism	has	been	described	as	 “neo-corporatism”,	but	 its	nascent	quality	 is	better	 captured	 by	 Gary	 Murphy’s	 description	 of	 it	 as	 “proto-corporatism”.	Lynch’s	non-interventionism	became	dominant	from	1966.	One	exception	to	this	trend	was	 NIEC’s	 revival	 in	 1967,	which	 occurred	 under	 the	 new	Minister	 for	Finance,	Charles	Haughey,	a	disciple	of	Lemass	and	an	advocate	of	what	would	later	be	termed	“social	partnership”.	But	an	industrial	relations	crisis	arose	in	the																																																									39		 Larkin	view,	O’Riordan	2001:	34-5;	NIEC	education	report,	NIEC	1966b,	and	D/Educ.	opposition,	FitzGerald	1968:	175;	fate	of	“manpower”	report,	FitzGerald	1968:	174	40		 “natural	anxiety”	and	“three	card	trick”,	speech	at	WUI	AR	1968,	in	O’Riordan	2001:	35;	“election	slogan”,	
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institutional	vacuum	created	by	Lynch’s	non-interventionism,	culminating	in	the	industrial	 “chaos”	 of	 1968-69.	 There	 were	 simply	 no	 institutions	 in	 place	 to	channel	the	grievances	that	undelay	it	towards	a	productive	resolution.41		
Spirit	of	the	‘60s:	social	change	and	industrial	crisis	1968-69	
		 Up	 to	 1961,	 average	 annual	 workdays	 lost	 in	 disputes	 was	 about	 170,000,	higher	 than	 most	 North	 European	 corporatist	 countries	 but	 modest	 for	 the	“Anglo-Saxon”	 liberal-voluntarist	 world.	 In	 the	 pre-1960	 closed	 economy,	external	competitiveness	had	not	been	a	decisive	factor	but	this	changed.	Wage	bargaining,	 characterised	 by	 what	 Lemass	 called	 “procedures	 of	 horse-trading	and	strikes”,	was	driven	by	three	tendencies,	of	workers	with	negotiating	power	pressing	 their	 advantage	 to	 secure	 better	 pay,	 expanding	 industries	 “buying	peace”	by	conceding	increases,	and	most	barely	profitable	enterprises	relying	on	suppressing	wages.	Most	wage	 settlements	 up	 to	 1965	 nevertheless	 remained	within	 agreed	 national	 “guidelines”.	 But	 1968-70	 witnessed	 an	 “upheaval”	 of	industrial	conflict	which	was	compounded	by	state	institutional	minimalism.42			 As	the	economy	opened,	strike-days	rose,	to	450,000	in	1964,	552,000	in	1965	and	 784,000	 in	 1966.	 These	 arose	 from	 long	 disputes	 involving	 relatively	 few	workers	in	several	specific	industries	rather	than	a	pattern	of	conflict	across	the	economy,	and	 in	many	cases	 involved	non-ICTU	unions	or	non-FUE	employers.	80	per	 cent	of	 strike-days	 in	1964	were	 in	 the	 construction	 industry,	 in	a	 long	dispute	 not	 over	 wages	 but	 a	 40-hour	 week,	 which	 employers	 refused	 to	concede.	 The	 union	 concerned	was	 the	 breakaway	MPGWU,	whose	 pickets,	 by	union	tradition,	other	workers	refused	to	pass,	 thus	closing	down	the	 industry,	while	on	 the	employer	side	construction	companies	were	still	outside	FUE	and	sought	 to	prevent	an	 industry-wide	concession	which	FUE	actually	 favoured.	A	similar	dynamic	characterised	the	print	strike	of	1965,	which	accounted	 for	66	per	cent	of	all	 strike-days,	with	small	craft	unions	 forcing	 the	closure	of	a	 then	large	industry,	and	the	bank	and	paper	mills	strikes	of	1966,	again	craft-driven,	which	that	year	similarly	accounted	for	most	strike-days.	The	bank	strike	again																																																									41		 On	emergence	of	the	term	“neo-corporatism”,	McGinley	1998;	on	“proto-corporatism,	Girvan	and	Murphy	2005;	on	“stakeholder	capitalism”,	Hutton	1996	42		 Strike	days,	McCarthy,	C.	1973;	Lemass	quote,	O’Brien	1981:	10-11;	“most	wage”,	CIO	1965;	“upheaval”,	McCarthy,	C.	1973	
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involved	 employer	 and	worker	 associations	 outside	 FUE	 or	 ICTU	 and	 Ryan	 at	Finance	ended	it	with	a	statutory	bank	salaries	order.	These	disputes	were	seen	at	 the	 time	 as	 arising	 from	weak	 institutions	 and	poor	 employment	 standards,	with	Larkin	on	the	union	side	recognizing	the	need	for	picketing	reform	so	that	general	workers’	interests	were	not	abused	to	benefit	sectional	craft	demands.43		 Industrial	 unrest	 spread	 more	 generally	 after	 1966	 as	 economic	 expansion	reversed	emigration,	generating	what	Charles	McCarthy	called	a	“mood	of	rising	aspirations”.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 wider	 social	 restlessness	 reflecting	 the	 US	 civil	rights	movement	and	cultural	rebellion	among	young	people.	While	the	surge	in	worker	militancy	reflected	an	international	trend,	its	scale	in	Ireland	was	greater	than	elsewhere,	with	 strike-days	 trebling	by	1968	 to	1,405	per	1,000	workers,	compared	to	just	4	per	1,000	in	West	Germany	and	489	in	the	UK,	and	in	1969	topped	 the	European	 league	apart	 from	 Italy.	This	was	 clearly	 a	 crisis	of	weak	institutions,	 as	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Ireland’s	 strike	 figures	 were	 small	 groups	 of	craftsmen	with	veto	power	in	key	sectors	or	of	employers	stubbornly	refusing	to	concede	 reforms	 otherwise	 widely	 accepted.	 ESB	 craftsmen	 shut	 down	 power	generation	in	1968	and	3,000	picketing	“maintenance	craftsmen”	locked	35,000	general	 workers	 out	 for	 six	 weeks	 in	 1969	 in	 what	 James	 O’Brien	 called	 “the	worst	strike	in	the	history	of	the	state”,	closing	much	of	Irish	industry.44			 The	example	of	craft	unions	and	the	weakness	of	state	institutions	encouraged	“breakaway”	unions	to	form	and	exploit	picketing	traditions	and	weak	law	to	bid	for	 members	 in	 a	 spiral	 of	 competitive	 militancy.	 British-based	 unions	 also	exploited	these	opportunities	to	grow	at	the	expense	of	established	forces	such	as	 the	 ITGWU,	 introducing	 a	 rousing	 left-wing	 rhetoric	 rejecting	 “class	collaboration”.	British	union	strategy	was	to	build	autonomous	shop-floor	power	and	 brought	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 “shop	 steward”	 to	 Ireland,	 where	 it	 was	hitherto	 little	 known,	 spreading	 even	 in	 the	 ITGWU	 where	 local	 officials	 had	previously	 managed	 industrial	 relations.	 The	 success	 of	 union	 militancy	 also	encouraged	public	service	officials	and	white-collar	workers,	who	had	previously	stayed	aloof	from	the	proletarian	Congress,	to	affiliate	to	it.	The	strike	wave	was	beyond	either	 the	Labour	Court	or	 ICTU	 to	manage,	with	 the	Court	 as	 early	 as																																																									43		 Strike	data,	Nevin	ed.	1994:	396;	disputes,	McCarthy,	C.	1973;	Larkin	1962,	in	O’Riordan	2001:	26-7	44		 “rising	aspirations”,	McCarthy,	C.	1973:	25;	statistics	in	ICTU	AR	1969:	253	and	Nevin	1980:	172;	details	of	strikes,	McCarthy,	C.	1973;	“worst	strike”,	O’Brien	1981:	15	
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1963	lamenting	the	“remarkable	…	number	of	occasions	on	which	…	strike	action	was	taken	or	threatened	before	the	Labour	Court	was	afforded	an	opportunity	of	either	 arranging	 a	 conciliation	 conference	 or	 investigating	 the	 matters	 in	dispute”.	By	1969	nearly	60	per	cent	of	all	strikes	were	“unofficial”,	i.e.	occurring	without	official	union	head-office	sanction.45			 Mainstream	 unions	 had	 engaged	 with	 Lemass’s	 original	 industrial	 relations	reform	 process,	 with	 ICTU	 proposing	 “industrial	 democracy”	 along	 European	lines	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 confrontational	 relations.	 The	 ITGWU	 advocated	 the	German	 system,	 which	 an	 ICTU	 document	 described	 as	 “probably	 the	 most	advanced	 form	of	 industrial	democracy	 in	any	capitalist	country”.	Similar	 ideas	were	promoted	by	Charles	McCarthy,	teachers’	union	leader	and	ICTU	President,	and	 also,	 though	 more	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 unions,	 by	 Jeremiah	 Newman,	 a	leading	 Catholic	 theorist	 and	 sociology	 professor.	 Basil	 Chubb,	 a	 prominent	political	 scientist	 and	 later	 chair	 of	 the	 ELC,	 argued	 that	 industrial	 democracy	was	 an	 inevitable	 reform	 that	 should	 be	 conceded.	 Such	 ideas	 had	 interested	Lemass,	but	Lynch	dismissed	them	as	“outside	the	realm	of	practical	politics”.46			 The	rise	of	union	militancy,	perceived	by	many	as	due	to	“British”	 influence,	revived	 the	 old	 basic	 divide	 in	 the	 movement.	 Left-wing	 militants,	 often	 from	British-based	unions,	disparaged	ICTU’s	“industrial	democracy”	proposals	as	the	“co-option”	 of	 workers	 in	 the	 running	 of	 capitalism,	 and	 inter-union	 disputes	over	 membership	 “poaching”	 increasingly	 dominated	 the	 ICTU	 agenda,	 at	 one	point	causing	the	ITGWU,	the	main	target	of	“poaching”,	to	consider	disaffiliating.	Maintaining	 leadership	 legitimacy	 against	 member	 impatience	 was	 not	 a	challenge	faced	only	by	unions,	but	also	by	employer	groups,	whose	more	hard-line	members	complained	of	government	“leniency”	in	the	face	of	union	power.47		 But	 the	 1968/69	 crisis	 led	 to	 some	 institutional	 innovation	 by	 unions	 and	employers	 as	 well	 as	 by	 government.	 Craft	 union	 power,	 said	 Larkin,	 was	ultimately	 not	 that	 of	 a	 powerful	 “lone	 wolf”	 “hunting	 alone”,	 but	 relied	 on																																																									45		 Int.	Geraghty;	Int.	O’Raghallaigh;	“rhetoric”	e.g.	ICTU	ADC	1969;	Labour	Court,	McCarthy,	C.	1973:	25;	“competitive	militancy”	e.g.	McCarthy,	C.	1973,	“unofficial	strikes”,	Hardiman	1988:	95-6;	“white	collar”	affiliations,	Maguire	2009	46		 ICTU	adopts	“industrial	democracy”,	ICTU	ADC	1967;	ITGWU	on	German	system,	Liberty,	passim	1967-8;	“probably	the	most	advanced	…”,	ICTU	ADC	1968:	165-70;	Newman	1953,	1966;	McCarthy,	C.	1966;	Chubb	1969;	Lynch	quoted	in	Roche	2009:	190	47		 “British”	influence,	Newman	1966;	left-wing	opposition	to	“industrial	democracy”,	ICTU	ADC	1968;	ITGWU	“disaffiliation”,	ITGWU	ADC	1971;	employer	position,	FitzGerald	1968:	208-9,	Hardiman	1988	
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general	 workers’	 loyalty	 in	 observing	 pickets.	 The	 “go-it-alone”	 approach	 of	some	employer	groups,	such	as	in	the	construction	dispute,	similarly	weakened	the	 FUE.	 After	 heated	 debates,	 and	 fearing	 statutory	 controls,	 ICTU	 in	 1970	instituted	 the	 discipline	 of	 a	 “Group	 of	 Unions”	 approach	 to	 joint	 and	 binding	bargaining	with	companies,	and	in	1971	adopted	rules	restricting	picketing,	with	workers	 henceforth	 obliged	 only	 to	 observe	 ICTU-approved	 “all-out-pickets”.	Similarly,	 employers	 consolidated	 in	 1969	 as	 the	 Irish	 Confederation	 of	Employers	 (ICE),	 incorporating	 the	 FUE	 and	 various	 individual	 associations,	specifically	 “to	 counter	…	 leap-frogging	wage	 claims	…	 [and]	 the	 playing	 off	 of	one	 industrial	group	against	another”.	Both	 ICTU	and	ICE	were	relatively	 loose	associations,	 if	 democratically	 structured,	 their	 constituent	 organisations	jealously	 guarding	 their	 autonomy.	 But	 despite	 rebels	 in	 both	 camps,	whether	“bloody-minded”	sectional	unions	or	 industry	 leaders	who	rejected	a	 “common	good”,	the	mean	preference	among	both	was	for	both	strengthening	the	unity	of	purpose	on	their	“side”	and	for	orderly	state-business-union	cooperation.48			 The	rebellious	spirit	of	the	1960s	was	experienced	in	Ireland	initially	through	a	modernising	of	Catholicism	in	the	wake	of	Vatican	2	and	the	rise	of	a	Catholic	“left”	on	the	basis	of	Pope	John	XXIII’s	commitment	to	“social	 justice”.	This	was	reflected	in	the	adoption	by	Fine	Gael	of	a	programme,	“The	Just	Society”,	often	wrongly	 described	 as	 “liberal”,	 and	 in	 the	 emergence	 in	 the	 Labour	 Party	 in	Dublin,	which	had	been	reduced	to	a	single	TD	in	the	person	of	 the	Republican	ITGWU	 official	 Michael	 Mullen,	 of	 a	 group	 of	 liberal-socialist	 intellectuals,	developing	from	a	base	in	TCD,	who	would	be	elected	TDs	in	1969.	Liberalisation	was	 also	 a	 strand	 in	 Fianna	 Fáil	 in	 the	 later	 Lemass	 years,	 epitomised	 in	 the	unbanning	 in	 1966	 at	 the	 stroke	 of	 a	 pen	 by	 Brian	 Lenihan	 of	 nearly	 10,000	books	prescribed	by	 the	puritanical	 censorship	 regime	 installed	by	Cumann	na	nGaedhal	in	1929.	A	harder	but	more	fringe	Left	also	emerged	in	the	late	1960s	connected	with	the	wave	of	union	militancy,	both	in	groups	such	as	the	IWL,	ICO	and	 others	 connected	 with	 the	 union	 conflicts	 and	 involving	 many	 returned	militant	 emigrant	workers,	 as	well	 as	 student	movements	 such	 as	 the	 reform-minded	 “Students	 for	 Democratic	 Action”	 and	 the	 more	 fundamental	 Maoist																																																									48		 Larkin	in	O’Riordan	2001:	28;	on	“Groups	of	Unions”	and	ICTU	policy,	ICTU	ADCs	1970-72,	Int.	McCarthy,	S.;	ICE	and	“leap-frogging”,	Hardiman	1988:	162-5;	weak	central	bodies,	O’Brien	1981:	14;	employer	attitudes,	FitzGerald	1968:	206-10	
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‘Internationalists’.	But	these	represented	an	essentially	cultural	rebellion	rather	than	a	societal	let	alone	revolutionary	one.49		 Union/employer	militancy	was	economically	driven	and	thus	did	not	signify	a	deeper	 intractable	polarisation	of	society.	This	was	shown	in	 the	1969	election	by	the	unexpectedly	poor	showing	of	both	Labour	and	Fine	Gael,	which	had	both	sought	 to	 capitalise	 on	 it	 from	 opposite	 sides.	 Fianna	 Fáil,	 winning	 a	 large	majority,	including	in	Dublin,	was	again	returned.	But	the	industrial	conflict	had	nevertheless	graphically	exposed	how	state	 institutions	had	failed	to	keep	pace	with	the	exigencies	of	industrial	modernisation.50		
“Order	plucked	from	threating	chaos”:	Haughey’s	1969-70	initiative		
		 In	 March	 1969,	 just	 as	 the	 maintenance	 workers’	 dispute	 was	 ending,	 an	initiative	 at	 the	 NIEC	 revived	 discussion	 of	 both	 an	 agreed	 prices/incomes	framework,	dormant	since	1966,	and	 industrial	 relations	reform.	This	reflected	an	international	trend	as	OECD	promoted	a	return	to	such	an	approach	to	master	inflationary	pressures,	while	new	Left	governments	across	Europe,	appealing	to	the	 expectations	 of	 the	 1960s,	 were	 elected	 on	 platforms	 of	 expanding	 liberal	freedoms,	 workers	 rights	 and	 industrial-democratic	 institutions.	 In	 Britain,	Labour	 Secretary	 Barbara	 Castle	 recommended	 a	 similar	 course,	 her	 famous	proposals,	In	Place	of	Strife,	published	in	January,	being	discussed	at	the	NIEC.51			 NIEC’s	 policy	 revival	 occurred	 following	 what	 the	 Irish	 Times	 called	 an	“unprecedented”	 intervention	 by	 Haughey,	 who	 in	 response	 to	 the	 wave	 of	strikes	 proposed	 a	 novel	 event,	 a	 pre-budget	 meeting	 between	 government	“economic	ministers”	and	ICTU’s	full	Executive	Council.	While	Hillery	and	others	attended,	 ICTU’s	minutes	make	 it	 clear	 that	Haughey	 dominated,	 proposing	 an	agreed	pay	“guideline”	and	a	revival	of	the	NIEC’s	strategic	policy	role.	Haughey	had	 a	 frosty	 but	 business-like	 relationship	 with	 Whitaker,	 his	 department	secretary,	who	as	a	result	had	retired	prematurely	in	December	1968	to	take	up	the	then	subordinate	role	of	Governor	of	the	Central	Bank,	though	remained	on	as	 NIEC	 chair.	 The	 council	 had	 become	 fractious	 and	moribund,	 producing	 no																																																									49		 Quinn	2005;	Thornley,	Y.	(ed.)	2008;	Thornley,	D.	1964;	Puirséil	2007	50		 1969	election,	Puirséil	2007	51		 Maintenance	dispute	outcome,	O’Brien	1981:	16;	OECD,	Hardiman	1988:	34;	Castle	1969;	NIEC	discusses	Castle,	McCarthy,	C.	1973:	229-31	
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major	 reports	 in	 1968,	 but	 now,	 encouraged	 by	 Haughey,	 it	 revived	 both	 its	shelved	1965	plans	for	a	prices-and-incomes	strategy	and	for	industrial	relations	reform.	Haughey	maintained	close	relations	with	business	and	union	interests,	in	the	latter	case	especially	the	ITGWU,	and	it	was	on	its	proposal	that	the	NIEC	in	March	1969	agreed	to	revive	these	plans	as	Haughey	had	urged.52		 This	 initiative	 coincided	 with	 publication	 of	 the	 Third	 Programme	 for	
Economic	 and	 Social	 Development	 which	 included	 a	 Department	 of	 Finance	instruction	 that	 income	 increases	 should,	 while	 incrementally	 improving	 the	relative	position	of	the	lower	paid,	track	productivity	but	remain	“slower”	than	in	the	 “main	 competing	 countries”	 (i.e.	 Britain).	 The	 confluence	 of	 the	 ITGWU	initiative	at	the	NIEC	and	the	Finance	statement	in	the	Third	Programme	was	not	coincidental.	The	meeting	between	“economic	ministers”	and	Congress,	and	the	NIEC	initiative	which	succeeded	them,	 followed	contacts	between	Haughey	and	the	 ITGWU.	 Freed	 by	 Whitaker’s	 retirement,	 Haughey,	 described	 by	 the	 Irish	
Times	as	the	“dominant	personality	in	the	Government	party”,	took	the	initiative	to	recover	control	of	economic	relations	lost	since	Lemass’s	departure.53			 Haughey	strengthened	his	position	with	the	unions	by	including	in	his	budget	that	month	measures	he	had	discussed	with	ITGWU	to	benefit	the	lower	paid	so	as	 to	 enable	 “an	 orderly	 policy	 in	 relation	 to	 wage	 and	 salary	 agreements”	 to	evolve,	with	a	potential	national	agreement	heralding	 “a	whole	new	era	 in	 this	field”.	He	also	incorporated	welfare	reforms	and	“envisaged”	a	series	of	national	agreements	 “in	which	 budgetary	measures	would	 play	 a	 vital	 role”.	 Both	 ICTU	and	 FUE	 welcomed	 the	 initiative	 and	 during	 the	 June	 1969	 election	 Haughey	called	this	“one	of	 the	most	helpful	 things	that	has	happened	…	 in	many	a	 long	day”,	the	response	of	the	unions	“magnificent	in	its	responsibility	and	maturity”.	“Order”,	he	announced,	had	been	“plucked	out	of	threatening	chaos”.54		 Following	the	election	and	the	Haughey	initiative,	ICTU	conferences	decisively	rejected	 opposition	 to	 a	 national	 agreement,	 adopting	 ITGWU-sponsored	motions	 proposing	 a	 “full-scale	 NIEC	 Report	 on	 all	 aspects	 of	 income																																																									52		 “unprecedented	intervention”	IT	editorial,	15.03.1969;	Haughey-ICTU	meeting,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	26.03.69,	item	3844;	Haughey-Whitaker	relationship,	Chambers	2014:	180-2,	190-2,	217-223;	ITGWU	initiative	at	NIEC,	IT	15.04.69	53		 Third	Programme	1969:	143-9;	“dominant	personality”,	IT,	30.05.69	54		 “whole	new	era”/“plucked	out	of	…”,	Haughey,	‘Election	meeting’	06/06/69,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	111;	“pivotal	role”,	Dáil	07.05.69	
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distribution”	and	a	“prices	and	incomes	policy”.	A	joint	FUE/ICTU	committee	was	established	in	July	1969	to	start	talks	on	terms	for	an	agreement.	Haughey	met	with	 ICTU	 the	 following	 November,	 accepting	 their	 internal	 “Note	 on	 a	 Wage	Negotiation	 System”,	 undoubtedly	 revealed	 to	 him	 by	 ITGWU,	 proposing	 a	complementary	NIEC/ELC	architecture.	Within	cabinet,	he	criticised	Whitaker’s	by-passing	of	 him	 in	 advising	Lynch	 to	 opt	 for	 statutory	 “corrective	 action”	 on	wages,	and	in	January	1970,	again	after	meeting	ITGWU	leaders,	he	met	Congress	to	 suggest	 that	 the	 forthcoming	 “pay	 round”	 upgrade	 negotiations	 to	 a	 full	“tripartite	 agreement”	 embracing	 wages,	 economic	 policy	 and	 reform	 of	 both	statutory	and	voluntary	aspects	of	industrial	relations.	Although	a	cautious	ICTU	insisted	the	talks	be	described	as	yet	only	as	“consultations”,	Haughey’s	initiative	led	to	the	NIEC’s	ground-breaking	report	the	following	month.	This	proposed	a	broad	tripartite	system	as	well	as	a	Prices	Commission	and	an	adjudicating	role	for	the	Labour	Court	over	disputes	under	the	proposed	agreement.55			 Employers	welcomed	 the	 breakthrough	 and	 the	NIEC	 exploited	 its	 restored	prestige	to	propose	 its	own	reconstitution	as	an	up-graded	“National	Economic	Council”.	Haughey,	along	with	Lynch	and	other	ministers,	met	with	ICTU	and	FUE	in	a	formal	“tripartite	conference”	in	April	1970,	which	agreed	to	the	drafting	of	enhanced	 terms	 of	 reference	 for	 the	 revived	 ELC	 to	 cover	 industrial	 relations	reform.	As	the	ESRI,	a	body	co-founded	by	Whitaker	and	cautious	of	tripartitism,	later	commented,	“it	did	seem	as	if	the	machinery	for	a	new	era	of	orderly	wage	adjustment	had	finally	been	pieced	together”.56		 At	 the	moment	of	 this	 imminent	 achievement,	 on	5	May	1970	Haughey	was	sacked	from	cabinet	by	Lynch	following	an	approach	by	opposition	leader,	Liam	Cosgrave,	 claiming,	 on	 the	basis	of	 an	anonymous	note	 from	Special	Branch	or	British	 sources,	 a	 “plot”	 involving	 military	 intelligence	 and	 some	 ministers,	including	Haughey,	 to	 import	arms	“for	use	 in	Northern	Ireland”.	Within	weeks	of	 Haughey’s	 removal	 and	 arraignment	 for	 what	 amounted	 to	 treason,	 the	national	wage	agreement	 initiative	would	collapse.	He	would	be	acquitted	by	a																																																									55		 	ITGWU	motions,	ICTU	ADC	1969:	394-410;	FUE	initiative,	O’Brien	1981:	17;	Haughey	on	ICTU	‘Note’,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	12.11.69	item	4102;	criticises	Whitaker	proposal,	Chambers	2014:	219-20;	Haughey	mtg.	ITGWU	leaders,	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	141,	and	Congress,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	28.01.70;	final	report,	NIEC	1970	56		 FUE/ICE	position,	O’Brien	1981:	41-2;	NIEC	proposals	for	“NEC”,	NIEC	1970,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	04.70,	item	4195,	McCarthy	1973:	179-81	and	IT	17.04.1970;	Haughey	and	“tripartite	conference”,	IT	17,	18.04.1970,	O’Brien	1981:	19;	ESRI	quoted	in	O’Brien	1981:	19	
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jury	 convinced	 he	 had	 implemented	 government	 policy	 but,	 while	 avoiding	imprisonment	and	retaining	his	Dáil	seat,	he	was	excluded	from	cabinet.57		 Whether	 Haughey’s	 initiative	 would	 have	 succeeded	 cannot	 be	 known.	Industrial	relations	at	the	time	were	in	turmoil,	the	country	gripped	by	a	strike	by	 the	 IBOA	 -	 a	 non-ICTU	 union	 -	 closing	 the	 banking	 system	 for	 six	 months.	Haughey	 was	 also	 only	 a	 mere	 minister,	 even	 if	 at	 Finance,	 under	 a	 cautious	Taoiseach	indisposed	to	“intervening”	in	the	social	relations	of	the	economy.		
Lynch’s	retreat	to	minimalism:	the	1970	“National	Wage	
Agreement”	(NWA)		 Just	 prior	 to	 the	 arms	 crisis,	 the	 ICTU,	 against	modest	 internal	 dissent,	 had	accepted	 the	NIEC’s	proposed	voluntarist	 framework.	 It	had	also	cooperated	 in	the	 plans	 to	 reconstitute	 the	 NIEC	 as	 a	 “National	 Economic	 Council”,	 which	 it	itself	had	proposed.	It	accepted	the	inclusion	of	farming	bodies	on	it	but	rejected	Whitaker’s	proposals	diluting	the	tripartite	formula	by	adding	“consumers”	and	the	 professions.	 Wage	 agreement	 talks	 had	 commenced	 and	 ICTU	 had	 even	suggested	re-convening	the	NIEC	to	set	immediate	guidelines	for	them.	But,	after	Haughey’s	 sacking,	 the	 ITGWU	 caused	 a	 major	 surprise	 when	 its	 leaders	announced	 that	 while	 they	 supported	 the	 “principle”	 of	 a	 national	 agreement,	they	doubted	the	advantages	to	workers	of	what	was	proposed	and	government	sincerity	 on	 price	 controls.	 At	 the	 ICTU	 conference	 the	 following	week,	 at	 the	start	 of	 July,	 the	 ITGWU	 took	 an	 even	 harder	 line,	 amazing	 other	 unions	 by	calling	 for	 ICTU’s	 support	 for	 the	 proposed	 NIEC/pay	 system	 to	 be	 “referred	back”,	 i.e.	 shelved,	 pending	 clarification	 on	 how	 it	 would	 work.	 The	 ITGWU’s	derailing	 of	 ICTU	wage	 strategy,	which	 it	 had	 largely	 itself	 engineered,	 caused	public	dismay,	the	ESRI	calling	it	“this	totally	unexpected	setback”.58				 With	 the	 ICTU’s	 position	 in	 tatters,	Whitaker	 and	 influential	 commentators,	such	as	Garret	FitzGerald,	warned	that	a	wage/price	inflation	“spiral”	threatened	and	 called	 for	 wage	 controls.	 The	 Irish	 Times,	 commenting	 on	 the	 collapse	 of	tripartitism	 and	 endorsing	 FitzGerald’s	 view,	 opined	 that	 British	 experience																																																									57		 Cosgrave	note	in	Clifford	2009:	73-4.	There	is	a	large	and	contradictory	literature	on	the	arms	conspiracy	trial	which	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis	58		 NEC	disagreement,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	20	and	31.07.70;	FUE	invitation	and	ICTU	call	for	NIEC	meeting,	O’Brien	1981:19	and	41-2;	ITGWU	leadership	stance,	ITGWU	ADC	1970	and	ICTU	AR	1971:	99-120;	public	amazement,	IT	10.07.70,	Hardiman	1988:	50;	“unexpected	setback”,	O’Brien	1981:	19;		
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showed	 that	 voluntary	 agreements	 were	 “ignored	 as	 blithely	 as	 speed	 limits”,	while	the	industry	group,	CII	–	the	former	FIM	-	briefed	against	price	controls	as	“unconstitutional”.	 Whitaker,	 although	 NIEC	 chairman,	 urged	 a	 statutory	 pay	“pause”	until	the	new	NEC/ELC	system	could	be	established,	and	FitzGerald,	once	a	 champion	 of	 the	 NIEC,	 now	 attacked	 its	 report	 as	 a	 “fudge”	 showing	 the	“limitations	of	consensus”	and	advised	unilateral	government	action.59			 The	 NIEC	 polarised,	 with	 ICTU,	 under	 ITGWU	 pressure,	 refusing	 to	 accept	statutory	 guidelines	 or	 a	 paper	 by	 Whitaker,	 ‘The	 Need	 to	 Control	 Inflation’,	which	 argued	 for	 wage	 control.	 Lynch	 supported	 Whitaker,	 saying	 if	 unions	would	 not	 engage	 at	 the	 ELC,	 government,	 regardless	 of	 the	 NIEC’s	 proposed	role,	would	 unilaterally	 impose	 controls.	 Congress	 responded	 by	 threatening	 a	return	 to	 aggressive	 bargaining	 and	 to	 review	 “the	 whole	 question	 of	participating	in	bodies	counselling	the	Government	on	economic	matters”,	i.e.	the	NIEC	 itself.	 The	 new	 Finance	 Minister,	 George	 Colley,	 introduced	 a	 statutory	prices/incomes	 bill,	 which	 reached	 its	 second	 Dáil	 reading	 before	 Lynch	relented,	meeting	the	ICTU	–	which	he	had	seldom	done	in	two	years	-	to	agree	to	suspend	 the	 bill	 if	 ICTU	 returned	 to	 the	 Employer-Labour	 Conference	 (ELC).	Colley,	in	withdrawing	the	bill,	confirmed	union	suspicions	by	now	admitting	he	had	never	seriously	believed	a	 "price	 freeze”	was	 “a	practical	proposition”.	But	the	 talks	were	 saved,	 as	 the	 ITGWU	 required	 an	 agreement	 for	 its	majority	 of	lower-paid	members,	 and	 the	 first	 “National	Wage	Agreement”	was	 concluded.	The	 ELC	 had	 been	 re-established	 at	 Haughey’s	 initiative	 -	 with	 Basil	 Chubb,	 a	champion	of	 industrial	democracy,	 its	 chair	 -	 as	 a	key	 “institution”	of	 the	NIEC	system.	Despite	its	collapse,	the	talks	leading	to	the	NWA	took	place	through	it.60			 The	 NWA	 became	 an	 enduring	 system,	 but	 it	 was	 a	 minimalist	 form	 of	tripartitism	 compared	 to	 what	 Haughey	 had	 envisaged	 and	 ICTU/FUE	 had	agreed	 in	 May	 1970.	 It	 simplified	 bargaining,	 setting	 common	 wage	 increases	over	 18	 months	 for	 all	 workers.	 But	 government	 participated	 solely	 as	 pubic	sector	employer,	without	any	wider	policy	input,	and	the	NIEC	was	not	involved	at	all.	The	wage	formula	combined	percentage	and	“flat	rate”	increases	as	sought																																																									59		 “spiral”,	IT	01.08.70;	“blithely”,	IT	editorial	01.09.70;	CII	briefing,	IT	08.10.70;	FitzGerald	in	IT	01.08.70	60		 ICTU	refuses	to	endorse,	ICTU	AR	1971:	135;	Lynch	threat	and	ICTU	response,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	10.70,	item	4443;	Colley	in	Dáil,	IT	26.11.70;	“industrial	democracy”,	Chubb	1969	
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by	ICTU	in	the	interests	of	the	low-paid.	The	NWA	also	left	scope	for	“above”	and	“below	norm”	pay	adjustments	under	various	headings,	including	“productivity”	and	 protecting	 “differentials”	 between	 grades	 of	 worker,	 and	 accorded	 the	Labour	 Court	 an	 “interpretation”	 role.	 It	 also	 aimed	 to	 gradually	 equalise	working	 conditions	 through	 working	 hours,	 holiday	 and	 sick	 pay	 norms,	 with	implementation	negotiated	“locally”.61			 The	 NWA	 did	 not	 link	 to	 budget	 policy,	 a	 wider	 incomes/prices	 policy	 or	overall	 economic	 strategy.	 Lynch	 praised	 the	 tripartite	 approach,	 extolling	 the	“new	role”	of	unions	 through	various	 “consultative	or	deliberative	bodies”,	 but	he	 dismantled	 it	 as	 a	 central	 economic	 policy	 approach.	What	 remained	were	some	 formal	 bodies,	 which	 Roche	 describes	 as	 “bolted	 onto”	 an	 unreformed	wage-bargaining	 system.	 Neither	 government	 nor	 the	 Department	 of	 Finance	were	 henceforth	 centrally	 involved,	 with	 the	 NWA	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	Department	 of	 Labour	 as	 a	 purely	 “industrial	 relations”	 matter.	 This	conservatism	 contrasted	 with	 developments	 in	 Europe	 where	 wide-ranging	reforms	expanding	cooperative	institutions	at	national	and	company	levels	saw	the	 late-1960s	 wave	 of	 militancy	 abate.	 In	 Ireland,	 industrial	 and	 inter-union	disputes	 remained	high	despite	 the	NWAs,	with	 strikes	and	 industrial	disputes	invariably	at	the	top	of	the	OECD	league	throughout	the	1970s.62		 Following	 Haughey’s	 removal	 and	 the	 collapse	 of	 his	 wider	 pay/policy	strategy,	the	NIEC	itself	disintegrated,	its	“immediate	plans”,	as	Charles	McCarthy	lamented,	 “in	 ruins”.	 Its	 proposed	 “Incomes	 and	 Prices	 Commission”	 failed	 to	materialise	 and	 plans	 for	 a	 wider	 “Economic	 Council”	 stalled	 after	 ICTU	withdrew	in	protest	first	over	Lynch’s	wages	order	and	then	Whitaker’s	adamant	insistence	that	“consumers”	be	included	on	it.	It	would	re-surface	in	1973	in	a	bill	for	 a	 “National	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Council”	 (NESC)	 with	 a	 narrow	 advisory-consultative	remit,	which	finally	convened	under	the	coalition	in	1974.63		 While	 the	Lynch	government’s	 institutional	 conservatism	explains	 the	decay	of	 tripartitism	 from	 1965,	 with	 disastrous	 consequences	 in	 industrial	 conflict,																																																									61		 ELC	1970	62		 NWA	no	wider	linkages,	ELC	1970;	O’Brien	1981:	42-8;	Lynch	on	union	participation,	Irish	Press,	20.10	70;	“bolted	on”,	Roche	2009:	188;	European	reforms	and	unrest	“abating”,	Frieden	2007:	350,	367-9;	strike	“league”,	Nevin	1980:	172	63		 “in	ruins”,	McCarthy,	C.	1973:	180;	Prices	Commission,	Hardiman	1988:	49;	Whitaker	proposals,	ICTU	AR	1971:	135;	establishment	of	NESC,	NESC	1974	
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and	also	 its	acceptance	of	a	minimal	NWA	framework	 following	 the	removal	of	Haughey,	the	volte-face	by	the	ITGWU	precipitating	the	end	of	Haughey’s	NIEC/	ELC	 project	 after	 his	 sacking	 from	 government	 had	 a	 further	 aspect,	demonstrating	the	wider	impact	of	politics	on	the	fortunes	of	Irish	tripartitism.		
Haughey,	the	ITGWU	and	the	suspension	of	tripartitism				 Haughey’s	relationship	with	the	unions	was	through	the	ITGWU,	for	whom	he	represented,	 in	 the	 Lemassian	 mould,	 both	 Fianna	 Fáil’s	 technocratic	 social	democratic	 wing	 and	 its	 republicanism,	 or	 popular	 nationalism.	 For	 ITGWU	leaders,	these	formed	a	continuum,	threatened	by	the	events	of	May	1970.			 The	ITGWU/Haughey	bond	might	seem	to	conflict	with	Haughey’s	image	as	a	wealthy	man,	 the	origins	of	whose	wealth	his	constituency	adversary,	Labour’s	Conor	Cruise	O’Brien,	first	made	a	bone	of	contention	in	1969.	O’Brien	attacked	him	for	his	role	in	fund-raising	for	Fianna	Fáil	among	business	circles,	and	for	his	fortuitous	 purchase	 of	 a	 run-down	 country	 house	 with	 land	 in	 Raheny,	 near	where	 he	 grew	 up,	 which	 had	 reaped	 a	 dividend.	 But	 many	 contemporaries,	including	 Irish	 Times	 editor	 Douglas	 Gageby,	 dismissed	 these	 attacks	 as	 mere	political	 sniping.	 Haughey	 was	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 a	 group	 of	 businessmen	 and	reforming	Fianna	Fáil	politicians	who	saw	themselves	as	“modernising	Ireland”,	and	had	been	entrusted	by	Lemass	with	developing	“Taca”	to	raise	party	 funds	from	business	circles.	Charges	of	having	accepted	money	to	fund	an	extravagant	lifestyle	 were	 to	 be	 levelled	 against	 him	 in	 later	 years,	 but	 acquaintances	described	 his	 pursuit	 of	 wealth	 as	 driven	 more	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 achieve	 status	among	 society	 leaders.	He	 also	 combined	his	 closeness	 to	wealthy	 circles	with	impatience	 with	 and	 disdain	 for	 the	 shoddiness	 of	 much	 of	 “backward”	 Irish	industry,	famously	deriding	Ben	Dunne	for	the	“drip-dry	shirts”	he	displayed	at	a	New	York	 trade	 fair	with	 the	 remark	 “where	 do	 you	 think	 you	 are	Dunne,	 the	fucking	Iveagh	Market?”	Property	developer	Pat	Gallagher	described	Haughey	as	determined	to	modernise	Ireland	by	creating	a	“national”	business	class	capable	of	 operating	 on	 the	 world	 stage,	 and	 he	 cultivated	 relations	 not	 only	 with	“national”	 entrepreneurs	 but	 also	with	wealthy	Anglo-Irish	 circles,	 such	 as	 the	Guinnesses,	Congreves	and	Hely-Hutchinsons.	Through	his	patronage	of	the	arts,	
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and	 initiatives	 such	 as	 ROSC,	 he	 aspired	 to	 raise	 the	 cultural	 horizons	 of	 the	
nouveau	riche	produced	by	Lemass’s	industrialisation.64			 Haughey’s	 social	 democratic	 tendency	was	 apparent	 -	 even	 before	 Lemass’s	first	Programme	–	in	his	1957	maiden	speech	in	the	Dáil,	in	which	he	advocated	an	 expansionist	 industrial	 policy,	 opening	 to	 foreign	 trade,	 shifting	 the	 public	service	 towards	 economic	 activism,	 and	 providing	 a	 capital	 budget	 for	 a	“dynamic	 programme	 of	 investment”.	 Ronan	 Fanning	 described	 him	 as	 “the	personification	of	Fianna	Fáil’s	 commitment	 to	planning	and	development”.	He	critiqued	 the	 “Left”	 for	 its	 propensity	 for	 confrontation,	 not	 its	 aims,	 as	 he	favoured	 improving	 wages	 and	 welfare	 and	 a	 national	 role	 for	 unions.	 As	Minister	 for	 Justice	 he	 instituted	many	 reforms,	 especially	 benefitting	women,	and	 attempted	 to	 initiate	 an	 inquiry	 into	 Church-controlled	 reformatories.	 At	Agriculture	 he	 confronted	 farmers	 over	 poor	 productivity	 and	 grant-seeking,	provoking	 a	 revolt	 by	 proposing	 to	 change	 farm	 subsidies	 from	 incomes	 to	investments,	though	also	boosted	the	“farmers’	dole”	to	counter	rural	poverty.	At	Finance	 he	 combined	 advocacy	 of	 industrialisation	 with	 financial	 discipline,	separated	out	the	capital	budget	and	produced	a	balanced	budget	each	year.65			 Haughey	 was	 also	 a	 champion	 of	 EEC	 accession,	 accompanying	 Lynch	 on	 a	tour	of	capitals	in	1967	to	advance	Ireland’s	case.	In	Paris	he	pressed	this	on	the	French	 foreign	 minister,	 despite	 de	 Gaulle’s	 continued	 hostility	 to	 British	membership.	 Against	 those	who	 claimed	 the	 economic	 restructuring	 accession	would	entail	ruled	out	Irish	membership	without	the	UK,	he	argued	that	the	EEC	would	be	obliged	 to	 support	 Irish	modernisation.	The	EEC	 leader	he	was	most	drawn	to	was	the	German	social	democrat	par	excellence,	Helmut	Schmidt.66			 Haughey’s	 republicanism	 was	 unexceptional	 in	 Fianna	 Fáil	 tradition.	 The	party	 had	 been	 founded	 on	 a	 platform	of	 completing	 sovereignty	 and	 giving	 it	substance	through	state-driven	economic	development.	This	was	how	de	Valera	
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could	 describe	 Lemass’s	 1959	 Programme	 as	 the	 embodiment	 of	 the	 party’s	founding	 principles.	 Both	 of	 Haughey’s	 parents	 had	 been	 active	 in	 the	independence	 struggle	 and	 he	 was	 reared	 in	 very	 modest	 circumstances,	educated	 through	 scholarship	 by	 the	 Christian	Brothers	 and	 at	UCD,	where	 he	excelled,	coming	first	in	Ireland	in	accountancy.	He	struggled	to	establish	himself	electorally,	but	was	assisted	by	minister	and	veteran	IRA	leader,	Oscar	Traynor,	whose	 ministerial	 assistant	 he	 became.	 Traynor,	 a	 social	 radical,	 had	 been	instrumental	in	bringing	Dublin’s	working	class	republican	base	to	Fianna	Fáil.67			 But	Haughey’s	 republicanism	was	 also	 distinctive	 in	 that	 he	was	 personally	acquainted,	through	family	ties,	with	conditions	in	the	North.	In	the	1950s	he	had	co-drafted	 a	 party	paper	 on	Northern	 strategy,	 often	 interpreted	 as	promoting	insurrection.	In	fact	it	described	a	revolt	as	inevitable	given	the	conditions	under	which	Catholics	lived,	and	proposed	that	the	state	prepare	to	intervene	when	it	occurred	 to	 channel	 it	 towards	 reform	under	Dublin	 direction.	 As	Minister	 for	Justice	 he	 justified	 de	 Valera’s	 wartime	 suppression	 of	 the	 IRA	 as	 essential	 to	defend	Neutrality	and	in	1960	dealt	with	the	IRA	border	campaign	with	special	courts	and	internment.	His	allegiance	to	the	state	was	unequivocal,	his	political	
raison	d’etre,	as	reflected	by	the	minimalist	defence	he	mounted	in	the	arms	trial,	leaving	 the	military	 defendants	 to	 argue	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 case	 and	 voting	confidence	 in	Lynch	after	his	acquittal.	He	was	no	“subversive”,	and	during	 the	somewhat	 illusory	 Lemass/	 O’Neill	 détente,	 Agriculture,	 while	 Haughey	 was	minister,	was	one	of	few	areas	where	a	degree	of	cross-border	cooperation	was	achieved.	 But	 that	 he	 was	 a	 serious	 nationalist	 is	 undoubted.	 In	 late	 1969	 he	startled	British	officials	by	confidentially	suggesting	to	them	that	Stormont	was	unreformable,	a	renewed	“Lemass/O’Neil-type	honeymoon”	a	“foolish	idea”,	and	the	only	solution	a	joint	British-Irish	government	deal	which	could	involve	Irish	concessions	including	even	military	bases	or	NATO	membership.68		 Haughey	 had	 grown	 up	 in	 Donnycarney,	 a	 working	 and	 lower	middle	 class	district	on	the	city’s	then	northern	fringe,	with	a	strong	trade	union	presence.	By	background	he	did	not	differ	greatly	from	leading	Dublin	union	leaders,	such	as																																																									67		 De	Valera	on	Lemass	programme,	McCarthy,	J.F.	1990b:	53-4;	Haughey	biography,	Maume	2007	68		 on	1950s	memo,	Ó	Béacháin	2010:	234-5;	“falsely	interpreted”,	Kelly	2016:	29-36;	Haughey	on	wartime	executions,	UCD:	P176/347;	North/South	agricultural	cooperation,	Ó	Béacháin	2010;	on	“minimalist”	arms	trial	defence,	Clifford,	A.	2009,	and	suggestions	to	British,	FO	reports	in	ibid.:	661-3	
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the	 ITGWU	 John	Carroll,	 also	 a	 scholarship-enabled	Christian	Brothers	 boy.	He	built	a	base	first	from	the	local	GAA,	in	which	he	had	excelled	as	a	player,	and	the	part-time	 defence	 forces,	 the	 FCA,	 in	 which	 he	 was	 a	 local	 officer.	 He	 did	 not	share	 in	 popular	 moralising	 at	 the	 “irresponsibility”	 of	 striking	 workers	 or	protesting	 activists,	 describing	 these	 as	 a	 “symptom	 of	 success”,	 as	 people	seeking	to	better	their	lot	in	the	new	wealth	and	expanding	freedoms	of	the	time.	He	 advocated	 resolving	 industrial	 conflict	 through	 institutional	 reform,	worker/employer	collaboration	in	expanding	national	wealth,	and	state	funding	of	union	and	management	organisations	to	modernise	and	professionalise	them.	He	 cultivated	 relations	 both	 with	 business	 and	 union	 leaders,	 especially	 the	party’s	 natural	 allies	 in	 the	 ITGWU.	 Haughey	 regarded	 himself	 as	 a	 political,	rather	 than	 business,	 entrepreneur,	 and	 recognised	 a	 similar	 trait	 in	 such	leaders.	These	relations	were	of	a	type	with	those	fostered	by	Lemass,	but	which	Lynch,	from	a	non-republican	Cork	trader	background,	never	achieved.69			 These	 relationships	 help	 explain	 how	 Haughey’s	 sacking	 and	 arraignment,	which	 were	 part	 of	 the	 general	 disorientation	 of	 Irish	 politics	 due	 to	 the	Northern	 crisis,	 nearly	 collapsed	 tripartitism	 too.	 The	 Haughey-ITGWU	relationship	had	been	pivotal	to	its	re-emergence,	and	his	removal	fatal	to	it.			 The	 ITGWU	was	 the	most	 republican	union	 in	 the	 ICTU.	Republicanism	was	still	 a	 strong	 force	 in	working	 class	 culture	 and	hence	 in	 the	 ITGWU’s	outlook.	Haughey’s	 main	 contact	 with	 the	 ITGWU	 was	 its	 powerful	 general	 secretary,	Michael	Mullen,	an	ex-Labour	TD	who	had	served	time	for	IRA	activities.	Mullen	had	tacitly	supported	pre-“Troubles”	IRA	social	activism,	which	had	included	an	incendiary	 incident	 at	 EI,	 General	 Electric’s	 Shannon-based	 Irish	 subsidiary,	 in	support	 of	 a	 seminal	 union	 recognition	 dispute.	 This	 action	 had	 nipped	 in	 the	bud	plans	by	some	multinationals,	then	just	starting	to	invest	in	Ireland,	to	avoid	unionisation,	and	led	to	the	“sweetheart”	agreements,	especially	with	the	ITGWU,	arranged	by	the	IDA	with	 incoming	companies	thereafter.	The	ITGWU	was	also	the	 only	 “southern”	 union,	 apart	 from	 the	 INTO,	 to	 organise	 among	 Northern	Catholic	 workers.	 Many	 of	 its	 Northern	members,	 such	 as	 Belfast	 “Republican																																																									69		 on	FCA	and	GAA	networks,	interviews	with	Kate	Nugent	and	Eoin	Brett	and	material	on	the	Haughey	family	website	www.charlesjhaughey.ie;	Haughey	on	social	unrest	and	unions,	‘The	Future	of	the	Left’,	speech	at	TCD	08/03/61,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	3-4,	‘Protest	stems	from	Progress’,	22/05/69,	ibid.	109-10;	on	enterprising	union	leaders,	Haughey	2014		
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Labour”	MP	and	ITGWU	official	Paddy	Devlin,	were	prominent	in	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	the	military	defence	of	Catholic	areas	in	1969-70.	Some	became	early	victims	of	the	conflict.	During	attempts	to	bring	support,	including	arms,	to	besieged	Northern	communities	–	as	publicly	demanded	by	Devlin	and	others	-	Mullen	 liaised	 with	 the	 government’s	 “Distress	 Committee”	 managed	 by	Haughey.	A	Belfast	ITGWU	executive	member	was	arrested	on	arms	charges	and	Mullen	 himself	 prosecuted	 for	 possession	 of	 a	 gun.	 He	 was	 later	 involved	 in	secret	cease-fire	talks	with	the	British,	and	when	he	died	in	1983	his	family	had	Haughey	unveil	his	memorial	in	the	Republican	Plot	in	Glasnevin.70		 The	arms	crisis	and	Lynch’s	volte-face	ended	government	intervention	in	the	Northern	 crisis,	 stabilising	 the	 state	 by	 disentangling	 it	 from	 the	 conflict.	 This	retreat	would	propel	the	Catholic	revolt	into	autonomous	channels	–	as	Haughey	had	warned	a	decade	previously	–	but	insulated	the	Republic	from	it.	According	to	Martin	O’Donoghue,	Lynch	embraced	the	EEC	to	avoid	the	“Republican	trap	of	the	North”,	and	his	1977	election	manifesto	devoted	just	two	paragraphs	to	it.71			 Lynch’s	abandonment	of	a	Northern	intervention	policy	and	his	sacrificing	of	Haughey	 and	 others	 to	 achieve	 it	 destroyed	 the	 ITGWU’s	 willingness	 to	cooperate	with	his	government.	The	union	continued	to	urge	direct	support	for	the	Northern	minority,	 including	within	ICTU,	and	to	oppose	security	measures	directed	against	republicans	by	both	Lynch	and	the	succeeding	coalition,	though	some	 in	 the	 ITGWU	 dissented	 from	 this.	 Mullen	 lost	 the	 Labour	 whip	 in	 the	Senate	by	voting	against	the	Emergency	Powers	Act,	as	did	later	another	ITGWU	Senator,	Chris	Kirwan,	for	a	similar	reason.	The	ITGWU’s	discontent	with	Lynch’s	change	of	Northern	policy	was	thus	a	significant	factor	in	its	June	1970	ending	of	ICTU’s	policy	cooperation	with	government,	including	on	the	NIEC,	which	was	no	longer	under	Haughey’s	direction	but	that	of	Colley	and	Whitaker.72		
																																																								70		 On	Mullen	and	EI	incident,	and	“sweetheart”	deals,	Inf.	from	the	late	Conor	Lynch,	at	the	time	a	Cork	IRA	activist,	also	Allen,	K.	1997:	129,	Roche	1994:	139,	Devine	2009:	523,	532,	605,	649;	ITGWU	victims	of	Northern	crisis,	Liberty	passim	1969-72,	Devine	2009:	602,	701;	Mullen	and	Haughey’s	Committee,	Devine	2009:	517,	1094;	ITGWU	NC	member	imprisoned,	Devine	2009:	599;	Mullen	charged,	Irish	Times,	27.02.1971;	Mullen	in	truce	talks,	Puirséil	2007:	296;	Glasnevin,	Haughey,	‘Tribute	to	Michael	Mullen’	06/11/83,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	784-5	71		 “autonomous	channels	“,Walsh,	P.	2016;	O’Donoghue	in	Begg	2016:	164;	“manifesto”,	Fianna	Fáil	1977	72		 ITGWU	urges	intervention,	ICTU	EC	Special	Meetings	18.08	and	03.09.71;	ITGWU	members	dissent	on	NI	position,	Allen	1997:	146-50	and	Devine	2009:	599,	641-3;	Kirwan	loses	whip,	Horgan	1986:	137	
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Chapter	3		
Politics	of	retreat	and	revival	1970-81		
Asymmetric	impact:	tripartitism	in	the	1970	Northern	crisis				 The	 context	 of	 the	 ITGWU’s	 abrupt	 about-turn	 on	 national	 pay	 strategy	following	Haughey’s	sacking	had	other	repercussions.	Talks	between	the	ITGWU	and	WUI	on	amalgamation,	which	were	nearing	fruition,	broke	down	after	WUI	leaders	denounced	Haughey	as	the	centre	of	a	“bourgeois”	conspiracy	to	revive	“the	 decaying	 Nationalism	 of	 the	 North”	 and	 divide	 workers	 along	 “sectarian	lines”.	The	union	had	been	founded	on	socialist	principles	in	the	1920s	as	a	split	from	 the	 ITGWU,	 and	 by	 the	 1960s	 its	 leaders	 regarded	 republicanism	 as	 a	nationalist	distraction	from	“class	politics”.	Prior	to	the	Northern	crisis,	with	the	national	issue	not	prominent,	common	left-wing	views	had	brought	the	WUI	and	ITGWU	closer,	reviving	amalgamation	talks	and	leading	both	to	re-affiliate	to	the	Labour	Party.	But	the	old	rift	now	re-opened,	with	the	Northern	conflict	central.	This	 was	 reflected	 in	 a	 new	 but	 bitterly	 personal	 animosity	 between	 anti-Republican	WUI	leader	Frank	Cluskey	and	Michael	Mullen	of	the	ITGWU.1			 The	crisis	also	reinforced	ITGWU	hostility	to	British-based	unions,	which	had	been	 challenging	 it	 industrially	 through	 competitive	wage	militancy	 but	which	now	also,	with	their	large	membership	among	Northern	protestant	workers	and	despite	the	CP-inspired	outlook	of	many	of	their	leaders	and	activists,	the	ITGWU	and	 others	 accused	 of	 tacit	 complicity	 in	 discrimination	 against	 Northern	Catholics.	 Of	 the	 eleven	members	 of	 ICTU’s	Northern	 Ireland	 Committee	 (NIC)	just	one	–	 though	 the	chair	 -	was	a	Catholic,	 and	of	78	 full	 time	union	officials,	just	16	were	Catholics,	almost	all	in	“Catholic”	unions	like	the	ITGWU	or	INTO.	An	activist	 later	 prominent	 on	 the	 NIC,	 Andrew	 Boyd,	 recalled	 the	 influence	 of	Freemasons	 even	 in	 the	militant	AEU,	 and	how	when	 starting	his	 career	 as	 an	official	he	had	been	advised	to	join	them	if	he	wished	to	“get	on”.2	
																																																										1		 “bourgeois	strategy”,	WUI	ADC	1970,	Irish	Times	11.05.70	and	Hanley	and	Millar	2009;	on	the	new	Cluskey/Mullen	antagonism,	Horgan	1986:	137			2		 ITGWU	suspicions	of	ATGWU	in	the	North,	Merrigan	1991;	NIC	and	officials,	Campaign	for	Social	Justice	1969;	Boyd	and	“Freemasons”,	O’Connor,	E.	2019:	99	
	 65	
	 ICTU	had	over	90	affiliated	unions,	the	great	majority	small,	craft	or	sectional	ones.	 British-based	 unions	 accounted	 for	 less	 than	 15	 per	 cent	 of	 total	membership,	based	mainly	in	the	North	though	rapidly	expanding	in	the	South,	while	the	two	general	unions,	the	ITGWU	and	WUI,	accounted	together	for	30	per	cent.	 On	 wage	 policy	 there	 was	 a	 block	 of	 about	 20	 per	 cent,	 mainly	 public	service	 unions,	 supporting	 central	 agreements,	 especially	 on	 public	 pay,	 while	British-based,	craft	and	sectional	groups,	which	were	on	principle	committed	to	“free”,	i.e.	non-centralised,	collective	bargaining,	had	a	combined	total	of	25	per	cent.	How	the	two	large	general	unions	“swung”	was	thus	decisive,	and	as	long	as	they	favoured	a	central	deal,	there	was	a	given	majority	for	it.	But	the	ITGWU’s	turn	after	Haughey’s	sacking	created	an	ICTU	majority	against	policy	cooperation	with	government,	though	accepting	the	purely	pay-orientated	NWA.		 An	example	of	the	movement’s	changed	political	orientation	under	nationalist	pressure	 arising	 from	 the	 Northern	 revolt	 was	 ICTU’s	 change	 of	 policy	 on	 the	EEC.	 A	 decade	 previously,	 and	 despite	 reservations	 and	 left-wing	 and	 British-union	 opposition,	 ICTU	 had	 backed	 the	 government’s	 application,	with	 ITGWU	support	 decisive.	 In	 1967	 the	 ICTU,	 again	 with	 ITGWU	 support,	 backed	 the	renewed	application.	But	in	mid-1970,	at	the	height	of	the	arms	crisis,	the	ITGWU	suddenly	changed	to	strident	opposition	to	both	government	and	its	EEC	policy.	Leaders	 who	 previously	 had	 supported	 accession	 now	 vigorously	 opposed	 it,	many,	 like	 the	 rising	Dublin	 firebrand	 and	 ITGWU	Vice-President	 John	 Carroll,	adopting	 the	arguments	of	previously	marginal	 left-nationalist	anti-EEC	groups	such	as	the	Wolfe	Tone	Society,	Sinn	Féin	and	the	Irish	Workers	League.3			 The	 ITGWU’s	 change	 of	 position	 had	 wide	 ramifications,	 not	 only	 for	 its	relationship	with	 Fianna	 Fáil.	 In	 the	 pre-“Troubles”	 1969	 election	 Labour,	 like	the	unions,	had	not	campaigned	against	EEC	membership.	This	now	changed	as	Labour	 politicians,	 influenced	 by	 the	 ITGWU	 to	 believe	 in	 a	 growing	 working	class	disenchantment	with	 the	EEC,	 came	out	 in	mid-1970	 to	oppose	 it.	Newly	elected	TDs	Justin	Keating,	Conor	Cruise	O’Brien	and	David	Thornley,	backed	by	party-leader	Brendan	Corish,	issued	an	anti-EEC	manifesto,	co-signed	not	only	by																																																											3	 ICTU	position	1961,	Murphy,	G.	2009:	171-235;	initial	ITGWU	position,	ITGWU	AR	1962:	67	and	ICTU	1962:	227-30;	1967	position,	ICTU	AR	1968;	Mullen	and	Kennedy	at	ICTU	ADC	1971;	on	the	left	groups	and	ITGWU	support,	Treacy	2012	and	O’Halpin	2012	
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traditional	 anti-EEC	 union	 figures	 but	 now	 also	 by	 prominent	 ITGWU	 leaders.	Keating	declared	that	“the	origins	of	the	EEC	lie	in	Hitler’s	New	Order”	and	Barry	Desmond,	 a	 former	 ICTU	 officer	 later	 prominent	 in	 the	 European	 Movement,	castigated	 it	 as	 a	 “neo-colonial	 trading	 block”	 dominated	 by	 a	 “cartel	 of	multi-national	 companies”.	 Within	 two	 years	 Cruise	 O’Brien,	 Keating	 and	 Desmond	would	be	among	the	most	ardent	champions	of	the	EEC	in	government.4			 The	media	 were	 taken	 by	 surprise	 when	 the	 ITGWU	 conference	 in	 January	1971,	which	was	characterised	by	general	attacks	on	government	across	many	areas,	 including	 the	North,	 voted	 “virtually	unanimously”	 to	 oppose	EEC	entry.	Carroll	 became	 a	 regular	 speaker	 at	 anti-EEC	 rallies,	 and	 the	 new	 ITGWU	position,	 to	 the	 dismay	 of	 many	 even	 in	 Congress,	 ensured	 that	 ICTU’s	 own	conference	 two	 weeks	 later	 adopted	 the	 same	 stance.	 Lynch	 retaliated	 by	rejecting	ICTU’s	request	for	a	representative	on	the	Irish	negotiating	team.	In	the	event	the	electorate	voted	by	83	per	cent	to	join	the	EEC,	though	a	poll	showed	a	lower	though	still	60	per	cent	majority	of	ITGWU	members	favouring	accession.5		 ITGWU	 friction	 with	 the	 Lynch	 government	 from	May	 1970	 thus	 had	 deep	roots	beyond	mere	industrial	relations.	These	informed	its	negative	stance	in	the	EEC	referendum,	which	Haughey	would	certainly	not	have	shared.	Nevertheless,	ITGWU	 leaders	maintained	 their	 links	with	 him,	 inviting	 him	 in	 October	 1970	immediately	 following	 his	 acquittal	 to	 address	 the	 full	 union	 Executive,	 an	honour	unprecedented	for	a	“capitalist”	politician.6		
Corporatist	minimalism:	the	NWA	system,	1971-76		 Despite	 the	 disruption	 of	 the	 Northern	 conflict,	 the	 minimalist	 NWA	 that	survived	from	Haughey’s	more	ambitious	1970	tripartite	plan	proved	durable,	a	series	of	similar	12	to	15-month	agreements	following	up	to	1978.	Government,	nominally	involved	only	as	an	employer,	continued	with	the	structure	as	at	least	providing	an	element	of	order	in	a	disorderly	wages	system	and	especially	as	a																																																											4		 on	1969	housing	demonstrations,	Ó	Béacháin	2010:	278,	IT	22.01.69;	change	of	Labour	policy	mid-1970,	Puirséil	2007:	297,	300-1,	O’Halpin	2012:	143-4	and	Collins,	S.	2012:	155-6;	Labour	EEC	“Manifesto”,	
Irish	Times	19.09.70;	Keating	quoted	in	Collins,	S.	2012:	156-7	and	Desmond	in	ICTU	AR	1971:	380-411;	“most	ardent	supporters”,	Collins	2012:	158-9	and	O’Halpin	2012			5		 “virtually	unanimously”,	Irish	Times	24.01.1971;	ICTU	conference	position,	ICTU	AR	1971:	381-425;	Lynch	response,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	July	1971	item	4480;	ITGWU	vote	and	poll,	Devine	2009:	629			6		 Haughey	invite,	Liberty,	Nov.	1970	and	speech	at	meeting,	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	141	
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framework	 for	 pubic	 pay.	 Minimal	 tripartitism	 survived	 through	 secondary	bodies,	 but	 neither	 Lynch	 nor	 his	 coalition	 successors	 sought	 any	 return	 to	Haughey’s	wider	framework.	The	NIEC	had	been	disestablished	and	Hardiman	describes	 its	weaker	 reincarnation	 as	 the	NESC	 as	 differing	 “in	 function	 from	the	 earlier	 body”,	 its	 reports	 “informative	 policy-oriented	 documents	 rather	than	 consensus-building	 exercises”,	 with	 dissenting	 opinions	 “frequently	appended”.	 As	with	 Lynch,	 the	 Cosgrave	 coalition	was	 strongly	 influenced	 by	Central	Bank	governor,	T.K.	Whitaker,	who	 in	1974	urged	 it	 against	 "allowing	the	unions	to	set	the	tone	of	the	negotiations".	"It	should	be	for	the	government	to	 take	 the	 initiative	 in	 securing,	 either	 by	 agreement	 or,	 failing	 that,	 by	statutory	 enforcement,	 a	 limit	 on	 income	 increases”.	 Unions	 should	 be	 made	“agree	to	this	course	of	action	in	advance	of	any	concessions	…	in	the	budget”.7			 The	1970s	economy	was	hit	by	the	global	monetary,	inflation	and	oil	crises,	the	 growth	 of	 the	 1960s	 replaced	 by	 stagnation.	 But	 the	 turbulence	 of	 an	opening	economy	continued,	accelerated	by	EEC	accession	in	1973.	The	“Third	Programme”,	driven	from	1972	by	the	state’s	first	recourse	to	deficit	budgeting,	initially	 continued,	 driving	 an	 expansion	 of	welfare	 state	 and	 social	 spending.	Liberalised	 trade	 led	 the	 workforce	 to	 expand,	 accelerated	 migration	 from	agriculture	 into	 industry	 and	 improved	 industrial	 performance,	 with	 output	rising	over	the	decade	by	62	per	cent	and	exports	increasing	to	40	per	cent	of	output,	mainly	 through	 foreign	 firms.	But	 industrial	development	was	uneven,	with	new,	mostly	FDI-financed	plants	increasing	employment	in	“less	developed	regions”	 by	 57	 per	 cent	 while	 traditional	 industries	 closing	 saw	 employment	contract,	mostly	in	the	cities,	by	over	20	per	cent.	Job	losses	in	older	industries	rose	 from	 4,000	 in	 1970	 to	 19,000	 in	 1975,	 with	 an	 “unprecedented	 rate	 of	change”	seeing	92,000	new	industrial	jobs	created	by	1980	that	had	not	existed	in	 1973	 while	 81,000	 older	 ones	 disappeared.	 Multi-national	 employment	expanded,	mainly	 in	 new	 centres,	while	 indigenous	manufacturing	 contracted	from	155,550	to	128,500,	in	a	relentless	process	of	“creative	destruction”,	but	at	a	cost	of	rising	union	discontent,	especially	in	Dublin.8		
																																																										7		 “providing	order”,	Murphy	and	Hogan	2008:	27;	Hardiman	1988:	62;	Whitaker	in	Chambers	2013:	240-1			8		 Programme	expansionism,	Bielenberg	and	Ryan,	2103:	31,	and	exports/output,	83-87;	IDA	job	figures	O’Riordan	1976:	101-14	and	White	1983:	51-72;	“creative	destruction”	Whelan,	Walsh	and	Qi	Li,	2007	
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	 In	 this	 turbulent	 economy,	 the	 NWAs	 enabled	 a	 generally	 orderly	 wage	development,	 particularly	 in	 the	public	 sector.	 They	 granted	percentage	wage	increases	tracking	inflation,	though	weighting	by	“flat”	 increases	improved	the	relative	 position	 of	 the	 low-paid.	 But	 as	 inflation	 often	 surpassed	 these	 rates,	successive	 agreements	 were	 often	 only	 narrowly	 agreed	 by	 unions.	 Varying	scope	 was	 provided	 for	 top-ups	 based	 on	 improved	 “productivity”	 through	clauses	open	to	interpretation,	and	these	precipitated	the	majority	of	disputes.	Employers	 in	distressed	 firms	could	claim	“inability	 to	pay”,	a	default	position	often	 pleaded	 by	 them	 at	 the	 Labour	 Court.	 The	 NWAs	 were	 poorly	 co-ordinated,	with	a	“bewildering	array”	of	start	and	end	dates	across	sectors.9			 Higher-wage	 multi-nationals	 drove	 wage	 expectations	 across	 the	 economy	and	the	momentum	of	plant-level	supplementary	“productivity”	claims	drove	a	steep	35	per	cent	increase	in	union	membership	over	the	decade,	to	527,000	or	65	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 workforce.	 Wages	 “chased”	 inflation,	 and	 while	 NWAs	maintained	a	kind	of	order,	productivity	 claims	drove	opportunist	bargaining,	with	 the	 incidence	of	 strikes,	 often	unofficial,	 remaining	high.	These	 averaged	500,000	work-days	 a	 year,	 a	 strike	 rate	 surpassing	 even	 that	 of	 Britain	 in	 its	1978	“winter	of	discontent”	and	second	only	to	Italy	in	Europe	by	1979.10			 These	strikes,	though	numerous,	involved	relatively	few	workers,	on	average	just	 40,000	 annually.	 In	most	 of	 industry,	 where	wages	 averaged	 just	 70	 per	cent	 of	 British	 rates	 and	 employers	 sought	 to	 suppress	 these	 low	 wages	 to	maintain	“competitiveness”,	workers	relied	on	the	NWAs	to	gradually	improve	their	basic	position.	But	the	leeway	for	local	bargaining	meant	that	in	stronger	industries	 the	 NWAs	 were	 remembered	 by	 employers	 as	 having	 “failed	miserably	 to	 keep	 wage	 growth	 in	 check”,	 an	 opinion	 shared	 by	 some	 union	leaders.	 Exaggerating	more	 than	 a	 little,	 Phil	 Flynn	 later	 conceded	 the	 NWAs	were	 “more	 honoured	 in	 the	 breach	 than	 the	 observance”	 and	 Bill	 Attley	recalled	“the	heady	days	of	the	seventies”	when	“the	only	issue	...	confronting	us	was	whether	...	[to]	take	the	money	centrally	or	at	the	level	of	the	enterprise”.11		
																																																									9	 O’Brien	1981;	also	Gunnigle	et	al.	1999:	113,	194-9			10		 MNCs	and	wages,	O’Gorman	and	Carroll	1987:	150;	union	members,	Nevin	1994:	393,	strike	figures	172	11		 strike	figures,	Nevin	1994:	395-97;	employer	view,	Hardiman	1988;	Flynn	view,	Hastings	et	al	2007:	28;	Attley	in	ICTU	ADC	1986:	221	
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	 The	 turbulence	 in	 industry	 was	 thus	 again	 largely	 a	 consequence	 of	 weak	institutions,	which	was	naturally	exploited	by	workers	to	improve	their	position	in	 the	absence	of	 alternative	options	or	 legal	 rights.	This	was	 compounded	by	sociological	factors.	Industrial	transformation	brought	social	change	as	Ireland	moved	 from	 a	mainly	 agricultural	 to	 an	 industrial	 society.	 Conflict	 was	more	common	less	in	traditional	sectors	with	long-unionised	workforces	than	in	new	industrial	plants,	often	located	in	previously	non-industrial	towns	and	involving	new	workers,	“many	rural	and	new	to	unionisation”,	in	towns	such	as	Askeaton	and	 Fermoy.	 British	 shop-floor	militancy	was	 an	 added	 influence,	 brought	 by	thousands	 of	 emigrants	 returning	 to	 take	 up	 the	 new	 jobs	 at	 home,	 Ford’s	expanding	mega-plant	in	Cork	being	a	case	in	point.	The	institution	of	the	“shop	steward”,	hitherto	unknown	outside	Dublin,	spread	rapidly.12			 Weak	 institutions	 also	 facilitated	 debilitating	 inter-union	 disputes	 and	membership	 “poaching”,	 especially	 in	 the	 expanding	 engineering	 and	building	sectors	 where	 labour	 shortage	 and	 competitive	 militancy	 drove	 wages,	strengthening	the	anti-central	agreement	forces	in	Congress.	The	phenomenon	was	epitomised	by	the	dispute	at	the	Dutch-owned	Ferenka	plant	in	Limerick.	It	finally	 closed	 despite	 efforts	 by	 the	 ITGWU	 to	 achieve	 a	 compromise	 through	the	 traditional	 route	 of	 the	 Labour	Court	 and	 government	 intervention,	when	the	 sectional	 break-away	 MPGWU	 exploited	 what	 it	 ridiculed	 as	 ITGWU	“moderation”	to	“militantly”	outflank	it	on	the	shop	floor	with	higher	demands.	This	 dynamic	 across	 industry	 assisted	 marginal	 sectional	 and	 amalgamated	unions	 to	grow	at	 the	expense	of	 traditional	ones.	Membership	of	 the	British-based	 ATGWU	 in	 the	 Republic	 trebled	 to	 nearly	 20,000,	 as	 did	 that	 of	 the	“maverick”	 AGEMOU	 and	 MPGWU,	 while	 the	 ITGWU,	 despite	 a	 growing	workforce,	grew	only	modestly	from	162,478	to	185,566	over	the	decade.	Shop	stewards	committees,	a	new	institution,	emerged,	which	companies,	to	maintain	production,	 had	 to	 engage	with,	 rather	 than	with	 official	 structures.	 By	 1977,	
																																																								12		 workers’	options,	McCarthy,	C.	1966;	“rural	and	new”,	Devine,	2009:	684-5,	also	Wickham	1980;	“British”	influence,	Int.	Ó	Raghallaigh;	“shop	stewards”,	Int.	Geraghty	
	 70	
nearly	half	of	all	strike-days	lost	were	in	“unofficial”	disputes	as	“management	abdicated	its	responsibilities”,	as	one	company	study	lamented.13			 A	 parallel	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 1970s	was	 a	 large	 expansion	 of	 the	welfare	state	and	hence	of	employment	in	education,	health,	welfare	and	state	agencies,	and	 the	 effective	 nationalisation	 of	 working	 relations	 in	 formally	 voluntary	bodies	 such	 as	 hospitals.	Women	 entered	 the	workforce,	 particularly	 through	these	public	services,	after	the	“marriage	bar”	was	lifted	and	equality	legislation	introduced	 following	EEC	membership,	 soon	 accounting	 for	 40	per	 cent	 of	 all	union	members.	Though	public	 sector	disputes	were	 constant,	 especially	over	“relativity”	claims,	the	1976	upgrading	of	the	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	(C&A)	service	 -	 an	 exception	 as	 an	 institutional	 innovation	 in	 this	 period	 -	 enabled	most	“special	claims”	to	be	managed	without	resort	to	strikes.14			 Barbara	Castle’s	In	Place	of	Strife	had	influenced	Haughey’s	1969-70	initiative	proposing	 a	 “tripartite	 system”	 encompassing	 pay,	 industrial	 relations	 reform	and	 industrial	 policy.	 Escalating	 conflict	 in	 British	 industry	 saw	 further	initiatives,	notably	Heath’s	1971	Industrial	Relations	Act	which	was	defeated	by	a	miners’	strike,	and	Wilson’s	Bullock	Commission	of	1975,	which	would	report	in	 1977	 recommending	 a	 continental-style	 “industrial	 democracy”	 solution.	Reforms	 in	 many	 European	 countries	 widening	 worker	 participation	 ended	widespread	industrial	conflict,	and	in	1975	the	European	Commission	proposed	that	company	law	be	amended	across	Europe	along	such	lines.15			 But	 neither	 Lynch	 nor	 the	 succeeding	 coalition	 undertook	 any	 comparable	reforms,	Finance	Minister	Richie	Ryan	disparaging	economic	planning	in	1975	as	based	on	“irrelevancies	in	the	past,	hunches	as	to	the	present	and	clairvoyance	as	to	the	future”.	One	exception	was	the	transposing	into	Irish	law	of	EEC	equal	pay	and	equality	provisions	in	1974,	and	Michael	O’Leary’s	White	Paper	of	1976	on	worker	 directors	 in	 state	 industries.	 But	 these	 were	 minimalist	 reforms,	 with	government	disappointing	ICTU	on	worker	directors	and	seeking	to	defer	equal																																																									13		 sectional	disputes	and	anti-agreement	tendency,	ICTU	ARs	1972-78	and	Hardiman	1994:	151-3;	“Ferenka”,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.,	1977	passim,	Limerick	Socialist,	6,	1977:10	and	Devine,	2009:	614-9;	membership	figures,	Nevin	(ed.)	1994:	435-6	and	Devine	2009:	684;	unofficial	strike	rate,	Hardiman	1988:	221-2,	and	in	general,	Int.	Geraghty;	Waterford	management,	Cooke	1990	14		 On	women,	Daly,	M.	1994;	white-collar,	Harold	O’Sullivan,	‘Opening	address	to	Seminar	organised	by	Dublin	Branches	LGPSU’,	17/10/1980,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2		15		 Castle	see	Chap.	2;	also	Bullock	1977;	European	reforms,	Frieden	2007:	350,	367-9;	Eur.	Comm.	1975		
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pay.	Even	when	this	was	rejected	by	the	European	Court,	it	was	implemented	in	such	a	way	as	to	provoke	further	disputes	to	clarify	it.	Equal	pay	was	only	finally	conceded	when	ICTU	threatened	to	withdraw	in	protest	from	the	NWA	itself.16		 The	NWA	did	evolve	somewhat,	with	government	conceding	some	linkage	to	budget	provisions,	as	sought	by	ICTU,	to	secure	an	agreement	during	the	1975	inflation	 crisis.	 It	 expanded	 food	 subsidies	 as	 a	 counter-inflationary	 measure	and	 a	 quid-pro-quo	 for	 a	 moderate	 settlement,	 and	 some	 in	 ICTU	 hoped	 to	exploit	this	as	a	lever	towards	a	return	to	a	wider	tripartitism.	Government	also	expanded	the	C&A	system	in	1976	to	mollify	public	sector	unions.	But	with	Fine	Gael	 intent	 on	 government	 autonomy	 and	 Labour,	 ever	 suspicious	 of	tripartitism,	 focused	 on	welfare	 state	 expansion,	 neither,	 as	 one	 study	 put	 it,	were	inclined	to	move	towards	“a	Scandinavian	style	corporatist	state”.17				 The	ICTU	itself	was	far	from	united	on	strategy.	The	dynamic	of	competitive	militancy	 and	 scope	 for	wage	 expansion	 through	 local	 bargaining	meant	 that	many	 unions	 –	 especially	 sectional	 and	 amalgamated	 groups	 –	 sought	 an	 end	even	 to	 the	modest	NWAs.	Leading	 ICTU	officials	were	also	ambiguous	on	 the	merits	of	NWAs.	General	secretary	Ruairi	Roberts,	and	his	later	successor,	Donal	Nevin,	 “careful,	 thoughtful	 men”	 from	 civil	 service	 backgrounds,	 had	 been	formed	by	the	Fabian	socialism	of	Labour’s	“Central	Branch”.	Their	preference	was	for	union	bargaining	freedom	and	a	Labour	Party	legislating	a	British-style	welfare	state.	They	distrusted	tripartitism	as	a	Fianna	Fáil-ITGWU	stratagem	to	decouple	 the	 unions	 from	 Labour	 and	 basically	 preferred	 the	 state’s	 role	 in	NWAs	to	be	confined	to	that	of	the	public	sector	employer.18			 Unions	 however	 were	 also	 “modernizing”	 in	 a	 form	 that	 increased	 their	preference	 for	 tripartite	policy	participation.	They	professionalised,	with	 ICTU	developing	 an	 extensive	 training/advisory	 service.	 Through	 this	 its	 state	funding	grew	to	exceed	its	union	affiliation	income	by	a	third,	and	this	expanded	capacity	 greatly	 enhanced	 its	 formerly	 meagre	 four-man	 full-time	 team.	 The	non-bureaucratic	and	 loose	coordinating	role	of	 the	 ICTU	 is	well	 illustrated	 in																																																									16		 Ryan	quoted	in	O’Riordan	1976;	O’Leary	White	Paper	and	equal	pay	controversy,	Int.	O’Donovan	and	documentation	in	ILHS:	LGPSU-2	17		 “lever”,	O’Brien	1981,	Roche	1994:	158,	Hardiman	1988;	C&A	system,	H.	O’Sullivan,	‘Revised	Scheme	of	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	(now	in	force)’,	n.d.	[1976],	ILHS	Archive:	LGPSU-2;	“Scandinavian”,	Murphy	and	Hogan	2008:	27	18		 Horgan	1986:	139-43:	“public	employer”,	Inf.	O’Riordan	
	 72	
the	multi-tasking	by	 this	 small	 core	of	officials.	Donal	Nevin,	 assistant	general	secretary,	 produced	 ICTU’s	 main	 publication,	 Trade	 Union	 Information,	 “with 
the assistance of his wife Maura and daughter Anne”. From	 1972	 the	ITGWU	built	a	research/training	capacity	of	its	own,	what	the	union’s	president,	Fintan	Kennedy,	called	a	“brain	bank	…	of	dedicated	experts”.	Many	officials	in	these	 services	 had	 a	 university	 education,	 a	 rarity	 in	 trade	 union	 circles	 a	decade	previously,	 or	were	members	 of	 left-wing	 intellectual	 groups.	Another	modernising	 influence	 was	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 white-collar	 unionism	 and	professional	organisations	affiliating	 to	 ICTU,	such	as	 tax	officials,	 civil	 service	technicians	 and	 even	middle	 management	 groups.	While	 on	 the	 other	 “side”,	employer	 bodies	 eschewed	 state	 funding,	 the	 state	 subsidised	 management	training	heavily,	enhancing	the	role	and	influence	of	bodies	such	as	IMI.19			 Interaction	 at	 EEC	 level	 had	 a	 further	 “modernising”	 effect.	 Irish	 business	organisations,	 particularly	 CII,	 engaged	 enthusiastically,	 opening	 an	 office	 in	Brussels	and	becoming	active	in	EEC	level	lobbying.	Irish	unions	had	previously	had	 few	 systematic	 international	 contacts	 beyond	 attending	 conferences,	 but	after	the	ETUC	was	founded	in	1974,	 ICTU	began	to	engage	enthusiastically	at	EEC	level.	The	role	of	EEC	legislation,	such	as	on	equal	pay,	workers’	rights	and	company	 law,	 converted	many	 previously	 sceptical	 trade	 unionists	 to	 a	more	benign	 view	 of	 the	 community.	 ICTU	 employed	 a	 “European	 Officer”,	 Patricia	O’Donovan,	 funded	 by	 an	 EEC	 grant,	 to	 explain	 and	 transmit	 European	directives,	and	ETUC	policies	came	to	play	an	increasing	role	 in	ICTU	strategy.	But	this	European	influence	should	not	be	exaggerated,	as	the	ETUC	was	itself	a	divided	 house,	 still	 excluding	 many,	 mostly	 communist	 inclined,	 national	federations,	and	its	consultative	role	at	EEC	level	was	as	yet	minimal.20		
From	tripartite	revival	to	“National	Understanding”,	1976-79		 ICTU,	with	the	general	unions	to	the	fore,	adopted	a	policy	in	1974,	proposed	by	the	ITGWU,	advocating	a	return	to	tripartite	“democratic	economic	planning”.	The	FWUI,	now	headed	by	Paddy	Cardiff,	supported	the	proposal,	 though	urged																																																									19		 Congress	staff	and	income,	ICTU	AR	1985:	46;	“sometimes	with	the	assistance”,	Nevin	obituary,	IT	22/12/2012;	“brain	bank”,	Devine	2009:	635	20		 On	CII,	Power	2009,	Int.	Power	and	O’Sullivan;	EEC	progressive”,	O’Donovan:	1999,	McCarthy,	S.	2013	and	Int	O’Donovan;	ETUC	influence,	Dølvik	1999:	43-76	
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that	 the	NESC	be	upgraded	 from	 its	current	 “purely	consultative	role”	 to	a	 “key	role	 in	 the	 actual	 formulation	 of	 the	 plan”.	 ICTU	 hosted	 a	 “summer	 school”	 in	1976,	addressed	by	union	leaders,	including	ITGWU	economist	Manus	O’Riordan,	as	well	as	CII	officials	and	former	top	civil	servant	T.K.	Whitaker.	Echoing	Larkin,	O’Riordan	 argued	 a	 sophisticated	 case	 for	 tripartite	 “economic	 and	 social	planning”.	Industrial	strategy	needed	to	balance	increased	employment	and	living	standards	 against	 “proper	 proportions	 of	 national	 output”	 being	 “allocated	between	 consumption,	 investment	 and	 public	 expenditure”.	 With	 a	 growing	population,	 30,000	 new	 jobs	would	 need	 to	 be	 created	 annually	 to	 achieve	 full	employment,	and	many	more	higher-quality	jobs	would	be	essential	if	the	aim	of	achieving	average	EEC	standards	of	living,	as	stated	in	the	Accession	Treaty,	was	to	be	realised.	With	living	standards	currently	just	45	per	cent	of	that,	a	plan	for	a	wholesale	 industrial	 restructure	 and	 upgrade	 was	 needed.	 Deciding	 priorities	was	 critical	 given	 that	 the	 current	 rate	 of	 public	 expenditure	 growth,	 which	exceeded	 that	 of	 GNP,	 could	 not	 continue,	 and	 financing	 it	 through	 increased	taxation	 only	 depressed	 living	 standards	 and	 consumption.	 Planning	 required	agreement	on	resource	allocation,	 including	wages	and	public	expenditure,	with	unions	needing	to	“prioritise	the	state	expenditure	…	crucial	to	meet	employment	targets”	 and	 agree	 managed	 wage	 growth	 compatible	 with	 these	 targets.	 The	NESC	was	the	appropriate	body	to	be	tasked	with	formulating	such	a	consensus.21			 The	ICTU	majority	for	such	a	strategy	in	the	1970s	was	narrow,	with	 leaders	cautious	of	 returning	 to	policy	compromises	and	unions	 trading	on	competitive	militancy	openly	hostile.	But	 it	was	 supported	by	 the	 leaders	of	 general	unions	that	had	been	at	 the	heart	of	 the	Lemassian	system,	the	ITGWU	and	FWUI,	who	also	sought	institutional	reforms	along	the	lines	proposed	by	the	British	Bullock	Commission.	 Civil	 service	 unions	 too	 supported	 such	 an	 approach,	 as	 did	 the	LGPSU,	the	largest	force	in	the	public	service.	O’Riordan’s	formula	for	a	tripartite	strategy	trading	wage	moderation	for	a	role	 in	planning	 industrial	development	and	resource	allocation,	with	the	NESC	at	its	core,	became	ICTU	policy	in	1976.22	
																																																								21		 O’Riordan	1976:	51-66	22		 Promoting	Bullock,	Liberty	1974-6	and	O’Riordan	1976b;	on	LGPSU,	O’Sullivan,	‘Industrial	Democracy	-	Worker	Participation	in	Decision	Making’,	13/01/76,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2;	ICTU	policy,	ICTU	1976b	
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	 Following	 the	 1975	NWA,	which	 included	 a	 cautious	 and	minimal	 linkage	 to	budget	policy,	ICTU	pressed	for	a	widening	to	a	full	tripartite	agreement.	In	1976,	in	deciding	on	the	latest	NWA,	several	unions	only	accepted	it	under	protest,	the	LGPSU	 proposing	 it	 be	 rejected	 “in	 its	 present	 format”	 and	 seeking	 a	 wider	framework	covering	job	protection,	welfare,	tax	reform	and	low-pay	security.	The	ITGWU,	when	balloting	on	it,	 for	the	first	time	rejected	an	NWA,	by	70	per	cent,	with	 the	 “sticking	 point”	 ostensibly	 employers’	 increasing	 resort	 to	 pleading	“inability	to	pay”.	But	the	real	reason	was	that	the	leadership	had	recommended	rejection	as	a	means	to	force	a	widening	of	the	NWA	to	a	“a	co-ordinated	policy	approach	over	the	whole	field	of	socio-economic	issues”.	The	NWA	proffered	by	government	 was	 finally	 accepted	 by	 an	 ICTU	 conference	 by	 240	 votes	 to	 215,	against	the	ITGWU’s	block	vote,	due	to	many	smaller	unions	usually	opposed	to	central	 agreements	 panicking	 at	 the	 consequences	 and	 voting	 in	 favour!	 The	following	year	 the	LGPSU	proposed	a	 return	 to	 free	collective	bargaining	 in	 the	absence	 of	 a	wider	 plan	 and	because	 of	 the	 “ever	 increasing	 restrictiveness”	 of	NWAs.	ICTU	concluded	a	final	NWA	with	the	coalition	in	March	1977,	though	only	on	condition	of	accompanying	tripartite	talks	“on	economic	and	social	matters”.23	This	offensive	by	the	ICTU	for	a	restoration	of	tripartitism,	and	particularly	the	ITGWU	revolt,	did	not	occur	in	a	vacuum.	Since	the	arms	trial,	Haughey	had	used	his	“wilderness	years”	to	rebuild	a	political	base,	within	and	outside	Fianna	Fáil,	not	through	factional	“clientelism”	alone,	as	often	claimed.	He	made	what	Conor	Lenihan	describes	as	an	“extraordinary	effort”	to	win	business	to	back	a	revival	of	the	economic	policy	approach	he	had	championed	at	Finance	and	also	cultivated	union	 leaders,	 especially	 the	 ITGWU’s	 Michael	 Mullen	 as	 well	 as	 its	 Vice-President,	John	Carroll,	whom	he	regularly	met.	These	impressed	on	him	ITGWU’s	ideas	 for	 a	 return	 to	 tripartitism,	 which	 Haughey	 eagerly	 adopted,	 requesting	copies	of	any	new	articles	by	O’Riordan.	He	combined	this	alliance	building	with	business	and	unions	with	repeated	attacks	on	government	borrowing	for	current	expenditure	rather	than	capital	investment,	and	also	directed	criticism	internally,	criticising	Colley’s	abandoning	of	balanced	budgets	and	the	party’s	expansionist																																																									23		 “under	protest”,	ICTU	AR	1977,	Roberts,	ICTU,	‘To	all	affiliated	unions.:	Proposed	Interim	Pay	Agreement.	Draft	encl.	EC	recommendation’,	22/07/76,	“enshrine”,	“To	Branch	Secretaries,	Documents	for	NEC	mtg.:	Proposed	Interim	NWA’,	09/08/76,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2;	“sticking	point”	Devine	2009:	609-11;	“restrictiveness”,	O’Sullivan	to	Branch	Secretaries,	‘Documents	for	NEC	meeting	-	Resolutions	adopted	at	Annual	Conference’,	09/08/76,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2;	“proviso”,	Devine	2009:	610	
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1977	manifesto,	written	by	O’Donoghue	and	O’Malley,	 from	the	 launch	of	which	he	 and	 Lenihan	 “silently	 absented	 themselves”.	 Though	 still	 excluded	 from	 the	inner	leadership,	Lynch	had	had	to	re-appoint	him	to	the	front	bench	in	1974.24		On	his	return	to	the	shadow	cabinet,	Haughey	used	an	invitation	to	address	a	conference	of	the	Dublin	Chartered	Accountants	–	a	body	he	had	helped	found	-	to	set	 out	 his	 ideas	 for	 a	 private	 sector-based,	 government-managed,	 industrial	transformation	within	a	fiscally	controlled	framework.	In	Lemassian	tradition,	he	proposed	 that	 this	 be	 developed	 through	 a	 “consensus”	 of	 government	 and	 the	major	social	interests.	These,	he	said,	could	pursue	their	rival	interests	separately	or	 their	 power	 could	be	harnessed	 in	 a	 common	national	 economic	 endeavour.	Echoing	Lemass’s	description	in	his	1945	address	to	the	ITUC	of	social	interests	as	productive	forces,	and	cleaving	to	ITGWU	policy,	Haughey	described	managing	the	wage/productivity	relationship	as	the	key	to	industrial	growth:		 “Trade	 union	 power	 is	 a	 socio-political	 fact	 which	 no	 legislation	 can	diminish	…	It	is	no	use	simply	preaching	to	the	trade	union	movement	that	the	containment	 of	wage	 claims	 is	 essential	 to	 future	 survival	…	 If	 the	 planning	process	does	not	permit	trade	union	power	to	be	exercised	in	developing	the	economic	 system	 we	 must	 not	 be	 surprised	 if	 it	 seeks	 its	 own	 ends	independently	…	The	vehicle	for	that	effort	can	only	be	participative	national	economic	planning”.				 Such	planning	required,	“as	an	essential	part	of	its	operation”,	“a	consultation	framework”	 in	which	 “the	 short	 term	 interests	of	 all	 groups	would	be	 thrashed	out	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 overall	 growth	 of	 the	 national	 income”	 and	 common	“outcome	policies	and	goals”	agreed.	These	were	not	perspectives	advocated	by	Lynch	and	Colley,	but	accorded	with	those	set	out	by	Manus	O’Riordan.25			 Fianna	 Fáil	 returned	 to	 power	 in	 1977	 on	 an	 expansionary	 programme.	 Tax	cuts	 and	 the	 abolition	 of	 domestic	 rates	 were	 to	 fuel	 consumption,	 which,	together	with	increased	borrowing,	would	finance	a	state-driven	industrial	drive	to	achieve	“full	employment”.	Called	by	Roche	Ireland’s	“Keynesian	interlude”,	it																																																									24		 “clientelism”,	Garvin	1981;	Lenihan	2015:	82;	Carroll	and	Haughey,	Hastings	et	al	2007;	“copies	of	articles”,	Int.	O’Riordan;	Haughey	on	coalition	investment,	Dáil	03/02/77;	opposes	manifesto,	Lenihan	2015:	87-8,	also	Whelan,	K.	2011:	194	25		 co-founds	association,	Inf.	Séamus	Lantry;	‘Speech	to	Dublin	Society	of	Chartered	Accountants’,	05/11/75,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	204-6	
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was	doomed	from	the	start	as	Keynes’	formula	applied	to	closed	economies	and	was	dysfunctional	in	a	vulnerable	open	economy	such	as	Ireland’s.	The	manifesto,	in	which	Haughey	 played	 no	 part,	made	 no	 reference	 to	wage	 agreements	 and	only	referred	to	“tripartitism”	 in	 its	proposal	 for	an	“Employment	Action	Team”	with	 business,	 unions	 and	 “community	 organisations”	 to	 develop	 “suitable	employment	 schemes	 for	 school	 leavers	 and	 other	 young	 people”.	 Actual	economic	 planning	 would	 be	 strictly	 in-house,	 as	 recommended	 by	 Whitaker,	under	 a	 new	 Department	 of	 Economic	 Planning	 and	 Development	 “consulting”	with	social	interests.	Martin	O’Donoghue,	a	TCD	economics	professor	and	another	Lynch	economic	policy	advisor,	was	appointed	Minister.26		 Whitaker’s	views	on	these	issues	heavily	influenced	Lynch	and	O’Donoghue.	As	Central	Bank	governor	he	had	made	clear	 to	 the	Cosgrave	coalition	 in	1974	his	hostility	to	ICTU	attempts	to	link	budget	policy	and	wage	bargaining.	Government	must	insist	on	“securing,	by	agreement	or,	failing	that,	by	statutory	enforcement,	a	limit	on	income	increases”	and	unions	must	agree	to	this	in	advance	of	budgets.	He	 set	 out	 his	 views	 on	 planning	 and	 tripartitism	 at	 the	 same	 1976	 ICTU	conference	 at	which	O’Riordan	 had	 presented	 the	 union	 case	 for	 a	 partnership	system.	Whitaker	argued	that	planning	was	the	prerogative	solely	of	government,	not	“social	partners”.	It	should	propose	a	plan	and	then	elicit	comments	through	“consultation”,	 with	 budgets	 serving	 as	 a	 “rolling”	 process	 of	 review	 and	adjustment.	Plan	targets	could	not	be	pre-agreed	and	should	involve	“indicative”	rather	 than	 “prescriptive”	 goals.	 “Democratic	 principles	 are	 not	 fully	 served	 by	consulting	 only	 the	 major	 organised	 interests”	 which	 were	 “not	 necessarily	coincident	with	the	general	community	 interest”.	Wage	regulation	was	essential	to	 investment	planning	but	to	ensure	restraint	“rather	than	 link[ing]	bargaining	about	 pay	 rounds	 with	 the	 annual	 budget”.	 As	 regards	 “the	 consensus	 issue”,	while	 consensus	 was	 useful	 for	 any	 plan,	 “the	 theory	 that	 people	 are	 always	reasonable	 …	 is	 not	 always	 valid”.	 “No	 Minister	 for	 Finance	 could	 expect	 the	advance	agreement	of	drinkers	to	an	 increased	tax	on	drink”	and	“there	 is	even	
																																																								26		 Roche	2009;	Fianna	Fáil	1977:	33	
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fainter	hope	of	trade	unions	agreeing	in	advance	to	a	temporary	pay	pause	or	pay	restraint”.	His	preference	was	clearly	for	statutory	wage	control.27		 ICTU	expressed	support	 for	Fianna	Fáil’s	expansionist	manifesto,	particularly	its	commitment	to	“full	employment”,	while	Labour-affiliated	unions	opposed	any	renewed	coalition	with	Fine	Gael	because	of	its	budgetary	policies.	A	poll	after	the	election	 showed	 that	 65%	 of	 organised	 workers	 had	 voted	 Fianna	 Fáil,	 with	support	among	skilled	workers	rising	since	1969	from	40	to	54	per	cent	as	those	who	had	voted	Labour	abandoned	it.	Other	issues	also	intruded,	with	ITGWU	also	opposing	 the	 coalition’s	Northern	policy	 and	Mullen	 resigning	 the	Labour	whip	over	the	Criminal	Law	Jurisdiction	Bill.	As	 the	Labour	Party	vote	collapsed,	 left-wing	factions	broke	away	to	form	a	short-lived	“Socialist	Labour	Party”	(SLP).28			 Following	the	election,	ICTU	reiterated	its	call	for	“participative	planning”	and	“the	extension	of	 collective	bargaining	and	 industrial	democracy”,	urging	Lynch	to	“push	the	frontiers	of	…	bargaining	beyond	the	field	of	wages	and	conditions”.	But	 Lynch,	 as	 when	 previously	 Taoiseach,	 embraced	 neither	 ICTU’s	 nor	Haughey’s	 advocacy	 of	 a	 return	 to	 tripartitism,	 and	 retained	 the	 NWA	 system,	while	 O’Donoghue’s	 department	 developed	 industrial	 strategy	 autonomously.	ICTU	meetings	with	Government	continued	to	be	strained	and	inconclusive.29			 O’Donoghue’s	 plans	 appeared	 in	 1978	 in	 the	 form	 of	 two	 “Green	 Papers”,	
National	Development	1977-80	and	Development	for	full	Employment.	While	these	had	 a	 Keynesian	 flavour,	 neither	 had	 involved	 union	 or	 NESC	 input,	 and	 the	limited	tripartitism	proposed	was	along	the	lines	of	the	rolling	“consultation”	or	“political	exchange”	Whitaker	advised.	Government	asked	NESC	to	“comment”	on	the	plans	when	they	were	already	finalised,	and,	unsurprisingly,	NESC’s	response	therefore	focused	only	on	minutiae,	avoiding	reference	to	governance	structures.	While	 Lynch’s	 planning	 conformed	 to	 the	 rather	 vague	 “social	 partner	consultation”	recommended	by	 the	EEC,	 it	was	consistent	with	 the	approach	he	had	 pursued	 in	 government	 previously.	 O’Donoghue’s	 post-1977	 expansionary	plans	appeared	initially	to	bear	dividends,	with	inflation	halving	in	their	first	year	
																																																								27		 Whitaker	and	Cosgrave	coalition,	Chambers	2014:	240;	at	ICTU	conference,	Whitaker	1976	28		 Post-election	poll,	Allen	1997:	150;	Mullen	resignation	and	SLP,	Horgan	1986:	131-2	29		 “Participative	planning”,	ICTU	AR	1977;	“push	the	frontiers”,	ICTU	motions	in	NAI:	Taoiseach/2009/135	/132/2;	“strained”	ICTU	AR:	318-29	and	ICTU	AR	1979:	163-65		
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to	7.5	per	cent,	the	economy	growing	by	9	per	cent,	and	recruitment	of	the	20,000	promised	new	public	sector	jobs	begun.30			 As	 the	 expiry	 of	 the	 coalition’s	 last	 NWA	 approached,	 the	 new	 government	proposed	a	similar	successor	agreement.	But	the	ITGWU	again	sought	a	“broader	package”	encompassing	social	and	economic	planning	and	at	a	special	conference	in	October	1978	ensured	that	ICTU	voted	by	large	majority	only	to	discuss	a	deal	that	incorporated	job	creation,	EMS	conditions	and	tax	reform.	ICTU	pressed	this	agenda	on	government	at	a	meeting	in	November	with	Lynch	and	his	“economic	ministers”.	But	while	offering	“consultation”,	Lynch	refused	to	go	beyond	his	offer	of	a	limited	NWA.	The	meeting	ended	with	little	progress	being	made.31			 What	changed	the	power	balance	in	this	stand-off	was	a	popular	tax	revolt	that	began	 in	 early	 1979,	 and	 how	 ICTU	 used	 it	 to	 leverage	 a	 broader	 tripartite	agreement.	 The	 disproportionate	 and	 growing	 burden	 of	 income	 tax	 borne	 by	PAYE	workers	had	been	a	simmering	issue	throughout	the	1970s	and	a	driver	of	wage	inflation.	From	71	per	cent	of	all	income	tax	in	1975,	PAYE	had	grown	to	87	per	 cent	 by	 1979.	 The	 trade	 union	 and	 left-wing	 press	 increasingly	 contrasted	this	with	the	near	tax	immunity	enjoyed	by	farmers	and	professionals	and	others,	with	the	SFWP	emerging	as	an	electoral	 force	for	the	first	time	not	 least	on	this	issue.	 Spontaneous	walk-outs	 by	 union	members	 in	Dublin	 firms	 in	 reaction	 to	Colley’s	 capitulation	 to	 the	 IFA	 by	withdrawing	 a	 proposed	 2	 per	 cent	 levy	 on	farming	 incomes	 in	 January	1979	sparked	growing	demonstrations	coordinated	by	 Dublin	 Trades	 Council.	While	 union	 leaders	were	wary	 of	 “political	 strikes”	and	ICTU	officials,	as	well	as	Barry	Desmond,	a	former	Labour	minister,	criticising	the	 movement,	 groups	 such	 as	 the	 B&ICO,	 which	 included	 ITGWU	 economist	Manus	O’Riordan,	and	the	SFWP,	whose	influence	was	growing	in	the	unions,	saw	the	revolt	as	a	re-awakened	class	politics	and	urged	ICTU	to	use	it	to	secure	a	full	“economic	and	social”	pact.	When	ITGWU’s	national	executive	decided	to	support	the	 tax	 movement,	 protests	 grew,	 culminating	 in	 a	 one-day	 national	 stoppage	involving	700,000	workers,	the	first	since	1922,	in	advance	of	the	1980	budget.32																																																									30		 D/EPD	1978a-b;	NESC	1978;	plan	“success”	and	cost,	Whelan,	K.	2011:	195,	Foster	2007:	17	31		 “broader	package”,	Liberty,	Aug.	1978;	ICTU-Lynch	meeting,	ICTU	AR	1979:	434	32		 On	SFWP,	Walsh	1994,	Hanley	and	Millar	2009;	left/union	press	on	tax	“burden”,	Liberty	(ITGWU)	and	
Irish	People	(SFWP)	1977-9;	“walk-outs”	and	tax	revolt,	Devine:	613,	778-9;	on	B&ICO,	Irish	Communist,	March	1979;	on	SFWP,	Hanley	and	Millar	2009,	SFWP	1978;	ICTU	AR	1979:	268-80	
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	 In	 this	 atmosphere,	 ICTU’s	 special	 pay	 conference	 in	 March	 1979	 rejected	Lynch’s	 proposed	 NWA,	 deciding	 to	 accept	 nothing	 short	 of	 a	 wide-ranging	tripartite	pay/policy	agreement.	It	produced	counter-proposals	to	O’Donoghue’s	
National	 Development,	 proposing	 a	 pay	 agreement	 incorporating	 an	 industrial	plan	 with	 specific	 job-creation,	 tax	 and	 social	 reform	 targets.	 Under	 pressure,	Lynch	 agreed	 to	 a	 joint	 “Working	 Party”,	 chaired	 by	 O’Donoghue,	 to	 develop	 a	joint	 document,	 with	 sub-groups	 drafting	 sections	 on	 education,	 tax	 reform,	employee	participation,	employment,	and	health.	This	appeared	on	23	April	as	a	draft	 “National	 Understanding	 for	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Development”.	 But	 the	ITGWU’s	 block	 vote	 ensured	 this	 was	 rejected	 as	 inadequate	 by	 an	 ICTU	conference	 in	 September,	Mullen	 saying	 it	 failed	 to	 concretely	 link	 pay	 and	 tax	reform,	 granted	 “pointless”	 “paper	 money”	 increases,	 much	 of	 which	 would	return	to	“government	and	the	rich”	in	tax	and	price	increases.	While	it	marked	“a	significant	step	forward”,	specific	tax	and	job	targets	were	essential.33			 Despite	 his	 large	 Dáil	 majority,	 Lynch’s	 authority	 was	 fading	 from	 January	1979,	with	 the	media	describing	him	as	 “tired”	and	his	European	Presidency	as	his	 “lap	 of	 honour”,	 and	 he	 himself	 publishing	 memoir-like	 reminiscences	 in	
Magill.	 Following	 Colley’s	 budget	 debacle	 and	 with	 the	 tax	 protests	 escalating,	Fianna	Fáil	 support	plummeted.	 It	 lost	 two	Cork	by-elections	and	poled	 just	35	per	 cent	 in	 the	 first	 European	 election,	 its	 worst	 electoral	 performance	 since	1926.	With	government	authority	fading,	unofficial	industrial	disputes	multiplied,	making	1979	the	worst	strike	year	on	record.	Lynch	responded	with	predictable	threats	of	wage	controls,	but	had	little	option	but	to	offer	an	improved	“National	Understanding	Mark	II”,	with	some	budget-linked	tax	reform	as	ICTU	had	sought.	Ruairi	 Roberts	welcomed	 his	 “effort	…	 to	meet	 the	 trade	 union	 point	 of	 view”,	enabling	an	agreement	such	as	“we	have	never	in	history	seen”.34			 The	“National	Understanding”,	effective	from	October	1979,	had	separate	pay	and	non-pay	aspects	(“Parts	1	and	2”),	as	constitutional	law	prescribed	the	formal	autonomy	 of	 both	 collective	 bargaining	 and	 budget	 policy.	 Pay,	 negotiated	separately	 at	 the	 Employer-Labour	 Conference	 as	 had	 the	 NWAs	 since	 1970,																																																									33		 ICTU	AR	1979:	268-80,	NU	text	in	ibid.:	257-66;	“worker	participation”,	D/Labour	1980	(March);	“paper	money”,	Devine	2009:	613;	Carroll	in	ICTU	ADC	1979:	286	34		 Irish	Times	quoted	by	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	316;	in	general,	Keogh	2008;	“life	and	times”,	Magill,	3/2	1979;	electoral	performance,	Lee	1989:	492-5	and	Whelan,	K.	2011:	193-8;	Roberts	in	ICTU	ADC	1979:	434	
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provided	for	inflation-linked	increases	over	12	months,	with	a	“no-strike”	clause	and	only	limited	scope	for	extra	productivity	or	public	service	“special	claims”.	On	policy,	“Part	2”,	negotiated	with	O’Donoghue,	was	conceived	as	 longer	term,	not	confined	to	the	12-month	pay	framework.	It	included	incremental	reforms	in	tax,	working	 hours,	 worker	 participation	 and	 education,	 a	 Tripartite	 Committee	 on	Employment,	Sector	Industrial	Committees,	a	Commission	on	industrial	relations	reform,	and	National	Enterprise	and	Employment/Training	agencies.35			 But	the	“National	Understanding	Mark	II”	did	not	include	either	an	integrated	wage/growth	 formula	or	a	 tripartite	policy	 system,	nor	did	 it	 establish	either	a	delivery	or	coordination	mechanism,	or	any	strategic	policy	role	for	the	NESC.	It	was	 thus	 a	 compromise	 between	 a	 consultative	 and	 a	 tripartite	 system,	wrung	from	 a	 reluctant	 government	 under	 electoral	 pressure	 led	 by	 a	 vacillating	Taoiseach	with	little	enthusiasm	for	any	social	partnership-type	departure.		 But	ICTU	was	optimistic,	in	November	circulating	120,00	copies	of	a	Review	of	
Progress.	 This	 declared:	 “the	 concept	 of	 the	 National	 Understanding	 is	 a	 trade	union	concept;	it	conceives	of	a	society	dedicated	to	social	ends;	it	is	for	the	trade	union	movement	to	ensure	that	the	objective	is	fully	and	universally	understood”.	On	 ICTU	 insistence,	 the	 “Tripartite	 Committee”	 was	 quickly	 convened,	 and	 by	December	had	met	ten	times	and	“commenced	the	work	of	seeking,	sorting	and	selecting	suitable	projects”	for	its	£20m	enterprise	support	fund.	ICTU	optimism	was	 reflected	 in	Ruairi	Roberts’	 statement	 that	 the	 trade	union	movement	now	wielded	“influence	and	power	far	greater	than	at	any	time	in	our	history”.36			 But	the	optimism	proved	premature.	By	early	1980	ICTU	was	complaining	that	the	Enterprise	Agency,	whose	composition	and	structure	had	been	finally	agreed	in	November,	was	“not	one	whit	further	advanced”,	the	Sectoral	Committees	were	“in	the	same	state”,	other	promised	bodies	had	yet	to	appear,	and	there	had	been	no	progress	on	the	“Green	Paper	on	Worker	Participation”	or	promised	initiatives	in	 education.	 By	 the	 time	 Lynch	 resigned	 in	 early	 December	 1979,	 little	 of	 the	“Understanding”	 had	 in	 fact	 been	 implemented,	 with	 civil	 servants	 using	 the	
																																																								35		 Text	in	ICTU	AR	1980	36		 ‘Review’	in	ICTU	AR	1980:	120;	“Tripartite	Committee”,	ICTU	ADC	1980:	231-47,	393	
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interregnum	 of	 the	 Fianna	 Fáil	 leadership	 contest	 to	 disengage	 from	 a	 process	many	of	them	seemed	to	regard	as	inappropriate	if	not	wholly	distasteful.37	
	
New	Deal:	Haughey	recasts	the	“Understanding”,	1980		Haughey	 had	 returned	 to	 national	 prominence	 in	 1978-79	 as	 Minister	 for	Health	and	Social	Welfare.	He	transformed	that	traditionally	dull	ministry	–	his	appointment	to	which	the	US	Ambassador	and	others	assumed	was	intended	to	end	of	his	career	-	 into	a	powerful	political	base	by	modernising	its	structures	and	services	and	undertaking	many	 low-cost	but	popular	reforms.	Within	 two	years	he	initiated	semi-commercial	activities	through	agencies	such	as	PARC	to	export	health	expertise	to	the	Middle	East,	upgraded	hospital	services	through	public-private	 partnerships,	 introduced	 new	 welfare	 measures,	 particularly	favouring	women	and	 the	elderly,	 legalised	contraception	with	a	prescription-based	 “Irish	 solution”,	 and	 revamped	 contributory	 social	 insurance	 (PRSI)	 as	sought	by	ICTU.	His	reforms	were	widely	seen	as	“progressive”,	including	by	the	ICTU.	 The	 “Understanding”	 contained	 little	 on	 health	 and	 welfare	 as	 ICTU	regarded	its	demands	in	these	areas	as	already	largely	met	in	the	budget.38			 Haughey	 used	 the	 popularity	 his	 new	 position	 conferred	 to	 intervene	 to	resolve	 a	 major	 Dublin	 postal	 strike,	 although	 as	 minister	 for	 health	 he	 was	responsible	 neither	 for	 the	 post	 office	 nor	 industrial	 relations.	He	mediated	 a	solution	with	his	ally,	Michael	Mullen	of	 the	 ITGWU	who,	although	the	ITGWU	was	 not	 involved	 in	 the	 dispute,	 was	 influential	 with	 Dublin	 trade	 unionists.	Haughey	 secured	 cabinet	 acquiescence	 for	 his	 intervention,	 which	must	 have	been	 galling	 for	 Lynch	 and	 his	 circle.	 It	 nevertheless	 showed	 the	 powerful	position	Haughey	had	achieved	long	before	Lynch’s	retirement,	and	presaged	a	new	approach	a	government	led	by	him	would	bring	to	industrial	relations.39			 Haughey	 had	 no	 involvement	 in	 the	 first	 “National	 Understanding”,	 which	O’Donoghue,	Lynch	and	Colley	had	negotiated,	and	it	was	unclear	at	first	what	he	intended	for	it	on	becoming	Taoiseach,	especially	as	he	signalled	his	priority																																																									37		 ICTU	AR	1980:	124;	civil	service	disengagement,	interviews	with	anon.	D/Finance	official	and	Attley	38		 Appointed	minister,	Lenihan	2015:	87,	Whelan,	K.	2011:	196-7;	US	view,	DubEmb	to	Secretary	of	State	20/02/75,	US	cable	75-Dublin-1828,	wikileaks;	reforms,	ICTU	1978:	201-04,	ICTU	1979:	172-5,	Devine	2009:	631,	Ryle	Dwyer,	‘Why	Haughey	now	deserves	some	compassionate	understanding’,	Irish	
Examiner,	10/06/2006;	on	PRSI,	ICTU	1978	201-2;	S/W	budget	and	NU,	ICTU	AR		1979:	160,	172-9	39		 On	strike	intervention	IT	06.11.2014	and	cabinet	acquiescence,	Lenihan	2015:	92		
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as	 cutting	 the	 budget	 deficit	 and,	 to	 Congress’s	 alarm,	 immediately	 abolished	O’Donoghue’s	Department.	Lynch	had	resigned	expecting	Colley	to	succeed	him,	but	 to	 public	 surprise	 a	 backbench	 landslide	 saw	 Haughey	 become	 leader.	Although	encumbered	with	a	hostile,	Colley-loyal	cabinet,	Haughey	immediately	signalled	policy	 reversals	 in	key	areas,	 abandoning	Keynesianism	 for	 financial	discipline	 (“living	 way	 beyond	 our	 means”)	 and	 restoring	 an	 interventionist	policy	on	Northern	Ireland	(“a	failed	political	entity”).	He	also	signalled	radical	change	in	socio-economic	policy,	moving	the	planning	sections	of	O’Donoghue’s	abolished	 department,	 which	 had	 evolved	 from	 Finance’s	 old	 EDD,	 to	 the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	as	its	“Economic	and	Social	Policy	Division”,	along	with	 the	 NESC,	 merged	 the	 Departments	 of	 Public	 Services	 and	 Labour	 and	announced	an	initiative	to	establish	“orderly	industrial	relations”.	These	moves	indicated	an	intention	to	restructure	the	National	Understanding	by	integrating	a	 tripartite	 approach	 to	 economic	policy,	 combining	public	 and	private	 sector	pay,	and	initiating	a	process	of	industrial	relations	reform.40			 Haughey’s	first	period	as	Taoiseach	was	dogged	by	the	hostile	cabinet	he	had	inherited.	 Some	 openly	 plotted	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 leadership	 election	 outcome	and	Colley	himself	expressed	only	conditional	loyalty	to	him	as	leader,	his	deep	hostility	 extending	 to	 leaking	 details	 of	 cabinet	 discussions	 to	 antagonistic	journalists.	The	divisions	were	presented	by	the	press	as	a	clash	of	 leadership	values	and	policy,	especially	on	the	North,	 though	also,	as	the	second	oil	crisis	took	hold,	on	economic	policy.	O’Kennedy	was	the	only	cabinet	member	to	have	voted	for	Haughey	as	leader,	being	rewarded	with	the	Department	of	Finance	in	place	 of	 Colley	 who	 refused	 to	 continue	 in	 the	 role.	 The	 new	 minister	immediately	 announced	 that	 Government	 had	 an	 “open	 mind”	 on	 whether	 it	would	continue	with	the	National	Understanding	at	all.41		 Haughey’s	 links	 to	 business	 and	 unions	 served	 as	 a	 counter-weight	 to	 his	precarious	 political	 position,	 but	 his	 decision	 to	 revive	 and	 restructure	 the	failing	“Understanding”	was	also	consistent	with	his	long-held	position	on	how	national	 bargaining	 should	 be	 shaped.	 He	met	 the	 ICTU	 Executive	 in	 January																																																									40		 Congress	alarm,	ICTU	AR	1980:	121;	on	aims	and	D/EPD,	Dáil	11	and	13/10/79	and	‘Broadcast	by	An	Taoiseach’,	RTÉ	TV,	09/01/80,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	316-26	41		 On	cabinet	alliances	and	events,	Whelan,	K.	2011;	“open	mind”,	Dáil	31/03/80	
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1980	 both	 to	 assure	 it	 of	 his	 “full”	 commitment	 to	 the	 agreement	 once	 pay	discipline	 was	 maintained	 and	 develop	 it	 beyond	 the	 uncoordinated	 Lynch/	O’Donoghue	 model.	 In	 a	 veiled	 reference	 to	 events	 in	 Britain	 under	 its	 new	premier,	 Margaret	 Thatcher,	 who	 had	 dramatically	 declared	 breaking	 union	power	her	primary	goal,	he	committed	to	tackle	the	“radical	…	deterioration	of	the	economic	situation”	not	 through	“deflationary”	methods	but	by	combining	“prudent”	 financial	 management	 with	 industrial	 expansion.	 He	 favoured	 “in	principle”	a	new	Understanding	as	the	framework	for	this,	though	one	“different	from	the	current	one”.	In	particular,	and	tellingly,	he	urged	ICTU	to	move	from	employment	targets	to	a	growth	formula	as	the	basis	for	agreed	strategy.42			 Haughey	underpinned	his	talks	with	ICTU	the	following	month	by	telling	his	Árd	 Fheis	 -	 to	which,	 to	much	 annoyance	 in	 anti-Fianna	 Fáil	 union	 circles,	 he	was	piped	in	by	the	ITGWU	band	with	‘A	Nation	Once	Again’	–	that	he	intended	developing	the	National	Understanding	into	“a	new	type	of	partnership	between	workers,	 employers	 and	 Government	 …	 a	 better	 way	 of	 doing	 things”	 which	“could	show	the	outside	world	that	we	had	at	last	found	the	way	to	handle	this	difficult,	complex,	but	vitally	important	aspect	of	our	national	life”.43		 When	 the	 budget	was	 published,	 Congress,	 while	 criticising	 its	 lack	 of	 any	reference	 to	 “full	 employment”,	 agreed	with	 the	 need	 for	 spending	 discipline	and	described	its	tax/welfare	provisions	as	consistent	with	the	Understanding.	But,	alarmed	by	O’Kennedy	declaring	that	government	might	dispense	with	the	agreement,	 ICTU	 sought	 another	meeting	with	Haughey,	 at	which	Carroll	 told	him	that	despite	his	assurances,	little	“progress	on	commitments”	had	occurred.	For	 this	 he	 blamed	Department	 of	 Finance	 hostility	 and	 the	Minister	 himself,	who	had	 ignored	requests	 for	a	meeting,	and	suggested	 that	responsibility	 for	the	agreement	be	transferred	to	Haughey’s	own	Department	given	how	its	role	had	now	been	“enhanced	significantly	in	the	Economic	and	Social	area”.44			 Haughey	did	not	 immediately	act	on	Carroll’s	proposal,	 initially	moving	 the	agreement	 from	 Finance	 to	 the	 new	 Department	 of	 Labour	 and	 the	 Public																																																									42		 Thatcher,	‘Speech	to	Conservative	Party	Conference’,	12/10/79,	Thatcher	Archive:	CCOPR	1059/79;	Haughey	meeting	with	ICTU,	report	in	ICTU	AR	1980:	121-2	43		 ITGWU	band,	‘ITGWU	band	to	greet	Soldiers	of	Destiny’,	IT	15.02.1980	and	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	327;	Haughey,	‘Presidential	Address,	49th	Fianna	Fáil	Árd	Fheis’,	16/02/80,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	330	44		 ICTU	EC	mtg.	11/04/80;	ICTU	AR	1980:	131-41	
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Service,	but	he	simultaneously	bolstered	the	socio-economic	capacity	of	his	own	Department	by	 transferring	NESC	 to	 its	new	E&S	Policy	unit	 under	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn	and	appointing	department	 secretary,	Noel	Whelan,	 to	 chair	 it.	 These	moves	 were	 part	 of	 a	 general	 radical	 expansion	 of	 the	 Department	 from	 its	previous	minor	 role	 as	 a	 government	 secretarial	 office,	 as	 he	 also	 transferred	Northern	policy,	the	arts	and	his	other	priority	policy	areas	to	it.	He	told	ICTU	that	 despite	 the	 Department	 of	 Labour	 and	 Public	 Service’s	 remit	 on	 the	Understanding	they	should	treat	Whelan	as	their	channel	for	direct	contact	with	government.	He	also	activated	the	stalled	institutions	of	the	agreement,	such	as	the	Tripartite	Employment	Committee,	the	Manpower	and	Enterprise	Agencies	and	 various	 agreed	 educational	 initiatives.	 A	 renewed	 confidence	 among	 the	unions	was	reflected	 in	 the	 large	majority	 ICTU	vote	 in	May	 for	entering	 talks	with	government	on	a	new	and	more	“integrated”	National	Understanding.45		 Modest	expenditure	cuts	in	1980/81	began	to	reduce	the	current	deficits,	as	it	 appeared	 at	 first	 the	 public	 expenditure	 crisis	 could	 be	mastered.	Although	unemployment	continued	to	rise,	it	was	believed	the	economy	was	recovering.	Haughey	 implemented	Understanding	 commitments,	 approving	 the	balance	of	the	 agreed	 public	 service	 jobs	 promised	 under	 it.	 New	 FDI	 continued	 to	 be	secured,	notably	including	Apple,	the	first	major	US	computer	firm	to	invest	in	Ireland,	 which	 opened	 a	 plant	 in	 Cork.	 Haughey	 innovated	 with	 economic	initiatives	even	in	foreign	policy,	securing	both	health	and	engineering	projects	for	semi-state	companies	and	increased	beef	sales	in	the	Mid-East.	He	assisted	this	with	the	“Bahrain	Declaration”	which	aligned	Irish	policy	with	Arab	opinion	on	the	Mid-East	conflict	and,	as	the	first	EEC	state,	recognised	the	PLO.	With	the	optimism	of	an	imminent	recovery	and	the	economic	bounce	of	these	stimulus	measures,	industrial	disputes	declined	to	their	lowest	level	in	five	years.46		 The	 EEC	 played	 a	 part	 in	 Haughey’s	 plans	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 National	Understanding.	He	had	long	been	an	advocate	of	the	EEC	and	in	1978,	back	to	prominence	in	cabinet,	strongly	supported	EMS	membership	and	breaking	with	Sterling,	 which	 a	 wavering	 cabinet	 had	 ultimately	 decided	 to	 do	 against	 the																																																									45		 ICTU	EC	mtgs.	22/01	and	11/04/80;	ICTU	AR	1980:	124-31,	143,	247	46		 Reduces	deficit,	Lee	1989:	502-3;	‘Bahrain	Declaration’,	O’Connor,	P.	2012;	“optimism”	Bielenberg	and	Ryan	2013:	31-2;	disputes,	Nevin	(ed.)	1994	
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opposition	of	Finance	and	the	Central	Bank,	its	former	governor,	T.K.	Whitaker,	warning	Lynch	it	would	be	a	“quixotic	gesture”.	Despite	a	view	that	Britain	was	in	permanent	post-imperial	decline	and	that	continuance	of	the	link	tied	Ireland	to	a	weak	economy,	 it	was	a	statement	by	a	French	minister	casting	doubt	on	Ireland’s	 economic	 independence	 from	Britain	 that	 tipped	 the	 scales.	 “Ireland	faced	a	clear	choice”,	then	Central	Bank	governor,	Maurice	O’Connell,	later	said,	“to	 go	 with	 Britain	 or	 Germany:	 we	 finally	 opted	 for	 Germany”.	 After	 1979	Ireland	within	 the	 EMS	 invariably	 supported	 German	 proposals,	 ensuring	 the	IR£	 closely	 tracked	 the	 DM.	 At	 the	 European	 Council	 in	 Dublin	 in	 November	1979,	at	which	Thatcher	first	raised	her	famous	demand,	“We	want	our	money	back!”,	 Haughey	 met	 Helmut	 Schmidt,	 with	 whom	 he	 was	 immediately	impressed	and	would	form	a	close	political	alliance.47			 Although	the	Understanding	ran	to	the	end	of	1980,	Haughey	moved	early	to	prepare	the	ground	with	ICTU	for	a	new	and	“different”,	“integrated”	successor	agreement.	He	aligned	his	policy	with	EC	priorities,	which	had	a	new	urgency	since	the	start	of	EMS	and	the	adoption	of	“policy	coordination”	in	1979	under	it.	 The	European	Council	was	 divided	 over	 how	 to	 tackle	 the	monetary	 crisis,	but	in	June	1980,	and	despite	British	opposition,	proposed	that	member	states	prepare	monetary	adjustment	in	“consultations	with	employers	and	labour”	and	in	 December	 recommended	 that	 in	 implementing	 “structural	 adjustments”	 to	meet	 EMS	 requirements	 “a	 combined	 effort	 by	 Governments	 with	 the	collaboration	of	employer	and	labour	organisations	is	essential”.	This	coincided	with	Haughey’s	preferred	approach	anyway,	but	further	reinforced	him	in	it.48			 Key	union	figures	shared	Haughey’s	views	on	the	shape	a	second	agreement	should	take.	Pubic	services	leader	Harold	O’Sullivan	warned	that	while	previous	expansionary	 policies	 had	 greatly	 grown	 the	 public	 service,	 this	 had	 meant	increased	borrowing	which	in	turn	had	caused	the	crisis	in	the	public	finances.	Unions	were	partly	to	“blame”,	he	said,	by	having	failed	to	“expand	and	deepen	dialogue	 with	 Government”	 and	 for	 a	 tendency	 to	 see	 “the	 Understanding	 as	little	 more	 than	 an	 NWA	 in	 new	 clothes”	 instead	 of	 a	 negotiated	 strategy	 of																																																									47		 Decision	on	EMS	and	French	statement,	Honohan	and	Murphy	2010;	“gesture”,	Chambers	2015:	190;	“opt	for	Germany”,	Int.	O’Connell;	“track	DM”,	Lee	1989:	492,	James	2012:	146-80;	Thatcher,	‘Press	Conference	after	Dublin	Council’,	30/11/79,	Thatcher	Foundation;	Haughey	and	Schmidt,	Int.	Mansergh	48		 European	Council,	1980	(June)	and	1980	(Dec.)		
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social	and	tax	reform	in	sensible	monetary	parameters:	 “If	monetarist	policies	are	to	be	avoided,	some	consensus	will	be	needed	with	Government	on	this”.49		 With	ICTU	support	and	EC	Council	encouragement,	Haughey	offered	talks	on	a	Second	Understanding.	While	pay	would	be	negotiated	 through	 the	ELC,	 the	“non-wage”	 aspect	 was	 to	 be	 negotiated	 with	 the	 E&S	 unit	 of	 his	 own	Department,	 with	 he	 himself,	 as	 Taoiseach,	 playing	 a	 central	 role.	 If	 Lynch’s	Understanding	 had	 been	 a	 “redistributive”	 expansionary	 plan,	 his	 would	 be	based	on	a	consensus	economic	strategy	for	a	recessionary	context.50			 While	 on	 ICTU	 insistence,	 and	 against	 Haughey’s	 preference	 for	 a	 growth	formula,	the	new	Understanding	retained	“full	employment”	as	its	primary	goal,	it	 accepted	 the	 principle	 of	 expenditure	 controls.	 The	 pay	 deal	 combined	 the	NWA	percentage-plus-“flat-rate”	approach,	providing	 for	about	17	per	cent,	or	roughly	 equivalent	 to	 inflation,	 over	15	months.	Budget	 linkage	was	provided	through	welfare	benefit	and	PAYE	reform	commitments.	The	pay	deal	simplified	the	spread	of	dates	under	the	previous	Understanding	 into	a	single	two-phase	schedule,	 tied	 to	 “industrial	 peace”	 through	 a	 pledge	 signed	 by	 unions	 and	employers	 in	 each	workplace,	 though	 allowed	 for	 some	 “local”	 bargaining	 on	limited	specific	issues	subject	to	Labour	Court	adjudication.	The	second	phase,	due	from	June	1981,	could	be	revisited	if	inflation	exceeded	projections,	and	the	recourse	 by	 employers	 to	 “inability	 to	 pay”	 was	 replaced	 by	 a	 company-by-company	approach	for	distressed	firms,	with	the	decision	on	whether	viability	or	employment	were	actually	threatened	reserved	to	the	Labour	Court.51			 Harold	 O’Sullivan,	 chair	 of	 the	 ICTU’s	 powerful	 Public	 Services	 Committee,	said	 the	new	Understanding	“dissipated	 the	 threat”	of	a	 “monetarist”	strategy,	having	 combined,	 as	 recommended	 by	 the	 EC,	 wage	 moderation,	 financial	discipline	 and	 budgetary	 targets	 within	 EBR	 goals,	 while	 protecting	employment	and	agreeing	measures	on	industrial	strategy,	health,	welfare,	tax	and	 supports	 for	 the	 unemployed	 and	 deprived.	 Improving	 public	 service	efficiency	and	a	“root	and	branch”	reform	of	industrial	relations	were	included	
																																																								49		 O’Sullivan,	‘Opening	address	to	Seminar	organised	by	Dublin	Branches	LGPSU’,	17/10/1980,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2,	Exec.	Board	papers		50		 ‘Meeting	with	Taoiseach’	in	ICTU	AR	1981	51		 ICTU	AR	1981:	210-23;	Power	2009:	52-4	
	 87	
with	 further	 provisions	 promoting	 employee	 participation	 in	 companies	 at	board	and	local,	plant,	level.52		 Other	 non-pay	 elements	 included	 employment-boosting	 commitments	 on	IDA	advance	 factory	 completions,	 central	 and	 local	 government	 infrastructure	investment,	house	building,	industrial	training,	a	£79m	Enterprise	Agency	fund,	the	 ring-fencing	 of	 welfare,	 a	 £10m	 joint	 government/employer-financed	“Employment	Guarantee	 Fund”,	 youth	work-experience/training	 programmes,	expanded	 worker	 consultation	 and	 other	 measures.	 Talks	 were	 promised	 on	fundamental	 industrial	 relations	 reform,	 paid	 maternity	 leave,	 anti-poverty	measures,	education,	child-care,	labour	and	welfare	reform.	Tripartite	working	groups	would	be	established	to	draft	detailed	proposals	for	each	area.53				 Despite	later	accusations,	notably	by	Charlie	McCreevy,	that	this	package	was	a	 negation	 of	 Haughey’s	 promised	 counter-expansionary	 policy,	 the	 EBR	parameters,	 conditionality	 of	 the	 second	 phase	 and	 restrictions	 on	 additional	claims	 in	 fact	 locked	 the	 agreement	 into	 a	 controlled	 spending	 framework,	 as	Harold	O’Sullivan	stressed.	ICTU	recommended	acceptance	of	the	package	and,	with	 anti-agreement	 unions	 subdued	 by	 Thatcher’s	 offensive	 against	 union	power	 in	Britain,	 it	was	overwhelmingly	endorsed.	Not	only	did	a	77	per	cent	majority	 in	 the	 ITGWU	 accept	 it,	 but	 so	 did	 a	 majority	 of	 members	 of	 the	traditionally	anti-collaboration	ATGWU	who	ignored	their	leaders’	call	to	reject	it.	Public	service	unions	overwhelmingly	supported	it	and	the	ICTU	conference	on	23	October	endorsed	it	by	an	80	per	cent	margin.	John	Carroll	of	the	ITGWU	declared:	“if	the	trade	union	movement	were	told	tomorrow,	‘you	take	over’,	the	type	of	programme	they	would	seek	to	implement	would	be,	almost	line	for	line,	as	set	out	in	the	Proposals	for	a	Second	National	Understanding”.54		 This	 extraordinary	 endorsement	 by	 ICTU	 unions,	 with	 Haughey’s	 special	relationship	with	the	ITGWU	at	its	core,	contrasted	with	the	divided	business/	employer	camp,	which,	influenced	by	events	in	Britain,	sought	a	strict	counter-																																																								52		 O’Sullivan,	‘Opening	address	to	Seminar	organised	by	Dublin	Branches	LGPSU’,	17/10/1980,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2,	Exec.	Board	papers	53		 Government	of	Ireland	1980	(July)	54		 McCreevey	interview,	Sunday	Tribune,	27.12.1981;	O’Sullivan,	‘Opening	address	to	Seminar	organised	by	Dublin	Branches	LGPSU’,	17/10/1980,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2,	Exec.	Board	papers;	union	ballots,	Devine	2009:	705;	public	service	vote,	Executive	Board	mtg.,	26/04/79,	ILHS:	LGPSU-2;	ICTU	conference,	ICTU	AR	1981.:	75-9,	240,	246;	Carroll	in	ibid.,	240	
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inflationary	 strategy	 instead.	While	 the	 industry	 lobby	CII	 decided	 to	 endorse	the	 Understanding	 for	 both	 the	 stability	 and	 involvement	 in	 planning	 it	promised,	FUE	demurred.	In	a	characteristic	intervention,	Haughey	forced	their	hand	 in	 an	 “unscheduled	 and	 unprecedented	 visit	 …	 to	 their	 headquarters”	when	their	General	Council	was	in	session,	arguing	the	merits	of	consensus	over	confrontational	“monetarism”.	While	avowing	“prudent	financial	management”,	he	conceded	that	some	“slippage	on	borrowing”	was	probably	 inevitable	but	a	price	 worth	 paying	 to	 prevent	 the	 “economy	 collapsing”.	 He	 undertook	 to	include	business-friendly	reforms	 in	his	1981	budget	but	also	 indicated	that	 if	employers	 still	 rejected	 an	 agreement	 he	would	 conclude	 a	 public	 sector	 one	anyway	that	would	set	a	benchmark	for	the	private	sector.	The	FUE	reluctantly	endorsed	the	agreement,	while	listing	its	various	reservations	about	it.55	
	
From	implementation	to	crisis	1980-81		 Implementation	of	 the	second	Understanding	began	 in	 late	1980.	 Industrial	disputes	 continued	 to	 decline	 and	many	 of	 the	 agreed	 initiatives	 commenced.	Working	 parties	 on	 education	 and	 social	 reform	 were	 formed	 and	 the	Enterprise	 Agency	 and	 Sector	 Industrial	 Committee	 established,	 the	 former	chaired	 by	Mark	Hely-Hutchinson,	 a	 leading	 figure	 in	 Guinness’s	 and	 Bank	 of	Ireland,	and	the	latter	by	Department	of	Taoiseach	secretary,	Noel	Whelan,	with	a	remit	to	stimulate	entrepreneurial	and	productive	capital	investment	projects,	both	state	and	private	sector-led.	The	Employment	Guarantee	Fund,	co-financed	by	an	employer	 levy,	eventually	 funded	33	projects	creating	2,800	whole-time	jobs.	Final	pay	terms	had	been	agreed	in	October	and	the	first	phase	increases	paid..	On	workers’	participation,	a	“Joint	Participation	Committee”	piloted	in	the	IIRS	was	judged	“reasonably	satisfactory”	and	it	was	agreed	to	extend	the	model	to	local	authorities,	Health	Boards	and	other	state	agencies.56			 The	new	Understanding	 lacked	 an	 overall	 joint	 coordination	body,	 but	 this	didn’t	 cause	 noticeable	 dissent.	 Government	 shared	 the	 European	 Council’s																																																									55		 CII	position,	Power	2009:	53-4;	Haughey	intervention,	Power	2009:	54	and	Murphy	and	Hogan	2008:	587,	591;	“unscheduled”,	Allen,	K.	1997:	160,	‘Haughey	rules	out	deflation’,	IT	18.10.80	and	‘Haughey’s	role	in	FUE	talks’,	IT	21.10.80;	“slippage”,	Dáil	21/10/80;	“benchmark’	threat,	Hardiman	1988:	212;	FUE	decision,	FUE	Bulletin,	Nov.	1980	56		 Implementation	and	chairs,	ICTU	AR	1981:	120-27	and	‘Sectoral	committee	meets’,	IT	15.05.81;	EGF	projects,	Power	2009:	53;	first	phase,	LGPSU,	‘LG&PB	Div.	Exec.	Mtg.’	07/11/80	and	‘Report	on	Agenda	LGPSU	Exec.	Board’,	14/11/80;	“Joint	Participation”,	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	mtgs.	28/05,	05/06,	14/08/81	
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optimism	 that	 with	 EMS	 stabilising	 interest	 and	 exchange	 rates,	 strategies	involving	 “intense	 consultation	 with	 the	 social	 partners”	 and	 combining	“prudent	 monetary	 policies,	 healthy	 budgetary	 management,	 and	 the	reorientation	 of	 public	 and	 private	 sector	 expenditure	 in	 the	 direction	 of	productive	 investment”,	 would	master	 the	 crisis.	 Haughey	 told	 the	 ICTU	 that	EMS	deficit	targets	could	be	achieved,	while	funds	accumulating	domestically	as	a	result	of	EMS	would	fund	public/private	capital	investment	without	a	need	for	recourse	to	increased	foreign	borrowing.	He	added	that	he	planned	to	“set	the	target	 for	 infrastructural	 development	 as	 high	 as	 possible”.	 His	 1981	 budget	reduced	current	spending	and	the	excess	of	actual	over	projected	deficit,	while	increasing	 short-term	 welfare	 benefits,	 modestly	 reducing	 PAYE	 taxes	 and	committing	£1.5bn	to	the	capital	programme.	He	told	his	April	1981	Árd	Fheis	that	the	new	National	Understanding	had	helped	restore	discipline	to	the	public	finances,	reduced	industrial	disputes	to	their	lowest	level	in	years	and	averted	the	social	confrontation	widespread	“elsewhere”,	meaning	Britain.57			 In	a	move	of	particular	importance,	Haughey	also	revived	the	long-neglected	NESC,	as	sought	by	 ITGWU,	requesting	 it	henceforth	 to	“report	 to	government	through	 the	 Taoiseach”.	 He	 asked	 it	 to	 prepare	 proposals	 regarding	 its	 own	future	 strategic	 role.	 In	 responding	 in	 February	 1981,	 NESC,	 emphasising	 its	unique	role	combining	the	major	social	 interests,	policy	makers	and	economic	experts,	 requested	 a	mandate	 to	 develop	 a	 consensus	 approach	 on	 “strategic	policy	 issues”	 and	 review	 government	 socio-economic	 policy,	 instead	 of	 as	heretofore	 commenting	 on	 individual	 policies	 at	 government	 request.	 It	 had	first	intervened	on	national	strategy	in	1978	when	in	response	to	a	government	request	 it	had	 issued	“Comments”	on	O’Donoghue’s	Full	Employment	plan.	But	now	sought	a	pro-active	strategy-proposing	role.	Haughey	immediately	agreed,	and	this	resulted	in	a	prodigious	output	that	very	year,	with	reports	on	Ireland’s	socio-economic	 position	 in	 the	 EEC	 and	 “Aims	 and	 Recommendations”	 for	national	socio-economic	policy.	In	July	1980	Haughey	had	already	suggested	it	develop	 a	 comprehensive	 review	 of	 industrial	 policy,	which	would	 eventually	result	 in	 the	 ground-breaking	 October	 1982	 report,	 Policies	 for	 Industrial																																																									57		 EC	Council	1981	(March);	Haughey	at	meeting	with	ICTU	EC,	ICTU	AR	1981:	120-1;	budget,	Lee	1989:	502-3;	Haughey,	‘Presidential	Address,	50th	Fianna	Fáil	Árd	Fheis’,	11/04/81	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	469	
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Development,	which	 J.J.	Lee	 later	described	as	a	watershed,	 initiating	 “the	 first	serious	debate	on	industrial	policy	for	more	than	twenty	years”.58			 But	hopes	for	economic	recovery	began	to	evaporate	from	early	1981	as	GDP	across	the	EC	contracted	by	1	per	cent	and	unemployment	rose.	The	deepening	recession	was	 due	 to	 the	 continued	 instability	 of	 the	 global	monetary	 system	since	the	US	had	abandoned	the	gold	standard,	to	which	EMS	itself	had	been	a	response.	The	optimistic	forecasts	of	1980	gave	way	to	admissions	of	structural	recession,	which	 the	 Commission	 now	described	 as	 “much	 deeper,	wider	 and	more	persistent	than	had	been	anticipated”.	Irish	inflation	again	topped	16	per	cent,	 unemployment	 rose	 and	 exchequer	 figures	 showed	 a	 deficit	 40	per	 cent	higher	than	predicted.	Despite	even	more	radical	expenditure	cuts	in	the	UK,	its	inflation	 also	 soared,	 to	 18	 per	 cent,	 with	 unemployment	 reaching	 2m,	while	Germany	 entered	 its	 first	 sustained	 post-war	 recession.	 It	 was	 now	 accepted	that	 the	 economic	 slowdown	was	 no	 temporary	 reversal	 due	 to	 the	 latest	 oil	price	hikes,	but	a	deeper	structural	crisis	and	monetary	policy	failure.59			 In	response	to	the	sudden	inflation	rise,	ICTU	sought	an	adjusted	increase	in	the	second	pay	phase	while	county	councils	pleaded	the	need	to	defer	payment	of	special	awards.	Private	employers	called	for	a	freeze	on	all	pay	increases	and	agreed	 to	 discontinue	 contributions	 to	 the	 Employment	 Guarantee	 Fund.	Government	 froze	 all	 spending	 commitments	 and	 promised	 tax	 reforms.	 The	Minister	for	Finance	approached	Congress	for	talks	on	deferring	special	awards	given	 “the	 community’s	 inability	 to	 find	 the	 resources	 to	meet	 further	 special	increases	without	risk	to	jobs	and	the	viability	of	the	economy”.	Internally,	ICTU	leaders	accepted	that	compromise	on	these	issues	would	be	necessary.60		 In	March	1981	Haughey	discussed	the	crisis,	EC	policy	co-ordination	and	the	“UK	 problem”	 with	 Helmut	 Schmidt,	 telling	 him	 Europe	 needed	 an	 economic	policy.	He	told	his	Árd	Fheis	that	the	National	Understanding	would	have	to	be	reconfigured	in	light	of	the	crisis,	though	not	abandoned	as	some	of	his	cabinet																																																									58		 New	role,	NESC	1981a;	“first	intervention”,	Hardiman	2002:	8;	1981	reports,	NESC	1981b-d;	Haughey	and	Industrial	Policy,	NESC	1982;	Lee	1989:	504	59		 US	monetary	crisis	and	EMS,	Frieden	2007,	James	2012;	“much	deeper”,	‘Recession	deeper	than	expected’.	Irish	Times,	27/03/81;	situation	in	Europe,	European	Council	1980	(Dec.)	and	‘From	Bad	to	Worse’	(editorial),	Irish	Times,	02/04/81	60		 ‘Unions	seek	new	talks	on	pay’,	Irish	Times,	19/03/81	and	‘ICTU	relations	with	employers	worsen’,	Irish	
Times,	23/03/81;	“internally”,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda,	LG&PB	Div.	Exec.	Cttee.	Mtg.’	10/04/81	
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opponents	proposed.	He	decided	on	a	general	election	in	May,	hoping	to	secure	the	 overall	 majority	 polls	 indicated	 he	 could	 attain	 and	 finally	 establish	 his	authority.	But	renewed	crisis	 in	 the	North	 led	to	the	 intervention	of	“H-Block”	candidates	who	denounced	his	handling	of	the	hunger	strikes.	These	mobilised	considerable	support,	with	John	Carroll	of	the	ITGWU	prominent	in	the	Dublin	H-Block	 movement,	 and	 denied	 Haughey	 the	 majority	 he	 sought,	 again	illustrating	the	on-going	impact	of	the	Northern	conflict	on	southern	politics.61		 Haughey’s	weakened	position	led	to	increasing	public	attacks	on	the	National	Understanding	by	 farming	and	business	 interests,	who	demanded	a	12-month	pay/price	freeze	as	“part	of	an	all-out	Government	campaign	to	curb	inflation”.	While	ICTU	called	for	commitments	and	C&A	rulings	to	be	honoured.	employer	claims	 for	 the	second	phase	 increases	 to	be	deferred	 through	 local	agreement	were	 increasingly	 upheld	 by	 the	 Labour	 Court,	 keen	 to	 avert	 a	 formal	 FUE	withdrawal	 from	 the	 agreement.	 Government	 criticised	 the	 “precipitative	deflationary	 action”	 sought	 by	 employers	 as	 it	 would	 only	 serve	 to	 dampen	demand	and	 could	provoke	 “widespread	 industrial	 and	 social	unrest”,	 but	 the	media	 increasingly	 portrayed	 this	 position	 as	 that	 of	 a	 Taoiseach	 who	 now	found	himself	a	prisoner	of	“interest	groups”	and	“fearful	of	unpopularity”.62			 Union	 leaders’	acceptance	of	 the	need	to	adjust	 the	National	Understanding	to	counter	recessionary	pressures	and	the	continued	if	weakened	preference	of	business	interests	to	remain	involved	with	government	might	have	sufficed	for	a	successful	restructuring	of	 the	agreement	 to	be	negotiated.	But	Haughey	did	not	get	the	opportunity	to	attempt	this	as	he	lost	the	election,	to	be	succeeded	by	a	new	Fine	Gael/Labour	coalition.	The	new	government	initially	declared	its	intention	to	continue	with	the	National	Understanding,	but	by	re-structuring	it	by	separating	pay,	budgetary	strategy	and	industrial	policy,	and	reverting	to	its	public	service-centred	approach	of	the	mid-1970s,	it	would	ensure	its	demise.																																																										61		 ‘Confidential.	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Chancellor	Helmut	Schmidt	in	Bonn’,	31/03/81,	NAI:	2012/90/926/3;	Haughy,	‘Presidential	Address,	50th	Fianna	Fáil	Árd	Fheis’,	11/04/81,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	466;	“opponents”,	McCreevey	interview,	Sunday	Tribune,	27.12.1981;	1981	election	Murphy,	G.	2016	and	Whelan,	K.	2011;	Carroll	in	English	2004:	203	62		 “NU”	crisis,	ICTU	AR	1981:	75-9;	“urged	parties”,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Executive	Board	mtg.’	28/05/81	and	05/06/81;	“rejects	precipitative	action”,	‘Observations	…	on	CII	points	as	elements	of	a	five-year	industrial	programme’,	n.d	[May	1981],	for	‘informing	a	reply	by	Michael	Woods	to	Liam	Connellan	of	the	CII’,	UCD:	P176/183;	‘Haughey:	fearful	of	unpopularity’,	Irish	Times,	25.05.81	
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Chapter	4:		
Partnership	and	autonomous	government	1981-86		
Breakdown	under	the	Fine	Gael-Labour	coalition,	1981-82		 The	 minority	 coalition	 government	 formed	 in	 June	 1981	 and	 headed	 by	Garret	FitzGerald	would	fall	within	eight	months	over	a	contentious	budget.	The	same	coalition	partnership,	under	 the	more	conservative	Cosgrave	 leadership,	had	successfully	managed	 the	wage	agreements	of	 the	1970s,	 even	expanding	them,	 however	 reluctantly,	 to	 incorporate	 minimal	 budget	 and	 social	 policy	aspects	 in	 the	 1975-76	 inflation	 crisis.	 The	 FitzGerald	 government	 claimed	initially	 to	 favour	 retaining	 the	Understanding	 framework,	 but	within	months	had	discarded	 it.	This	decision,	 and	 the	 retreat	 to	a	narrower	pay	 framework,	again	demonstrated	the	core	party	political	divergence	on	corporatist	solutions.			 FitzGerald,	from	the	urban	liberal	wing	of	Fine	Gael,	saw	himself	as	a	“social	democrat”.	He	claims	 that	when	starting	out	 in	politics	he	had	considered	but	decided	against	the	Labour	Party,	principally	because	of	its	“dependence	on	the	trade	union	movement”.	He	had	nevertheless	been	an	enthusiast	for	Lemassian	economic	planning.	As	a	minister	in	the	1970s	coalition	he	had	often	sided	with	Labour	 on	 social	 policy	 issues	 against	 his	 party	 colleagues	 and	 supported	 the	broadening	of	 the	NWA	in	1975,	even	praising	 the	NESC’s	role	 in	achieving	 it.	But	 while	 favouring	 pay	 agreements	 he	 remained	 essentially	 hostile	 to	“consensus”	 policy	making,	 having	 argued	 in	 1970	 that	while	 a	 body	 like	 the	tripartite	 NIEC	 might	 recommend	 an	 approach,	 it	 was	 compromised	 by	 the	“limitations”	 of	 “consensus”.	 Government	 should	determine	policy.	 But	 during	the	1981	election	campaign	he	criticised	Fianna	Fáil’s	1980	tax	concessions	only	for	not	having	formed	“part	of	a	less	inflationary	national	understanding	deal”.1		 Labour	unexpectedly	lost	seats	in	1981	in	its	poorest	electoral	performance	since	 1957,	 reducing	 its	 bargaining	 power	 in	 the	 coalition.	 Major	 affiliated	unions	opposed	it	coalescing	with	Fine	Gael	and	some	Dublin	TDs	advocated	an																																																											1		 FitzGerald	on	Labour	Party	and	NESC,	FitzGerald	1991:	67,	295-304;	“limitations	of	consensus”,	FitzGerald,	‘NIEC	report	on	incomes	and	prices	shows	backward	progress’,	IT	15.04.1970	and	‘Wage-price	spiral	can	lead	to	economic	stagnation’,	IT	01/08/70;	“less	inflationary”,	‘Government	handling	of	incomes	policy	criticised’,	IT	04.05.81	
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arrangement	with	 Fianna	 Fáil	 instead.	 But,	 as	 ever,	 a	majority	 prioritised	 the	exclusion	of	Fianna	Fáil	from	government.	Labour	also	stated	a	preference	for	a	national	pay	agreement	but	with	economic	planning	returned	to	government.2			 The	new	“Programme	for	Government”	proposed	to	continue	prudent	 fiscal	management	with	an	eventual	return	to	expansionary	policy.	Besides	a	range	of	social	reforms,	ring-fencing	welfare,	extending	provision,	and	some	tax	reform,	it	 pledged	 to	 avoid	 pay	 freezes	 and	 honour	 arbitration	 awards	 in	 the	 public	sector.	Economic	policy	prioritised	“getting	inflation	down	to	EEC	levels”,	with	wage	 determination	 through	 “free	 central	 wage	 bargaining”	 within	 pay/price	“guidelines”	 to	be	recommended	“by	an	 independent	body”	–	 i.e.	 the	ESRI	 -	 to	maintain	“competitiveness	at	home	and	abroad”.	Industrial	policy	would	be	the	remit	of	a	new	“National	Planning	Board”	(NPB)	composed	of	“the	key	economic	and	 social	 Ministers”	 and	 “representatives”	 of	 unions,	 employers,	 farmers,	youth,	consumers	and	“public	agencies”,	“presided	over	by	the	Taoiseach”.	This	would	draft	a	 “four-year	plan”,	 to	be	 implemented	by	a	Minister	 for	Economic	Planning	and	Development.	The	proposed	approach	was	a	return	to	side-lining	the	NESC,	separating	pay	and	economic	policy,	and	post-hoc	“consultation”	on	government-driven	plans,	as	had	also	been	Whitaker	and	Lynch’s	preference.3			 FitzGerald	 appointed	 an	 “independent	 expert	 body”	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	Committee	 on	 Costs	 and	 Competitiveness.	 This	 consisted	 of	 three	 academic	economists	 -	 Professors	 Brendan	 Walsh	 (UCD),	 Dermot	 McAleese	 (TCD)	 and	Terence	Baker	(ESRI)	-	dubbed	the	“Three	Wise	Men”	after	a	similar	grouping	at	EC	 level.	 Their	 role	 was	 to	 recommend	 price/incomes	 “guidelines”	 and	 in	August	 1981	 they	 proposed	 an	 incomes	 freeze,	 a	 public	 sector	 employment	embargo,	 increased	 indirect	 taxes	 and	 drastic	 cuts	 in	 foreign	 borrowing.	FitzGerald	 accepted	 the	 advice,	 alarming	 ICTU	 by	 declaring	 that	 while	 a	“national	wages	agreement”	was	“vital”,	it	must	be	within	these	guidelines.4			 For	Labour,	Barry	Desmond,	a	former	ICTU	official,	conceded	the	need	for	a	“temporary	 pay	 pause”,	 but	 championed	 a	 new	 National	 Understanding	 as	 a																																																											2		 ITGWU/FWUI	reject	coalition,	Irish	Times	22.06.81;	Dublin	TDs,	FitzGerald	1991:	359;	LP	manifesto1981			3		 On	PfG	commitments,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda,	LG&PB	Div.	Exec.	Cttee.	mtg.’	10/04/81	and	‘Fine	Gael	and	Labour	set	out	aims	for	government’,	text	of	programme,	IT	29.06.81			4		 ‘Living	10	per	cent	above	means	–	FitzGerald’,	IT	15.08.81;	European	Council	1979	(Dec.)	and	1980	(Apr.);	ICTU	AR	1982:	132	
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“prerequisite”	for	a	fair	approach	to	“economic	and	social	planning”.	Otherwise	the	 “weak,	 those	 on	 low	 incomes	 and	 the	 unorganised”	 would	 “lose	 out”.	 To	soften	the	prescriptions	of	the	“Three	Wise	Men”,	he	proposed	that	the	NESC	be	“incorporated”	 into	the	NPB.	But	this	would	have	negated	both	the	purpose	of	the	NESC	and	 the	pay/policy	 continuum	of	 the	Understanding.	 In	 essence,	 his	position	reflected	continued	Labour	antipathy	to	Fianna	Fáil	corporatism.5			 But	 with	 the	 public	 finances	 in	 a	 worse	 condition	 than	 anticipated,	 and	 a	weakened	Labour	Party	in	little	position	to	dictate	policy,	FitzGerald	reverted	to	traditional	 Fine	 Gael	 solutions,	 i.e.	 deflationary	 price/income	 controls,	 tax	increases	and	expenditure	cuts.	He	sought	NESC	endorsement	for	his	approach,	whose	chairman’s	draft	reply	was	leaked	before	the	council	considered	it.	This	supported	 the	 proposals	 of	 the	 “Wise	 Men”	 adding	 only	 that	 controls	 should	extend	to	all	incomes,	not	just	wages,	and	was	certainly	influenced	by	Whitaker,	the	 dominant	 “expert”	 on	 the	 council	 and	 advisor	 to	 FitzGerald.	 ICTU’s	 NESC	representatives	 dissented,	 querying	 government’s	 ability	 to	 control	 non-wage	incomes	 or	 prices.	 Pat	 Rabbitte	 of	 ITGWU	 described	 the	 leaked	 proposals	 as	intended	to	undermine	any	chance	for	a	new	agreement,	and	even	the	FUE	saw	them	as	“more	theoretical	than	practical”.6		 Within	weeks	of	the	coalition’s	formation,	and	despite	election	commitments,	any	 potential	 for	 a	 new	 National	 Understanding	 had	 evaporated.	 Employers	backed	government’s	preference	for	a	pay	pause,	adding	that	the	policy	aspect	of	previous	Understandings	had	been	agreed	between	government	and	unions	without	 their	 input.	 Fine	 Gael	ministers	 declared	 that	 while	 “social	 partners”	might	be	consulted,	they	had	“no	right	to	decide	important	social	and	economic	policy”,	 and	 matters	 “such	 as	 education	 and	 maternity	 leave,	 which	 bear	 no	direct	relationship	to	incomes	…	should	not	be	the	subject	of	bargaining”.7			 This	 separation	 of	 pay	 bargaining	 and	 economic	 planning	 led	 FitzGerald,	despite	the	receding	hopes	for	fruitful	pay	talks,	to	meet	ICTU	anyway	to	discuss	the	three-year	“national	plan	for	economic	and	social	development”	he	hoped	to	publish	 “before	 end	 of	 year”.	 Some	 institutions	 of	 the	 Understanding	 were																																																											5		 ‘Desmond	against	wage	free-for-all’,	Irish	Times	18.08.81			6		 ‘FitzGerald	seeks	to	control	all	incomes’,	Irish	Times	24.08.81;	‘NESC	calls	for	18-month	freeze	on	income	rises’,	Irish	Times	27.08.81;	ICTU	AR	1982:	200-1;	Rabbitte	and	FUE	quoted	in	Irish	Times	28.08.81			7		 Irish	Times	28.08.81	
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retained,	such	as	the	Sectoral	Developmental	Committee,	or,	like	the	Enterprise	Agency,	 abolished	 on	 the	 promise	 that	 their	 functions	would	 reappear	 in	 the	planned	 “National	 Development	 Corporation”.	 While	 still	 aspiring	 to	 a	 “new	National	 Understanding”,	 unions	 adopted	 to	 the	 new	 situation,	 with	 an	 ICTU	conference	in	September	1981	voting	3-to-1	to	“explore	the	possibility”	of	a	pay	agreement	with	employers	only	and	“negotiate	separately	with	Government	on	…	trade	union	policy	on	social	and	economic	matters”.8		 FitzGerald	again	met	and	 “consulted”	 ICTU	 in	December	1981,	 encouraging	them	to	pursue	a	private	sector	“central	agreement”	with	employers.	The	NESC	position	 when	 published,	 while	 amended	 from	 the	 leaked	 August	 draft,	 still	advocated	a	pay	pause	and	incomes/price	controls,	and	ICTU	refused	to	sign	it.	Union	 disillusionment	 at	 the	 ending	 of	 tripartite	 wage/policy	 bargaining	was	apparent	in	a	bitter	ITGWU	appraisal	which	declared	“the	word	[had]	failed	to	become	flesh”,	the	institutions	established	in	April-May	1981	having	proved	to	be	a	Fianna	Fáil	electoral	ploy	and	stalling	by	civil	servants	having	enabled	the	Coalition	 dispense	 with	 them	 “with	 contempt”.	 But	 ICTU	 President	 Paddy	Cardiff	mourned	the	demise	of	 the	National	Understandings,	 “a	brave,	original	and	creative	attempt	to	broaden	the	scope	of	centralised	bargaining”.9		 Abandoning	tripartite	planning	did	little	to	enhance	state	control	of	income/	price	development.	Government	itself	rather	absurdly	pleaded	“inability	to	pay”	to	 justify	 a	 proposed	 18-month	 pubic	 service	 deal	 which,	 despite	 inflation	 of	over	10%,	would	 freeze	pay	 for	a	year,	 followed	by	 increases	capped	at	7	per	cent,	and	with	the	private	sector	expected	to	follow	suit.	Private	sector	talks	at	the	Employer-Labour	Conference	collapsed	when	employers	insisted	on	holding	to	this	“government	guideline”	and	unions	on	maintaining	wage	values.	Pressed	by	Labour,	FitzGerald	acceded	to	a	15-month	public	pay	deal	matching	inflation	and	weighted	to	the	low-paid,	though	freezing	special	claims.	ICTU	declined	to	recommend	it	but	its	weary	public	sector	membership	balloted	to	accept.10																																																												8		 “before	end	of	year”,	ICTU	AR	1982:	114;	institutions	retained,	ibid.	205-6;	“aspiring”,	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	mtg.	25/09/81;	union	vote,	ICTU	AR	1982:	127			9		 FitzGerald-ICTU	meetings,	ICTU	AR	1982:	127-30,	179;	NESC	1981d:	91-94	and	ICTU	AR	1982:	201;	ITGWU	response,	Liberty,	Nov.	1981;	Cardiff	quoted	in	Devine	2009:	763	10		 ‘Government	has	not	broken	pact	–	Kavanagh’,	Irish	Times	11.09.81,	‘Government	will	not	intervene	to	save	pay	talks’,	Irish	Times	02.11.1981,	and	ICTU	AR	1982:	131;	ELC	breakdown,	ICTU	AR	1982:	129-30;	agreement	“wearily”	accepted,	LGPSU,	‘Report	for	Agenda,	H&W	Div.	Exec.’	22/01/82		
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	 No	side	was	content,	farmers	accusing	the	coalition,	“like	its	predecessor”,	of	“abandoning	its	anti-inflation	programme”,	the	CII	decrying	the	deal	for	setting	“an	utterly	 unreal	 example”	 for	 private	 industry,	 and	 the	 FUE	 condemning	 its	reneging	on	the	pay	pause,	“ignor[ing]	the	implications	for	the	private	sector”.	Settlements	in	the	private	sector	nevertheless	mostly	followed	the	terms	of	the	public	 deal,	 though	 few	 of	 those	 without	 bargaining	 power	 received	 any	increases.	Government,	which	Congress	accused	of	seeking	“to	run	the	economy	by	diktat	and	economic	 lecture”,	 resorted	 to	 increasingly	draconian	measures,	cutting	 spending	and	 increasing	 taxes	 that	 severely	 reduced	wage	values,	 and	embargoing	a	third	of	public	service	vacancies.	It	dispensed	with	public	service	“special	claims”	by	simply	not	re-appointing	the	Arbitrator.	Strike	days	rose	by	a	 third	 in	 1981	 while	 the	 budget	 deficit	 climbed	 to	 7.3	 per	 cent.	 While	“discarding”	the	National	Understandings	it	ended	up	with	a	rancorous	old-style	public	pay	agreement	that	antagonised	unions	and	employers	while	alienating	expert	 economic	opinion.	The	Coalition	 fell	 by	a	 single	vote	 in	February	1982	over	a	budget	imposing	VAT	on	children’s	clothes	and	shoes.11			 In	opposition	Haughey	had	contended	that	his	gradualist	approach	to	current	expenditure	 reduction	 and	 capital	 investment,	 with	 a	 recovery	 of	 revenues	through	 revived	 growth,	 was	 the	 only	 way	 “to	 avoid	 serious	 economic	disruption	and	greater	unemployment”.	Having	eschewed	a	tripartite	consensus	in	 favour	 of	 deflation,	 the	 FitzGerald	 government	 also	 failed	 to	 achieve	 an	electoral	 consensus,	 and	 lost	 the	 February	 1982	 election,	 being	 replaced	by	 a	further	 minority	 Haughey	 administration.	 On	 Haughey’s	 threatened	 return,	Whitaker	 resigned	 from	 NESC,	 reminding	 its	 chair	 both	 of	 his	 opposition	 to	socio-economic	planning	being	moved	 from	Finance	 to	 the	Department	of	 the	Taoiseach	-	which	FitzGerald,	while	also	criticising	the	move,	had	not	reversed	-	and	 his	 belief	 in	 the	 need	 for	 “effective	means	 of	 keeping	 incomes	 and	 costs	from	 rising	 faster	 in	 relation	 to	 real	 output	 than	 in	 countries	with	which	we	compete”,	i.e.	statutory	wage	controls.12																																																											11		 “farmers”,	‘FUE,	unions	consider	new	wage	talks’,	Irish	Times	17.12.1981;	CII	view,	‘Employer	group	condemns	pay	deal’,	Irish	Times	17.12.1981;	FUE	view,	‘Employers	challenge	Government	pay	proposals’,	
Irish	Times	22.12.81;	“settlements”,	ICTU	AR	1982:	125-6;	“diktat	and	lecture”,	IRN,	30.10.1981	12		 Haughey	in	Dáil	21/10/81;	Whitaker	to	Noel	Whelan,	NESC,	10.02.1982,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3	
	 97	
	
Revival	in	another	Haughey	interlude,	1982	
		 The	first	budget	of	the	new	Haughey	government,	in	March	1982,	retained	the	coalition’s	spending	cuts	and	introduced	additional	deficit	cutting	measures.	But	while	unions	complained	that	the	“savage	cutbacks	represent	an	attack	…	on	the	poor”,	Haughey	included	left-wing	measures	which	ensured	it	was	passed.	These	included	his	securing	of	Independent	Dublin	TD	Tony	Gregory’s	vote	by	agreeing	with	 him	 a	 radical	 social	 plan	 for	 the	 inner	 city,	 brokered	 by	 ITGWU	 general	secretary	 Michael	 Mullen,	 and	 ensuring	 the	 abstention	 of	 the	 three	 Workers	Party	 TDs	 by	 ring-fencing	welfare	 benefits.	 He	 also	maintained	 the	 basis	 for	 a	return	to	tripartitism	by	re-activating	initiatives	under	the	1980	Understanding,	paying	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 FitzGerald’s	 pubic	 service	 agreement	 and	 intervening	directly	to	settle	various	festering	industrial	disputes.	Unlike	for	FitzGerald,	none	of	these	measures	represented	an	ideological	compromise	for	Haughey.13		 What	 is	 notable	 in	 retrospect	 about	 this	 short-lived	8-month	 government	 is	how	much	its	core	approach	to	socio-economic	policy	and	attempts	to	organise	these	 politically	 would	 be	 replicated	 in	 1987.	 He	 revived	 key	 elements	 of	 the	National	Understanding	approach	abandoned	by	FitzGerald	but	by	late	summer	1982	 remodelled	 it	 into	 a	 new	 paradigm	 pre-figuring	 the	 1987	 departure.	 He	revived	 other	 innovations	 of	 his	 1980-81	 government,	 in	 the	 arts,	 third-level	technical	 education,	Northern	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 semi-state	 commercialisation	and	urban	regeneration.	 In	 industrial	policy	he	revived	his	 formula	of	a	capital	investment/welfare	 expansion/growth	 rather	 than	 “full	 employment”	 model,	restored	 the	 NESC	 to	 a	 central	 strategic	 role,	 re-asserted	 the	 primacy	 of	monetary	policy,	and	centralised	policy	management	in	a	tight	team	coordinated	in	his	Department.	Finally	he	pursued	a	social	partnership	strategy	first	with	the	unions	 and	 then	 other	 forces,	 notably	 the	 CII.	 Why	 was	 this	 strategy,	 almost	identical	to	the	paradigm	shift	he	engineered	in	1987,	not	successful	in	1982?																																																										13	 “savage	cutbacks”,	‘Annual	Conference,	LGPSU	H&W	Division’,	13/05/82,	ILHS:	LGPSU-1;	on	Gregory,	Gilligan	2011,	with	text	of	‘Agreement	reached	by	Charlie	Haughey	TD	and	Tony	Gregory	TD’,	196-223,	and	on	WP,	Hanley	and	Millar	2009;	“stoke”,	Joyce	and	Murtagh	1983;	revives	“Understanding”	initiatives,	ICTU	AR,	1983	and	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	617;	implements	pay	deal,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	LG&PB		Div.	Exec.’,	16/04/82	and	D/Env.	circular	E14/82;	on	settling	disputes,	Ger	Connolly	TD,	‘Address	to	…	annual	conference’	LG&PB	Div.,	13/05/82	and	‘Annual	Conf.,	LGPSU	H&W	Division’,	13/05/82,	ILHS:	LGPSU-1		
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	 Having	 attacked	 FitzGerald	 for	 “abandoning”	 the	 National	 Understanding,	Haughey	 announced	 his	 intention	 to	 develop	 a	 “comprehensive	 plan”	 in	consultation	 with	 unions,	 employers	 and	 “economic	 and	 social	 research	institutions”,	 i.e.	 both	 the	 NESC	 and	 ESRI.	 Despite	 Congress	 scepticism	 arising	from	its	bruising	experiences	with	the	unravelling	of	the	National	Understanding	in	1981,	 ITGWU	leader	 John	Carroll	again	 liaised	with	Haughey	and	his	union’s	Executive	 welcomed	 his	 proposals.	 It	 called	 for	 the	 suggested	 talks	 to	 begin	immediately	 between	 the	 “social	 partners”	 on	 a	 “national	 economic	 and	 social	plan”	to	“maximize	the	country’s	resources”,	accepted	the	role	of	pay	restraint	in	“securing	 economic	 recovery”	 and	 proposed	 a	 state-sector-driven	 industrial	policy	and	“major	extension	of	the	principle	of	industrial	democracy”	as	the	way	to	achieve	it.	Haughey	met	both	employers	and	unions,	pressing	on	both	his	wish	on	 the	 expiry	 of	 the	 pay	 round	 in	 December	 1982	 to	 conclude	 a	 national	agreement	covering	pay	and	tax	as	well	as	“appropriate	[tripartite]	structures	for	long	term	economic	and	social	planning”.	As	he	later	told	the	Dáil:		 “There	are	those	who	think	economic	policies	can	be	pursued	on	the	basis	of	confrontation	with	the	trade	union	movement.	We	do	not	subscribe	to	that	…	We	also	maintain	full	consultation	with	employer	organisations,	again	on	the	 fundamental	 principle	 that	 in	 a	 small	 community	 such	 as	 ours	 the	confrontation	policies	which	 the	Opposition	 seem	 to	 favour	will	 only	 bring	dissension	and	division.	Our	economic	plan	will	provide	a	basis	for	uniting	all	economic	effort	and	interests	in	a	concerted	programme,	to	build	up	a	more	competitive	and	better	structured	economy”.14		 Again	prefiguring	events	of	five	years	later,	Haughey	simultaneously	convened	an	 inner	 cabinet	 group	 headed	 by	 Finance	 Minister	 Ray	 MacSharry,	 which	 he	tasked	with	producing	within	three	months	a	4-year	“economic	and	social	plan”	to	form	the	basis	for	a	programme	to	be	agreed	with	employers,	unions,	farmers	and	 “economic	 and	 social	 research	 bodies”	 to	 transform	 the	 economy	fundamentally	and	grow	it	out	of	recession.	This,	he	told	the	Dáil,	would	 firstly																																																									14		 “abandoning”	Haughey,	‘Budget	speech	January	1982’	(not	delivered),	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	589;	also	‘Cabinet	failed	on	pay	talks,	says	Haughey’,	Irish	Times	13.11.81;	“comprehensive	plan”,	Haughey,	‘Speech	to	the	Economic	Club,	New	York’,	15/03/83,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	604	and	‘Plan	to	right	economy	pledged’,	Irish	Times	16.03.82;	ITGWU	response,	‘Union	wants	to	meet	Haughey’,	Irish	Times	25.03.82;	Haughey	proposal,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	21.04.82;	“there	are	those	who	think”,	Dáil	01/07/82	
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identify	 the	 “measures	 and	 sacrifices”	 needed	 to	 tackle	 the	 immediate	 deficit	problem	 and	 then	 drive	 an	 industrial	 take-off.	 The	 Enterprise	 Agency,	 IDA	schemes	 and	 other	 initiatives	 of	 the	National	Understanding	would	 be	 revived	and	 state	 industries,	 if	 operated	 efficiently,	 would	 have	 an	 enhanced	 role.	Following	an	 initial	period	of	radical	 financial	adjustment,	an	agreement	would	be	sought	with	the	“social	partners”	on	the	detail	of	the	longer-term	plan.15		 Planning	 by	 the	 MacSharry	 group,	 coordinated	 by	 Ó	 hUiginn	 through	 the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	in	close	liaison	with	Haughey,	involved	a	tight	circle	of	ministers,	 civil	 servants,	 agency	 leaders	 (notably	 Pádraic	White	 of	 the	 IDA)	and	 economists	 (notably	 Kieran	Kennedy	 of	 the	 ESRI).	 In	what	would	 prove	 a	political	mistake,	however,	 it	was	not	coordinated	with	a	simultaneous	process	with	 the	 social	partners	 at	NESC.	Tensions	arose	 in	April	when	a	mooted	PRSI	increase	 led	 ICTU	 to	 threaten	renewed	 tax	protests,	but	 this	was	reversed	as	a	critical	 Dublin	 by-election	 loomed.	 On	 31	 July,	 within	 Haughey’s	 deadline,	MacSharry	 announced	 his	 financial	 plan	 to	 “progressively”	 but	 “prudently”	reduce	 the	 deficit	 through	 spending	 cuts	 while	 protecting	 lower	 incomes	 and	avoiding	 tax	 rises.	 Industrial	 policy	 initiatives	 being	 developed	 by	 Ó	 hUiginn’s	group	would	 follow,	with	the	 joint	monetary/industrial/social	strategy	 forming	the	basis	for	a	programme	with	the	social	partners	before	the	end	of	the	year.16			 The	 as	 yet	 speculative	 industrial	 strategy	 and	 partnership	 agreement	 were	not	enough	 to	deflect	union	shock	at	MacSharry’s	31	 July	statement,	which	not	only	drastically	cut	all	department	budgets	and	extended	the	public	recruitment	embargo,	but	deferred	for	18	months,	into	1983,	payment	of	both	public	service	special	 awards	 and,	 even	 more	 critically,	 of	 the	 final	 5	 per	 cent	 phase	 of	 the	current	 public	 service	 pay	 deal.	 Haughey	 suggested	 that	 MacSharry’s	 pay	deferral	form	a	starting	point	for	wider	talks	with	ICTU.	But	he	had	no	intention	of	rescinding	it,	and	at	the	same	time	instructed	the	measure	also	to	be	enforced	in	 the	 array	 of	 contracted	 non-state	 agencies	 delivering	 health	 services.	 ICTU	denounced	 MacSharry’s	 plan	 as	 an	 “arbitrary	 breach	 of	 a	 freely	 negotiated	agreement”,	warning	government	to	“desist	from	the	course	of	confrontation	and	
																																																								15		 Haughey	in	Dáil	02/05/82	16	 Planning,	MacSharry	and	White	2000:	53-5;	not	consult,	‘The	Way	Forward	to	What?’	Liberty,	Nov.	1982	
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conflict”	 which	 would	 “end	 any	 possibility	 of	 a	 constructive	 dialogue	 on	economic	policy”.17		 Haughey	 responded	 by	meeting	 the	 ICTU	 on	 17	 August	 and	 proposing	 that	while	 the	pay	deferral	had	to	stand,	 it	could	be	 incorporated	 into	a	wider	pay/	policy	agreement	that	 included	elements	offsetting	 it	such	as	compensatory	tax	reductions	 and	other	measures.	 In	 September	he	 further	 eased	 tensions	by	 re-appointing	 the	 Arbitration	 Board	 suspended	 by	 the	 coalition,	 which	 health	unions	were	soon	reporting	was	 fairly	adjudicating	special	claims,	even	 if	 their	eventual	 payment	 was	 deferred.	 But	 the	 public	 pay	 crisis	 dominated	 ICTU’s	agenda,	 one	 union	 noting	 “all	 else	 in	 the	 period	 [was]	 overshadowed	 by	 the	shock	announcement”.	ICTU	threats	of	protests	and	strikes	receded	as	Haughey	again	offered	to	encompass	the	deferral	of	the	payment	phase	within	a	wider	18-month	public	pay	agreement	that	could	encompass	compensatory	elements.18			 In	 fact	 Haughey	 already	 realised	 his	 mistake	 in	 not	 accompanying	 the	MacSharry	 financial	 adjustment	plan	with	 a	 social	 partnership	process	 and	 in	deferring	 the	 latter	 until	 after	 the	 former	 was	 achieved.	 After	 an	 EC	 Council	summit	 in	 Brussels	 in	 June	 he	 had	 had	 a	 “chat”,	 which	 he	 “vividly”	 recalled	twenty	years	later,	with	his	main	EC	ally,	Helmut	Schmidt,	whom	he	admired	as	the	 quintessential	 European	 social	 democratic	 leader.	 He	 met	 him	 again	 two	weeks	later	in	Bonn,	discussing	economic	policy	and	industrial	relations	at	both	meetings.	 When	 he	 casually	 asked	 Schmidt	 what	 he	 planned	 to	 do	 after	 the	council,	the	German	leader	replied	that	“this	weekend	is	the	most	important	one	in	 my	 annual	 calendar	 -	 I	 meet	 with	 the	 employers	 and	 the	 trade	 unions	 to	hammer	out	an	agreement	on	the	rates	of	pay	and	salaries	appropriate	for	the	coming	year	in	the	light	of	the	economic	situation	anticipated”.	Haughey	related	how	he	was	“immediately	struck	with	this	common-sense	approach”	and	how	“I	began,	 in	my	mind,	as	I	 listened	to	Chancellor	Schmidt,	to	develop	and	expand	the	 concept	 [of	 social	 partnership].”	 This	 statement,	 just	 two	 years	 before	 his	death,	 in	 a	 paper	 he	 co-drafted	 with	 Ó	 hUiginn,	 might	 be	 misconstrued	 as																																																									17		 Budget	plan	and	Haughey	proposal,	‘Government	statement:	Public	Expenditure	Policy’,	30/07/82,	GIS;	instruction	on	health	bodies,	LGPSU	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board	mtg.’	06/08/82	encl.	Albert	Reynolds	TD,	circular,	“to	all	Departments”,	30/07/82;	Congress	reaction	ICTU	AR	1983:	146-7	18		 Haughey	meets	ICTU,	ICTU	AR	1983:	148-51;	re-appoints	Arb.	Brd.,	‘Staff	Panel	[Health	Service]’	mtg.	07/09/82,	ILHS:	LGPSU-1;	“all	else	in	the	period”,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	H&W	Exec.	Cttee.’	27/09/82;	Haughey	offer,	ICTU	AR	1983:	148-51	
	 101	
Haughey	adopting	a	partnership	 strategy	after	 these	 “chats”,	 but	 that	was	not	the	 case.	 What	 Haughey	 took	 from	 Schmidt	 was	 the	 need	 to	 integrate	 his	monetary/industrial	strategy	 from	the	start	 in	a	partnership	process,	securing	buy-in	to	its	essential	outline.		It	was	a	mistake	he	would	not	repeat	in	1987.19		 Once	 the	 deficit	 strategy	was	 announced,	 the	Ó	 hUiginn-coordinated	 group	finalised	its	 industrial	and	economic	plans.	The	claim	that	this	was	an	internal	civil	service	initiative	in	which	Haughey	played	little	part	is	not	sustainable.	Not	only	 did	 Haughey	 form	 the	 group	 and	 personally	 appoint	 its	 members,	 but	Kieran	Kennedy,	recalling	Haughey’s	regular	inputs	to	it,	was	later	reported	as	saying	 he	 had	 “never	 encountered	 a	 person	 with	 such	 an	 incisive	 mind	 and	intellect	as	Haughey”,	who	as	Taoiseach,	“unlike	some	others,	…	listened	to	his	suggestions”.	Ó	hUiginn,	while	naturally	stressing	his	own	role,	similarly	admits	discussing	the	plan	with	Haughey	“virtually	on	a	daily	basis”	as	it	developed.20			 The	final	plan,	The	Way	Forward,	published	in	October	1982,	was	not	solely	the	 product	 of	 the	 tight	 group	 that	 compiled	 it,	 as	 it	 in	 turn	 built	 on	 key	strategies	 produced	 by	 the	 tripartite	 NESC	 after	 it	 had	 been	 upgraded	 by	Haughey	 in	1980	 from	a	subordinate	policy	 function	 to	a	strategic	 role.	These	reports	 included	 a	 pro-integration	 EEC	 strategy,	 a	 sector-focused	 industrial	strategy	and	a	report	-	by	the	US	consultancy,	Telesis,	also	commissioned	by	the	NESC	 -	 advising	 a	 radical	 reconfiguring	of	 FDI	 and	preferential	 state	 supports	for	promising	indigenous	exporting	companies.	These	reports	had	developed	in	parallel	with	The	Way	Forward,	involving	many	of	the	same	personnel.21		 The	Way	Forward	proposed	both	eliminating	the	national	deficit	in	five	years	and	 simultaneously	 driving	 an	 economic	 transformation	 through	 “productive	investment”	 in	 export	 sectors	 and	 aggressively	 increasing	 foreign	 inward	investment,	 though	 shifting	 from	Whitaker’s	 now	 collapsing	 laissez	 faire	 FDI	model	 to	 a	 targeting	 of	 selected	 high	 value-added	 hi-tech	 sectors	complementing	 indigenous	 development.	 In	 addition,	 as	 advised	 by	 Telesis,																																																									19		 “greatly	admired”,	Interview	with	Martin	Mansergh	and	Hastings	et	al.	2007:	33;	“chat”	Haughey	2013	and	background	material	in	NAI/Taoiseach/2012/90/926,	‘Brief:	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	Chancellor	Schmidt,	Bonn,	13	July	1982’;	“co-drafted”,	interview	with	Ó	hUiginn	20		 “often	touted”,	e.g.	Roche	2009,	Regan	2012;	Kennedy	quoted	in	Charles	Lysaght,	‘Where	are	they	now?’,	
Sunday	Independent	17/09/06,	similarly	interview	with	Pádraig	White;	“daily	basis”,	int.	Ó	hUiginn	21		 Way	Forward,	Fianna	Fáil	1982;	on	its	development,	MacSharry	and	White	2000;	NESC	plans	NESC	1981a	and	b,	and	1982a	and	b		
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promising	indigenous	firms	were	to	be	selected	for	state	assistance	to	grow	to	a	globally	 competitive	 scale.	 New	 industries	 should	 be	 created,	 in	 ICT,	 marine	technology	 and	 other	 areas,	 and	 access	 to	 technical	 education	 radically	expanded.	The	economic	turn-around	should	be	accompanied	by	a	new	National	Understanding	 agreeing	 the	 stages	 of	 industrial	 transformation,	 ring-fencing	welfare	 and	delivering	 industrial	 peace	by	offsetting	pay	moderation	with	 tax	cuts	boosting	real	pay	at	 low	net	cost	to	industry.	Accepting	this	shift	 in	profit	distribution,	though	subsidised	by	worker-friendly	fiscal	reform,	was	regarded	as	 the	major	contribution	social	partnership	could	provide.	The	recession	was	to	 be	 “out-grown”	 while	 stability	 was	 assured	 and	 confrontation	 avoided.	Revenues	would	expand	 through	corporation	 taxes	and	a	broadened	 tax	base.	When	accused	of	a	policy	volte-face,	Haughey	cryptically	told	The	Irish	Times:	“I	don’t	intend	to	be	a	prisoner	of	my	past,	and	you	should	not	be	either”.22		 Haughey,	as	he	later	recalled,	now	approached	unions	and	employers	formally	and	 informally	with	The	Way	Forward	 “to	 see	 if	 their	 agreement	with	 the	Plan	could	 be	 obtained”.	 But	 despite	 “exchanges	 of	 views”	 an	 agreement	 “did	 not	prove	 possible”.	 He	 told	 the	 ICTU	 the	 plan	 was	 as	 significant	 a	 departure	 as	Lemass’s	Programmes	and	had	been	welcomed	by	employers,	farmers	and	the	EC	Commission	and	suggested	a	 “social	partnership”	 that	excluded	statutory	wage	controls	“at	this	stage”	and	based	on	a	“new	permanent	structure	for	economic	and	 social	 planning”.	 But	 ICTU	 equivocated,	 still	 reeling	 from	 the	 public	 pay	“shock”	 and	 reluctant	 following	 its	1981	experience	 to	 yet	 again	 enter	 a	wider	deal	with	a	government	whose	stability	was	becoming	increasingly	precarious.23			 Until	August	1982,	the	Haughey	government	had	appeared	determined,	stable	and	united,	with	an	impressed	media	largely	supportive.	But	a	series	of	bizarre	mishaps	from	late	summer,	eagerly	seized	upon	by	sensation-hungry	journalists,	notably,	despite	its	Haughey-friendly	editor,	in	The	Irish	Times,	undermined	him,	reviving	an	internal	party	opposition	intent	on	displacing	him.	Haughey	believed	that	 successful	government	power	depended	on	a	united	cabinet	 committed	 to	delivering	 specific	 goals	 rather	 than	party	 or	 backbench	 support,	which	would																																																									22		 Fianna	Fáil	1982;	“laissez	faire	FDI”,	O’Riordan	2019,	Pt.	7	‘Beyond	our	Ken!’;	“profit	share”,	Kennedy,	K.	2001;	“prisoner”,	Irish	Times	22.10.82	23		 “see	if	their	agreement”,	Haughey	2013;	proposals	to	ICTU,	ICTU	AR	1983:	148-51;	
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follow	 when	 these	 existed.	 But	 this	 unity	 was	 now	 collapsing.	 Nevertheless,	despite	his	waning	authority,	diminishing	his	plausibility	as	a	negotiating	partner	for	 social	 interest	 leaders,	 “intense	 negotiations”	with	 ICTU	 produced	 a	 public	pay	agreement	in	October,	with	Haughey	agreeing	to	phasing	in	increases	rather	than	outright	deferral,	and	conceding	on	other	issues	such	as	top-up	productivity	bargaining	in	state	enterprises.24		 Agreement	on	public	service	pay	was	a	prerequisite	for	a	broader	partnership	agreement,	 but,	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 distance	 from	government,	 the	 ICTU	public	services	 committee	 that	 negotiated	 it	 put	 it	 to	 membership	 ballot	 without	recommending	acceptance	or	rejection.	In	the	Dáil	Haughey	pleaded	with	public	service	union	members,	traditionally	Fianna	Fáil	voters,	to	accept	it	as	“the	limit	of	what	the	Exchequer	can	bear”,	adding	that	he	hoped	bargaining	in	the	private	sector	would	follow	based	on	“unit	wage-cost	competitive	gain”.25			 Unions	 distancing	 themselves	 from	 Haughey	 as	 his	 authority	 collapsed	included	 even	 the	 ITGWU,	 which	 now	 castigated	 the	 Way	 Forward	 as	 “the	greatest	 expression	 of	 blind	 faith	 in	 unbridled	 capitalism	 issued	 by	 any	 Irish	Government	for	two	decades”	and	an	“exercise	in	 ‘Reaganomics’”	as	if	designed	to	make	an	agreement	impossible.	ICTU	had	not	in	fact	set	its	face	against	a	new	National	Understanding,	but	its	Executive	was	deeply	divided	and	still	arguing	its	position	when	 the	government	 fell	 on	28	October	 as	Gregory	and	 the	Workers	Party,	opposing	MacSharry’s	cuts,	supported	a	motion	of	no-confidence.26		 	In	the	event,	the	public	pay	deal	was	accepted	by	union	members	balloting	in	November	during	 the	election	campaign.	Following	much	wrangling	 reflecting	deep	 internal	 divisions	 over	 a	 return	 to	 an	 Understanding	 strategy,	 the	 ICTU	Executive	narrowly	agreed	a	10-point	policy	statement	entitled	 ‘The	Real	Way	Forward’,	 which	 advocated	 a	 partnership	 agreement	 that	 accepted	 monetary	retrenchment	 and	debt	 reduction	 if	 combined	with	 an	 expansionist	 industrial																																																									24		 “sensation-hungry”,	Joyce	and	Murtagh	1983,	and	contemporary	columns	in	The	Irish	Times	by	Haughey’s	old	adversary,	Conor	Cruise	O’Brien;	on	Gageby	and	Haughey,	Whittaker	2006	and	Brady	2005;	Haughey	views	on	power,	interview	Haughey	2005;	“intense	negotiations”,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	LG&SB	Exec.	Cttee.’	13/10/82;	‘Draft	Proposals	for	amending	the	Agreement	on	Public	Sector	Pay	between	the	Minister	for	the	Public	Services	and	the	Public	Services	Committee	of	the	ICTU’,	in	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	LGPSU	Exec.	Board.’	22/09/82		25	 “later	recalled”,	Haughey	2013;	“social	partnership”,	Irish	Times	22.10.82;	“limit	of	what	exchequer”,	Haughey,	Dáil	27/10/82;	“unit	gain”,	Dáil	22/10/82	26		 ITGWU	position,	‘The	Way	Forward	to	What?’,	Liberty,	Nov.	1982;	“arguing”,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	Oct.-Dec.	1982;	fall	of	govt.,	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	706		
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policy	based	on	NESC	policies,	pay	moderation	offset	by	tax	reform,	and	union	participation	in	“all	facets	of	economic	and	social	planning”.	Its	red	line	was	that	real	wage	and	welfare	values	be	maintained.	The	Plan	appeared	before	a	new	government	was	formed,	and	Haughey	responded	eagerly	to	each	of	its	points,	claiming	 their	 compatibility	 with	 his	 own	 concepts	 and	 even	 intimating	 his	willingness	to	form	a	coalition	with	Labour	as	a	basis	for	realising	them.27		 The	Way	Forward	and	Haughey’s	proposed	social	partnership	framework	had	some	parallels	in	post-Keynesian	recovery	strategies	being	pursued	by	other	left-of-centre	 governments	 with	 which	 Haughey	 was	 aligned,	 notably	 Schmidt’s	 in	Germany	 and	Mitterand’s	 in	 France.	Many	 social	 democratic	 governments	 lost	power	 in	 Europe	 in	 this	 period,	 being	 replaced	 by	 right-of-centre	 alternatives	committed	 to	 austerity	 and	 monetary	 adjustment	 or,	 as	 in	 Mitterand’s	 case,	surviving	by	abandoning	what	has	been	termed	his	experiment	in	“Keynesianism	in	one	country”	and	partly	adapting	such	a	course.	But	the	Way	Forward	was	also	different	from	these	in	also	being	a	long-term	plan	to	address	deeper	structural	problems	of	Irish	economic	underdevelopment	and	“late	industrialisation”.28			 At	 EC	 Council	 level,	 differing	 approaches	 to	 monetary	 adjustment	 led	 to	increasing	disunity.	In	March	1982	a	majority	on	the	Council	had	still	favoured	a	consensus	 approach	 and	 “convergence”	 of	 national	 policies	 along	 such	 lines,	recommending	that	member	states	tackle	the	“major	structural	crisis	…	affecting	every	 country”	 by	 reducing	 inflation	 and	 controlling	 production	 costs,	 but	simultaneously	 increasing	 “productive	 investment”	 in	 the	 public	 and	 private	sectors,	in	“industries	of	the	future”	and	in	youth	training	and	employment.	But	this	EEC	council	consensus	had	collapsed,	giving	way	 to	several	years	of	policy	disunity	and	Community	inaction,	often	termed	the	period	of	“Eurosclerosis”.29		 Despite	such	exogenous	factors	and	the	policy	disunity	at	EC	level,	Haughey’s	1982	government	policies	and	the	fate	of	its	“social	partnership”	initiative	were	primarily	 determined	 by	 domestic	 factors.	 In	many	ways	 his	 1982	 corporatist	formula,	developed	from	his	first	National	Understanding	of	1980-81,	as	well	as																																																									27		 Pay	deal	accepted,	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	mtg.	07/10/82;	Reporter	(LPGSU)	Dec.	1982;	“wrangling”,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	Oct.-Dec.	1982;	‘The	Real	Way	Forward’,	ICTU	AR	1983;	Haughey	response,	‘Speech	to	Dublin	North-Central	Comhairle	Dáilcheantair’,	09/12/82;	on	Labour,	Mansergh	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	716-8	28		 “parallels	in	other	countries”,	Irish	Times	22.10.82;	“Keynesiasm	in	one	country”,	Dølvik	1999;	“late	inustrialisation”,	Hardiman	1988	29		 European	Council	1982	(March)	and	1982	(June);	“Eurosclerosis’,	Meenan,	1999		
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the	political	process	to	realise	it,	would	be	repeated	in	1987,	but	with	the	critical	factors	of	early	partner	engagement	and	convincing	cabinet	authority	resolved.	
	
Policy	consensus,	ideology	and	party	conflict	in	the	1980s	
		 Ireland’s	political	 turmoil	 in	1980-82	was	multi-facetted,	but	at	 its	 core	was	disarray	over	economic	policy,	common	to	most	countries	as	vying	formulae	for	a	post-Keynesian	order	caused	political	turbulence	and	division	across	the	OECD,	paralysing	even	the	EC	Council.	By	1982	a	consensus	consolidated	in	Irish	policy	circles	on	 a	need	 to	 combine	monetarist	 adjustment	with	 a	 stimulus	 industrial	strategy	to	overcome	structural	underdevelopment.	What	was	disputed	was	the	combination	and	framework	in	which	these	should	occur.30			 NESC	 reports	 commissioned	 under	 the	 Haughey	 government	 of	 1980	 and	completed	in	1982,	as	well	as	Fianna	Fáil’s	own	Way	Forward,	set	out	aspects	of	this	 dual	 strategy.	While	 how	 to	 resolve	 the	monetary	 challenge	was	 taken	 as	given	 –	 by	 reducing	 both	 inflation	 and	 government	 consumption	 –	 the	 major	policy	challenge	of	how	to	overcome	industry’s	failing	to	adapt	to	free	trade	and	revive	 on	 a	 development	 path	 remained	 contended.	 Companies	 that	 had	prospered	under	protection	were	often	subsidiaries	of	foreign	firms	engaged	in	basic	assembly	and	exploiting	remaining	protections,	but	these	were	now	closing	as	 those	 benefits	 ended.	 Indigenous	 firms	 had	 neither	 the	 scale,	 skills	 nor	capacity	to	exploit	free	trade	competitively	and	became	the	primary	victims	of	it.	Foreign	investment	had	been	a	major	driver,	but	the	FDI	sector	stalled	as	firms	withdrew,	its	legacy	of	unreliability	and	high-cost	per	job	much	criticised.	A	view	emerged	 at	 policy	 level	 advocating	 supports	 be	 redirected	 to	 indigenous	 firms	with	the	potential	to	become	internationally	competitive	players.31			 The	 IDA	 opposed	 this	 policy	 turn,	 Pádraic	 White	 vigorously	 defending	 FDI	while	advocating	it	be	re-focused	towards	selected	higher	quality-added	sectors	in	 place	 of	 the	 hitherto	 laissez	 faire	 approach,	 though	 also	 “picking	 winners”	among	indigenous	firms	and	“scaling	them	up”	to	higher	value-added	trading.	A	primary	weakness	 in	 the	 indigenous	 economy	 he	 identified	was	 the	 dearth	 of	investment	capital	–	an	 issue	 that	had	dogged	 the	 Irish	state	since	 the	1920s	–																																																									30		 Emerging	consensus,	O’Gorman	and	Carroll	1987		31		 NESC	reports	1982a,	1982b;	Kennedy,	K.	1984;	“dual	strategy”	Lee	1989:	504	
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with	traditional	finance	wedded	to	unproductive	“rent	seeking”,	especially	in	the	London	bond	markets,	and	an	aversion	to	productive	investment	at	home.	In	its	absence,	an	activist	state	would	again	have	to	drive	productive	development.	The	NESC	 additionally	 identified	 reforming	 archaic	 institutions	 and	 how	 best	 to	exploit	the	educational	expansion	of	the	late	1960s	as	further	priorities.32			 A	 concept	 that	 rapidly	 gained	 traction	 in	policy	 circles,	 early	 identified	by	 a	rising	economist,	Colm	McCarthy,	was	a	need	for	an	institutional	transformation	to	emulate	more	successful	 “small	open	European	economies”.	A	new	theme	 in	the	 international	 economic	 literature	 identified	 how	 states,	 by	 “concerting”	government,	 agencies	 and	 business	 in	 a	 “consensus”	 strategy,	 had	 successfully	pursued	niche	foreign	market	advantage.	But	the	Irish	case	was	“exceptional”	not	only	in	its	underdeveloped	institutions,	but	also	in	what	Niamh	Hardiman	called	the	challenge	of	a	“late	industrialising”	country	undergoing	“a	structural	shift	in	economic	 composition	 of	 quite	major	 proportions”.	 Agriculture,	 Ireland’s	main	economic	resource	until	the	1960s,	had,	despite	the	CAP	boom,	failed	to	expand	significantly	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 strong	 food	 industry.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 new	manufacturing	 and	 services	 firms	were	 emerging	 in	 place	 of	 collapsing	 1960s	industries	in	a	process	of	“creative	destruction”	at	high	social	cost.33			 The	consensus	on	a	“small	open	economy”	development	formula	was	reflected	in	the	quite	similar	economic	agendas	proposed	in	competing	party	manifestos.	The	goals	were	not	 contested,	only	how	the	 transformation	might	be	achieved.	Opinions	 differed	 on	 the	 prioritising	 of	 financial	 adjustment	 or	 developmental	innovation,	how	they	could	be	combined	and	the	form	this	should	take.			 A	strident	“New	Right”	economics,	though	not	yet	universally	ascendant,	and	epitomised	 by	 the	 new	 Thatcher	 and	 Reagan	 governments	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 US,	aggressively	promoted	a	new	capitalist	growth	paradigm	of	controlling	inflation	through	monetarist	 discipline,	 “unshackling”	 business	 from	 the	 state,	 restoring	share-holder	 hegemony,	 curbing	 union	 power	 and	 “restrictive	 practices”,	 and	abolishing	 capital	 controls.	 Even	 the	 OECD,	 hitherto	 a	 guardian	 of	 Keynesian	orthodoxy,	began	to	challenge	the	primary	employment	creation	role	of	the	state,	and	across	Europe	new	governments	were	elected	advocating	varying	degrees	of																																																									32		 White,	P.	1983;	NESC	1982b	33		 McCarthy,	Colm	1979;	NESC	1982a,	1982b;	“literature”	Katzenstein	1985;	Hardiman	1988:	4-8;	agriculture	and	FDI,	Whelan,	C.	et	al,	2007	
	 107	
the	 paradigm.	 A	 new	 right/left	 divide	 emerged	 over	 how	 to	 respond	 to	 the	monetary	crisis,	whether	through	greater	capital	autonomy	and	liberalisation	or	a	consensus	restructuring.	The	policy	paralysis	at	EC	level	reflected	this	schism.34			 While	 electoral	 democracies	 involve	 much	 rhetorical	 polarisation	 masking	underlying	 policy	 agreement,	 the	 paradigm	 shift	 in	 international	 economic	thinking	revived	“conservative”	policy	impulses	in	Fine	Gael	while	weakening	the	Keynesian	 ones	 in	 Fianna	 Fáil.	 Social	 democratic	 tendencies	were	 strong	 in	 all	parties,	 but	 Labour,	 which	 claimed	 to	 embody	 them,	 dissipated	 its	 social	democratic	 appeal	 by	 an	 obsessive	 opposition	 to	 Fianna	 Fáil	 less	 on	 socio-economic	grounds	than	for	being	a	“nationalist”,	 “corrupt”	 force	to	be	excluded	from	power.	This	Labour	view	of	Fianna	Fáil	–	determined	by	Labour’s	electoral	marginality	 -	 had	 been	 present	 since	 the	 1920s	 and	 been	 strongly	 revived	 by	Cruise	O’Brien	 in	 the	 late	 1960s.	 It	was	 re-articulated	 by	 Frank	 Cluskey	 in	 his	eviscerating	speech	on	Haughey’s	election	as	Taoiseach	in	1979.	It	was	a	moral	position	 that	 not	 only	 bewildered	 many	 working	 class	 voters	 but	 restricted	Labour	to	the	sole	government	option	of	coalition	with	Fine	Gael.	It	also	shaped	Labour’s	continued	suspicion	of	tripartitism	which,	as	Larkin	had	tried	to	argue,	would	anywhere	else	have	been	the	essence	of	a	labour	movement	programme.35			 The	party	divide	of	the	1980s	thus	remained	that	between	varieties	of	social	democracy,	 with	 Fianna	 Fáil,	 Fine	 Gael	 and	 Labour	 differentiated	 not	 least	 by	their	conflicting	approaches	to	corporatist	planning	and	development	strategy.	
	
Autonomous	government:	economic	crisis	and	policy	choice	
		 The	 coalition	 of	 1982-87	 had	 little	 opportunity	 to	 pursue	 development	strategies	 as	 proposed	 by	 the	 NESC	 or	 other	 bodies,	 as	 it	 faced	 a	 deepening	economic	crisis,	one	of	the	worst	in	the	state’s	history	and	as	destructive	as	that	of	 the	 mid-1950s	 in	 its	 social	 effects.	 Although	 primarily	 a	 subset	 of	 another	global	 crisis,	 it	 impacted	 in	 Ireland	on	an	economy	already	 struggling	with	 the	challenges	of	“late”	industrialisation	as	its	1960s	industrial	model	re-structured	autonomously	 and	 drastically	 to	 free	 trade	 conditions.	 Employment	 fell	 nearly	7%	from	873,000	to	816,000	between	1982	and	1986	while,	with	the	population																																																									34		 “New	Right”,	Graham	and	Clarke	1986;	on	OECD,	McCracken	1977;	“paralysis”,	Meenan,	1999		35		 Cruise	O’Brien	see	Chap.	2;	Cluskey	in	Dáil	11/12/79,	also	McGinley	ed.:	224-231	
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growing,	unemployment	doubled	to	an	unprecedented	250,000	or	18	per	cent	of	the	workforce,	topping	the	OECD	league,	and	would	have	risen	further	but	for	the	return	 of	 high	 emigration.	 The	 decline	 was	 starkest	 in	 manufacturing,	 with	employment	 falling	 20	 per	 cent	 to	 204,000.	 Government	 responded	 primarily	with	 deflationary	 measures	 to	 maintain	 competitiveness,	 cutting	 spending,	raising	taxes	and	containing	welfare,	while	seeking	to	minimise	cuts	to	services.	While	 successfully	 reducing	 inflation	 to	5	per	 cent	by	1986,	 social	 expenditure	increased	 due	 to	 rising	 unemployment,	 reaching	 75	 per	 cent	 of	 GNP,	 and	 the	national	debt	trebled	to	148	per	cent.	The	inflation	“success”	was	not	combined	with	 productive	 investment	 or	 expansion,	 and	 hence	 contributed	 to	 deflating	economic	activity.	 Investment	 fell,	by	a	catastrophic	37	per	cent	 in	1984	alone,	and	FDI	contracted	for	the	first	time	since	the	1950s.	A	poverty	crisis	emerged,	concentrated	in	urban	areas	of	previously	robust	industrial	employment,	with	a	growing	 welfare-dependent	 population	 suffering	 severe	 social	 decline	 and	persistent	poverty.	For	those	in	work	living	standards	also	fell,	with	rising	taxes	reversing	 earlier	 improvements,	 after-tax	 real	 wages	 falling	 15	 per	 cent	 and	wage	 costs	 to	 employers	 rising	 10	 per	 cent.	 Housing	 policy	 encouraged	occupants	 with	 means	 to	 vacate	 public	 housing,	 exacerbating	 poverty	ghettoization	and	crime,	and	generating	a	drugs	crisis	never	before	experienced,	as	Fianna	Fáil	highlighted	in	opposition.36			 Focused	on	monetary	policy,	government	saw	few	opportunities	to	undertake	industrial	 expansion.	 In	 October	 1984	 it	 finally	 published	 its	 growth	 strategy,	
Building	 on	 Reality,	 but	 its	 development	 policies,	 based	 on	 supporting	 SMEs,	relied	 on	 deflation	 reducing	 interest	 rates	 to	 generate	 growth,	 and	 economic	historians	 judge	it	as	having	simply	further	depressed	activity	and	demoralised	entrepreneurs.	 Within	 eighteen	 months,	 economic	 performance	 lagged	 far	behind	the	plan’s	projections,	with	73,000	fewer	at	work,	emigration	four	times	the	projected	level,	and	unemployment	40,000	above	the	plan’s	“stabilised”	level.	FitzGerald,	 regretting	 not	 having	 implemented	 his	 stimulus	 measures	 earlier,	later	claimed	that	by	the	time	he	left	office	the	plan	had	not	had	time	to	produce	results,	 pointing	 out	 that	 by	 1986	 not	 only	 had	 inflation	 fallen,	 but	 output,																																																									36		 Figures	in	Hardiman	1988:	222-8;	FDI	collapse,	IDA	Ireland	1986;	fall	in	wage	value,	OECD	1985:	38;	housing	policy/drugs	crisis,	Gilligan	2011,	Mick	Raferty	in	Int.	Inner	City	Group;	“highlighted”,	Haughey,	‘The	Crimes	Crisis.	Presidential	Address	to	Ard	Fheis’,	30/03/85,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	932-4	
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exports	and	foreign	investment	were	recovering.	This	is	certainly	true,	as	lower	inflation	assisted	the	process	of	“creative	destruction”	and	revived	some	output	and	 productivity	 growth,	 which	 increased	 30	 per	 cent	 by	 1986	 despite	 falling	employment.	 But	Building	 on	Reality	 lacked	 an	 overall	 industrial	 strategy,	 and	deflation-driven	choices	alienated	wide	social	groups.37			 The	FitzGerald	government’s	adherence	 to	deflation	was	reflected	 in	 its	EEC	orientation.	 Apart	 from	 continuing	 the	 traditional	 CAP-defensive	 policy	 and	initiating	some	imaginative	uses	of	EC	Social	Funds	for	training,	community	and	youth	schemes,	it	aligned	with	the	centre-right	in	the	EC	Council	policy	divide.	In	1984	FitzGerald	appointed	as	Ireland’s	Commissioner	the	attorney	general,	Peter	Sutherland,	 who	 epitomised	 the	 private-educated	 Fine	 Gael	 patrician	 with	 a	strong	 free	 market	 outlook.	 At	 his	 request	 Fitzgerald	 secured	 for	 him	 the	competition	 rather	 than	 agriculture	 or	 social	 policy	 portfolio.	 Although	 the	European	Christian-democratic	mainstream	was	not	averse	to	tripartitism	and	in	many	 cases	 had	 initiated	 it,	 such	 governments	 were	 now	 retreating	 from	 it.	Sutherland	 became	 central	 in	 the	 Single	 Market	 project	 and	 while	 impressed	with	 President	 Delors’	 leadership,	 saw	 him	 as	 “not	 a	 natural	 deregulator”	 and	was	 hostile	 to	 his	 state-dirigiste	 tendencies	 and	 attempts	 to	 “impose”	 social	constraints	on	the	emerging	single	market	construct.38			 In	 domestic	 socio-economic	 policy,	 FitzGerald,	 while	 struggling	 to	 expand	social	provision,	 continued	his	1981	anti-corporatist	direction	on	planning	and	pay.	He	believed	circumstances	allowed	no	other	option	and,	despite	his	 social	democratic	inclinations,	opted	for	a	traditional	Fine	Gael	deflationary	approach.	In	 November	 1982	 the	 party	 had	 won	 its	 hitherto	 greatest	 number	 of	 seats,	though	considerably	behind	Fianna	Fáil,	while	its	coalition	partner,	Labour,	had	been	weakened	and	had	to	accept	a	very	subordinate	role	 in	cabinet.	The	1981	coalition	 had	 initially	 sought	 to	 continue	 the	 National	 Understanding	 but	 had	done	so	in	such	a	way	as	to	end	it,	and	the	renewed	coalition,	reflecting	a	trend	among	 right-of-centre	 governments	 elsewhere,	 simply	 dispensed	 with	 it.	 But,	unlike	Thatcher,	FitzGerald,	 in	William	Roche’s	 judgement,	was	not	disposed	to																																																									37		 “depressed	activity”	and	historians’	views,	Bielenberg	and	Ryan	2012:	32-3;	projections/performance,	J.	Travers,	D/Taois.,	‘Possible	supplementary’	PQ	by	Michael	Keating’,	DTA:	DTA:	S25858-A;	government	choices,	FitzGerald	1991	38		 Appointment	of	Sutherland,	FitzGerald	1991:	615;	on	his	career,	Fintan	O’Toole,	‘Trump	and	Brexit	are	products	of	Sutherland’s	success’,	IT	09/01/18;	on	Delors,	Sutherland	1999:	289-90	
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“breaking	 unions”	 and	 was	 not	 adverse	 to	 consulting	 with	 them.	 He	 had	 long	been	 sceptical	 of	 policy	 “consensus”,	 had	been	 critical	 of	 Lemass’s	 “vocational-bureaucratic	 system	 of	 government”,	 and	 was	 generally	 “unwilling	 to	 regard	collective	actors,	and	especially	trade	unions,	as	more	than	‘lobbying	interests’”.	Other	 senior	 ministers,	 notably	 John	 Bruton,	 were	 more	 stridently	 hostile	 to	tripartitism.	 The	 coalition	 resumed	 its	 1981-2	 strategy	 though,	 on	 Labour	insistence,	 also	 continued	 funding	 union	 and	 management	 bodies	 and	established	 a	 National	 Development	 Corporation	 (NDC)	 to	 develop	 industrial	strategy.	It	also	maintained	a	few	initiatives	inherited	from	the	Understandings,	such	 as	 public	 service	 “worker	 participation”	 projects	 and	 bodies	 like	 the	Sectoral	Development	Committee,	though	treating	its	reports	as	ephemeral.39			 The	NDC	when	it	emerged	in	1983,	far	from	the	“planning	agency”	promised,	was	a	purely	“advisory”	body	with	limited	resources,	composed	of	civil	servants	and	economic	experts,	along	with	a	few	business	and	union	officials	selected	by	the	 Taoiseach	 rather	 than	 representatives	 nominated	 by	 those	 interests.	FitzGerald	saw	 the	NDC	replacing	 the	 tripartite	NESC	 in	 the	 role	 the	 latter	had	acquired	under	Haughey.	This	followed	advice	from	Whitaker	and	Louden	Ryan,	replicating	their	preference	for	a	civil	service-led,	purely	advisory	forum.40			 FitzGerald	intimated	to	ICTU	his	willingness	to	consider	what	he	bundled	as	a	“National	 Understanding/Wage	 Agreement”,	 though	 strictly	 separated	 from	budget	 and	 economic	 policy,	 a	 formula	 which	 negated	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 an	Understanding.	Public	service	unions	found	themselves	“awaiting	the	outcome	of	these	discussions,	including	the	possibility	of	centralised	negotiations”	on	a	new	Understanding,	before	deciding	on	their	strategy.	The	March	1983	budget	clearly	revealed	government’s	determination	on	a	deflationary	course.	Government	also	announced	its	preference	for	a	stand-alone	public	pay	agreement,	consisting	of	a	six-month	 pay	 freeze	 and	 single	 figure	 increase	 thereafter,	 followed	 by	 “free”	bargaining	 in	 private	 industry.	 The	 FUE	 responded	 approvingly,	 suggesting	 a	similar	 “guideline”	 on	 pay	 terms	 for	 the	 private	 sector,	 while	 a	 resigned	 ICTU	instructed	 unions	 in	 both	 sectors	 to	 get	 on	 with	 individual	 claims	 for	 a																																																									39		 “sceptical	of	consensus”,	see	Chapter	2;	“vocational-bureaucratic”,	Bew	and	Patterson	1982:	66;	“unwilling”,	Bacarro	and	Simoni	2007:	9;	Bruton	in	Roche	2009:	196;	on	NDC,	FitzGerald	1991;	on	worker	participation	initiatives,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board	mtg.’	11/01/85	40		 Chambers	2014:	227,	240-1;	on	Whitaker’s	preferences	see	also	Chapter	3		
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“substantial	general	increase”	to	counter	both	inflation	and	the	reduction	of	real	wage	values	by	tax	increases.	The	looming	threat	of	fragmented	bargaining	and	widespread	industrial	conflict,	especially	in	the	public	sector,	forced	government	to	negotiate	a	public	agreement	different	to	its	stated	preference,	concluding	it	in	late	 1983	 on	 terms	 very	 similar	 to	 what	 Haughey	 had	 proposed	 to	 ICTU	 in	autumn	1982,	while	the	private	sector	reverted	to	local	bargaining.41		 With	de-industrialisation	and	high	unemployment,	private	sector	unions	had	little	leverage	and	wages	stagnated	or	contracted.	Disputes	were	predominantly	in	the	public	sector,	becoming	endemic,	with	strike-days	rising	again	to	412,000	by	 1985.	 Recruitment	 embargoes	 and	 service	 cuts	 in	 health,	 local	 government	and	education	 led	 to	work-to-rules,	boycotting	of	vacant	posts,	demonstrations	and	 threatened	 strikes.	 LGPSU’s	 central	 council	 repeatedly	 rejected	government’s	proposed	pay	 terms,	 though	when	civil	 service	unions	voting	 for	them	formed	a	majority	on	ICTU’s	PSC,	 its	branches	grudgingly	acceded.	A	one-day	general	public	service	strike	in	October	1985	followed	a	government	refusal	–	 the	 first	 since	 1935	 –	 to	 implement	 Conciliation	 Board	 and	 Labour	 Court	awards,	and	further	 longer	stoppages	planned	for	1986	were	only	averted	by	a	last-minute	compromise.	 In	September	1986	government	refused	to	re-appoint	the	 arbitrator,	 froze	 public	 pay	 and	 extended	 the	 recruitment	 embargo.	 A	teachers’	strike	further	undermined	public	dispute	resolution	systems	and	at	the	end	 of	 1986	 LGPSU	decided	 to	 “black	 all	 public	 representatives”	 and	 refuse	 to	implement	rent	and	housing	schemes,	and	strikes	over	local	disputes	multiplied.	Government	relations	with	the	public	services	had	collapsed	by	January	1987.42		 In	1983	FitzGerald	set	out	his	plans	for	the	NPB	plan	to	a	sceptical	 ICTU.	He	envisaged	the	NPB	submitting	proposals	to	his	“Task	Force	of	Ministers”	on	how	to	 “maximise	 output	 and	 employment	 in	 competitive	 conditions”,	 a	 “public	works”	 scheme	 for	 the	 unemployed,	 and	 welfare	 reforms	 “to	 reconcile	 social																																																									41		 FitzGerald	“willingness”,	ICTU	AR	1983:	142;	public	service	unions	await	outcome,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board	mtg.’	04/03/83;	ICTU	and	FUE	post-budget	decisions,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda’	and	‘Exec.	Board	mtg.’	04/03/83	and	ICTU	EC,	‘Statement	by	Executive	Council	on	Pay’,	16/03/83,	in	ICTU	AR	1983;	public	pay	agreement	and	private	sector,	ICTU	AR	1984:	139-43	42		 Public	service	resistance,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board.	Special	Mtg.’	28/01/83,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	H&W	Div.	Exec.	Cttee.’	29/07/84	and	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	LGPSU	Exec.	Board’	12/02/85;	branches	accede,	LGPSU	H&W	Div.	Exec.	mtg.	16/12/83,	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	mtgs.	09/12/83	and	18/07/86;	one-day	strike,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board	mtg.	06/09/85	encl.	‘Government	Statement	on	Pay’;	further	strikes	planned,	teachers’	strike,	Exec.	Board	mtgs.	Sept.	1985-Jan.	1986;	“black	all	representatives”,	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	mtgs.,	Oct.	and	Nov.	1986	
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equity	and	the	efficient	use	of	public	resources”.	NPB	inputs	would	form	only	a	peripheral	 element	 of	 the	 plan,	 Building	 on	 Reality,	 notably	 reforms	 in	 public	service	delivery,	income	tax	changes,	DIRT,	the	Farm	Advisory	Service	and	road	investment,	but	its	proposed	public	works	programme	was	rejected	as	“not	very	realistic”.	 FitzGerald	 later	 conceded	 the	 NPB	 had	 proven	 ineffective,	 failing	 to	impact	on	“the	permanent	administrative	structure	for	decision	making”	or	make	“as	enduring	a	mark	on	public	administration	as	I	would	have	liked”.43		 Having	 established	 the	 NPB,	 FitzGerald	 reframed	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 NESC.	The	Council	was	due	for	re-appointment	in	1984	and	he	used	the	opportunity	to	dilute	 its	 functions	 and	 reduce	 it	 from	 47	 to	 23	 members,	 five	 each	 for	employers,	 unions	 and	 farmers,	 along	 with	 seven	 Government-appointed	economists,	 politicians	 and	 other	 figures.	 The	 Department	 of	 the	 Taoiseach	continued	 to	 chair	 it,	 but	 would	 no	 longer	 provide	 expertise,	 research	 or	secretarial	 supports,	which	 transferred	 to	 the	 NPB.	 The	 new	 task	 of	 the	 NESC	was	described	as	providing	reports	as	requested	by	ministers.	Thus	emasculated,	NESC	 was	 busied	 until	 1986	 with	 projects	 on	 secondary	 issues	 such	 as	 the	criminal	 justice	 system,	 local	 authority	 finance	 and	 profit	 sharing.	Building	 on	
Reality	was	compiled	without	NESC	input	and,	unsurprisingly,	the	council	hardly	features	at	all	in	FitzGerald’s	memoirs.	ICTU	protested	this	down-grading	of	the	tripartite	 NESC	 and	 its	 subordination	 to	 the	 NPB.	 When	 it	 was	 being	 re-constituted,	 it	 requested	 that	 civil	 service	 representatives	 be	 at	 least	 secretary	grade,	objected	 to	 the	 inclusion	of	new	groups	and	pleaded	 to	be	restored	 to	a	strategic	role,	but	was	ignored	on	all	counts.	Resigned	to	the	down-grading	of	the	NESC,	Congress	nominated	second-tier	representatives	onto	it.44			 When	Building	on	Reality	appeared,	ICTU	criticised	its	diffuse	content	and	lack	of	 consultation	 with	 the	 NESC	 in	 its	 preparation,	 and	 the	 LGPSU	 produced	 a	hostile	critique	of	it,	Stark	Reality.	Amongst	other	initiatives,	the	plan	established	the	Social	Employment	Scheme	(SES)	to	provide	part-time	roles	for	unemployed	people	in	community	organisations,	schools	and	public	services.	ICTU	objected	to	this	as	“a	gimmick”	and	to	it	being	used	to	do	the	work	of	public	jobs	unfilled	due																																																									43		 Plans	for	NPB,	ICTU	AR	1983:	186;	FitzGerald	aims	for	NPB,	FitzGerald	1991:	449,	role	in	Building	on	
Reality	and	“not	realistic”,	Ibid.:	450-1	44		 Govt.	announcement	re	NESC,	‘Press	Statement’,	20/07/1984,	GIS;	“busied”,	ICTU	AR	1985:	219;	FitzGerald	1991;	ICTU	appointees	to	NESC,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	20/06	and	19/09/84	
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to	 the	 embargo,	 but	 internally,	 fearing	 the	 “public	 perception	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	take	 it	 head-on”,	 moderated	 its	 stance,	 insisting	 only	 that	 it	 not	 be	 used	 to	replace	“real	jobs”	and	demanding	a	tripartite	monitoring	committee	to	oversee	it.	 While	 government	 conceded	 this,	 it	 was	 yet	 another	 occasion	 where	 prior	consultation	might	have	avoided	ill-will	and	a	rancorous	dispute.45			 The	 secondary	ministerial	 projects	 entrusted	 to	NESC	were	 often	 politically	divisive	 ones.	 John	 Bruton	 requested	 a	 study	 of	 employee	 shareholdings	 to	promote	“cooperation	in	the	workplace”,	which	neither	employers	nor	unions	on	the	 NESC	 favoured,	 if	 for	 opposite	 reasons.	 Employers	 opposed	 worker	encroachments	 on	 managerial	 or	 shareholder	 power	 while	 the	 report’s	consultant	bemoaned	his	difficulty	“engaging	the	unions”	due	to	ICTU	antipathy	to	 “employee	 shareholding”	 as	 a	 “New	 Right”	 strategy	 for	 de-unionisation.	 A	report	 on	 local	 government	 financing	 through	 “consumer”	 service	 charges	was	equally	divisive,	being	naturally	supported	by	business	but	viewed	with	hostility	by	unions,	who	opposed	 them	 in	 the	 absence	of	 tax	 reform	or	 income	off-sets.	LGPSU	staff	“boycotted”	service	charge	schemes,	the	union	threatening	to	expel	members	who	cooperated	 in	 them.	Both	projects	 lingered	on	 the	NESC	agenda	until	finally	being	shelved	under	the	new	1987	government.	Other	projects	fared	little	better,	rejected	by	ICTU	or	the	reports	published	noting	their	dissent.46		 Abandoning	 pay/policy	 tripartitism	 and	 allowing	 its	 institutions	 erode	 was	essentially	 ideological,	with	 government	determined	 to	 restore	 its	 “autonomy”,	but	to	little	obvious	benefit.	It	soured	relations	with	public	servants,	undermined	staff	cooperation	and	incited	widespread	disruption,	while	squandering	planning	assets	such	as	the	NESC.	An	ITGWU	leader	criticised	government	for	abandoning	“emerging	 arrangements”	 for	 cooperative	 planning	 and	 conflict	 resolution.	 It	“put	 nothing	 in	 planning	 terms	 in	 their	 place”,	 facing	 “the	 worst	 employment	crisis	in	the	history	of	the	state	without	any	sense	of	direction”.47																																																										45		 ICTU	on	Building,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	17.10.84	and	ICTU	AR	1985:	181;	‘Stark	Reality’,	LGPSU	1984	and	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	mtg.	06/12/84;	“gimmick	…	public	perception”,	ICTU	position	in	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board	mtg.’	08/03/85;	ICTU	circular,	n.d.	[1985]	“Social	Employment	Scheme”		46		 On	employee	shareholdings,	Bruton	to	Dr	Noel	Whelan,	chair	NESC,	29/01/1984,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b,	and	NESC,	‘Council	Meetings’,	16/10	and	26/11/1986;	on	local	government	financing	and	local	charges,	LGPSU,	‘AGM	of	LG&PB	Div.’	of	17/05/84	and	18/05/85,	and	‘Reports	on	Agenda	for	LG&PB	Div.	Exec.’,	27/05	and	22/07/83,	20/07/84;	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board’,	20/7/84;	“linger	on	agenda”	and	“shelved”,	NESC,	‘Council	Meeting’	19/12/86	inc.	draft:	‘Employee	Shareholding’;	“progress	little”	and	ICTU	dissent,	NESC,	‘Council	Meeting’	01/03/87	and	attchd.	‘Workprogramme’	47		 ICTU	ADC	1986:	102	
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	 Government	 could	 and	 did	 comprehensively	 “walk	 away”	 from	 tripartitism	though,	ever	courteous,	FitzGerald	regularly	met	with	ICTU.	He	recalled	how	the	unions	had	had	“an	easy	time	of	it	with	Fianna	Fáil”	and	how	his	meetings	with	the	ICTU	were	“formal,	often	tense,	and	on	the	whole	unproductive”.	John	Carroll	recalled	 how	 FitzGerald	 “lectured	 us	 when	 we	 met	 him;	 he	 told	 us	 about	 the	economy;	we	made	no	progress”,	while	civil	service	leader	Dan	Murphy	said	that,	while	not	“unsympathetic”,	FitzGerald	couldn’t	see	“unions	having	any	particular	role”	 in	 economic	 policy.	 Another	 ITGWU	 leader	 said	 FitzGerald	 “had	 no	intention	 whatever	 of	 consulting	 with	 us”	 let	 alone	 “engaging	 in	 a	 search	 for	consensus”.	 “We	 were	 told	 there	 was	 no	 alternative	 to	 the	 Coalition	 view	 of	reality”.	 Bill	 Attley	 of	 the	 FWUI	 regarded	 Fine	 Gael	 in	 general	 and	 especially	FitzGerald	 as	 unable	 to	 grasp	 the	 potential	 of	 a	 national	 agreement	 either	 to	mobilise	business	and	unions	in	a	common	endeavour	or	in	its	social-integratory	function:	“as	an	orthodox	economist	he	just	couldn’t	get	his	head	around	it”.48		 Despite	 FitzGerald’s	 social-reformist	 inclinations,	 the	 coalition	 in	 effect	reverted	 to	 the	 pattern	 of	 previous	 coalitions	 in	 deflationary	 economic	 policy,	interest	group	disengagement	and	reliance	on	business	economists	for	advice.			
Unbridgeable	divide?	–	Employers,	unions	and	the	state	in	the	‘80s			 When	Thatcher	came	to	power	in	Britain	in	1979,	one	of	her	central	messages	was	 that	 union	 power	 was	 throttling	 the	 economy	 and	 the	 remedy	 was	 its	disestablishment	 and	 the	 restoration	 of	 market	 forces.	 Tripartitism	 in	 Ireland	had	arisen	in	a	different	context	to	the	rise	of	union	power	in	Britain.	While	the	disruptive	potential	of	unions	was	a	factor,	 it	was	a	secondary	one,	and	Lemass	and	Haughey	 in	 pursuing	 a	 tripartite	 paradigm	 had	 regarded	 it	 as	 a	means	 to	“harness”	unions	and	other	interests	as	creative	forces	rather	than	to	neutralise	them,	thereby	expanding	the	social-institutional	base	of	economic	development.				 Many	in	other	parties,	in	the	civil	service	and	even	in	Fianna	Fáil	opposed	this	Lemass/Haughey	 perspective.	 In	 1984	 Whitaker	 noted	 that	 “no-one	 twenty	years	 ago	 would	 have	 believed	 the	 amazing	 strength	 which	 trade	 unions,	employers	and	farmers	now	possess	compared	with	political	parties”.	This	was																																																									48		 “walk	away”,	Murphy	and	Hogan	2008;	“easy	time	of	it”,	FitzGerald	1991:	453-4;	“lectured	us”,	ICTU	ADC	1986:	226;	Murphy	in	Hastings	et	al.	2007:	16;	“no	alternative”,	ICTU	ADC	1987:	98;	Attley	in	Int.	Attley	
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now	being	reversed	in	Britain,	he	wrote,	and	FitzGerald	should	forego	tripartite	experiments	 and	 rely	 instead	on	 the	Department	 of	 Finance,	 economic	 experts	and	 “independent”	 economic	 institutions.	 FitzGerald	 followed	 his	 advice.	Whitaker	had	been	appointed	an	NESC	member	by	FitzGerald,	but	resigned	from	it	in	February1982	when	the	coalition	fell	and	a	return	of	Haughey	seemed	likely.	On	his	resignation,	he	wrote	that	socio-economic	policy	should	never	have	been	transferred	to	the	Taoiseach’s	Department	and	should	be	returned	to	“the	clear	responsibility”	of	Finance	assisted	by	“planning	units	in	other	Departments”.49			 Unions	 in	 Ireland	organised	half	 a	million	workers,	 55	per	 cent	 of	 the	 total.	This	 was	 not	 evenly	 distributed	 across	 the	 economy	 but	 concentrated	 in	particular	 areas,	 including	 over	 90	 per	 cent	 in	 the	 public	 service	 and	 state	enterprises,	and,	 in	 the	private	sector,	 in	stronger	vocational	groups	and	 larger	enterprises.	As	a	historical	inheritance	there	were	over	70	unions	(compared	to	12	in	Germany),	many	evolved	from	pre-industrial	era	guilds.	Over	85	per	cent	of	union	members	were	grouped	 in	a	 few	 large	general	and	public	service	unions	and	about	five	craft	and	sectional	ones.	While	there	were	militant	groups,	and	a	significant	 socialist	 sub-culture,	 most	 members	 were	 passively	 engaged,	 with	union	membership	a	secondary	aspect	even	of	their	working	lives.50			 On	the	employer	side,	over	half,	 including	all	 the	largest	and	strongest,	were	also	 organised,	 in	 groups	 combined	 in	 the	 Irish	 Confederation	 of	 Employers,	though	many	smaller	employers	stayed	aloof	from	these:		
Growth	and	concentration	of	union/employer	organisations	1970-8351	
Trade	Unions	(ICTU)	(Republic	only)	 Employer	Organisations	(ICE)	
	 1970	 1983	 	 1965	 1981	
Membership	>	20,000	 	Unions		Members			2	 181,400	 	 	Unions	Members			3	 235,053	 Organisations	Retail,	Grocers	(RGDATA)	 Members	3,000	 Members	1,350	10-20,000	 		3	 45,000	 		3	 49,992	 Fed.	Union	Employers	(FUE)	 1,630	 2,563	5-10,000	 		9	 60,600	 		7	 53,522	 Construct.	Ind.	Fed.	(CIF)	 750	 2,166	1,500-5,000	 27	 75,300	 	23	 62,518	 Pharmaceutical	Union	 1,061	 1,402	<	1,500	 	 54	 24,500	 35	 19,966	 Motor	Industry	(SIMI)	 945	 1,119		 	 	 Licensed	Vintners	 560	 676		 	 	 Eleven	other	minor	assocs.	 1,306	 1,193	
TOTAL	ICTU	 95	 386,800	 78	 498,900	 TOTAL	membership	ICE		 9,252	 10,469																																																									49	 Whitaker	in	Hardiman	1988:	205;	views	on	Britain	and	advice	to	FitzGerald,	in	notes	for	Radio	Senate,	RTÉ	Radio,	01/09/93,	quoted	in	Chambers	2014:	241;	FitzGerald	takes	advice,	FitzGerald	1991:	449,	Chambers	2014:	227,	240-1;	NESC	resignation,	Whitaker	to	Noel	Whelan	10/02/82,	NESC	Archive.	Box	3		50		 Gunnigle	et	al.	1999:	111-39	51		 Figures	from	tables	in	Hardiman	1988:	131,	163	
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		 Unions	 and	 the	 ICTU	had	 been	 subsidised	 by	 the	 state	 in	 their	 training	 and	advisory	functions	since	the	1950s,	and	while	employer	organisations	eschewed	state	 funding,	 many	 ancillary	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	 Irish	 Management	 Institute	(IMI),	were	equally	heavily	subsidised,	as	was	in-company	training.	As	industrial	relations	were	determined	by	constitutional	and	common	law,	umbrella	bodies	–	the	ICTU,	FUE,	CII	etc.	–	were	voluntarist	leaderships,	with	only	directive	power	to	the	extent	conceded	by	affiliates.	While	small	and	loose,	 for	that	very	reason	they	 had	 to	 lead	 and	 reproduce	 their	 legitimacy	 through	 considerably	 more	democratic	practices	than	was	common	among	their	European	counterparts.52			 Employers,	farming	bodies	and	business	opinion	leaders	generally	supported	FitzGerald’s	 deflationary	 policy	 as	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 recovery.	 But	 they	 also	jealously	 defended	 grants	 for	 industry	 and	 subsidies	 to	 agriculture,	 while	advocating	reductions	in	other	public	spending,	in	input	costs	–	including	taxes	-	and	 in	 “red	 tape”.	 As	 they	 were	 reliant	 on	 linkages	 with	 the	 state,	 they	 also	remained	active	within	cooperative	policy	bodies	such	as	the	NESC.53			 After	 being	 cajoled	 by	 Haughey	 into	 the	 1981	 National	 Understanding,	 the	FUE,	 influenced	by	developments	 in	Britain,	 adopted	a	 strategy	 -	Pay	Policy	for	
the	1980s	 –	with	 the	 aim	of	 ending	 centralised	 bargaining.	 Influenced	by	 “new	right”	economics,	 this	also	 reflected	 realities	 in	an	economy	being	 transformed	by	industrial	change.	As	conditions	between	productive	and	declining	industries,	individual	firms	and	the	public	and	private	sectors	radically	diverged,	it	was	held	to	 be	 increasingly	 counter-competitive	 to	 enforce	 national	 pay	 standards	 or	industry-specific	pay	“norms”.	Firms	should	bargain	separately	(“locally’),	based	on	 competitiveness	 and	 productivity	 gain,	 trading	 pay	 for	 new	 technology	acceptance	and	flexibilisation	of	work	practices,	and	gradually	move	from	group	bargaining	altogether	to	individualised	“human	resources”	management.54		 In	the	absence	of	a	national	 framework,	 this	new	employer	 ideology	 led	to	a	fragmentation	 of	 industry	 agreement	 patterns	 and	 timeframes,	 with	 FUE	triumphantly	 declaring	 in	 1986	 “the	 wage	 round	 has	 ceased	 to	 exist”.	 When	NESC’s	 1986	 Strategy	 for	 Development	 tentatively	 proposed	 a	 national																																																									52		 On	legal	frame,	McCarthy,	C.	1977:	482-523,	and	voluntarist	structures	Hardiman	1988:	138-41,	171-4	53		 Hardiman	1988:	218		54		 Pay	Policy,	Fogarty	et	al	1981;	“gradually	move”,	‘Six	Priorities	for	1986:	Policy	Statement	by	the	National	Executive	Council’,	FUE	Bulletin,	Jan.	1986	
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agreement	framework	for	a	recovery	strategy,	the	FUE,	which	had	resisted	this	at	NESC,	reluctantly	agreed	to	participate	in	exploring	such	a	common	strategy	but	stressed	 “there	 was	 hardly	 any	 support”	 among	 its	 members	 “for	 a	 return	 to	national	 agreements	 or	 understandings”.	 The	 ICTU	 believed	 employers	 feared	that	national	bargaining	would	only	serve	to	“breathe	life	back	into	the	unions”.55			 Employers	 per	 se	 often	 differed	 from	 the	 more	 strategically-orientated	business	group,	the	CII,	which,	having	developed	from	the	FIM	and	representing	large	companies,	valued	close	state-business	collaboration.	But	in	the	1981	crisis	it	 converged	with	 FUE	 thinking,	 highlighting	 the	 “unsustainable	 level	 of	 public	expenditure”,	 sought	 radical	 income/business	 tax	 cuts	 and	 blamed	 Labour’s	influence	in	government	for	the	“unsustainable”	level	of	social	spending.	Using	a	popular	monetarist	phrase,	 it	accused	 the	coalition	of	having	been	“seduced	by	Big	Government”.	In	1981	it	had	urged	ending	the	Understanding	and	from	1983	unreservedly	supported	Fine	Gael’s	advocacy	of	a	deflationary	policy.56			 But	 the	 CII	 also	 became	 frustrated	 with	 FitzGerald’s	 government	 for	 its	ineffectual	 industrial	policies	as	business	activity	 contracted.	As	NESC’s	Telesis	Report	showed,	the	programmes	of	the	1960s-70s	had	not	produced	a	dynamic	indigenous	sector,	with	virtually	no	internationally	trading	performers	surviving	by	1984.	Finance	institutions	remained	risk	adverse,	wedded	to	safe	investments	in	British	or	 Irish	bonds	and	hidebound	by	what	 the	 IDA	 termed	unproductive	“rent-seeking”.	The	mass	industrial	closures	of	the	early	1980s	resulted	from	the	unwillingness	 or	 inability	 of	 the	 type	 of	 industry	 generated	by	Whitaker’s	 free	trade	 formula	 to	 adjust	 to	 open	 competition,	 tending	 to	 close	 once	 protective	advantage	 was	 withdrawn.	 This	 was	 exemplified	 in	 such	 high-profile	 1980s	closures	as	Ford,	Dunlop,	Semperit,	Talbot,	Parsons	and	many	others.	As	regards	indigenous	 industry,	 Albert	 Reynolds,	 when	 he	 became	 industries	 minister	 in	1987,	 lamented	 to	 a	 CII	 audience	 that	 the	 very	 “survival”	 of	 the	 economy	depended	on	building	export	capacity,	but	 this	had	yet	 to	materialise	as	 “many	
																																																								55		 “ceased	to	exist”,	FUE	Bulletin,	Oct.	1986;	FUE	response	to	NESC	report,	FUE	Bulletin,	Dec.	1986;	“breathe	life	back”	–	Dan	Murphy	quoted	in	Hastings	et	al	2007:	10	56		 “seduced”,	Power	2009:	38;	supports	FG,	Int.	Power;	Int.	O’Sullivan	
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senior	Irish	managers	were	educated	and	gained	their	formative	experience	in	a	protected	environment	where	market	competition	was	not	a	significant	factor”.57		 The	retreat	to	decentralised	or	even	non-bargaining,	encouraged	by	the	policy	preferences	of	the	FitzGerald	coalition,	can	be	seen	in	retrospect	as	the	exception	rather	 than	 rule	 for	 the	 post-war	 period.	 The	 dismantling	 of	 tripartitism	 and	reversion	 to	 local	 bargaining	 also	weakened	 business	 associations	 such	 as	 the	FUE	and	CII.	Newer	 -	not	only	US	 -	 firms	evaded	not	only	unions	but	 even	 the	support	services	of	employer	organisations,	 taking	these	“in-house”.	Bargaining	was	the	raison	d’etre	of	employer	associations,	with	FUE	having	described	itself	on	 its	 foundation	as	a	coordinating	group	“similar	 to	 the	Trade	Union	Council”,	while	 concerted	 planning	 was	 that	 of	 the	 CII.	 Employers	 had	 participated	 in	national	 “wage	 rounds”	 since	 the	 1950s,	 and	management	 training	 at	 IMI	 and	business	 colleges	was	 still	 imbued	with	 Catholic	 sociological	 views	 of	 a	 “social	order”	to	which	orderly	relations	with	trade	unions	were	integral.58			 Trade	 unions	 faced	 different	 but	 not	 unrelated	 challenges.	 While	 public	service	cuts	and	recruitment	embargoes	led	to	public	sector	union	membership	contracting,	 in	the	shrinking	private	sector,	de-industrialisation,	falling	incomes	and	 rising	 unemployment	 precipitated	 an	 even	 greater	 decline.	 This	 followed	two	decades	of	growth	and	 increasing	worker	empowerment.	Membership	had	peaked	at	524,000	in	1980	–	56	per	cent	of	the	workforce	–	but	fell	by	1984	to	501,000,	most	notably	in	manufacturing.	Amalgamations	increased,	with	smaller	unions	absorbed	by	larger	ones.		The	membership	decline	was	numerically	small,	but	a	more	marked	phenomenon	was	the	drop	in	activity.	Despite	the	reversion	to	 local	bargaining,	worker	militancy	and	shop	steward	power	fell	dramatically	as	the	rebellious	wave	of	the	1960s-70s	receded.	Cases	before	the	Labour	Court	declined,	with	strike-days	through	unofficial	action	-	46	per	cent	of	all	strikes	in	1977	-	falling	to	12	per	cent	in	1985	and	just	6	per	cent	in	1986.	In	a	recessionary	economy	competitive	pay	militancy	lost	its	raison	d’etre	while	labour	law	reform	eroded	 traditional	 grounds	 for	 conflict.	 Sectional	 unions	 like	 the	 MPGWU	 and	AGEMOU	 shrank	 dramatically	 and	 where	 disputes	 occurred	 these	 were																																																									57		 CII	criticisms,	Power	2009:	58-9;	economic	model	in	crisis,	Telesis,	NESC	1982a,	1982b,	Kennedy,	K.	1984;	“rent-seeking”,	White	1983;	tendency	to	close,	Whelan,	C.	et	al.	2007;	Reynolds,	‘Speech	…	at	the	Annual	Lunch	of	the	CII’,	13/05/87,	GIS:	D/I&C		58		 “in-house”,	Hardiman	1988:	167,	Roche	and	Larragy	1987;	“newer	firms”,	Turner	et	al	2013:	216;	“similar	to	the	TUC”,	FUE	Bulletin	Aug.-Sept.	1983,	quoted	in	Hardiman	1988:	163;	on	IMI	see	chapter	2	
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increasingly	over	terms	for	company	survival	or	redundancies	rather	than	wages	or	 productivity.	 These	 factors	 and	 a	 related	 fall	 in	 income	 led	 to	 redundancies	among	 union	 staffs	 themselves,	 not	 least	 in	 the	 ITGWU.	 Even	 the	 “militant”	ATGWU	found	itself	with	“staff	surplus	to	requirements,	if	not	totally	redundant	then	underloaded”,	as	its	leader,	Matt	Merrigan,	put	it.59		 Disputes	 were	 increasingly	 in	 the	 public	 service,	 where	 unions	 that	 still	exercised	 veto	 power	 fought	 recruitment	 embargoes,	 the	 suspension	 of	 pay	awards	and	worsening	conditions.	But	 the	private	sector	decline	and	ending	of	tripartitism	 caused	 a	 crisis	 for	 unions	 regarding	 their	 future	 role.	 ICTU	conferences	became	circular	set-piece	debates	involving	an	ageing	core	of	a	few	hundred	 officials,	 as	 an	 internal	 ICTU	 report	 concluded,	 and	 with	 growing	member	apathy,	delegates	mostly	the	same	long-term	executive	members	or	full-time	 officials	 pre-mandated	 to	 vote	 on	 agenda	 items.	 Leaders	 like	 Attley	 and	Carroll	saw	the	movement	fighting	to	prevent	its	threatening	“marginalisation”.60			 An	 inner	 circle	 in	 the	 ICTU	 strove	 to	 reverse	 this	 threat	 by	 maintaining	 a	commitment	 to	 a	 National	 Understanding,	 as	 in	 the	 last	minute	 initiative	with	Haughey	at	 the	end	of	1982.	They	recognised	 that	with	relations	 in	production	changing	under	the	“new	capitalism”,	shop-floor	militancy	and	veto	power	were	phenomena	of	 a	 passing	 era.	 They	 looked	 to	worker	participation	 in	 economic	planning	and	in	partnership	at	company	level	–	vigorously	opposed	by	the	Left	-	as	 a	 new	 strategy	 for	 the	 movement.	 The	 ICTU	 based	 its	 case	 for	 a	 revived	tripartitism	not	 solely	on	 the	pay	aspect	but	 rather	as	 a	basis	 for	 an	 industrial	and	 particularly	 employment	 recovery.	 This	 case	 was	 articulated	 in	 ‘The	 Real	Way	 Forward’	 of	 December	 1982	 and	 in	 a	 pamphlet	 by	 three	 “socialist	economists”,	Jobs	and	Wages,	which,	influenced	by	the	rise	of	the	Workers’	Party,	marked	a	turn	by	the	Left	to	a	state-orientated	tripartite	industrial	strategy.61			 The	case	 for	an	autonomous	 industrial	 strategy	based	on	a	union-employer-government	 partnership	 was	 further	 reinforced	 by	 disillusionment	 with	 the	Labour	 Party.	 Following	 the	 first	 FitzGerald	 coalition,	 an	 ITGWU	 official	wrote																																																									59		 “empowerment”,	Wickham	1980;	unofficial	strikes	and	Labour	Court,	Hardiman	1988:	221-2;	issues	in	disputes,	IRNR	1982-6;	Devine	2009:	794;	union	redundancies,	Roche	and	Larragy	1987;	in	ITGWU,	Devine	2009:	692-3;	“underloaded”,	Merrigan	at	ICTU	ADG	1985:	7	60		 ICTU	report	in	ICTU	AR	1987:	8-9;	“marginalised”,	ICTU	ADC	1987:	5-12	and	Hastings	et	al	2007:	10	61		 “ageing	left”,	Merrigan	2014:	163-5;	new	ICTU	strategy,	ICTU	ADC	1986:	206-9;	Group	of	Socialist	Economists	1983;		
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that	 “in	 the	 Irish	 context,	 the	 trade	 union	 movement	 has	 a	 particular	responsibility	to	articulate	the	aspirations	of	workers,	given	the	absence	of	any	real	 effective	 political	 party	 to	 do	 so”.	 Unions	 looked	 to	 north-European	corporatism	for	inspiration.	ICTU’s	powerful	public	services	committee	deferred	its	pay	strategy	in	1983	until	 it	was	clear	that	FitzGerald	would	not	entertain	a	return	 to	 an	 Understanding-type	 agreement.	 “Organised	 labour”,	 Phil	 Flynn,	 a	rising	 LGPSU	 leader,	 told	 a	 1984	 ICTU	 conference,	 had	 been	 “on	 a	 hiding	 to	nothing”.	“Our	credibility	is	on	the	line”	as	the	unemployed	and	the	young	were	“calling	into	question	the	relevance	of	trade	unions”.	Unions	had	no	choice	but	to	prepare	 an	 industrial	 plan,	 “mobilise	 around	 a	 set	 of	 social	 and	 economic	demands”	and	insist	on	a	recovery	strategy	as	the	basis	of	“the	next	pay	round”.62			 The	coalition’s	ending	of	 tripartitism	and	side-lining	of	 its	 institutions,	while	in	tune	with	a	global	trend,	were,	apart	from	a	certain	freeing	of	bargaining	in	the	private	 sector,	 increasingly	 regarded	 by	 many	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 industry	 as	 a	regressive	 development,	 especially	 as	 the	 employment	 and	 development	 crisis	deepened.	With	this	realisation,	particularly	on	the	union	side,	 the	framing	of	a	return	to	a	consensus	industrial	recovery	strategy	had	already	begun	in	1983.		
																																																								62		 “in	the	Irish	context”,	Liberty,	Feb.	1982;	Flynn,	‘Collective	Bargaining,	ICTU	1984’,	Flynn	Papers	
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Chapter	5	
Policy	revolution:	the	politics	of	the	NESC	plan	
Inception:	Ó	hUiginn,	Flynn	and	the	genesis	of	an	idea		 Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn,	regarded	by	coalition	leaders	as	too	closely	associated	with	the	1980-82	Haughey	governments,	was	 “exiled”	by	FitzGerald	 to	 chair	 the	 re-constituted	 but	 downgraded	 NESC	 in	 June	 1984.	 This	 would	 have	 major	unintended	 consequences.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 sought	 to	 revive	 the	 “demoralised”	institution,	 whose	 business	 and	 union	 representatives	 found	 his	 informal	 but	energetic	 style	 refreshing	and	 invigorating.	 From	a	modest	northside	Cork	 city	background	 and,	 like	 Haughey,	 educated	 by	 the	 Christian	 Brothers	 through	scholarship,	 later	 also	 excelling	 at	 university,	 Ó	 hUiginn,	 following	 a	 brief	involvement	 in	radical	republicanism,	had	entered	the	civil	service	at	a	modest	grade	but	then	advanced	rapidly	in	it.	He	enjoyed	an	unusual	career,	especially	in	his	considerable	European	and	international	experience	 in	economic	briefs.	His	rise	to	the	top	of	the	service	was	purely	meritorious,	as	with	contemporaries	of	his	such	as	Seán	Cromien	 in	Finance,	a	man	from	a	similar	background.	That	Ó	hUiginn	would	thrive	in	Haughey’s	circle	was	unsurprising,	and	during	1980-82,	on	transferring	to	Haughey’s	Department	with	the	socio-economic	planning	staff	of	O’Donoghue’s	disbanded	one,	he	was	promoted	to	secretary	level	and	oversaw	its	 new	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Policy	 Division,	 where	 he	 played	 a	 central	 role	coordinating	Haughey’s	1982	Way	Forward	planning	group.1			 Despite	 the	 ICTU’s	 fraught	 relations	with	government,	 and	 its	membership’s	hostility	 to	 a	 return	 to	 central	 bargaining,	 those	 favouring	 an	 Understanding	sought	to	revive	a	basis	for	it.	Among	the	most	committed	was	Phil	Flynn,	newly	appointed	 LGPSU	 “acting	 general	 secretary”	 following	 Harold	 O’Sullivan’s	secondment	 to	 FitzGerald’s	 National	 Planning	 Board.	 Flynn,	 from	 a	 border	county	and	whose	father	had	suffered	discrimination	and	long	unemployment	in	the	North,	was	a	Republican	socialist,	his	politics	and	activism	 formed	 through	the	 Irish	Workers	Group	 in	1960s	London.	As	 an	official	 in	 the	LGPSU’s	health	service	section	he	had	had	dealings	with	Haughey	as	minister	in	the	late	1970s.																																																											1		 Interviews	with	Ó	hUiginn,	Attley,	O’Sullivan,	Power	
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In	1982	he	was	elected	Vice-President	of	Sinn	Féin,	then	a	marginal	party	tied	to	the	IRA	but	since	the	hunger	strikes	emerging	as	an	electoral	force.2			 Flynn	urged	his	LGPSU	executive,	despite	the	on-going	public	pay	conflicts,	to	pursue	a	return	to	a	National	Understanding	with	government,	a	position	it	then	formally	adopted	 in	1983.	 “In	 the	present	 climate”,	he	argued,	 “the	 interests	of	members	and	their	families	would	best	be	served	if	[bargaining]	was	national	in	character	and	included	both	pay	and	socio-economic	elements”,	with	the	“actual	cash	 increase	 into	 the	 hand	 of	 workers	 achieved	 by	 the	 necessary	 tax	adjustment”.	 This	was	 already	 a	 formula	 tried	 in	 the	 1980-82	Understandings.	Flynn	 proposed	 it	 essentially	 as	 a	 political	 strategy	 at	 ICTU	 level,	 urging	 it	 to	adopt	 “a	national	approach	 to	bargaining	 in	 the	next	pay	 round”	and	“mobilise	around	 a	 set	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 demands”.	 But	 an	 ICTU	 pay	 conference	rejected	this	as	pointless	in	“the	absence	of	support	for	[it]	from	Government”.3			 Other	rising	 leaders,	notably	Attley	of	the	FWUI,	a	decidedly	non-Republican	socialist,	and	older	“centralists”	such	as	civil	service	leader	Dan	Murphy	and	John	Carroll	of	 the	 ITGWU,	were	aware	of	 the	new	possibility	opening	at	NESC	with	the	 appointment	 of	 Ó	 hUiginn,	 and	 manoeuvred	 for	 a	 mandate	 from	 ICTU	 to	exploit	 it.	At	 the	 following	 ICTU	annual	conference,	 in	 July	1984,	which	elected	ATGWU	 leader	 Matt	 Merrigan	 -	 who	 decried	 central	 bargaining	 as	 “class	collaboration”	 -	 as	 Congress	 President	 for	 the	 year,	 a	 proposal	 from	 Flynn	 to	pursue	a	national	deal	encompassing	“jobs,	 taxation,	 land	property	speculation,	health	 and	 education”	 was	 again	 rejected.	 But	 two	 lengthy	motions,	 proposed	through	 their	unions	by	Carroll	 and	Attley	advocating	 “economic	planning”	–	 a	mantra	 all	 accepted	 -	 were	 carried.	 Carefully	 buried	 within	 them	 were	statements	 that	 planning	 be	 “in	 full	 co-operation	 with	 the	 trade	 union	movement”	and	deliver	 “an	 integrated	programme”	agreed	with	 “Government”.	They	made	no	link	to	pay,	which	would	only	have	drawn	the	ire	of	the	Left.4		 With	this	mandate	at	least	for	negotiating	an	“industrial	plan”,	pro-agreement	leaders	 drafted	 an	 ambitious	 document,	 Confronting	 the	 Jobs	 Crisis,	 timed	 to																																																											2		 Interview	with	Flynn			3		 “In	the	present	cimate”,	Flynn	at	LGPSU	Exec.	Board	08/04/83	and	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	H&S	Div.	Exec.’,	08/04/83;	Flynn	to	ICTU,	‘Collective	Bargaining,	ICTU	1984’	(speech),	Flynn	Papers;	“reported	back”,	‘Report	on	Agenda,	Exec.	Board’,	23/03/84			4		 “maneouvre”,	Interviews	with	Cassells,	Flynn,	McLoone,	Attley;	“class	collaboration”,	Merrigan	2014:	142-8;	ICTU	ADC	1985:	3-14;	motions,	ICTU	ADC	1984:	61,	73-83	
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appear	that	autumn	ahead	of	FitzGerald’s	Building	on	Reality.	The	driving	figures	behind	it	were	all	committed	to	achieving	a	new	Understanding	-	Carroll,	Flynn,	Murphy,	 Quigley	 and	 Attley.	 It	 was	 compiled	 by	 the	 new	 deputy	 general	secretary,	 Peter	Cassells,	 unlike	Nevin	 an	 enthusiast	 for	 social	 partnership	 and	once	associated	with	the	B&ICO,	with	assistance	from	like-minded	researchers	in	individual	 unions,	 such	 as	 O’Riordan	 and	 Róisín	 Callander	 in	 the	 ITGWU,	 both	former	B&ICO	members	and	Callender	now	influential	in	the	Workers	Party.	The	plan	avoided	traditional	union	jargon	or	the	language	of	“demands”,	specifically	so	 as	 to	 enable	 a	 “policy	 dialogue”	 develop	 at	 the	 NESC.	 Cassells,	 showing	 the	plan	 to	 Ó	 hUiginn,	 proposed	 that	 he	 try	 to	 secure	 FitzGerald’s	 consent	 to	 the	NESC,	despite	its	weakened	remit,	working	on	a	“consensus”	industrial	strategy.5			 Confronting	the	Jobs	Crisis	repeated	the	principles	of	ICTU’s	earlier	 ‘Real	Way	Forward’	 of	 1982,	 but	 greatly	 expanded	 on	 them.	 It	 accepted	 the	 need	 for	controlling	public	expenditure	while	pursuing	an	expansionist	 industrial	policy,	and,	uncommonly,	and	 though	seeing	state	 industry	 in	a	pivotal	 role,	proposed	an	expansion	of	private	sector	industry.	Also,	somewhat	stretching	its	conference	mandate,	 it	 indicated	 a	 role	 for	 pay	 moderation,	 weighted	 towards	 the	 lower	paid	 and	 compensated	 for	 through	 social	 policy	 and	 tax	 reform.	 Critically,	 it	identified	the	tripartite	NESC	as	the	“appropriate	body”	to	develop	the	plan.6			 The	 ICTU	plan’s	 backers	 ensured	 it	was	widely	 circulated	 in	 the	movement,	billed	as	its	main	strategy,	though	the	motions	enabling	it	had	hardly	suggested	that.	Flynn	urged	LGPSU	branches	to	endorse	it	and	at	a	special	ICTU	conference	on	 it	described	 its	 core	 strategy:	 “The	 struggle	 for	 a	planned	economy	 is	more	than	a	firmly	held	trade	union	principle	…	A	national	plan	must	be	a	negotiated	document	…	extending	collective	centralised	bargaining	to	a	new	level”.7		 The	Plan’s	proposed	role	for	the	NESC	mirrored	that	of	Lemass’s	NIEC	of	the	1960s,	 as	well	 as	 that	of	 the	 transformed	NESC	 the	 ICTU	had	argued	 for	when	paving	the	way	for	the	National	Understandings	and	which	Haughey	had	sought	to	realise	in	1980.	But	its	immediate	context	was	the	opportunity	opening	at	the																																																											5		 	“driving	figures”,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	18/07,	19/09/84;	drafting/	language,	Interviews	Attley,	Cassells	and	Callander;	promote	with	NESC,	ICTU	EC	mtgs.	19/09,	17/10/84;	Cassells’	approach,	Interview	Ó	hUiginn			6		 Confronting,	ICTU	1984			7		 Dissemination,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	17/10/84;	promotion	by	Flynn,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	H&W	Div.’	and	LGPSU	Exec,	17/12/84;	“planned	economy”,	speech,	‘Special	Conference	ICTU	01/11/84’	Flynn	Papers		
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NESC.	This	was	again	demonstrated	in	an	unorthodox	move	by	ICTU’s	Executive	which,	after	publishing	the	plan,	nominated	Attley	and	Carroll	as	“alternates”	to	its	existing	second-tier	representation	on	the	Council	to	ensure	an	authoritative	pro-partnership	presence	at	the	NESC	should	it	assume	a	strategic	purpose.8			 These	 ICTU	 appointments	 and	 the	 proposing	 and	 drafting	 of	 the	 plan	 had	followed	 Cassells’	 soundings	 with	 Ó	 hUiginn	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 Council	serving	 as	 a	 vehicle	 for	 an	 economic	 strategy.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 had	 responded	positively,	and	ICTU’s	plan,	with	its	conciliatory	language,	was	the	result	of	these	contacts.	Ó	hUiginn	circulated	the	ICTU	Plan	to	key	Departments,	ostensibly	for	their	 comments	 on	 “what	 is	 already	 policy,	…	what	might	 be	 acceptable	 [and]	what	 is	 definitely	 unacceptable”,	 but	 in	 reality	 to	 engage	 them	 in	 a	 new	policy	process.	He	wrote	 to	 FitzGerald,	 urging	him	 too	 to	 engage	with	 it,	 drawing	his	attention	to	its	innovatory	aspects	-	for	a	union	document	-	and	its	“many	points	of	agreement”	with	government	policy.	Apart	from	its	“unrealistic”	emphasis	on	state	industry,	he	listed	these	as	its	acceptance	of	reduced	public	expenditure,	a	pro-active	 EEC	 policy,	 and	 industrialisation	 through	 “advanced	 technologies,	high-growth	and	resource	based	areas”.	He	stressed	 its	proposed	“well-defined	role	for	the	NESC”	and	said	its	proposal	for	“some	planning	of	incomes”	through	the	pay/tax	relationship	“suggests	an	opening	which	should	be	explored”.9		 But	government	was	uninterested.	At	an	awkward	meeting	with	 the	 ICTU	 in	early	1985,	FitzGerald	 “lectured”	 it	on	his	deflationary	strategy,	 to	which	 there	was,	he	said,	no	alternative,	and	insisted	public	pay	remain	a	stand-alone	issue.	In	vain,	Ó	hUiginn	in	June	again	urged	him	to	engage	with	ICTU’s	plan,	repeating	its	 pay/tax	 proposal	 and	 willingness	 to	 contribute	 to	 “solving	 the	 deficit	problem”.	Despite	even	an	ESRI	study	proposing	“that	pay	restraint	could	best	be	achieved	through	a	broadly-based	negotiated	incomes	policy”,	he	continued	to	be	swayed	by	T.K.	Whitaker	who	held	to	a	statutory	controls	approach.	10			
	
																																																										8		 ICTU	EC	mtg.	17/10/84		9		 Sec.	[Ó	hUiginn]	to	Taoiseach,	‘Meeting	with	ICTU’,	28.11.84,	and	ICTU	to	Taoiseach	28.11.84,	DTA:	OHP	10		 ICTU	AR	1985;	ICTU	EC	meetings	18.09	and	10.10.1985;	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn]	to	Taoiseach,	20.06.85,	‘M/Finance	letter	of	17	June	on	Pay	Policy’,	DTA:	OHP;	ESRI	position,	Kennedy,	K.	1984	
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Parting	of	the	ways:	the	Labour/union	policy	split		 Despite	FitzGerald’s	dismissal	of	both	the	ICTU’s	plan	and	Ó	hUiginn’s	plea	to	engage	 with	 it,	 Phil	 Flynn	 and	 other	 union	 leaders	 worked	 to	 keep	 alive	 its	possibility.	The	ICTU	went	through	the	motions	of	inviting	both	government	and	employers	to	engage	on	it	in	the	hope,	as	Flynn	put	it,	that	this	would	“contribute	to	continuing	in	the	public	mind	the	concept	of	a	[pay]	round	which	employers	have	 been	 anxious	 to	 bury”.	 He	 had	 the	 LGPSU	 Executive	 secure	 its	members’	support	 for	 a	 motion	 that	 ICTU	 should	 “rigorously	 pursue	 negotiations	 with	government	 …	 at	 the	 earliest	 possible	 date”	 for	 “a	 return	 to	 centralised	 pay	bargaining	in	the	format	of	an	annual	National	Understanding	for	Economic	and	Social	Development	as	the	only	effective	method	of	ensuring	a	trade	union	input	into	national	planning	…	to	end	unemployment	and	achieve	a	just	distribution	of	the	 nation’s	 wealth	 and	 a	 real	 and	 substantial	 reform	 in	 the	 tax	 system,	 …	structured	 in	 favour	of	 the	 less	well	off”.	Given	 that	LGPSU	members’	 interests	were	addressed	in	pubic	sector	pay	agreements,	this	was	a	political	manifesto.11			 Two	 other	 union	 leaders	 promoted	 an	 identical	 position	 –	 Carroll	 of	 the	ITGWU,	and	Attley	of	the	FWUI,	with	Carroll,	who	maintained	close	contact	with	Haughey,	bluntly	telling	his	union	that	the	ICTU	jobs	strategy	was	only	realisable	through	 a	 National	 Understanding.	 This	was	 not	 solely	 a	 personal	 position,	 as	both	 unions	 had	 been	 central	 to	 corporatist	 endeavours	 since	 the	 1940s.	 But	both	men	were	also	Labour	Party	members,	Attley	passionately	and	Carroll	more	ambiguously,	 and	 hoped	 though	 despaired	 of	 a	 coalition	 change	 of	 course	through	the	agency	of	the	party.	They	sided	with	the	party	leadership	against	the	Left,	Carroll	deploying	ITGWU’s	block	vote	against	a	1985	motion	to	renegotiate	the	coalition	programme,	which	would	have	brought	down	the	government.12		 But	 as	 Labour	 was	 increasingly	 side-lined	 in	 cabinet,	 party-union	 relations	became	more	 fractious.	 This	 had	 begun	with	 the	 resignation	 in	 1983	 of	 Frank	Cluskey,	 who	 on	 losing	 the	 party	 leadership	 had	 been	 relegated	 to	 a	 junior	ministry	and	marginalised.	He	resigned	over	Bruton’s	bailing	out	of	Dublin	Gas	shareholders,	 denouncing	 it	 as	 crony	 capitalism.	 The	 new	 Spring/Desmond	leadership,	 guided	 by	 advisor	 Fergus	 Finlay,	 prioritised	 social	 reform	 in	 areas																																																									11		 ‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	Board’,	09/05/85;	‘Annual	Delegate	Conference’	15-18/05/85,	ILHS:	LGPSU	12		 Carroll	in	Devine	2009:	708;	“block	votes”,	Horgan	1986:	127-8	
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such	 as	 contraception	 and	 defending	 health	 and	 welfare	 spending,	 and	 were	hostile	to	ICTU’s	tripartite	agenda.	Like	Norton	in	his	dismissal	of	the	NIEC	in	the	1960s,	they	were,	in	essence,	as	opposed	to	tripartitism	as	Fine	Gael	was.13			 Finlay	 recalled	 how	 relations	 between	 party	 and	 unions	 “plummeted	throughout	the	time	we	were	in	government”,	their	respective	leaders	“barely	on	speaking	terms”	by	1986.	The	ICTU,	he	claimed,	regarded	the	party	as	“a	dog	that	would	 bark	 whenever	 they	 kicked	 us”,	 Carroll	 “routinely”	 denouncing	 as	“Thatcherite”	budgets	in	which	“Dick	and	Barry	had	fought	for	weeks	to	protect	essential	social	spending”.	Desmond,	a	former	ICTU	official,	who	in	government	in	1981	had	failed	to	retrieve	the	National	Understanding,	was	equally	resentful,	particularly	of	Attley,	who	he	accused	of	 “undermining”	Labour	 in	government.	The	party	was	also	under	pressure	electorally	and	in	the	unions	from	the	rising	Workers	Party,	which	in	1985	won	nine	seats	on	Dublin	City	Council	to	Labour’s	two	and	appeared	to	be	on	the	verge	of	replacing	it	in	the	capital.14			 Labour	was	 in	 a	 dilemma,	 only	 able	 to	 pursue	 its	 objectives	 in	 coalition	 by	submitting	to	Fine	Gael	economic	policy.	The	cabinet’s	overruling	of	arbitrators’	awards	 and	 resulting	 widespread	 union	 unrest,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 teachers’	strike,	 further	 tested	 union	 patience.	 In	 August	 1986	 Bruton	 reiterated	 his	deflationary	strategy,	following	an	8	per	cent	“downward	adjustment”	of	the	IR£	in	 the	 EMS	 by	 instituting	 a	 pay	 freeze	 to	 “suppress	 inflation”	 in	 September.	Unions	affiliated	to	Labour,	led	by	the	ITGWU	and	FWUI,	had	already	in	February	1986	called	for	it	to	“stay	out	of	government	for	a	decade	…	to	build	itself	up	as	a	credible	alternative	government”.	They	now	also	backed	the	left-wing	leadership	challenge	 by	 Emmet	 Stagg	 and,	 in	 an	 unprecedented	 move,	 the	 ITGWU	 had	 a	motion	adopted	that	forced	the	ICTU	to	demand	that	the	government	resign	and	parties	 fight	 an	 election	 on	 both	 their	 socio-economic	 policy	 record	 and	 their	position	on	the	ICTU’s	plan,	which	of	course	only	Fianna	Fáil	had	welcomed.15			 The	 Northern	 conflict	 intruded	 again	 to	 further	 sour	 union-government	relations	 when	 Phil	 Flynn	 was	 appointed	 acting	 LGPSU	 general	 secretary.	FitzGerald	 forbade	 ministerial	 meetings	 with	 Sinn	 Féin	 members,	 which																																																									13		 Cluskey,	in	O’Mahoney	2015:	27-9,	36-8,	Halligan	2015:	132-3	14		 Finlay	1998:	43-4;	Desmond	2000:	210;	on	rise	of	the	WP,	Hanley	and	Millar	2009:	468-71	15		 Bruton	position,	‘Statement	by	Minister	for	Finance,	John	Bruton,	02.08.86’	GIS:	D/Finance;	“stay	out	of	government”,	Horgan	1986:	140;	ICTU	call	on	government,	ICTU	ADC	1986:	100-13	
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Desmond	 defended	 as	 “an	 act	 of	 political	 hygiene”.	Minister	 Noonan	 called	 on	LGPSU	 members	 not	 to	 ratify	 Flynn’s	 appointment	 and	 when	 Flynn	 was	nevertheless	 appointed,	 another	 Fine	 Gael	 Minister,	 Paddy	 Cooney,	 urged	 the	ICTU	 to	 exclude	 him	 from	 its	 Executive.	 Some	 LGPSU	branches	 did	 oppose	 his	ratification	or	demanded	he	resign	his	Sinn	Féin	role,	but	the	ever-popular	and	effective	Flynn	succeeded	in	not	only	being	voted	onto	the	ICTU	Executive	but	in	becoming	chair	of	 its	powerful	Public	Services	Committee.	His	own	union	even	lobbied	government	for	a	visa	for	him	to	travel	to	the	US,	a	request	it	refused.16			 Ironically,	 it	was	just	as	union	relations	with	Labour	had	reached	an	all-time	low	 and	 the	 coalition	 appeared	 on	 the	 point	 of	 disintegrating	 that	 FitzGerald	finally	risked	a	move	towards	a	shared	socio-economic	planning	approach.		
	
Strategy	revolution	at	the	NESC		 Following	FitzGerald’s	rejection	of	his	proposal	to	engage	with	ICTU’s	plan	as	the	basis	for	a	pay/tax	strategy	in	1985,	Ó	hUiginn	took	a	different	tack.	He	now	suggested	that	he	approve	an	ICTU	request	for	the	NESC	to	be	allowed	prepare	a	“mid-term	review”	of	macro-economic	policy.	FitzGerald	deflected	this	by	asking	the	NESC	for	“feasible	proposals	in	the	short	term	for	specific	 improvements	in	the	 environment	 for	 job	 creation	 and	 job	 protection	which	 the	 social	 partners	could	 jointly	recommend”.	But	 the	relatively	marginal	 issues	he	suggested	 they	examine	 -	 disability	 benefits,	 PRSI	 and	 employment	 schemes	 -	 were	 precisely	“micro-issues”	Ó	hUiginn	regarded	as	of	a	kind	with	the	divisive	subjects	which	Ministers	 had	 been	 imposing	 on	 the	 council.	 FitzGerald,	 unsurprisingly,	 found	the	 inconclusive	 results	 that	 NESC	 produced	 on	 these	 issues	 “disappointing”,	confirming	his	negative	view	of	the	“consensus”	seeking	Council.17				 During	1986,	however,	as	cabinet	relations	deteriorated,	FitzGerald	agreed	to	a	 suggestion	 by	 Ruairí	 Quinn	 that	 Quinn	 sound	 out	 Carroll	 and	 Attley	 on	 the	potential	for	a	“social	pact”	based	on	a	tax/pay	trade-off.	Quinn,	a	minister,	FWUI	member	 and	 Cluskey	 protégée,	 was	 the	 only	 front	 bench	 voice	 even	 mildly	favourable	 to	 tripartitism.	 But	 when	 he	 reported	 their	 positive	 response,																																																									16		 Desmond	and	Noonan	in	Browne,	V.	2006;	Flynn’s	position,	LGPSU,	‘Report	on	Agenda	for	Exec.	meetings’	04/11/83,	24/02/84,	Exec.	Board	meetings	19/12/1980,	09/12/83	and	‘Annual	Delegate	Conference’	15/05/84,	Special	Exec.	Board	meeting,	25/04/86	17		 “review”,	ICTU	AR	1984:	223,	Hastings	et	al:	27,	Interview	Ó	hUiginn;	“feasible”,	Power	2009:	57-8;	FitzGerald	idea,	‘Council	Meeting	25/07/1986,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b;	“disappointing”,	Power	2009:	58		
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FitzGerald	was	sceptical,	telling	cabinet	that	Nevin	told	him	union	leaders	would	oppose	 talks	 with	 him.	 These	 “leaders”	 were	 presumably	 Carroll,	 Attley	 and	Flynn,	 but	 Carroll,	 although	 certainly	 favouring	 dealing	 with	 Haughey,	 later	claimed	ICTU	was	willing	but	FitzGerald	would	simply	not	take	the	“gamble”.18				 At	 the	end	of	1985,	however,	 FitzGerald,	his	 government	under	pressure	by	public	 service	disputes,	 finally	 conceded	 that	NESC	might	 “play	a	useful	 role	 in	looking	 at	 the	 employment/unemployment/public	 finance	 situation	 and	attempting	 to	 reach	 some	agreed	position	on	 it”,	 especially	 “if	 it	were	 to	 come	with	agreement	by	all	social	partners”,	and	told	a	CII	conference	that	he	would	welcome	 “agreed	 views	 on	 development	 policies	 …	 that	 would	 have	 a	 strong	impact	on	employment”.	Ó	hUiginn	grasped	the	opportunity,	using	the	excuse	of	the	Council’s	limited	resources	to	set	aside	its	“micro”	projects	and	focus	on	the	“plan”.	Work,	 initially	 delayed	 by	 heated	 public	 debate	 between	 the	 ICTU	 and	FUE/CII	over	budget	policy,	got	underway,	Ó	hUiginn	tabling	the	ICTU’s	Jobs	Plan	and	Fianna	Fáil’s	Way	Forward	among	the	documents	for	initial	discussion.19		 A	 framework	 “economic	 and	 social	 review	 set	 in	 the	 medium	 term”	 soon	emerged,	with	“policy	groups”	of	council	members	interrogating	outside	experts,	receiving	submissions	and	examining	policies	under	the	strategy	headings	of	the	ICTU	 plan	 -	 macro-economic/financial,	 industrial,	 tax	 and	 social	 policy.	 The	outcomes	were	debated	and	collated	by	NESC	staff	 into	an	evolving	document,	titled	 “Strategy	 for	 Development”.	 The	 process	 was	 driven	 by	 Ó	 hUiginn	 in	 an	atmosphere	 described	 by	 Cassells	 as	 “like	 a	 government-in-exile”,	 one	 civil	servant	saying	Ó	hUiginn	turned	the	NESC	from	an	“underused	back-room	into	a	policy	powerhouse”,	 applying	 “Chatham	House	Rules”	 to	 ensure	 confidentiality	and	encouraging	the	ICTU	and	FUE	to	leave	their	differences	at	the	door.20			 Employers	were	initially	reluctant	to	engage,	given	their	hostility	to	a	return	to	central	agreements.	But	the	business	lobby,	CII,	was	convinced	by	Ó	hUiginn	to	participate,	especially	on	 industrial	policy,	and	 internally	began	to	consider	the	
																																																								18		 Quinn	initiative,	Quinn	2005:	246-7;	“gamble”,	Hastings	et	al.	2007:	28	19		 FitzGerald	proposal	to	NESC,	‘Council	Meeting’	16/10/1986	and	‘Draft	Preface’,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b;	Power	2009:	58;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	n.d.	[11/02/86]	‘Re:	NESC	Report’,	DTA:	OHP;	originis	of	report,	Ó	hUiginn	‘Presentation	…	on	Strategy	for	Development’,	NESC	‘Council	Meeting’	11/06/87;	tables	“Confronting”	and	“Way	Forward”,	interview	with	Ó	hUiginn	20	 	‘Presentation	by	Chairman	on	Strategy	for	Development’,	Council	Mtg.	11/06/87.	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b;	Interviews	with	Cassells;	“Chattam	House”,	interview	with	anon.	D/Taoiseach	official
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framework	 of	 a	 “social	 partnership”	 as	 proposed	 by	 ICTU	 leaders	 for	 the	“strategy	for	economic	recovery”	emerging.	The	council’s	modus	operandi	was	an	implicit	understanding	to	cooperate	while	agreeing	to	disagree	on	what	divided	them,	 such	 as	 specific	 options	 in	 reducing	 public	 expenditure	 rather	 than	 the	principle	of	it,	or	even	whether	a	pay	agreement	had	to	form	part	of	a	recovery	strategy.	While	ICTU	was	committed	to	this,	CII	still	favoured	a	purely	industrial	strategy	 backed	 by	 “political	 “consensus”.	 But	 the	 principle	 of	 controlling	spending	and	a	consensus	industrial	strategy	were	shared	by	all	partners.21			 Haughey	 followed	 the	 NESC	 process	 closely	 and,	 as	 will	 be	 seen,	 played	 a	critical	role	in	the	emergence	of	both	the	ICTU	and	NESC	plans.	While	FitzGerald	appears	to	have	taken	little	interest	in	the	NESC	work,	Haughey	ensured	he	was	kept	appraised,	urging	any	with	whom	he	had	influence	to	“try	to	hammer	out”	a	“consensus”.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 had	 no	 formal	 contact	 with	 Fianna	 Fáil	 and	 kept	 his	professional	distance,	but	all	involved	saw	him	as	a	driving	force,	McCreevy	later	describing	 him	 rather	 colourfully	 as	 “the	 smartest	 civil	 servant,	 the	 smartest	person	I	ever	met	…	His	role	was	at	least	equal	to	Whitaker,	if	not	greater”.22				 By	October	1986	the	massive,	400-page	Strategy	for	Development	1986-90	had	emerged.	It	incorporated	and	synthesised	a	wide	range	of	policies,	 from	Telesis	to	The	Way	Forward,	 IDA’s	sectoral	and	 inward	 investment	strategies,	 the	ICTU	Plan’s	proposals	on	state	companies,	tax	and	social	policy,	and	CII	suggestions	on	infrastructure	and	greenfield	sectors	such	as	traded	services.	It	was	unique	as	an	“integrated	four-part”	plan,	covering	the	macro/financial,	industrial,	taxation	and	social	equity	elements	which	it	 insisted	had	to	be	implemented	simultaneously.	Tax	reform	was	a	policy	lever	to	stimulate	growth	and	expand	the	labour	force,	compensate	 for	 pay	 moderation	 and	 increase	 equality.	 The	 Plan	 stressed	 the	need	for	any	strategy	to	form	a	consensus	across	social	interests	and	parties.23		 While	referencing	the	sense	of	purpose	of	the	Lemass	era,	the	planning	NESC	proposed	surpassed	 that	of	 the	1960s	 in	state	activism.	 It	also	referenced	 then	current	institutionalist	“small	open	economy”	theory,	notably	Katzenstein,	which	
																																																								21		 CII	position	in	Con	Power,	‘Strategy	for	Development.	Speech	to	South	Co.	Dublin	Fine	Gael’,	25/02/86.	Power	Papers	and	CII	Newsletter,	11/11/86	22		 “hammer	out”,	Interview	with	Ó	hUiginn;	“influence”,	interview	with	Mansergh;	Ó	hUiginn	role,	Rafter	2002:	128;	McCreevy	quoted	in	Hastings	et	al.:	34	23	 NESC	1987	
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argued	 the	 central	 role	 of	 an	 integrated	 institutional	 state	 and	 national	 policy	consensus	 in	 generating	 and	 implementing	 successful	 development	 strategies.	Given	 the	 dearth	 of	 venture	 capital	 or	 an	 industrial	 investment	 culture,	 NESC	proposed	 interventionist	planning	as	 the	key	driver	of	development,	 criticising	the	 traditional	 over-reliance	 on	 purely	 fiscal	 policy.	 It	 also	 critiqued	 the	conservatism	 and	 inefficiencies	 of	 indigenous	 industry,	 proposing	 that	modernisation	and	scaling	up	of	potential	large-scale	export	performers	through	preferential	state	supports	be	a	priority,	particularly	in	underdeveloped	natural-resource-based	and	service	 industries.	FDI	was	seen	 in	an	ancillary	but	 critical	role.	Instead	of	the	indiscriminate	approach	of	the	1960s-70s,	FDI	should	target	only	 select	 high-skill	 sectors	 to	 develop	 comparative	 advantage,	 drive	 a	 rising	value-chain,	 improve	 production	 quality	 and	 through	 “linkages”	 develop	indigenous	 firms.	The	 food	sector	was	 singled	out	as	having	significant	growth	potential,	 but	 to	 supply	 it	 agriculture	would	have	 to	overcome	over-seasonally	dependent	 production	 and	 be	 weaned	 from	 grant	 reliance	 towards	 greater	commercialisation.	Improving	“social	equity”	would	be	essential	to	developing	a	motivated,	 skilled	 workforce,	 by	 removing	 welfare	 traps,	 facilitating	 social	security	supports	and	educational	access,	and	removing	barriers	to	the	economic	and	social	participation	of	women	and	disadvantaged	groups.24			 One	 area	 on	 which	 a	 consensus	 was	 not	 achieved	 was,	 ironically,	 on	 what	exactly	“consensus”	entailed!	This	was	due	to	political	differences	between,	and	within,	 union	 and	 business	 groups.	 The	 NESC	 report	 could	 only	 agree	 “that	reference	 be	made	…	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 building	 consensus	 if	 the	measures	necessary	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 current	 economic	 and	 social	 situation	 were	 to	 be	implemented”.	 In	early	1986,	on	the	ICTU’s	 initiative,	 the	council	had	agreed	to	study	“institutional	arrangements	for	economic	and	social	planning”	elsewhere,	identifying	a	specific	“number	of	European	countries”.	But	attempts	to	progress	“study	visits”	 to	 further	this	made	 little	headway,	and	were	soon	abandoned.	Ó	hUiginn	suggested	a	compromise	formula	for	the	Strategy:		 “There	 is	a	need	to	 foster	a	greater	degree	of	consensus	 in	 Irish	society	 if	these	 measures	 are	 to	 be	 implemented	 without	 giving	 rise	 to	 conflict.	 This	consensus	 is	 necessary	 both	 on	 the	 national	 level	 and	 the	 level	 of	 the																																																									24		 NESC	1987;	on	“SOE”	theory,	Katzenstein	1984	
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workplace.	 The	 Council	 intends	 to	 pursue	 this	 issue	 further,	 through	examining	the	institutional	arrangements	for	economic	and	social	planning	in	a	number	of	European	countries	and	in	particular	the	mechanisms	in	place	for	the	achievement	of	consensus”.	25			 In	 the	 event	 a	 weaker	 formulation	 was	 agreed,	 that	 stressed	 the	 value	 of	“consensus”	without	specifying	institutions,	especially	at	the	workplace	level,	but	committing	 NESC	 to	 “pursue	 this	 matter	 further”.	 The	 reason	 was	 employer	antipathy	 to	 “power	sharing”	 in	 industry,	which	 they	had	consistently	opposed	since	the	1960s,	and	what	they	saw	as	ICTU	attempts	to	foist	a	commitment	to	an	Austrian-style	 corporatism	 on	 the	NESC.	 The	 Council	was	 a	 consensus-seeking	rather	than	negotiating	body,	and	in	other	areas	it	avoided	divisive	subjects.	As	Ó	hUiginn	pointed	out,	consensus	on	strategy	could	only	recommend	so	much,	with	specific	measures	a	matter	for	the	negotiating	parties	and	political	arena.26		 The	NESC	 strategy	was	novel	 in	 its	 comprehensiveness,	 its	 range	of	 specific	proposals	 collated	 from	 existing	 plans,	 the	 indivisibility	 rather	 than	 a-la-carte	nature	 of	 its	 four	 strategy	 areas,	 and	 its	 emphasis	 on	 state	 institutions	 being	coordinated	in	a	concerted	consensus.	In	essence	this	approach	was	inherent	in	
The	Way	Forward,	Telesis	and	the	NESC	proposals	of	1982,	only	now	integrated	as	 a	 national	 strategy.	 The	 core	 aim	 was	 tackling	 Ireland’s	 comparative	underdevelopment	 rather	 as	 well	 as	 the	 immediate	 debt	 crisis,	 and	 this	contradicts	 a	widespread	 view	 that	 the	 plan	 could	 “only”	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	conditions	of	the	1986	crisis.	But	on	monetary	adjustment,	it	produced	a	formula	to	 also	 resolve	 that	 problem.	 This	 originated	 with	 Jim	 O’Leary,	 a	 young	economist	on	the	NPB	seconded	to	the	NESC	to	work	on	the	plan.	He	proposed	replacing	 linear	 deflationary	measures	with	 gradual	 debt/GNP	 reduction	 ratio,	“stabilising”	it	at	a	target	level	within	three	years,	and	with	economic	expansion	through	industrial	strategy	“out-growing”	it	thereafter.	The	last	NESC	meeting	on	the	Strategy	agreed	to	include	“some	of	the	implications	of	this	note”.27		
																																																								25		 “examine	structures”	and	“study	visits”,	NESC	mtgs.	25/07,	19/09,	19/12/1986,	‘Draft	Report’,	‘Work	Programme	1986’,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b;	Ó	hUiginn	text,	‘Draft	Report’,	NESC	Council	Mtg.	19/09/86,	26		 NESC	Council	19/12/86	–	‘Work	Programme	1987.	Note	from	Secretariat’	27		 “only	have	emerged”,	Begg	2016;	O’Leary	formula,	‘Secretariat	Note	–	Alternative	paths	to	Fiscal	Adjustment’	[by	JO’L],	Council	Meeting	16/10/1986,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b;	also	Hastings	et	al	2007:	20	
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	 NESC	 members	 were	 aware	 that	 many	 of	 the	 report’s	 proposals	 would	 be	opposed	by	government.	But	they	nevertheless	agreed	one	explosive	conclusion:	that	“while	the	current	situation	is	grave	the	Council	is	even	more	concerned	…	that	 the	 medium	 term	 prospects	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 unchanged	 policies	 offer	 no	relief”.	They	also	criticised	as	“defeatist”	the	popular	public	discourse	on	the	“end	of	 work”	 and	 a	 “jobless	 future”,	 insisting	 that	 “the	 fall	 in	 manufacturing	employment	…	 is	more	 the	result	of	 the	 type	of	 industrial	and	other	policies	…	pursued	than	the	product	of	any	set	of	immutable	historical	forces”.28			 FitzGerald	was	furious.	When	the	NESC	presented	its	Strategy	for	Development	in	 November	 1986,	 he	 effectively	 rejected	 it	 by	 claiming	 it	 justified	 his	deflationary	strategy.	Much	of	the	press,	including	even	the	Irish	Press	which	as	a	Fianna	Fáil-linked	newspaper	might	have	been	expected	to	sympathise	with	 its	approach,	 showed	 little	 understanding	 for	 it,	 highlighting	 almost	 solely,	 and	approvingly,	 the	 recommendations	 prioritising	 spending	 cuts	 and	 debt	reduction.	Spring	demanded	to	know	which	spending	cuts	the	NESC	had	in	mind	and,	although	proposing	that	NESC	nevertheless	be	consulted	when	drafting	the	budget,	sarcastically	welcomed	“trade	unions	taking	a	new	attitude	towards	pay,	competitiveness	and	restrictive	practices”.	NESC	was	alarmed	at	 the	responses,	though	media	hostility	 to	unions	was	nothing	new,	with	 some	unions	officially	“boycotting”	the	Irish	Independent	because	of	its	biased	coverage	of	disputes.	But,	fearing	“for	the	fate	of	the	report”,	the	NESC	issued	a	statement	emphasising	it	as	an	“integrated”	four-part	strategy,	no	part	of	which	could	“work	on	its	own”.29		
	 ICTU	 condemned	 the	 government’s	 “scandalous	 abuse	 and	 misuse	 of	 the	report”	 and	 its	 “selective	 use”	 of	 its	 recommendations.	 The	 report	 did	 not,	 “as	claimed	 by	 the	 Taoiseach”,	 “endorse	 current	 Government	 policy”,	 but	 on	 the	contrary	 concluded	 that	 current	 policies	 were	 driving	 unemployment	 and	 the	“deterioration	in	the	public	finances”.	The	CII	also	publicly	defended	the	report,	stressing	its	integrated	“four-part”	aspect.	More	reservedly,	FUE	welcomed	it	as	“helpful	for	business	planning	and	pay	bargaining”	to	have	“as	little	uncertainty	as	possible	about	national	economics,	social,	industrial	and	agricultural	policies”.																																																									28		 Mtg.	19/09/86,	‘Draft	Report’,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b.	Also,	Interview	Cassells	and	Allen,	M.	1998:	247-50	29		 FitzGerald	position,	‘Government	Statement’	in	NESC	Council	Meeting	13/11/86	and	IT	14/11/86;	press	reports,	IT,	II,	IP,	13-16/11/86;	Spring	in	IT	17/11/86;	LGPSU	boycott	of	Independent,	LGPSU,	‘Reports	on	Agenda.	LG&PB	Div.	Exec.’,	18/01	and	18/10/85,	Exec.	Board	mtg.	18/01/85;	NESC	‘Press	Statement’,	13/11/86,	in	Irish	Press,	14/11/86	and	Council	Meeting	19/12/86		
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While	it	supported	a	tripartite	development	policy,	 including	guidelines	on	pay,	it	was	still	opposed	to	national-level	wage	setting	and	minimum	wages.30		 Given	 the	 debt,	 emigration	 and	 unemployment	 crisis,	 the	 obvious	 imminent	disintegration	of	 the	FitzGerald	coalition	over	budget	policy,	and	the	continued	industrial	 unrest,	 these	 responses	 by	 government	 and	 employers	 to	 the	 NESC	report	 were	 hardly	 surprising.	 The	 pro-partnership	 faction	 in	 the	 ICTU	leadership	was	well	aware	of	this,	having	engineered	its	own	Jobs	Plan	to	revive	a	basis	for	social	dialogue	in	1984	and	behind	the	scenes	working	with	Ó	hUiginn	to	 have	 the	 NESC	 secure	 government	 consent	 to	 develop	 a	 plan	 for	 economic	recovery.	By	1986	it	was	in	little	doubt	that	the	government	with	which	it	would	most	 likely	 be	 able	 to	 realise	 a	 restoration	 of	 social	 partnership	 was	 not	 the	incumbent	one	but	the	imminent	prospect	of	a	Haughey	one.		
	
“Palace	coup”:	the	ICTU	secures	a	“mandate”			 It	is	not	true,	as	some	studies	claim,	that	ICTU	entered	talks	with	Haughey	on	social	partnership	in	1987	“without	a	mandate”	from	its	members.	This	error	is	understandable	 given	 the	 considerable	 subterfuge	 involved	 in	 securing	 that	mandate.	As	work	got	underway	on	 the	NESC	report	 in	early	1986,	and	with	a	change	of	 government	 in	1987	 increasingly	 likely,	 the	pro-partnership	 leaders,	convinced	 a	 once-off	 opportunity	 was	 presenting,	 determined	 to	 secure	 a	mandate	 to	be	able	 to	enter	 talks	 immediately	a	new	government	was	 formed,	well	aware	that	that	this	would	not	be	a	simple	task.31		 The	 trade	union	movement	was	 a	house	divided.	As	described	 in	 chapter	4,	ICTU	was	an	alliance	of	interests	often	divided	due	to	the	divergent	interests	of	different	 unions.	 Congress’s	 carefully	 balanced	 25-member	 Executive	 Council	reflected	the	dominant	strands	in	the	movement	and	its	authority	relied	on	the	acquiescence	of	its	affiliate	unions	to	policy	courses	adopted.	Social	partnership	divided	the	movement	like	no	other	issue.			 Two	 ICTU	 conferences	 in	 1983	 had	 rejected	 Phil	 Flynn’s	 proposal	 for	 a	restoration	 of	 social	 partnership	 as	 ICTU’s	 central	 strategy,	 on	 the	 ambiguous	grounds	 that	 it	 was	 “pointless”	 pursuing	 it	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 government																																																									30		 ICTU	AR	1987:	212;	CII	Newsletter,	11/11/86;	FUE	Bulletin,	Nov.	and	Dec.	1986,	Feb.	1987	31		 “no	mandate”,	e.g.	Adshead	2011	
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willing	to	engage.	The	pro-partnership	group	had	had	to	carefully	politic	first	to	build	the	basis	for	a	return	to	such	a	strategy.	As	described	above,	this	had	been	achieved,	following	FitzGerald’s	“exiling”	of	Ó	hUiginn	to	the	NESC	in	June	1984	and	 union	 leaders’	 discussions	 with	 him,	 through	 disingenuous	 motions	 they	secured	 through	 ICTU’s	 July	 1984	 conference	 authorising	 Congress	 to	 draft	 an	“industrial	 policy”,	 though	 with	 a	 coded	 link	 to	 pay	 buried	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	motions	to	enable	a	strategy	form	the	basis	of	a	negotiated	agreement.	This	plan	–Confronting	the	Jobs	Crisis	-	kick-started	both	the	strategy	development	at	NESC	and	ICTU’s	political	re-engagement	with	Haughey,	now	securely	in	control	of	his	party,	who	advocated	a	partnership	strategy	 if	he	returned	to	government.	The	pro-partnership	leaders	now	required	a	mandate	to	open	talks	on	an	agreement.				 Given	 the	 on-going	 union	 conflicts	 with	 FitzGerald’s	 government	 and	 the	collapse	of	relations	with	Labour,	ICTU	leaders	could	hardly	propose	a	strategy	of	policy	collaboration	with	that	government	or	openly	declare	a	preference	for	a	future	Fianna	Fáil	government	to	replace	it.	But	if	on	tenuous	ground	politically	and	 uncertain	 of	 support	 on	 the	 ICTU	 Executive,	 the	 pro-partnership	 leaders	were	 strong	 organisationally.	 They	 dominated	 the	 ICTU	 Executive’s	 agenda-setting	 “General	 Purposes	 Committee”	 (GPC)	 and	 its	 NESC	 representation,	 and	used	this	position	both	to	ensure	that	John	Carroll	of	the	ITGWU	–	who	had	close	relations	 with	 Haughey	 -	 would	 be	 in	 the	 key	 position	 of	 Congress	 President	during	1986-87	when	the	likely	change	of	government	occurred,	and	to	arrange	the	1986	ICTU	conference	agenda.	Achieving	a	mandate	to	engage	with	a	future	government	was	 a	 “high-risk	 strategy”,	 entailing	what	 an	LGPSU	official	would	call	“something	of	a	palace	coup”	at	the	July	1986	ICTU	conference.32		 ICTU	 conferences	were	 four-day	affairs,	with	 a	 social	 evening	before	 a	 final,	usually	 poorly	 attended,	 morning	 session	 devoted	 to	 worthy,	 non-contentious	issues.	The	pro-partnership	group	–	Carroll,	Attley,	Murphy	and	Flynn	-	decided	to	 have	 a	 brief	 and	 seemingly	 innocuous	 motion	 on	 pay	 not	 adopted	 and	proposed	through	the	Executive,	as	would	be	normal	 for	such	an	 issue,	but	put	directly	 to	 conference	 during	 that	 sleepy	 final	 morning	 session	 as	 a	 routine	motion	 by	 the	 LGPSU.	 To	 further	 avoid	 highlighting	 its	 significance,	 Flynn																																																									32		 GPC	and	NESC	membership	in	ICTU	AR	1987;	“high	risk	strategy”,	interview	with	Cassells;	“palace	coup”,	interview	with	McLoone;	see	also	Hastings	et	al.	2007:	18	
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absented	himself	and	had	his	then	little-known	deputy,	Peter	McLoone,	propose	it	with	a	short	speech	he	had	prepared	for	him.	Flynn’s	speech	declared	that	the	traditional	union	aims	of	a	right	to	work,	decent	housing,	health	and	education,	and	 “a	 fair	 return	 for	 [their]	 labour”	 could	 be	 realised	 only	 “by	 extending	collective	bargaining	to	new	levels	through	a	series	of	national	understandings”.	The	motion	 itself	 simply	 proposed	 that	 ICTU	 seek	 “a	 return	 to	 centralised	pay	bargaining	in	the	format	of	an	annual	National	Understanding	…	ensuring	trade	union	 input	 into	 national	 planning”.	 Moved	 to	 objections	 from	 surprised	 anti-agreement	 delegates	 in	 what	 McLoone	 called	 a	 “near-empty	 hall”,	 it	 was	supported	by	Carroll	and	Murphy	and	passed.	The	leadership	had	the	mandate	it	needed	to	open	negotiations,	with	the	critical	word	“pay”	included.33			 Following	the	securing	of	the	mandate	and,	in	December	1986,	publication	of	the	NESC	report	as	a	general	election	was	increasingly	obviously	imminent,	ICTU	held	a	 “Special	Conference	on	Pay,	 Jobs	and	Taxation”	 to	strategise	 its	aims	 for	the	 series	 of	 National	 Understandings	 it	 envisaged.	 With	 the	 anti-agreement	unions	powerless	to	oppose	this	as	it	accorded	with	adopted	policy,	the	meeting	assessed	the	weaknesses	of	previous	Understandings,	deciding	that	a	monitoring	body	 would	 be	 essential	 to	 ensure	 delivery	 of	 any	 new	 agreement.	 It	 also	identified	 the	 policy	 areas	 ICTU	 should	 prioritise	 -	 summarised	 in	 A	 Plan	 for	
Work	 -	 endorsing	 the	 NESC	 report	 and	 its	 debt/GNP	 formula,	 and	 a	 tax-offset	approach	to	pay	negotiations.	10,000	copies	were	circulated	to	political	activists	nationwide	during	the	election.34				 The	context	was	a	firm	commitment	ICTU	leaders	had	secured	from	Haughey.			
The	“Haughey	Factor”	again	decisive		 Haughey,	 summarising	 his	 party’s	 history	 in	 1980,	 described	 de	 Valera’s	achievement	 as	 establishing	 the	 nation’s	 sovereignty	 and	 intellectual	 freedom,	and	 Lemass’s	 as	 an	 economically	 successful	 state	 as	 the	 substance	 of	 that	independence.	 His	 own	 political	 goal	 was	 to	 realise	 the	 economic	 success	 for	which	 Lemass’s	 “techniques	 of	 modern	 nation-building”	 had	 laid	 the	 basis.	“Harnessing”	 the	 creative	 potential	 of	 social	 forces	 such	 as	 unions	 to	 realise	 it																																																									33		 Interviews	with	McLoone,	Cassells,	Flynn;	on	“little	known”,	the	ICTU	conference	report	misnames	him	as	“McClune”!	“debate”,	ICTU	ADC	1986:	223-9;	Flynn	speech,	‘ICTU,	1986,	Res[olution]	7’,	Flynn	Papers.	34		 ICTU	AR	1987:	194	
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was	the	substance	of	“national	endeavour”.	This	was	a	consistent	position	he	had	presented	repeatedly	since	the	1960s	as	a	singularly	“pragmatic”	concept.35			 Haughey	had	sought	to	frame	his	Way	Forward	economic	plan	in	a	new	type	“social	 partnership”	 in	 autumn	 1982	 and	 before	 going	 into	 opposition	 in	December	had	again	approached	ICTU	proposing	a	National	Understanding	as	a	balanced	 programme	 combining	 financial	 adjustment,	 pay	 determination	 and	industrial	 expansion.	 FitzGerald,	 while	 not	 averse	 to	 cooperative	 policy	structures,	 considered	 tripartitism	 and	 monetary	 entrenchment	 mutually	exclusive,	 and	 suspended	 the	 former	 to	 achieve	 the	 latter,	 while	 Haughey’s	model	 remained	Germany’s	 corporatist	 approach	which	he	had	discussed	with	Helmut	Schmidt.	While	FitzGerald	 ignored	 the	 ICTU’s	December	1982	renewed	call	 for	a	“negotiated”	plan,	Haughey	had	welcomed	 it,	pointing	to	Fianna	Fáil’s	record	 of	 interventionism	 and	 describing,	 point-by-point,	 the	 compatibility	 of	
The	Way	Forward	with	Congress’s	position.	He	endorsed	its	proposals	on	public	enterprise,	sectoral	planning,	industrial	growth	based	on	natural	resources,	and	even	worker	participation.	A	recovery	strategy	could	protect	wages	and	welfare	benefits,	 he	 said,	 and	he	promised	a	 “permanent	economic	and	 social	planning	system”	founded	on	“widespread	consultation”.36		 Once	 in	 control	 of	 the	party	 following	 several	 failed	 “heaves”	 by	 opponents,	Haughey	in	opposition	in	the	mid-1980s	developed	a	programme	building	on	the	sectoral	approach	of	The	Way	Forward	and	ideas	gathered	from	unconventional	business	and	social	entrepreneurs.	He	integrated	these	into	what	he	increasingly	called	a	“programme	for	national	recovery”.	On	hearing	of	an	innovative	idea	he	would	 typically	 invite	 the	 individual	 concerned	 to	 present	 it	 and,	 if	 convinced,	adopt	 it	 as	 party	 policy.	 This	was	 the	 case	with	 Dermot	 Desmond’s	 idea	 for	 a	financial	 services	 centre	which	 the	 coalition	 had	 rejected,	 and	 Eoin	 Sweeney’s	marine	policy.	When	Sweeney,	a	 former	 ITGWU	official,	 called	 for	an	 industrial	strategy	 to	 exploit	 maritime	 resources,	 Haughey	 “summoned”	 him	 and	 after	listening	to	his	case	had	it	adopted	virtually	unchanged	as	Fianna	Fáil	policy.37		
																																																								35		 Haughey,	‘Presidential	Árd	Fheis,	16/02/80,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	327	36	 On	1982	initiatives	see	chapter	4	37	 Haughey	on	“National	Recovery”,	‘Presidential	Address	to	Árd	Fheis’,	30/03/85,	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	935,	and	in	Dáil	16/01/86;	on	Desmond	proposal,	see	chapter	8;	Sweeney,	Obituary,	Irish	Times	19.08.17		
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	 In	 1984	 Haughey	 re-committed	 to	 tripartitism:	 “We	 will	 re-establish	 in	Government	a	close	understanding	with	the	social	partners	and	secure	their	full	co-operation	 in	 achieving	 clearly	 stated	 and	 fully	 understood	 economic	 and	social	objectives”.	Following	the	coalition’s	rejection	of	arbitration	decisions	and	the	wave	of	public	sector	disputes,	he	attacked	it	for	its	“insensitive	handling”	of	industrial	 relations	 and	 failure	 to	 “win	 the	 confidence	 of	 workers	 and	 their	representatives”	or	“establish	some	understanding	of	policies	and	targets”	with	the	 unions.	 Government	 should	 revive	 the	 National	 Understanding	 or	 “devise	some	similar	kind	of	mechanism”	to	unite	employers,	unions,	expert	centres	“and	all	other	relevant	sectors	fully	behind	clearly	defined	economic	policy	objectives	…	The	full	cooperation	of	the	trade	union	movement	is	vital”.38			 This	was	consistent	with	his	approach	as	Minister	in	the	1960s	and	Taoiseach	in	 1980-82.	 For	 him,	 trade	 union	 power,	 as	 he	 had	 put	 it	 in	 1975,	 reflecting	Barbara	 Cassells’	 In	 Place	 of	 Strife	 of	 1969,	 was	 a	 “socio-political	 fact”	 to	 be	harnessed	in	a	common	plan:	“If	the	planning	process	does	not	permit	[it]	to	be	exercised	 in	 developing	 the	 economic	 system,	 we	 must	 not	 be	 surprised	 if	 it	seeks	its	own	ends	independently”.	While	he	continued	to	hold	to	his	1982	Way	
Forward	 plan,	 with	 its	 combination	 of	 monetary	 reform	 and	 state-driven	industrial	 expansion,	 he	 castigated	 FitzGerald’s	 government	 as	 “monetarist”,	 a	prisoner	 of	 “Thatcherism”	 and	 “New	 Right”	 economics	 wedded	 to	 a	 “book-keeping	ethos”.	Growing	social	polarisation	was	a	consequence	of	its	“uncaring”	policies,	but	could	be	overcome	by	a	national	“cooperative”	approach.39			 His	critique	extended	to	the	government’s	stance	on	Europe.	Before	1986	the	EEC	 had	 played	 little	 role	 in	 Irish	 economic	 development	 apart	 from	 CAP	transfers	 and	 modest	 social	 funding,	 Haughey	 describing	 it	 in	 1985	 as	 “quite	frankly	 irrelevant”	 to	 an	 Irish	 recovery.	 He	 criticised	 the	 “one-sided”	 Single	European	Act	and	Commissioner	Sutherland’s	opposition	to	Delors’	balancing	of	regional/social	 policy	 proposals:	 “Unless	 there	 is	…	meaningful	 regional	 policy	one	 can	 forget	 about	 economic	 integration	 and	 monetary	 union	 …	 	 Economic	integration	 without	 a	 proper	 redistributive	 mechanism	 is	 nineteenth	 century																																																									38	 “We	will	re-establish	…”,	‘Presidential	Address	to	Árd	Fheis’,	31/03/84,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	824;	“insensitive	handling”,	Dáil	19/12/85;	“revive	the	NU”,	Dáil	06/02/85	39		 “If	the	planning	process	…”,	speech	to	Dublin	Society	of	Chartered	Accountants,	in	Mansergh	ed.	1986:	205-6;	“Way	Forward”	combined	plan,	Dáil	01/02/84	and	14/12/84;	“monetarist”,	“New	Right”,	“Thatcherism”	etc.,	in	Dáil	10/10/84	and	‘Presidential	Address	Árd	Fheis’,	30/03/85		
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economics”.	 EEC	 policies	 played	 far	 from	 the	 central	 role	 in	 Haughey’s	 social	partnership	plans	critics	have	claimed.	His	view	of	Europe	was	epitomised	by	his	reply	 to	 Schmidt	 in	 1981	 that	 the	 EEC	 could	 not	 aspire	 to	 shape	 international	economic	affairs	as	long	as	it	had	no	economic	strategy	of	its	own.40			 Many	 union	 officials	 distrusted	 Haughey	 for	 his	 connections	 with	moneyed	interests	and	his	conservative	stance	on	social	 reforms	such	as	divorce.	But	he	saw	 himself	 as	 a	 sophisticated	 and	 subtle	 statesman	 and	 felt	 insulted	 by	 the	Leftist	 narrative	 –	 such	 as	 in	The	Boss,	 a	 book	 by	 two	 Irish	Times	 journalists	 -	portraying	 him	 as	 a	 venal,	 corrupt	 and	 even	 thuggish	 leader.	He	was	 similarly	outraged	when	a	 faux	pas	by	his	PR	“handler”,	P.J.	Mara,	who	jokingly	used	the	fascist	slogan	“Una	Duce,	una	voce!”	 to	describe	his	 leadership	style,	was	widely	reported.	Union	leaders	were	reluctant	to	engage	with	him	as	his	days	as	party	leader,	 at	 least	 until	 1984,	 seemed	 numbered,	 with	 even	 the	 Irish	 Press	publishing	a	premature	political	obituary	of	him.	The	chaos	of	the	final	months	of	his	 1982	 government,	 MacSharry’s	 expenditure	 cuts	 and	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	National	 Understanding	 had	 strengthened	 anti-agreement	 sentiment	 and	 sewn	union	distrust	of	Fianna	Fáil,	including,	critically,	on	the	ITGWU	Executive.41			 Nevertheless,	 Haughey	 had	maintained	 contact	with	 leaders	 such	 as	 Carroll	and	 Flynn	 and	 when	 ICTU	 published	 Confronting	 the	 Jobs	 Crisis,	 he	 “endorsed	fully”	its	objectives	and	expressed	his	party’s	“broad	agreement	with	the	thinking	of	Congress”,	demurring	only	over	its	reliance	on	state	enterprise	which	had	also	been	Ó	hUiginn’s	sole	criticism	of	 it	 to	FitzGerald.	Haughey	proposed	that	ICTU	meet	Fianna	Fáil’s	full	front	bench	to	discuss	it,	something	Congress	had	turned	down	in	1981	as	contrary	to	ICTU	practice,	but	this	time	accepted.	At	the	meeting	Haughey	 praised	 “the	 broad	 economic	 policy	 outlined	 in	 their	 valuable	document”	and	its	compatibility	with	Fianna	Fáil	strategy,	convincing	key	union	leaders	they	“could	do	business”	with	him	.42		 Haughey’s	 social	 partnership	 idea	 gained	 little	 traction	 with	 the	 press	 or	electorate,	 or	 even	 noticeably	 within	 Fianna	 Fáil.	 But	 he	 was	 attentive	 to	 its																																																									40		 Haughey	on	SEA,	Dáil	26/06/85;	“critics	have	claimed”,	Foster	1988,	2007;	‘Confidential.	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Chancellor	Schmidt	in	Bonn	on	31st	March	1981’,	NAI:	TAOIS/2012/90/926	41		 View	as	“statesman”,	Cronin	1997;	irritation	at	“Left”	portrayal,	Ryle	Dwyer	1996;	outraged	at	Mara,	RTÉ	2016;	“obituary”,	Irish	Press,	21/01/83;	ITGWU	distrust,	‘The	Way	Forward	to	what?’	Liberty,	Nov.	1982	42		 Haughey	in	Dáil	10/10/84;	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn]	to	FitzGerald,	28.11.1984,	‘Meeting	with	ICTU’,	DTA:	OHP;	Hastings	et	al	2007:	33;	ICTU	EC	meeting	10.12.1981	
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electoral	 aspect	 and	 in	 1983	 established	 a	 task	 force	 to	 address	 Fianna	 Fáil’s	failing	 support	 in	 Dublin	 working	 class	 areas	 where	 the	 Workers’	 Party	 was	making	 inroads.	 “Operation	Dublin”,	 led	by	Brian	Lenihan,	 re-focused	policy	 to	meet	 working	 class	 concerns	 and	 revived	 local	 Cumainn.	 Haughey	 also	established	 a	 “Committee	 on	 Trade	 Union	 Affairs”	 of	 TDs	 and	 party	 trade	unionists	 such	 as	Noreen	 Green	 and	 Tony	McKenna,	 to	 “position”	 the	 party	 in	tackling	the	“recession”.	This	was	unsurprising	given	that	many	trade	unionists	were	Fianna	Fáil	voters.	The	committee	was	chaired	by	Bertie	Ahern	and	Michael	Woods,	 the	 party’s	 labour	 and	welfare	 spokesmen,	 and	 produced	 positions	 on	issues	of	union	concern	such	as	PRSI	reform	and	industrial	training.	But	it	didn’t	pander	to	union	demands,	with	Ahern,	despite	the	on-going	union	disputes	with	government,	stressing	that	on	pubic	pay	“our	policy	…	would	likely	include	only	cost-of-living	increases	and	not	payment	of	special	awards”.43		 Haughey	 also	 used	 the	 committee	 to	 educate	 his	 own	 front	 bench.	 At	 his	direction	it	was	“lectured	to”	on	partnership	in	Europe	and	sent	on	a	“study	visit”	to	Austria	to	examine	its	“model	of	social	partnership”.	This,	Ahern	recalled,	was	because	of	Haughey’s	view	that	it	was	why	Austria	-	an	often	referenced	model	“small	open	economy”	with	a	“consensus	approach”	-	had	risen	“from	the	ashes	of	a	world	war	to	rank	well	above	the	OECD	average	on	most	indices”.	Ahern	was	also	 instructed	 to	 build	 relations	with	 union	 leaders	 and	 developed	 a	 rapport	particularly	with	Attley	of	the	FWUI,	in	which	he	himself	had	once	served,	as	well	as	 Phil	 Flynn	 of	 LGPSU	 and	 Christy	 Kirwan	 of	 ITGWU.	 He	 organised	 the	 front	bench	 meeting	 with	 ICTU	 on	 its	 Jobs	 Plan	 and	 drafted	 the	 party’s	 response	endorsing	it.	But	it	was	Haughey	himself	who	dominated	that	meeting,	and	who	also	“lunched	regularly”	with	ITGWU	President	John	Carroll,	an	austere	and	aloof	but	authoritative	 figure	 in	many	ways	resembling	him	 in	both	background	and	character.	It	was	clear	that,	whatever	the	role	of	Ahern	or	others,	under	a	Fianna	Fáil	government	tripartite	strategy	would	be	driven	from	the	top.44			 Just	 before	 the	 NESC	 report	 was	 published	 and	 with	 an	 election	 imminent,	Attley	made	a	widely	publicised	call	for	a	return	to	the	“pioneering	spirit	of	the																																																									43		 On	‘Operation	Dublin’,	New	Hibernia,	Oct.	1984	and	UCD-A:	P176/382-3;	on	trade	union	committee,	Ahern	2009:	79-82;	Ahern	quote	at	Committee	meeting,	12/12/1985,	UCD-A:	P176/393	44		 Ahern	and	Austria,	Ahern	2009:	92,	also	Interview	with	Ahern;	and	union	leaders,	Ahern	2009:	92-3,	Interviews	with	Flynn,	Cassells;	on	Carroll-Haughey	lunches,	Hastings	et	al	2007:	31;	“hammer	out	consensus”,	Interview	with	Ó	hUiginn	
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1960s”,	 lauding	 the	 “virtuous	 circle”	 of	 the	 “Nordic	 model”	 and	 advocating	 a	“national	 plan	 for	 economic	 recovery”	 agreed	 between	 government	 and	 social	partners.	 There	 was	 little	 doubt	 to	 whom	 the	 speech	 was	 addressed,	 and	Haughey	 responded	 by	 welcoming	 Attley’s	 proposal,	 stating	 that	 a	 social	partnership	 as	 in	 “Austria,	 Norway	 and	 Sweden”	 would	 be	 “an	 important	element”	 in	Fianna	Fáil’s	programme	for	recovery”.	The	ire	of	the	Labour	Party	with	 ICTU	 thus	 had	 some	 basis,	 as	 ICTU’s	 preference	 for	 the	 election	 outcome	was	now	unambiguous.	As	a	final	straw,	when	government	dismissed	the	NESC	report,	 Haughey	 turned	 on	 it	 for	 its	 selective	 treatment	 of	 it,	 saying	 “reduced	public	spending	alone	will	not	revive	the	economy”	and	emphasising	the	report’s	integrated	strategy	and	the	centrality	to	it	of	involving	the	social	partners.45			 Despite	 his	 friendships	 with	 individual	 entrepreneurs,	 Haughey’s	 relations	with	business	organisations	were	frosty,	a	majority	of	the	CII	board	supporting	FitzGerald	and	hostile	 to	a	 return	 to	Fianna	Fáil	 government.	But	he	 contacted	them	 just	 before	 the	 NESC	 report	 appeared,	 and	 over	 an	 extraordinary	 three	days	of	meetings	with	CII	officials	discussed	their	policy	proposals,	incorporating	many	 into	 his	 strategy.	 He	 also	 urged	 their	 support	 for	 social	 partnership,	suggesting	 a	 meeting	 between	 his	 front	 bench	 and	 the	 full	 CII	 board.	 This	occurred	 on	 8	 January	 1987,	 shortly	 before	 the	 budget	 that	 brought	 down	 the	FitzGerald	 government.	 The	 CII	 leaders	 cautiously	 agreed	 to	 engage	 with	 his	“consensus”	 strategy.	While	 both	 CII	 and	 FUE	 continued	 to	 espouse	monetary	orthodoxy,	they	publicly	endorsed	the	NESC	tripartite	plan	on	industrial	policy.46				 Haughey	had	set	his	hopes,	and	reputation,	on	achieving	a	complex,	high-risk	partnership	framework	for	his	recovery	strategy,	which	he	was	intent	on	despite	media	and	public	scepticism	and	divided	councils	within	business	and	unions.			
Partnership	on	principle:	Fianna	Fáil	in	the	1987	election			 Though	long	certain,	Labour	ministers	resigned	on	20	January	1987,	unwilling	to	accept	Bruton’s	final	budget,	which	as	well	as	further	public	service	cuts	and	tax	increases,	continued	the	public	pay	freeze	and	advocated	private	sector	pay																																																									45		 Hastings	et	al	2007:	34;	FUE	Bulletin	Nov.	1986;	IT	18/10/86	and	IT,	IP	14/11/86;	Attley	speech	in	
Liberty,	Nov.	1986	and	FUE	Bulletin	Nov.	1986;	Haughey,	speech	to	Fianna	Fáil,	Athlone,	17/10/86,	in	Mansergh	(ed.)	1986:	1160-61	46		 Haughey-CII	meetings,	Power	2009:	60-2;	FUE-CII	positions,	FUE	Bulletin,	Feb.	1987,	Power	2009:	61	
	 142	
being	suppressed	below	inflation.	Spring	adopted	an	“independent	programme”,	with	 “opposition	 to	 cuts”	 central	 to	 Labour’s	 manifesto,	 along	 with	 “social	partnership”.	 This	 was	 formulaic	 and	 unconvincing,	 inserted	 by	 Quinn	 on	 the	urging	of	Attley	and	Carroll,	who	had	impressed	on	him	Haughey’s	 intention	to	return	to	tripartitism	and	their	own	intention	to	cooperate	fully	with	it.	Despite	a	Labour-FG	 coalition	 being	 off	 the	 cards,	 and	 a	 campaign	 overshadowed	 by	economic	crisis,	media	reporting	concentrated	on	the	issue	of	Haughey’s	“fitness”	to	govern	and	provided	soft	support	 for	Des	O’Malley’s	new	PD	party.	Haughey	had	 long	 lost	 the	outlet	critical	 to	the	narrative	of	previous	Fianna	Fáil	 leaders,	
The	Irish	Press,	and	his	partnership	plan	barely	figured	in	the	election	coverage.47		 Fianna	 Fáil’s	 manifesto,	 Programme	 for	 National	 Recovery,	 accepted	 the	“principles”	of	the	NESC	report	and	listed	a	host	of	industrial	and	infrastructure	projects	along	with	the	economic/fiscal	strategy	of	The	Way	Forward.	Employers	and	 unions	 promoted	 opposing	 forms	 of	 tripartitism,	 with	 ICTU	 circulating	10,000	 copies	 of	 its	 partnership-orientated	 Plan	 for	 Work	 while	 employers	favoured	 a	 common	 industrial	 strategy	 only.	 Haughey’s	 manifesto	 straddled	both,	 down-playing	 the	 pay	 aspect	 but	 tilting	 towards	 ICTU:	 “The	 economic	situation	requires	us	 to	 take	a	major	step	 forward	…	to	work	together	towards	national	goals”	through	“a	 forum	in	which	the	social	partners	can	negotiate	the	terms	of	a	national	plan	based	on	agreed	medium-term	objectives”.48			 Haughey	 gained	 a	 surprising	 supporter	 during	 the	 campaign.	 Following	 a	private	meeting	at	Kinsealy,	new	Irish	Times	editor	Conor	Brady,	a	long–standing	Fine	 Gael	 supporter,	 was	 so	 impressed	 by	 Haughey’s	 economic/partnership	strategy	that	he	editorialised	favourably	on	it.	This	met	with	“outrage”	from	Irish	
Times	staff,	mostly	hostile	to	Haughey	and	inclined	to	the	PDs.	Brady	praised	the	plan’s	 coherence	 and	 noted	 IDA	 warnings	 that	 FDI	 flows	 were	 contracting	because	of	a	perception	that	Ireland	lacked	a	growth	strategy.	While	falling	short	of	urging	readers	to	vote	accordingly,	as	that	paper	had	never	advocated	support	for	 Fianna	 Fáil,	 it	 was	 a	 substantial	 endorsement	 from	 a	 surprising	 source,	though	no	doubt	informed	by	the	near	certainty	of	a	Haughey	victory.49																																																										47	 Bruton	statement,	Irish	Times	21/01/87;	Spring	position,	Irish	Times	21	and	26.01.1987;	“impress	on	Spring”,	Interview	with	Attley;		48		 ICTU	AR	1987:	194;	FUE	Bulletin,	Mar.	1987;	IT	13/03/1987;	IRN	Report,	Mar.	1987;	Fianna	Fáil	1987	49		 Brown,	T.	2015:	339-40;	Brady	2005;	Irish	Times,	editorial,	02/03/87	
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Chapter	6:	
	
Long	haul:	the	dramatic	road	to	the	“PNR”,	1987		
Government	choice	and	policy	positioning		 Haughey	was	elected	Taoiseach	on	10	March	on	the	casting	vote	of	the	Ceann	Comhairle	and	with	Tony	Gregory’s	abstention,	forming	a	minority	government	in	a	context	where	neither	the	mooted	FG/PD	coalition	nor	any	other	alternative	commanded	a	majority.	In	his	acceptance	speech,	Haughey	declared	his	intention	to	meet	with	the	NESC,	the	“principles”	of	whose	report	-	a	“consensus	…	among	the	principal	 economic	and	social	partners”	 -	was	 “consistent	with	our	view	of	what	is	required”.	But	to	public	dismay,	he	then	announced	his	priority	as	radical	expenditure	 cuts,	 continuing	 those	 of	 Bruton’s	 defeated	 budget,	 including	 its	public	 pay	 decree.	 Introducing	 a	 drastic	 budget	 on	 31	 March,	 McSharry	nevertheless	 repeated	 that	 NESC’s	 “strategy	 and	 principles”	 would	 “form	 the	basis	 for	 the	 Government's	 general	 approach”.	 It	 is	 claimed	 by	 Conor	 Lenihan	that	 McSharry	 insisted	 to	 Haughey	 on	 budget	 autonomy	 (and,	 less	 likely,	 that	Brian	Lenihan	likewise	did	on	foreign	affairs),	but	this	had	long	been	Haughey’s	perspective	anyway.	MacSharry,	it	might	be	noted,	was	an	insider	on	Haughey’s	small	team	and	had	played	an	identical	role	in	his	1982	government	strategy.1		 Minority	government	had	advantages	for	a	strategy	of	financial	retrenchment.	As	Fine	Gael	and	the	PDs	shared	this	principle,	and	FitzGerald,	and	later	Dukes,	committed	 to	 support	 Haughey	 in	 continuing	 their	 budget	 policy,	 clientelist	pressures	 could	 be	 kept	 at	 bay.	 Haughey	 praised	 FitzGerald	 for	 the	 difficult	decisions	he	had	taken	when,	as	he	put	it,	the	state	had	few	other	options.	But	he	planned	 achieving	 monetary	 stabilisation	 and	 growth	 through	 an	 alternative	route	that	eschewed	“Thatcherism”	in	favour	of	a	social	“consensus”	strategy.			 Given	 Haughey’s	 repeated	 commitment	 to	 such	 a	 course,	 it	 is	 striking	 that	while	he	would	engage	with	 the	 “social	partners”	 from	 the	 start,	 it	would	be	a	year	before	an	agreed	programme	would	be	in	place.																																																													1		MacSharry	in	Dáil	31/03/1987;	insisted	to	Haughey,	Lenihan	2015;	“praised	FitzGerald”,	Dáil	10/03/87	
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First	step:	Haughey	engages	the	social	partners			 Haughey	delayed	his	announced	meeting	with	the	NESC.	Before	the	change	of	government,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 had	 had	 the	 NESC	 agree	 to	 invite	 the	 “incoming	Taoiseach”	to	meet	it	to	discuss	its	report	and	seek	a	strategic	role	“elaborating”	the	“National	Plan”.	Haughey	on	becoming	Taoiseach	had	accepted	the	invitation	and	a	meeting	was	initially	set	for	April.	But,	following	discussions	with	Cassells,	Ó	 hUiginn’s	 advised	 a	 delay	 to	 accommodate	 ICTU.	 Congress	 feared	 talks	 in	 a	tripartite	 setting	 would	 put	 it	 “at	 a	 disadvantage	 since	 it	 can	 be	 assumed	 the	other	parties	would	form	a	united	front”	against	it,	and	also	sought	an	agreement	structure	determined	by	ICTU	and	government	before	involving	other	partners.2			 Congress	 proved	 equally	 accommodating	 to	 government.	 Despite	 public	outcry	 over	 the	 budget,	 ICTU	 only	mildly	 criticised	 it,	 expressing	 its	 “extreme	disappointment”	 at	 the	 “savage	 cuts”,	 but	 the	 same	 day	 wrote	 to	 Haughey	seeking	talks	“on	all	aspects	of	the	economic	situation	…	to	devise	a	national	plan	for	growth	and	economic	recovery”	along	NESC	lines.	Haughey	of	course	agreed,	publicly	 down-playing	 it	 in	 the	 Dáil	 as	 routine	 “consultation	 with	 the	 social	partners	at	least	on	economic	and	social	objectives”.	But	he	warned	that	without	pay	 restraint	 “major	 lay-offs”	 in	 the	 public	 service	 were	 inevitable.	 ICTU	 put	down	a	marker	by	insisting	both	public	and	private	sector	pay	form	“an	integral	part	of	an	agreed	national	programme	of	economic	and	social	priorities”.3		 Ó	hUiginn	agreed	with	Congress	on	principles	and	structures	for	negotiations	before	engaging	other	partners.	ICTU	insisted	that	any	“negotiated	national	plan”	be	driven	centrally	from	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	to	ensure	control	from	the	 top	 and	 that	 it	 adopt	NESC’s	 “four-part”	 strategy	 approach	with	 integrated	macro-economic,	 industrial,	 tax	 and	 social	 policies,	 from	which	 “pay	 questions	cannot	be	divorced”.	Bilateral	“working	parties”	chaired	by	the	Department	and	involving,	at	a	minimum,	secretary-level	officials	should	develop	the	detail	and	a																																																											2		 NESC	Council	Meetings	23.02,	and	24.04.87,	also	Council	Meeting	24.043.87	‘Note	from	Secretariat’;	Secretary	[Ó	hUigin]	to	Taoiseach,	13/04/1987,	‘Subject:	Meeting	with	ICTU’,	DTA-OHP;	Cassells,	‘Brief	for	General	Purposes	Committee	re	Discussions	with	Taoiseach’,	13/04/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a			3		 ‘Budget	Statement’,	01/04/87,	in	ICTU	Annual	Report	1987:	206;	Carroll	(Pres.	ICTU)	to	Taoiseach	01.04.87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	Haughey	in	Dáil	07	and	08/04/1987;	‘Leading	trade	unionist	urges	new	approach	on	public	pay’,	IT	11/04/1987	
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“Ministerial-ICTU	Working	Group”	deal	with	pay	and	agree	the	final	plan.	ICTU’s	insistence	on	this	structure	was	because	of	its	experience	of	senior	civil	servants	in	1980-82	as	uncooperative	and	given	 to	 “blocking	 tactics”,	and	 their	 “general	contempt	for	unions”	during	the	FitzGerald	years.	It	was	a	perception	Haughey’s	circle	shared.	When	Ahern,	now	Minister	 for	Labour,	 told	officials	of	Haughey’s	plans	for	social	partnership,	they	advised	him	to	“stay	away	from	it”.4			 Haughey	himself	 faced	considerable	resistance	from	senior	officials	who	had	resented	his	centralisation	of	power	in	the	Taoiseach’s	Department	in	1980-82.	Enda	Delaney,	a	new	recruit	to	Foreign	Affairs,	described	how,	on	taking	up	his	post	 in	 early	 1987	 he	 encountered	 “an	 incendiary	 group	 of	 embittered	 senior	officials	 …	 plotting	 against	 [Haughey]”	 and	 “drawing	 up	 ‘Documents	 of	Resistance’”.	They	resented	his	moving	responsibility	for	European	and	Northern	policy	 from	 their	 Department	 to	 Taoiseach’s,	 as	 he	 had	 also	 done	 with	 socio-economic	policy	 in	1981.	Haughey	would	continue	 to	 face	 resistance	 from	civil	service	circles,	necessitating	a	tight	central	government	group.5			 Internally,	Cassells,	who	spoke	regularly	with	Ó	hUiginn,	recommended	that	in	the	talks	ICTU	“recognise	and	accept	the	necessity	for	pay	restraint/moderation	given	 the	 difficult	 competitive	 position	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 the	 acute	Exchequer	financial	problems”.	This	would	“persuade	Government	to	engage	in	meaningful	 discussions	 on	 public	 service	 pay”.	 A	 period	 of	 budget	 autonomy	followed	by	a	2-year	agreement	would	“help	get	[us]	out	from	under”	the	budget	pay	deferral	and	build	a	positive	framework	for	future	pay	development.6		 Government	also	had	a	strategy,	part	of	which,	despite	Haughey	understating	it	 in	 the	 Dáil,	 was	 engaging	 the	 social	 partners	 early	 to	 avoid	 the	mistakes	 of	1982.	 In	preparing	for	Haughey’s	meeting	with	ICTU,	Ó	hUiginn	advised	him	to	commit	 to	 the	 NESC	 principles	 and	 structures	 Congress	 sought	 but	 stress	 the	centrality	of	NESC’s	debt/GNP	formula,	which	was	“so	realistic	in	its	approach	to	the	 public	 finances”,	 its	 prioritising	 of	 the	 exporting	 and	 FDI	 sectors	 as	 the	“locomotives	 of	 growth”,	 and	 its	 tax/pay	 formula.	 “It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 union																																																											4		 H/w	note:	‘President	of	Congress	and	reps.	of	EC’	[for	mtg.	15/04],	and	“Brief	for	General	Purposes	Committee	re	Discussions	with	Taoiseach’,	13/04/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	‘Joint	Government-ICTU	Press	Statement’,	15.04.1987,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	Ahern	in	Hastings	et	al	2007:	22-3,	33-4	and	Interview	with	Bertie	Ahern			5		 Delaney	(2001),	Accidental	Diplomat:	1-3				6		 ‘Brief	for	General	Purposes	Committee.	Discussions	with	Taoiseach’,	13/04/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a	
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leaders	 want	 to	 be	 involved	 …	 A	 Plan	 will	 take	 them	 off	 a	 number	 of	 hooks,	particularly	the	evolution	of	public	sector	pay	over	the	next	few	years”.	Tax	was	also	the	key	to	involving	business	interests.	The	“prospects	of	such	a	consensus	Plan,	given	the	NESC	basis,	are	excellent”	and	“would	be	a	great	achievement”.7			 Ó	hUiginn	also	urged	Haughey	to	accept	the	“institutional	mechanisms”	ICTU	proposed	for	the	talks	-	the	policy	“working	parties”	chaired	by	his	Department	and	 only	 secretary-level	 civil	 service	 involvement,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 “Ministerial-ICTU	 Working	 Group”,	 chaired	 by	 Haughey	 himself.	 Just	 before	 the	 meeting,	Cassells	told	Ó	hUiginn	that	ICTU’s	main	concern	was	how	serious	Haughey	was	regarding	the	“integrated”	 four-part	NESC	strategy,	while	Haughey	told	him	his	concern	 was	 how	 serious	 ICTU	 was	 on	 debt	 reduction.	 Two	 intense	meetings	followed	on	15	 and	29	April	 clarifying	 these	 issues,	 at	which	Congress	 leaders	stressed	their	commitment	to	reducing	the	debt	and	Haughey	committed	to	the	NESC	framework	and	the	“institutional	arrangements”	ICTU	proposed.8		 It	was	 clear	 from	 these	meetings	 that	 the	agreement	would	not	be	a	1970s-style	 “redistributive”	 one,	 but	 instead	 involve	 monetary	 retrenchment	 and	industrial	 growth	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 NESC	 plan,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 trade-off	 of	 pay	restraint	for	job	creation,	tax	and	social	reform.	The	key	moment	came	when,	as	Cassells	 had	 intimated	 to	 ICTU	 beforehand,	 Haughey	 said	 they	 would	 have	 to	“envisage	[an	initial]	period	of	time”	to	“enable	the	Exchequer	finances	to	be	put	in	order”	and	the	EBR	“reduced	to	a	sustainable	level”.	A	Programme	could	then	be	 ready	 for	agreeing	 in	September.	While	 ICTU	agreed	 to	 this,	Carroll	warned	that	publicly	ICTU	would	have	to	continue	opposing	health	cuts	and	the	retention	of	 Bruton’s	 public	 pay	 freeze.	 But	 Haughey	 agreed	 to	 try	 to	 get	 employers	 to	include	a	national	private	sector	pay	deal	within	the	agreement,	and	the	meeting	agreed	a	target	date	of	September.	Ó	hUiginn	was	confident	 that	with	 the	ICTU	committed,	other	partners	would	have	little	other	option	but	to	follow.9																																																												7		 Secretary	[Ó	hUigin]	to	Taoiseach,	13/04/1987,	‘Subject:	Meeting	with	ICTU’,	DTA-OHP				8		 ICTU	strategy,	‘Brief	for	General	Purposes	Committee	re	Discussions	with	Taoiseach’,	13/04/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	Ó	hUiginn	advice,	Secretary	[Ó	hUigin]	to	Taoiseach,	28/04/1987,	‘Government/ICTU’	and	‘Mechanisms	for	Implementing	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery’,	DTA-OHP;	on	NESC	structure	and	debt,	interview	with	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn	and	Hastings	et	al	2007:	36;	on	meeting	outcomes,	Cassells	to	ICTU	EC,	‘Discussions	with	the	Taoiseach	on	a	National	Plan	for	Growth	and	Economic	Recovery.	Report	of	Meeting	on	29	April	1987’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a	and	‘Joint	Government/ICTU	Press	Statement’,	29/04/1987,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach			9	 “enable	the	Exchequer”,	‘Statement	by	Taoiseach	at	the	meeting	with	ICTU’,	15.04.1987,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	discussion,	Cassells	to	EC,	‘Discussions	with	the	Taoiseach	on	a	National	Plan	for	Growth	and	
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	 Having	prioritised	agreeing	a	 framework	with	the	unions,	Haughey	now	met	the	other	partners	to	bring	them	into	the	process,	starting	with	the	construction	industry,	 the	 CIF,	 on	 30	 April.	 Though	 opposed	 to	 national	 agreements	 and	minimum	wage	setting,	CIF	more	than	any	sector	was	dependent	on	government	capital	 programmes,	 a	 point	Haughey	 exploited.	He	 chided	 their	 infrastructure	proposals	as	“not	ambitious	enough”	and	they	quickly	committed	to	engage	with	his	 more	 audacious	 plan.	 A	 joint	 CIF-Departmental	 “working	 party”	 was	established,	 though	 with	 the	 Department	 of	 the	 Environment	 rather	 than	 the	Taoiseach	as	was	the	case	with	the	privileged	ICTU.10			 On	7	May	Haughey	met	farming	groups.	Given	his	history	of	conflict	with	the	IFA,	he	had	ensured	a	wider	grouping	was	 involved,	 including	dairy	producers	(ICMSA),	 the	 coop	 industries	 (ICOS)	 and,	 to	 the	 delight	 of	 Agriculture	Minister	Walsh,	the	“progressive”	young	commercial	farmers	of	Macra	na	Féirme.	IFA	had	welcomed	 the	 NESC	 report,	 its	 President,	 Joe	 Rea,	 praising	 its	 expenditure	targets	and	 food	 industry	ambitions.	He	had	called	on	all	parties	 to	 “put	aside”	their	 antipathy	 to	 Haughey	 and	 support	 him	 in	 implementing	 it.	 But	 Rea	 now	pressed	Haughey	for	a	“strong	line	on	[the]	EEC”	to	counter	threats	to	CAP	and	presented	a	 list	of	 IFA	grant-seeking	demands,	which	he	described	as	 the	 IFA’s	“development	 proposals”.	 Before	 the	 meeting,	 officials	 bemoaned	 the	 poor	economic	performance	of	 farming	and	 the	 IFA’s	superficial	endorsement	of	 the	NESC	 report:	 “This	 line,	 set	 out	 in	 the	 forward	 to	 the	 IFA	 proposals”,	 Finance	noted,	“is	in	contrast	to	the	policy	proposals	which	follow”,	which	would	involve	“substantial	outlay”	by	the	exchequer	and	“must	be	rejected”.11			 The	 IFA	 pressed	 their	 shopping	 list	 on	Haughey,	which	 he	 deftly	 evaded	 by	welcoming	 their	 endorsement	 of	 the	 NESC	 report	 with	 its	 strategy	 for	commercialising	 farming.	He	re-stated	his	goal	of	 transforming	agriculture	 into	an	 entrepreneurial,	 export-led	 and	 consumer-oriented	 sector	 by	 up-grading	product	 quality,	 farmer	 training	 and	 marketing.	 He	 side-stepped	 demands	 for																																																																																																																																																															Economic	Recovery.	Report	of	Meeting	on	29	April	1987’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	concessions	and	private	sector	pay,	Secretary	[Ó	hUigin]	to	Taoiseach,	13/04/1987,	‘Meeting	with	ICTU’,	DTA-OHP	10		 Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	30/04/87,	‘Meeting	with	CIF’,	DTA:	OHP	11		 ‘Meeting	with	ICMSA/ICOS	7th	May	1987’,	Fergus	O’Farrell,	chief	executive,	Macra	na	Féirme	to	Taoiseach,	16/04/87,	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	hand-written	note,	‘farm	bodies’,	01/05/87,	DTA:	S25861-A;	‘Rea	calls	for	decisive	rule’,	IT	02/03/87;	IFA	(1987);	Joe	Rea	to	‘Mr.	Haughey’,	02/03/87,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Meeting	with	ICMSA/ICOS	7th	May	1987’,	F.	Coleman,	D/Finance	to	P	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	06/05/87:	‘Brief	for	meeting	of	Taoiseach	with	IFA,	7	May	1987’,	DTA:	S25861A	
	 148	
wider	 grant	 schemes	 by	 suggesting	 the	 IFA	 pursue	 them	 and	 other	 ideas	 in	 a	joint	Working	Party	with	the	Department	of	Agriculture,	to	which	they	agreed.12			 Finally	he	met	business	and	employer	leaders	on	14	May.	They	were,	as	ever,	divided	 on	 priorities.	 While	 what	 Ahern	 called	 the	 “big	 boys”	 of	 the	 CII	 were	eager	 to	 progress	 proposals	 they	 had	 discussed	 with	 Haughey	 before	 the	election,	 the	 “small	 boys”	 of	 the	 FUE	 remained	 truculent.	 They	 had	 endorsed	NESC	 strategy	 but	 opposed	 any	 return	 to	 “National	 Understandings”,	 as	 they	again	repeated	at	the	meeting.	Ó	hUiginn	advised	Haughey	to	focus	on	industrial	policy	and	leave	pay	to	be	dealt	with	later	at	“Ministerial	CII-FUE	Group	level”.13			 Although	the	FUE’s	insistence	on	excluding	pay	was	a	challenge	for	Haughey,	he	 was	 not	 overly	 perturbed	 despite	 his	 promise	 to	 ICTU	 to	 try	 to	 ensure	 its	inclusion.	Finance,	never	enthusiasts	for	“Understandings”,	had	advised	him	the	differences	 between	 the	 ICTU	 and	 FUE	 on	 pay	 made	 “the	 achievement	 of	 a	central	 deal	well	 nigh	 impossible”,	 and	 typically	 recommended	 that	 he	 control	public	 pay	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 FitzGerald	 government	 and	 hope	 this	 set	 the	pace	for	the	private	sector.	But	it	was	also	a	growing	public	perception,	with	the	
IRN	believing	an	agreement	on	industrial	policy	“without	a	national	pay	deal”	the	most	 likely	 outcome.	 For	 Haughey	 the	 pay	 stand-off	 provided	 more	 time	 for	government	planning	without	having	to	confront	the	 issue	yet.	He	told	the	Dáil	the	talks	underway	were	on	a	“medium-term	programme	based	on	the	principles	recommended	 by	 NESC”	 and	 should	 not	 be	 “confused”	 with	 pay	 negotiations.	Government	would	 “adhere	 to	 [the]	 strategy	 of	 the	 budget”,	 including	 on	 pay,	and	budget	policy	would	remain	“a	matter	for	the	Government”.14		 Before	meeting	the	FUE/CII,	Haughey	had	agreed	to	accept	employers’	views	on	pay	while	encouraging	them	to	engage	with	the	recovery	plan,	with	pay	to	be	“revisited”.	At	 the	meeting	 they	confirmed	their	support	 for	 the	NESC	plan	and	agreed	to	work	with	government	on	“industrial	development	strategy,	industrial	promotion,	 productive	 infrastructure,	 taxation	 and	 industrial	 input	 costs”	 to																																																									12		 ‘Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	IFA	on	Monday	27	April	1987’,	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	06/05/87,	re	‘Meeting	with	IFA,	ICMSA/	Macra	na	Féirme’,	‘Statement	by	the	Taoiseach	at	meeting	with	Presidents	and	representatives	of	the	IFA,	ICMSA,	ICOS	and	Macra	na	Féirme	on	7	May	1987’,	DTA:	S25861-A;	IFA,	
National	Recovery.	The	Role	of	Agriculture	and	Food	13	 “big	boys”,	Ahern	in	McGinley	1997;	FUE	Bulletin,	Feb.	1987;	‘Search	for	Consensus’	(editorial),	IT	13/03/87;	FUE	‘Press	Release’,	15/04/87;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Haughey.	‘CII/FUE	Mtg.’,	14/05/87,	DTA:	S25875		14		 D/Finance.	‘Briefings	for	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	the	CII/FUE’,	26/04/87,	DTA:	S25875;	IRN	Report	21/05/87;	Haughey	in	Dáil	28/04/1987	
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make	 industry	 “competitive	 internationally”.	 Three	 CII-FUE	 “working	 parties”	were	 established	 with	 the	 Department	 of	 I&C,	 on	 “Employment-Development	Measures”,	 “Social	 Policy”	 and	 “Environment	 for	 Enterprise”.	 On	 industrial	policy,	CII	was	very	much	in	the	driving	seat	on	the	employer/business	side.15	
	
Blunt	talk:	Haughey’s	three-stage	strategy		 Haughey	 had	 a	 clear	 three-stage	 monetary-industrial-partnership	 plan.	Engaging	 the	 “partners”	 in	 protracted	 planning	 gave	 him	 space	 to	 implement	radical	 monetary	 adjustment	 while	 integrating	 the	 major	 social	 forces	 by	involving	them	in	the	detail	of	what	could	be	committed	to.	He	avoided	repeating	his	mistakes	of	1982	by	making	it	clear	to	the	unions	that	this	was	how	he	would	proceed,	 but	 also	 promising	 to	 achieve	 an	 agreed	 integrated	 recovery	 plan	 by	September.	What	they	did	not	know	was	his	determination	also	to	pre-determine	aspects	of	that	plan	by	proceeding	immediately	with	industrial	initiatives.		 Haughey	would	later	state	the	view	that	real	political	power	rested	not	in	the	party	 or	 on	 the	 backbenches,	 but	 in	 cabinet.	 An	 authoritative	 Taoiseach	managing	 a	 cabinet	 united	 on	 a	 clear	 strategy	 could	 marshal	 the	 support	 of	backbenchers	and	party.	While	geographic	factors	were	unavoidable	in	forming	a	government,	 the	 key	 figures	 must	 be	 able	 for	 the	 task.	 Irish	 politics	 were	constrained	 by	 PR	 and	 multi-seat	 constituencies,	 exaggerating	 clientelist	influences,	but	a	strong	cabinet	could	overcome	these.	In	a	small	country,	“where	you	 sort	 of	 know	 everyone	 well”,	 personalities	 and	 connections	 were	 vital	 in	strategy	 building	 and	 implementation.	 Fianna	 Fáil	 would	 unite	 behind	government	once	convinced	 it	was	advancing	 the	national	welfare.	These	were	principles	he	followed	in	asserting	his	authority	over	government	in	1987.16		 Haughey	first	moved	to	establish	his	authority	over	government	and	his	own	ministers.	He	reinstated	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	to	a	commanding	role,	elevating	its	Secretary,	Ó	hUiginn,	to	the	centre	of	government	and	investing	him	with	 “plenipotentiary	powers”	 to	 re-organise	departments,	 integrate	agencies	 -	particularly	the	IDA	-	in	the	planning	process,	and	ensure	ministers’	compliance.																																																									15		 “revisited”,	[Ó	hUiginn],	hand-written	note,	‘CII/FUE	Mtg.	19/5/87’,	DTA:	S25875;	‘Joint	Government-FUE/CII	Statement’,	14/05/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	‘Discussions	with	Social	Partners	on	National	Programme	for	Growth	and	Economic	Recovery’	n.d.,	DTA:	S25281-E;	D/Finance:	‘Briefings	for	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	the	CII/FUE	26/04/87’,	DTA:	S25875	16		 Interview	Haughey,	2005	
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He	 formed	 an	 inner	 cabinet	 of	 himself,	 MacSharry	 and	 Ahern	 to	 work	 with	 Ó	hUiginn	 in	 driving	 policy.	 It	 was	 largely	 the	 same	 group,	 strengthened	 by	 the	union-friendly	Ahern,	that	had	produced	the	Way	Forward	in	1982,	a	“cabal”	he	had	previously	 attempted	but	 failed	 fully	 to	 achieve	 in	1982,	 and	which	Ahern	and	Cowan	would	later	replicate	in	their	governments.17		 The	new	strategy	was	driven	home	to	ministers	at	a	meeting	on	13	April,	the	day	 before	 Haughey’s	 first	 meeting	 with	 ICTU.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 circulated	 a	 memo	synthesising	Haughey’s	priorities.	Monetary	autonomy	was	essential	for	the	first	year	 and	 ministers	 were	 to	 report,	 on	 a	 monthly	 basis,	 their	 progress	 in	achieving	 targets	 and,	 to	 relieve	 interest	 rate	 pressures,	 postpone	 spending	plans.	Ministers	of	state,	meanwhile,	were	to	develop	“quick	practical	action	on	development	proposals”,	“fleshed	out	urgently”	with	the	IDA.	All	such	initiatives	were	 to	 be	 tailored	 to	 fit	 with	 a	 later	 negotiated	 social	 partnership	 plan	 and,	while	kept	strictly	within	current	resources,	should	emphasise	their	employment	potential,	a	“key	input	into	the	discussion	on	a	Plan	with	the	social	partners”.	The	Departments	of	Education,	Labour,	Health	and	Welfare	were	to	develop	low-cost	reforms	reflecting	NESC	priorities	that	could	be	implemented	immediately,	such	as	 moving	 from	 institutional	 to	 community	 care	 in	 health,	 job-friendly	 school	curriculum	 reforms,	 social	 employment	 initiatives	 in	 place	 of	 “ephemeral”	training,	and	reforming	welfare	 to	benefit	 “lower-incomes,	bring	greater	equity	and	reduce	costs”.	On	tax,	Finance	was	to	plan	for	two	thirds	of	workers	to	move	to	 the	 standard	 tax	 rate	over	a	 series	of	budgets,	 a	key	manifesto	 commitment	and	 “quid	 pro	 quo	 for	 pay	 restraint”.	 On	 industry,	 state	 supports	 were	 to	 be	redirected	 from	 fixed	 assets	 to	marketing	 and	modernization,	 and	 the	 Finance	Act	 should	 include	 provisions	 to	 encourage	 multinationals	 to	 re-invest,	 as	currently	“most	of	them	keep	their	funds	off-shore”.	McSharry	was	to	prepare	a	1988	“budget	profile”	as	a	“key	to	the	Plan	discussions”,	encompassing	spending	reductions	 but	 also	making	 “a	 start	 on	 PAYE	 tax	 concessions	 etc.”	 to	 facilitate	“social	 partner	 agreement	 to	 changes”.	 All	 measures	 were	 to	 be	 complete	 by	
																																																								17		 Cruinniú	Rialtais,	13/03/87,	‘Changes	in	Governmental	Structure’,	DTA-OHP;	on	inner	cabinet	group,	MacSharry	and	White	2000:	43-5;	on	the	Ahern	and	Cowan	cabinet	“cabals”,	O’Riain	2014	
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September,	 which,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 told	 Haughey,	 would	 put	 him	 “in	 a	 very	 strong	political	position”	in	securing	a	partnership	deal.18		 Ministers	 were	 ordered	 to	 report	 to	 a	meeting	with	MacSharry	 by	 22	May,	after	which	expenditure	decisions	by	the	core	cabinet	would	 issue	on	a	weekly	basis.	Proposals	were	to	involve	“radical”	cuts,	“the	elimination	or	reduction”	of	programmes,	 “rooting	 out	 overlaps	 and	 duplications”,	 and	 “the	 disposal	 of	physical	assets	that	are	no	longer	productively	used”.	A	final	programme	was	to	be	 ready	 by	 September	 for	 discussion	with	 the	 “social	 partners”.	 Haughey	 did	“not	want	a	 series	of	 justifications	of	 the	 status	quo	or	 special	pleadings”.	This	clear	 if	 somewhat	humiliating	message	 to	ministers	was	deliberately	 leaked	 to	the	media	to	add	further	pressure	and	signal	government’s	determination.19		 Haughey	even	acted	to	slow	down	the	working-party	policy	process	with	the	social	partners,	first	delaying	appointing	them.	On	21	May	Ó	hUiginn	instructed	officials	 to	 treat	 the	 “working	groups”	 for	 the	moment	 as	purely	 “exploratory”,	gather	 “costed”	 proposals	 for	 later	 consideration	 at	 “Ministerial-social	 partner	level”	 but	 “without	 prejudice	 to	 decisions	 at	 that	 level	 and	 clearly	 subject	 to	budgetary	 constraints”.	 The	 framework	 for	 an	 eventual	 plan	 would	 be	 the	“emerging	 macro-economic	 and	 budgetary	 scenarios	 for	 1988	 and	 the	 years	beyond,	to	be	agreed	by	Government	on	a	submission	next	week	by	the	Minister	for	Finance”,	and	then	“put	to	the	social	partners	as	the	framework”.20			 In	 another	 move,	 possibly	 both	 to	 put	 ICTU	 on	 the	 defensive	 and	 deflect	opposition	criticism	of	a	revived	tripartitism,	Tánaiste	Lenihan	told	the	Dáil	that	ICTU’s	 engagement	 reflected	 its	 “agreement”	 to	 continuing	 the	 previous	government’s	public	pay	policy.	Government	was	determined	“to	get	order	into	the	public	sector”	which	was	why	it	had	agreed	“these	working	committees”	with	ICTU,	with	 private	 sector	 pay	 a	 purely	 “separate	 operation”.	 An	 alarmed	 ICTU,	who	 Lenihan	 had	 portrayed	 as	 hapless	 collaborators,	 demanded	 that	 Haughey	distance	himself	from	Lenihan’s	comments,	which	he	promptly	but	tactfully	did	in	a	statement	to	the	Dáil.	With	ICTU	on	the	defensive	over	its	engagement	with	
																																																								18		 Secretary	[Ó	hUigin]	to	Taoiseach,	13/04/1987,	‘Subject:	Meeting	of	Ministers’,	DTA-OHP	19		 Taoiseach	to	all	Ministers,	13/05/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	on	leaks	to	the	press,	Bew,	Hazelkorn	and	Patterson	1989	and	‘Bombshell’	(editorial),	IT	27/05/1987	20		 Ó	hUiginn	to	Paddy	Mullarkey,	D/Finance,	21/05/87	[with	h/w	note:	“letters	in	similar	terms”	issued	to	Secs.	of	all	relevant	Departments],	DTA:	S25281-E	
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government,	 the	 weekly	 announcements	 of	 drastic	 cuts	 continued	 into	 the	summer.	They	met	with	growing	unrest	 in	 the	public	service,	especially	health,	and	opposition	in	the	Dáil,	but	widespread	media	approval.21			 Government	thus	moved	simultaneously	on	monetary	planning	and	a	parallel	process	of	 industrial	policy	initiatives	while	also	engaging	the	“social	partners”.	The	approach	was	agreed	at	an	inner	cabinet	meeting	on	27	April,	just	days	after	Haughey’s	 second	 meeting	 with	 ICTU.	 The	 cabinet	 meeting	 was	 attended	 by	agency	officials,	notably	Pádraic	White	of	the	IDA,	and	reviewed	industrial	policy	options	compiled	from	various	Ministers’	reports	by	Ó	hUiginn’s	staff.		 The	review	described	the	performance	of	indigenous	industry	as	“disastrous”,	its	“management,	marketing	and	product	development	…	poor”,	domestic	market	share	 down	 “sharply”,	 investment	 down	 by	 two	 thirds	 since	 1980,	 and	employment	a	third	since	“we	joined	the	EEC”.	Despite	1960s	planning,	 Ireland	had	 failed	 “in	 creating	 strong	 indigenous	 companies	 based	 on	 our	 natural	resources”	and	companies	remained	“production	rather	than	market	led”.	Dairy	coops,	for	example,	with	“large	unwieldy	boards	dominated	by	production	rather	than	 market	 interests”,	 were	 performing	 poorly	 commercially.	 Policies	prioritising	 indigenous	 industry	had	to	be	“called	 into	question”	and	 incentives	redirected	and	 “concentrated	on	 fewer	 firms	with	high	growth	potential	 to	 the	exclusion	 or	 benign	neglect	 of	many	 small	 firms	which	 soak	up	 a	 good	deal	 of	time,	 effort	 and	 resources	 of	 the	 State	 with	 little	 return”.	 But	 internationally	traded	 FDI	 had	 proved	 uniquely	 successful,	 greatly	 outperforming	 domestic	industry	 and	 providing	 high	 quality	 jobs,	 linkages	 to	 the	 economy	 and	 know-how,	 and	was	an	 “area	of	 growing	opportunity	 suitable	 to	our	highly-educated	work-force”.		“A	shift	of	resources	to	this	area”,	it	concluded,	“is	justified”.			 To	drive	the	policy	shift,	state	agencies	were	to	be	rationalised	and	supports	re-directed	to	growth	sectors	on	a	“company	development	plan”	basis.	Supports	should	 shift	 from	 fixed	assets	 to	marketing,	 upgrading	 technology	and	product	
																																																								21		 Lenihan	in	Dáil	debates	21/05/1987;	ICTU	EC	meeting	20/05/87;	Nevin	to	Haughey,	21/05/87,	and	Nevin	to	EC	members,	05.06.87	‘ref.	1030’,	GS-PA-1a;	Haughey’s	“tactful”	statement	in	Dáil	27/05/87;	“opposition”,	in	Dáil	04/06/87;	“media	approval”,	IT	editorials,	27/05,	and	04,	26/06/1987	
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development.	 International	 and	 financial	 services,	 and	 natural-resource	 based	exporting	firms	with	growth	potential	should	be	“selected”	and	assisted.22		 This	 reflected	NESC	 proposals,	 though	 in	much	 starker	 language,	 as	well	 as	IDA	 thinking,	 especially	 its	 robust	 defence	 of	 the	 FDI	 sector	 against	 Telesis’s	criticisms.	 The	 targets	 identified	 revealed	 Haughey	 own	 preferences	 and	Departments	were	given	two	weeks	to	come	up	with	appropriate	costed	plans.		 On	 26	May	 Haughey	 publicly	 announced	 several	 major	 projects	 to	 proceed	immediately,	notably	 the	 financial	 services	centre	(IFSC),	expansion	of	 the	beef	industry,	 a	 commercially	 funded	 gas	 pipeline,	 and	 initiatives	 in	 forestry,	horticulture,	 tourism	 and	 maritime	 policy,	 again	 all	 private-sector	 driven.	 By	playing	down	the	partnership	“working	parties”	but	announcing	these	initiatives,	he	was	pre-determining	the	thrust	of	industrial	strategy.23		 Government	 also	 proceeded	 with	 a	 policy	 to	 radically	 commercialise	 the	farming	 sector.	 Responsibility	 for	 the	 food	 industry	was	moved	 from	 Industry	and	Commerce	to	an	expanded	Department	of	“Agriculture	and	Food”,	which	was	henceforth	 to	 be	 industry-	 rather	 than	 producer-driven,	 and	 a	 horticultural	marketing	board,	Bord	Glas,	was	 established.	A	plan	 for	 the	 food	 industry	was	produced	by	IDA	in	its	first	ever	collaboration	with	that	Department.24	
	
Broad	base:	mobilising	social	partner	input		 Having	 achieved	 budgetary	 breathing	 space,	 and	 with	 the	 MacSharry	Committee	 driving	 expenditure	 cuts	 and	 the	 Way	 Forward	 team	 industrial	strategy,	Haughey	returned	to	the	talks	with	the	social	partners.		 Given	the	rolling	cuts,	ICTU	faced	growing	internal	dissent.	Disputes	erupted	in	 the	 ESB,	 the	 new	 training	 agency	 FÁS,	 CIÉ	 and	 other	 public	 bodies,	 and	 a	campaign	 of	 non-compliance	 was	 launched	 by	 an	 “Alliance	 of	 Health	 Service	Unions”	 led	 by	 ambitious	 ITGWU	 official,	 Pat	 Rabbitte.	 Congress	 found	 itself	managing	 these	 revolts	while	 facing	 a	 government	 determined	 on	 a	 continued	suspension	of	special	awards,	and	public	pay	guidelines	stipulating	cost-of-living																																																									22		 Ó	hUiginn	to	Haughey,	n.d.,	with	memo	by	John	Travers,	‘Presentation	to	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance	and	Labour	on	April	27th	on	Industrial	Policy’,	DTA-OHP	23		 Haughey	in	Dáil	debates	24	and	/05/1987;	Press	Release,	‘Office	of	the	Taoiseach’	[no	title	–	announcing	initiatives],	26/04/1987,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	24		 “first	ever”,	Joe	Walsh,	Minister	for	Agriculture,	to	Taoiseach	16/04/87,	and	‘Draft	of	Government	Minutes’,	23.4.87,	‘Bord	Glas’,	in	DTA:	OHP;	IDA	Ireland	(1987)	
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increases	 only,	 “tailored	 to	 EBR	 goals”.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 also	 insisted	 to	 ICTU	 that	 a	campaign	for	non-payment	of	hospital	charges	be	abandoned:	“The	authority	of	the	 Dáil	 cannot	 be	 flaunted”.	 Congress	 mounted	 token	 protests,	 refusing	 for	example	 to	 nominate	 to	 the	 new	 FÁS	 board,	 but	 drew	 back	 from	 Rabbitte’s	campaign.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 later	 suggested	 to	 Haughey	 that	 it	 was	 now	 time	 for	 a	conciliatory	move:	ICTU	could	not	be	expected	to	“buy	a	pig-in-the-poke”.25				 Haughey	revived	momentum	with	a	typical	intervention.	He	approached	Phil	Flynn,	 LGPSU	 general	 secretary	 and,	 as	 observers	 noted,	 a	 republican	 if	 of	 a	different	stripe,	proposing	he	address	the	union’s	annual	conference	dinner.	This	was	unprecedented,	for	while	ministerial	addresses	to	the	union	were	common,	this	would	be	a	first	by	a	Taoiseach.	Flynn	convinced	his	executive,	despite	their	anger	over	service	cuts,	to	invite	him.	McLoone	recalls	how	Health	Minister	Rory	O’Hanlon	had	been	greeted	with	“stony	silence”	at	the	union’s	health	division	and	Environment	Minister	Pádraig	Flynn	“fared	little	better”	with	its	 local	authority	division,	 but	 “it	 was	 different	 with	 Haughey”.	 Flynn	 in	 his	 conference	 speech	urged	the	union	to	hold	to	its	commitment	to	a	national	plan,	mentioning	“other	successful	 small	 economies	 where	 a	 consensus	 approach	 ...	 [had]	 resulted	 in	standards	of	living	far	higher	than	we	have	here”.	ICTU,	he	said,	would	make	“any	fair	compromises	…	to	solve	Ireland’s	economic	problems”.	Haughey	in	his	after-dinner	speech	defended	his	strategy	but	also	promised	an	agreement	beneficial	to	public	servants	as	 “an	essential	element	of	 the	programme”.	He	was	greeted	by	a	standing	ovation	and	delegates	queuing	for	his	autograph.26		 The	ICTU	remained	wary,	not	yet	convinced	of	Haughey’s	bona	fides,	though	also	fearing	that	a	budget	defeat	would	precipitate	an	election	that	could	return	a	government	 less	 favourable	 to	 its	 strategy.	 It	 agreed	 to	 a	 first	 meeting	 of	 the	“Ministerial-ICTU	Working	Group”	on	9	 June	 to	discuss	 the	“National	Plan”	and	public/private	 pay.	 The	 policy	 “working	 parties”	 agreed	 in	 April	 also	 finally	began	to	meet.	Ó	hUiginn,	as	agreed,	appointed	“secretary	level”	and	other	senior	civil	servants	while	Congress	nominated	six	to	eight	of	its	Executive	members	to	each	group,	ensuring	the	two	drivers	of	its	strategy,	Attley	and	Flynn,	were	on	all																																																									25		 ‘dissent”,	‘Civil	Service	Union	protests	at	powers	of	new	Bill’	and	‘Unions	to	meet	three	Ministers	on	health	crisis’,	Irish	Times	13/06/87,	and	ICTU	EC	mtg.	17/06/87;	also	Nevin	to	Taoiseach,	08/06/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	29/07/87,	‘Subject:	Meeting	with	ICTU’,	DTA:	OHP	26		 Interviews	with	Phil	Flynn	and	Peter	McLoone;	“observers	noted”,	Hastings	et	al	2007:	37;	Flynn,	‘Speech	to	LGPSU’,	15/05/87’,	Flynn	Papers;	Haughey	in	IRN	Report	21/05/87;	Hastings	et	al	2007:	37	
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three,	along	with	officials	Nevin	and	Cassells.	Representatives	of	anti-agreement	unions,	 hostile	 to	 engaging,	 were	 conspicuous	 by	 their	 absence.	 The	 meeting	with	Haughey	was	 short	 and	 formal	but,	 critically,	 he	 repeated	his	wish	 for	 an	agreement	which	“saw	jobs,	pay,	tax	reform	and	social	services	as	interlinked”.27			 ICTU	mobilised	all	its	resources	to	flesh	out	proposals	for	a	two-year	budget-linked	 plan.	 Years	 of	 ICTU	 policies	 were	 “ransacked”	 for	 useful	 material,	 and	priority	objectives	set.	It	would	seek	a	statutory	minimum	wage	and	“trade	offs	between	 jobs	 and	 pay	 ‘moderation’”	 and	 pay	 increases	 and	 tax	 reform.	 A	 “40-Point	 Jobs	 Plan”	 was	 produced,	 adopting	 NESC’s	 private-sector	 drivers	 while	stressing	the	potential	of	semi-states.	 	 ICTU	opposed	privatisation	on	principle,	but	 sought	 improved	 welfare	 benefits,	 reform	 of	 employment	 services	 from	 a	punitive	 to	 an	 enabling	 system,	 and	 reduced	 working	 hours.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 told	Haughey:	 “basically	 they	 are	 prepared	 to	 be	 moderate	 on	 pay	 in	 return	 for	measures	on	jobs	and	tax	reform”.	They	did	not	expect	“firm	responses”	now	but	only	that	the	process	get	underway	and	that	the	arbitrator	be	re-appointed.28			 Initial	 meetings	 of	 the	 policy	 groups	 consisted	 of	 ICTU	 representatives	 -	mostly	 Flynn,	 Cassells	 and	 Attley	 –	 presenting	 proposals,	 with	 officials,	 on	 Ó	hUiginn’s	 instructions,	“noting”	these	without	committing.	At	early	meetings,	as	ICTU	noted,	secondary	non-cost-increasing	demands	were	met,	such	as	supports	for	 workers’	 cooperatives	 and	 advisory	 forums	 on	 worker	 participation	 and	industrial	relations	reform.	Addressing	the	first	meeting	of	the	government-ICTU	industry	 policy	 group	 on	 11	 June,	 Haughey	 departed	 from	 his	 script	 to	emphasise,	 Lemass-like,	 how	 the	 “viability	 of	 the	 economy	 [was]	 at	 stake”	 and	the	plan	would	be	a	“historic”	departure.	“Consensus	on	development	measures”	would	 produce	 “an	 improvement	 in	 morale”,	 the	 “key	 to	 success”.	 This	 was	 a																																																									27		 ICTU,	Special	Mtg	of	EC,	02/06/87,	‘Note	on	Agenda	for	Pay	Talks	–	the	Congress	Perspective,	27	May	1987’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	ICTU	EC	meeting	29/05/87,	Item	1260;	Nevin	to	EC	members:	05.06.87,	‘ref	1030’	and	‘Discussions	with	Taoiseach	on	National	Plan’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	‘Joint	Government-ICTU	Statement’,	09/06/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	28		 Interview	with	Cassells	and	following	material	in	ICTU	Archive	GS-PA-1a:	‘Jobs	and	Development	Measures:	Discussions	on	a	Programme	for	National	Recovery”,	June	1987;	‘Tax	Reform.	Discussions’,	Construction	Industry	Committee:	A	Programme	for	Construction.	A	40-Point	Plan	for	the	Building	
Industry,	ICTU	Press	Release.	18/06/87.	‘ICTU	submits	proposals	for	the	Health	Services’;	‘Social	Policy’,	12/06/87,	‘Social	Policy’,	12/06/87;	D.	Nevin,	‘Meetings	of	Congress	Committees	etc.	in	June	1987	involving	Executive	Council	members,’	28/05/87,	[Cassells],	‘Special	Meeting	of	Executive	Council	02/06/87:	Note	on	Agenda	for	Pay	Talks	–	the	Congress	Perspective,	27	May	1987’,	Nevin,	‘Briefing	Note	for	Meeting	with	the	Taoiseach,	9	June	1987’,	09/06/87ICTU	Press	Release,	‘National	Talks	with	the	Government	-	ICTU	Proposals	for	a	Programme	for	National	Recovery”,	09/06/87,	‘ICTU	40-Point	Plan	on	Jobs’;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Haughey,	cc.	P.	Teehan,	‘Re:	ICTU	Meeting’,	08/06/87,	DTA-OHP	
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point	he	often	stressed,	 including	privately	to	the	 Irish	Times	editor	and	to	Phil	Flynn:	“the	great	merit	of	what	we’re	trying	to	do	…	is	to	instil	confidence	in	the	economy	…,	the	essential	ingredient	…	to	turn	[it]	around”.29			 On	the	same	day,	11	June,	Haughey	also	finally	met	and	addressed	the	NESC,	making	 a	 significant	 proposal.	 Introducing	 the	 NESC	 report,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 said	council	requested	a	reversal	of	the	previous	government’s	marginalisation	of	the	body	and	a	new	strategic	role	for	it.	Haughey	undertook	to	hold	to	the	four-part	NESC	strategy,	 abolish	ministers’	 right	 to	 seek	 studies	 from	 the	 council,	 and	 to	restore	it	to	a	central	role	in	“elaborating”	the	“Recovery	Plan”.	He	then	proposed	the	council	undertake	an	in-depth	“strategic”	study	on	“Ireland	and	the	EEC”	to	shape	government	strategy.	Although	the	EEC	had	played	only	a	marginal	role	in	Irish	recovery	and	partnership	policy,	Haughey	expected	this	to	change	with	the	Single	Market.	Ó	hUiginn	had	already	drafted	a	brief	for	the	study	and	the	council	eagerly	 agreed	 to	 pursue	 it,	 Ó	 hUiginn	describing	 it	 as	 a	 key	national-strategic	task.	 Following	 the	 meeting,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 suspended	 all	 work	 on	 subordinate	projects	to	concentrate	NESC’s	energies	on	the	EEC	study,	which	would	take	two	years	to	complete	but	play	a	significant	role	in	Irish	EC	strategy.30			 In	a	statement	two	weeks	later,	Haughey	emphasised	“the	whole	tradition	of	Fianna	 Fáil	 Governments	 back	 to	 the	 early	 thirties”	 of	 “active	 intervention	 to	promote	 economic	 and	 social	 development	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 resources	available”.	 This	 would	 continue,	 with	 a	 “realistic	 consensus	 with	 the	 social	partners”	“one	of	the	most	important	endeavours	of	this	Government”.31			 This	 statement	 came	 days	 before	 ICTU’s	 annual	 conference	 where	 the	leadership	 faced	 a	 swathe	 of	 motions	 denouncing	 health	 cuts	 and	 national	bargaining.	 The	 Health	 Service	 Alliance	 in	 particular	 had	 mobilised	 anti-government	 sentiment	 which	 ICTU	 sought	 to	 assuage	 by	 presenting	 their	complaints	 to	 government.	 But	 anti-talks	 sentiment	 had	 largely	 shrunken	 to																																																									29		 J.	Mooney,	D/Fin.,	to	J.	Travers	D/Taoiseach,	12/05/87,	inc.	financial	briefing	on	ICTU	proposals,	DTA:	S25875;	ICTU	EC	mtg.	17/6/87;	Haughey,	in	h/w	note,	“First	mtg.	Working	Party	on	Industry/Devpt.’	n.d.,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	Irish	Times,	Brady	2005:	8-9,	and	Flynn	in	Hastings	et	al.	2007:	31	30		 ‘Special	Meeting	of	the	Council	with	Taoiseach	and	Minister	for	Finance	(Minutes),’	11/06/87,	‘Presentation	by	Chairman	on	Strategy	for	Development’,	11.06.87,	‘Ireland	and	the	EEC.	Request	from	the	Taoiseach.’	Confidential.	11/06/87,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b;	‘Address	by	Taoiseach,	Mr.	Charles	J.	Haughey,	TD,	to	National	Economic	and	Social	Council,’	11.06.1987,	GIS:	D/	Taoiseach;	Minutes	of	Council	Meetings	17/07,	11/09,	16/10,	20/11	and	17/12/1987,	‘Meeting	with	Minister	of	the	Environment’,	17/07/1987,	Council	Meeting	16/10/87	-	‘Literature	review	for	EEC	Study’,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3b	31		 Dáil	25/06/1987	
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what	 a	 government	 official	 called	 ICTU’s	 “Dublin	 problem”,	 i.e.	 the	 sectional,	militant	 “Left”.	Despite	 ill-tempered	debates,	 a	 strong	 speech	by	Carroll,	which	the	 Executive	 had	 urged	 him	 to	 give,	 stressed	 government’s	 concession	 of	 an	integrated	 pay/policy	 package,	 and	 ETUC	 leader,	 Matthias	 Hiinterscheid,	passionately	backed	the	ICTU	leaders,	contrasting	the	position	they	had	achieved	to	 the	 retreat	 from	 tripartitism	elsewhere	 in	Europe	 and	 the	 stalling	 of	 “social	dialogue”	 even	 at	 EEC	 level.	 An	 ITGWU	motion	was	 easily	 passed,	 committing	ICTU	 to	 “pursue	 its	 objective	 of	 a	 national	 economic	 and	 social	 programme	by	consensus	between	the	disparate	elements	of	society	and	the	Government”.32		 Over	 the	 summer,	 the	 working	 parties	 progressed	 laboriously,	 with	 much	stalling	by	 the	official	 side.	The	government-ICTU	 social	 policy	 group	met	only	twice,	 officials	 refusing	 to	 commit	 on	 issues	 with	 “budgetary	 implications”	 or	which	 disturbed	 elite	 vested	 interests,	 such	 as	 medical	 consultants’	 tax-free	earnings	 or	 drug	 procurement	 policy.	 The	 tax	 talks	 also	 met	 with	 official	unwillingness	 to	 commit	 until	 budget	 strategy	 was	 finalised.	 At	 the	 FUE/CII	social	 policy	 group,	 employers	 pressed	 for	 cost	 relieving	 demands,	 while	 the	farming	 group,	which	met	 six	 times,	 advanced	 little	 beyond	 IFA’s	 catalogue	 of	cost	increasing	grants.	But	by	August	a	range	of	composite	policy	documents	was	nevertheless	completed,	the	most	substantial	one	that	on	industrial	policy.33				
Pay	and	planning	agendas:	crafting	the	agreement			 Government’s	stalling	on	the	policy	working	groups	was	of	course	deliberate,	reflecting	 its	 pre-emptive	 strategy.	 But	 ICTU	 by	 this	 stage	was	 the	 least	 of	 its	worries,	as	employers,	who	had	gained	leverage	through	the	plan’s	dependence	on	an	agreed	pay	strategy,	suddenly	adopted	a	hard	line,	publicly	declaring	their	opposition	 to	 a	 central	 pay	 agreement	 and	 even	 taking	 out	 newspaper	advertisements	 explaining	 their	 objections.	 Their	 opposition	 also	 extended	 to	statutory	 minimum	 wages,	 reduced	 working	 hours,	 proposals	 for	 a	 Labour	Relations	Commission,	paternity	 leave,	reform	of	occupational	pensions	and,	as																																																									32		 ICTU	ADC	1987:	5-13,	77-80,	97-129,	150-2;	‘ICTU	proposals	for	the	Health	Services’,	18/06/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	IT	13/06/87;	Interview	with	anon.	D/Taois.	official;	ICTU	EC	meeting	17/06/87		33		 ‘Discussions	with	Social	Partners	on	National	Programme	for	Growth	and	Economic	Recovery’	n.d.,	DTA:	S25281-E;	J.	Cantwell,	D/Taoiseach	to	Nevin,	ICTU,	15/07/87,	encl.	summary	report	of	meeting	of	Working	Group	on	Tax	of	6	July	1987,	‘Jobs	and	Development	Measures.	Discussion	of	a	Programme	for	Economic	Recovery’,	and	‘ICTU/Government	Department	Officials,	Working	Group	on	Jobs	and	Development	Measures:	Working	Group	Summary	Paper:	Industrial	Policy’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a	
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they	 particularly	 impressed	 on	 Haughey,	 any	 “legislation	 for	 worker	participation	at	board	and	below	board	level	in	the	private	sector”.34			 Government	 decided	 to	 first	 secure	 terms	 on	 public	 pay	 with	 ICTU.	 Before	meeting	 Haughey,	 ICTU	 agreed	 its	 own	 objectives	 as	 a	 “gross	 post-tax”	improvement	 in	 “real	 pay”	 in	 both	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 composed	 of	 a	modest	 annual	 3	 per	 cent	 increase	 –	 below	 predicted	 inflation	 –	 once	 it	 was	combined	with	equivalent	compensation	 in	tax	delivering	a	real	value	 increase.	To	appease	employers,	 ICTU	was	prepared	to	accept	 increases	being	subject	 to	firms’	 competitiveness	 and	 “ability	 to	 pay”.	 But	 in	 return	 it	 would	 need	 “firm	commitments”	 from	government	on	 job	creation,	“however	modest”,	and	to	the	“pay/tax	adjustments”	starting	in	January	1988.	Such	a	settlement,	it	was	aware,	“would	involve	a	…	scaling	down	of	[members’]	expectations”.35			 Two	meetings	with	Haughey	and	his	ministers	followed.	These	were	taken	up	dealing	 with	 press	 rumours	 of	 a	 renewed	 public	 pay	 freeze,	 which	 Haughey	dismissed	 as	 “speculative	 ….	 rubbish”,	 and	 solo	 runs	 by	ministers	 announcing	industrial	 projects,	 which	 Haughey	 undertook	 to	 rein	 in.	 Government	 even	provided	“confidential”	revenue	accounts	for	1987	to	demonstrate	its	bona	fides.	To	secure	the	“very	restrained”	settlement	ICTU	now	appeared	willing	to	accept,	Haughey,	 at	 Ó	 hUiginn’s	 urging,	 and	 while	 continuing	 to	 stall	 on	 detailed	commitments,	hinted	publicly	that	he	would	concede	substantial	tax	reform	and	“firm	commitments”	on	jobs	policy.	What	enabled	government	accept	Congress’s	pay	 proposal	 was	 ICTU’s	 unexpected	 consent	 to	 a	 voluntary	 redundancies	programme	which	would	“ease”	pressure	on	 the	public	pay	bill.	Ó	hUiginn	 told	Haughey	that	with	inflation	falling	towards	3	per	cent	and	exports	growing,	the	1987	 public	 pay	 bill	 “used	 in	 Finance	 estimates	 up	 to	 now”	 was	 in	 fact	 an	overestimate,	 and	 with	 staff	 reductions,	 “a	 gain”	 of	 £80m	 could	 be	 achieved,	sufficient	to	finance	the	deal.	“We	have	not”,	he	added,	“told	ICTU	of	this”.36	
																																																								34		 FUE	Bulletin,	June	1987;	IT,	II,	IP	23/07/87;	Diarmuid	Quirke,	Pres.	FUE	to	Taoiseach,	27/07/87,	‘Plan	for	Economic	Recovery’,	DTA:	S25875	35		 dn	[=	Dan	Murphy],	‘Note	for	Special	Group	on	Pay	meeting	10/07/87’,	J.	Cantwell,	D/Taoiseach	to	Nevin	15/07/87,	encl.	report	of	meeting	of	the	Working	Group	on	Tax	of	6	July	1987,	‘Confidential.	July	1987.	Notes	for	meeting	with	Taoiseach,	16	July	1987’	15/07/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a	36	 ‘Joint	Statement	on	Meeting	between	Government	and	ICTU’,	16/07/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	29/07/87,	‘Subject:	Meeting	with	ICTU’,	DTA:	OHP;	ICTU	h/w	notes	of	meeting	of	15/07/87,	John	Travers,	D/Taoiseach	to	Donal	[Nevin],	22/07/87,	encl.	‘Receipts	into	and	Issues	out	of	Exchequer	between	1/1/87	and	30/6/87’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	‘Haughey	hints	at	PAYE	cut	in	return	for	pay	
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	 With	 movement	 towards	 a	 public	 pay	 deal,	 the	 development	 plan	 was	finalised	 as	 government	 gave	 “firm	 commitments”	 on	 expanding	 semi-state	activities	 and	 “social	 equity”	measures.	 The	 text	 of	 a	 “Programme	 for	National	Recovery”	 (PNR)	 was	 “generally	 agreed”,	 encompassing	 monetary	 and	 fiscal	goals,	 indicative	 job	 targets,	 social	 policy	 initiatives	 and	 a	 tax/jobs	 “trade	 off”.	Congress	 publicly	 lauded	 the	 package,	 Attley	 reminding	 members	 that	 unions	had	no	future	if	they	“concentrated	purely	on	wages	and	conditions	…	The	only	way	was	to	get	the	country	on	a	growth	pattern”.	ICTU	pressed	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	for	“continuous	meetings”	to	finalise	it,	with	specific	job	targets	for	industrial	projects	and	a	pay/tax	formula	weighted	to	the	lower	paid.37			 But,	as	The	Irish	Press	reported,	talks	on	the	PNR	“threatened	breakdown”	as	Congress	refused	to	withdraw	its	insistence	on	the	private	sector	being	included.	Ó	 hUiginn	 told	 Haughey	 he	 believed	 FUE	would	 relent	 with	 a	 bit	 of	 pressure,	given	 ICTU’s	 modest	 3	 per	 cent	 claim,	 which	 had	 to	 be	 “very	 attractive”	 to	employers	 given	 the	higher	 settlements	 emerging	 at	 the	Labour	Court	 through	local	 bargaining.	 But,	 ignoring	 Irish	 Times	 editorials	 describing	 the	 emerging	consensus	as	essential	to	economic	“certainty”	and	to	a	recovery	that	avoided	the	social	 divisions	 of	 “Mrs.	 Thatcher’s	 Britain”,	 FUE’s	 Central	 Council	 again	 voted	against	any	“return	to	national	understandings”,	and	rejected	minimum	wages	as	topping-up	low	pay	was	a	matter	for	welfare	policy.	But	it	agreed	to	postpone	a	definitive	decision	until	a	final	Government-ICTU	public	pay	formula	emerged.38		 Government	and	 ICTU	conspired	 to	 force	 the	pace	with	a	public	 sector	deal,	which	they	quickly	concluded	a	week	before	government’s	budget	plan	deadline	of	9	October.	Congress	dropped	its	demand	for	a	statutory	minimum	wage.	But,	as	Ó	hUiginn	informed	Haughey,	its	further	terms	were	also	moderate	and	a	key	deal	on	redundancies	made	the	package	workable.	ICTU	would	now	accept	a	2.5	per	cent	annual	 increase	with	matching	 tax	concessions	over	 two	years,	with	a																																																																																																																																																															rises’,	Irish	Independent,	17/07/87;	‘Cabinet	offers	pay	deal	for	union	support’,	IT	05/08/87;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	26/08/87,	DTA:	OHP	37		 Nevin	‘To:	Each	member	of	the	Executive	Council”,	27/08/87,	ref.	4030:	‘Special	meeting	Executive	Council,	2	September’,	Cassells	‘To:	Each	member	of	the	Special	Working	Group”,	11/09/87,	ref.	4030:	Next	meeting	with	Taoiseach,	18	Sept.’,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a;	Attley	quoted	in		IT	26/09/87;	on	ICTU	pressure	and	demands	on	D/Taoiseach,	Travers	to	Teahon	and	Sec.	[Ó	hUiginn],	hand	written	note,	18/09/87,	DTA:	S25871	and	P.	O’Sullivan,	‘Meetings	with	Social	Partners,	conference	room,	Department	of	the	Taoiseach,	18-23	September’,	15/09/87,	DTA:	S25875	38		 ‘Pay	Deal	Talks	on	Tightrope.	Unions’	Challenge	to	Haughey’,	Irish	Press	26/09/87;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	26/08/87,	DTA:	OHP;	IT	editorial	‘Tonic	for	the	Troops’	25/09/87;	‘Special	deal	for	low	paid	delays	economic	plan’,	IT	26/09/87	
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higher	increase	of	3	per	cent	on	earnings	below	£120	p.w.	or	a	flat	minimum	of	£4	p.w.	to	ensure	the	over	80,000	public	service	workers	and	the	quarter	of	the	entire	 private	 sector	 in	 that	 category	 benefited	 proportionally.	 As	 tax	improvements	 in	 the	 January	budget	would	serve	as	a	pay	 increase	equivalent,	deferring	the	first	pay	phase	to	July	1988	would	not	represent	a	pay	“freeze”.	The	arbitrator	would	be	re-instated	and	“special	claims”	allowed	to	be	lodged	though	with	 awards	 only	 payable	 from	 July	 1989.	The	 cost	 of	 the	 overall	 pay	package	would	be	partly	offset	by	 the	agreed	voluntary	redundancy	scheme.	Both	sides	agreed	 recommending	 that	 the	 same	 terms	 apply	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 except	where	stressed	conditions	in	individual	cases	precluded	them.39			 The	Irish	Times	urged	the	FUE,	which	dismissed	the	deal	as	geared	to	appease	the	public	sector,	to	come	on	board,	editorials	(“In	the	Interests	of	All”)	stressing	its	 centrality	 to	 recovery	 and	 stressing	 ICTU’s	 concessions	 meeting	 employer	fears	 on	 the	 minimum	 wage,	 the	 “local	 conditions”	 clause,	 and	 the	 purely	voluntary	approach	to	worker	participation.	Ó	hUiginn	was	shocked	by	the	FUE’s	obstinacy,	having	believed	the	low	wage/tax	formula	sufficient	for	them.	He	soon	learned	that	indigenous	industry,	with	its	predominantly	weak-sector	employers	dominating	the	FUE,	had	“more	lower-paid	workers	than	we	have”	and	opposed	the	 3	 per	 cent	 or	 £4	 flat	 rate	 minimum	 proposal.	 With	 little	 other	 choice,	Haughey	set	9	October	for	launching	the	programme,	setting	final	meetings	with	each	group	for	that	very	morning	to	try	to	finalise	their	acceptance,	followed	by	a	press	event	in	the	afternoon	launching	the	Programme	for	Economic	Recovery.40		 Government	mobilised	 its	 leverage	 to	 bring	 employers	 around.	 In	meetings	with	 the	 FUE	 Haughey,	 as	 Turlough	 O’Sullivan	 recalled,	 intimated	 that	 “if	 we	didn’t	go	along	with	it”	he	would	“do	the	deal	[with	ICTU]	anyway”	which	would	“set	 the	 pace	 for	 the	 private	 sector”.	 On	 7	 October	 the	 FUE	 conceded	 the	minimum	3	 per	 cent/	 £4	 increase	 though	 only	with	 strong	 conditionality.	 The	rate	would	be	a	“guideline”	only	that	“could”	apply	but	only	“with	due	regard	…	to	 the	 economic	 and	 commercial	 circumstances	 of	 the	 particular	 firm	 or	industry”,	 subject	 to	 “local	 negotiations	 and	 local	 agreement”,	 and	 with	 “no																																																									39		 ‘Cassells	warns	Government	on	conditions	for	pay	pact’,	IT	05/10/87;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	02/10/87,	re:	[draft]	‘Programme	for	National	Recovery’,	DTA:	OHP	40		 IT	30/09;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Haughey,	02/10/87	‘Programme	for	National	Recovery’,	DTA:	OHP;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Ministers,	08/10/87,	encl.	‘Draft	Programme	for	National	Recovery	for	discussion	with	social	partners	on	09/10/87	and	‘Meetings	with	Social	Partners’	09/10/87,	DTA:	S25281-E	
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further	cost	increasing	claims	…	except	where	otherwise	agreed	at	local	level”.	As	a	senior	civil	servant	noted,	this	formula	represented	the	“breaking	point	as	far	as	 the	 FUE	were	 concerned”,	 and	 “the	words	 ‘could’	 and	 ‘by	 local	 negotiations	and	local	agreement’	…	the	outcome	of	very	many	hours	of	difficult	negotiation”.	Employers	achieved	other	concessions,	such	as	excluding	the	Labour	Court	from	an	“interpretative”	role,	and	the	clauses	on	annual	leave,	part-time	workers	and	working	 hours	 also	 all	 subject	 to	 “local	 agreement	 and	 practice”.	 Industrial	relations	reform,	worker	participation	and	parental	leave	were	left	unspecific,	to	be	 advanced	 through	 “consultation”	 and	 “advisory	 committees”.	 On	 securing	these	considerable	concessions,	and	with	one	day	to	spare,	FUE	agreed	to	sign.41		 Farmers	 too	 sought	 further	 concessions.	 Their	 “working	 party”	 with	 the	Department	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 Food	 had	 progressed	 little	 beyond	 the	 IFA’s	catalogue	 of	 grant	 demands.	 But,	 after	 a	 meeting	 with	 Haughey	 in	 late	September,	 the	 IFA,	believing	 it	had	successfully	 rebuffed	a	 looming	 tax	 threat,	announced	 its	 new	 “special	 relationship”	 with	 government,	 and	 intimated	 it	would	join	the	agreement.	ICMSA,	on	the	other	hand,	fearing	the	threat	of	a	full	PRSI	levy	on	farmers	remained,	threatened	to	pull	out.	At	the	final	meeting	with	Haughey	 on	 the	 morning	 of	 9	 October,	 ICMSA	 complained	 of	 the	 proposed	“unsuitable	 tax	 treatment	 for	 farmers”.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 presented	 a	 compromise	offering	 a	 consultation	 process	 with	 the	 PRSI	 charge	 phased	 in	 over	 several	years.	 When	 ICMSA	 rejected	 even	 this,	 Haughey	 offered	 to	 “solve	 ICMSA’s	problem	 by	 scrubbing	 their	 name	 from	 the	 draft	 Programme”,	 whereupon	 its	representatives	 “made	 no	 further	 contribution	 at	 the	 meeting	 …,	 having	 been	eliminated	from	further	participation	by	the	Taoiseach’s	action”.	At	Ó	hUiginn’s	urging,	Haughey	also	resisted	other	farmer	demands,	such	as	IFA’s	Eurocurrency	proposal,	 which	 Finance	 had	 warned	 would	 “involve	 a	 heavy	 cost	 for	 the	taxpayer”	and	exchequer	 losses	of	25	per	cent	of	amounts	drawn	down.	 ICMSA	also	 demanded	 levies	 only	 at	 point	 of	 sale	 rather	 than	 income,	 but	 Ó	 hUiginn	warned	that	this	was	“completely	in	conflict	with	Government’s	commitment	to	tax	 farmers	 on	 the	 same	 basis	 as	 everyone	 else”.	 Government	 offered	 some																																																									41		 “set	the	pace”,	interview	with	Turlough	O’Sullivan,	and	similar	Hastings	et	al	2007:	39;	‘Major	breakthrough	on	Economic	Plan’,	IT	08/10/87;	‘Proposals	for	an	Agreement	between	the	ICTU	and	the	FUE	and	CIF’,	[Memo:]	‘Meetings	with	Social	Partners’	09/10/87,	and	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	08/10/87,	‘Points	Employer	bodies	are	likely	to	raise’,	DTA:	S25281-E;	Kevin	Murphy	Sec,	PSMD	(D/Lab.)	to	Ó	hUiginn	and	Travers,	01/12/87,	DTA:	S25857-A	
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sweeteners,	 such	 as	 “an	 aggressive	 international	 marketing	 strategy”	 for	 food	exports	 which	 the	 Minister	 had	 just	 that	 night	 agreed	 in	 Berlin.	 In	 the	 event,	Haughey	 had	 to	 concede	 several	 of	 the	 IFA’s	 demands.	 But	 government’s	leverage	remained	its	CAP	bargaining	role,	and,	as	the	press	reported	–	and	apart	from	 ICMSA	 -	 the	 IFA	 and	 the	 other	 groups,	 describing	 the	 agreement	 as	 a	“historic	landmark”,	agreed	to	sign,	“pending	ratification	by	their	members”.42			 Congress	 secured	 some	 final	 concessions	 too.	 The	 Department	 of	 Labour,	warning	of	employer	hostility,	had	advised	Ó	hUiginn	“against	any	 inclusion	on	Worker	Participation”,	or	if	unavoidable	then	at	most	talks	on	recommendations	from	the	existing	“Advisory	Committee”.	It	also	insisted	that	similar	measures	in	the	public	sector	be	made	subject	to	“budgetary	constraints”.	A	clause	was	now	agreed,	 even	 if	 diluted	 to	 the	 maximum	 employers	 had	 indicated	 they	 would	accept.	Commitments	to	equality	measures	and	industrial	relations	reform	were	also	 finalised,	 again	 subject	 to	 consultative/“review”	 processes.	 Finally	 an	“umbrella”	 clause	 was	 added	 for	 “outstanding”	 issues,	 such	 as	 on-going	 local	authority	lay-offs,	outstanding	Labour	Court	rulings	in	the	semi-states,	a	strike	at	Irish	 Sugar	 etc.,	 which	 it	 was	 agreed	 be	 resolved	 in	 urgent	 “bi-lateral”	 talks	between	ICTU	and	Ministers	 immediately	 the	agreement	was	ratified.	Congress	then	 agreed	 to	 sign,	 pending	 ratification	 by	 affiliates.	 The	 ICTU	 Executive	convened	straight	after	 the	meeting,	narrowly	voting	–	by	what	majority	 is	not	recorded	-	to	recommend	the	PNR	at	a	special	conference	on	19	November.43		 Finally,	having	finalised	disputed	clauses,	the	FUE	met	Haughey	and	agreed	to	sign,	though	subject	to	ratification	by	the	FUE	Central	Council	in	late	October.		
		
“To	the	strains	of	Mise	Éire”:	the	political	symbolism	of	a	plan	
		 The	fate	of	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery,	contentious	even	among	the	signing	 groups’	 leadership	 strata,	 now	 depended	 on	 endorsement	 by	 volatile	memberships.	But	Haughey’s	paramount	determination	was	 to	have	 it	succeed,	
																																																								42		 ‘Main	Points	Farmer	Bodies	are	likely	to	raise’,	08/10/87,	DTA:	S25281-E;	‘Farm	talks	boost	Haughey	strategy	on	economic	plan’,	IT	24/09/87;	ICMSA	report,	‘National	Plan	1’,	09/10/87,	‘Department	of	Finance	view	on	extension	of	Eurocurrency	scheme,’	12/10/87,	DTA:	S25858-A;	David	Costello,	D/A&F,	on	behalf	of	Minister	Kennedy,	in	Berlin,	to	D/Taoiseach,	09/10/87,	and	J.	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Note’,	07/10/87,	DTA:	S25281-E;	‘ICMSA	pulls	out	of	draft	National	Pan’,	IT	10/10/87		43		 J.	Travers,	‘Note’,	07/10/87.	‘Points	ICTU	want	included’,	and	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	08/10/87,	‘Points	ICTU	are	likely	to	raise’,	DTA:	S25281-E;	ICTU	EC	meeting	09/10/1987	(‘Special	Meeting’)	
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with	 his	 and	 his	 government’s	 political	 credibility	 riding	 on	 it.	 It	 was	 an	extraordinarily	high-risk	political	gamble,	but,	as	he	would	later	say,	the	critical	turning	point	and	crowning	achievement	of	his	political	career.44		 On	 the	 afternoon	 of	 those	 final	 meetings,	 the	 partner	 leaderships,	 together	with	 Haughey	 and	 his	 full	 cabinet,	 assembled	 in	 a	 Dublin	 hotel	 for	 the	 press	launch.	When	 Ó	 hUiginn	 announced	 Haughey’s	 arrival,	 the	 doors	 swung	 open	and,	as	Carol	Coulter	reported,	he	solemnly	led	his	entourage	up	the	hall	to	the	“strains	of	Mise	Éire”,	Seán	Ó	Riada’s	famous	score	to	a	film	celebrating	the	birth	of	the	state.	The	fragility	of	the	moment	was	reflected	in	a	last	minute	panic	at	a	rumoured	 public	 sector	 rebellion.	 Haughey,	 muttering	 “that’s	 very	 helpful”,	turned	 to	 those	 beside	 him,	 repeating	 “rhubarb,	 rhubarb”	 as	 he	 shook	 their	hands.	Later,	seeing	a	photographer	poised,	he	put	his	arm	around	an	off-guard	embarrassed	Phil	Flynn.	Attley	later	said	it	was	like	being	in	“a	fuckin’	play”.45				 In	a	brief	speech	Haughey	stressed	the	PNR’s	“historic”	significance	ensuring	“a	long	period	of	industrial	peace”	though	also,	with	its	“more	realistic	basis	than	any	 previous	National	 Plan,	 Understanding	 or	 Agreement”,	 “a	 better	 and	more	productive	way	of	conducting	our	affairs”.	Keeping	his	options	open,	he	entered	a	caveat	that	the	PNR	“supplemented”	the	“development	and	employment	policies	already	 being	 carried	 out	 by	 Government	 in	 accordance	 with	 its	 own	programme”	while	 adding	 “greater	 precision	 and	 new	possibilities”.	 Observing	from	a	distance,	T.K.	Whitaker,	who	had	always	opposed	Haughey’s	tripartitism	and	 been	 a	 proponent	 of	 statutory	 controls,	 and	 who	 would	 later	 describe	Thatcher’s	 “most	 creditable	 and	 enduring	 achievement”	 her	 re-establishing	 of	“the	supremacy	of	Government	and	Parliament	over	sectional	interests",	seemed	both	aghast	and	impressed	in	equal	measure	at	Haughey’s	achievement.46		
The	PNR:	a	plan	for	socio-economic	transformation		 The	 PNR	 proposed	 a	 3-year	 plan	 running	 from	 January	 1988	 to	 December	1990.	Compared	to	later	agreements,	it	was	a	relatively	short	text,	the	product,	it																																																									44		 Haughey	2013	45		 Coulter,	‘Nothing	allowed	disturb	the	sound	of	harmony’,	IT	10/10/87;	Attley	quoted	in	Hastings	et	al	2007:	41	46		 ‘Economic	Plan	“a	major	achievement”’,	IT	10/10/87		and	‘Opening	remarks	by	Taoiseach	at	Press	Conference	to	launch	PNR’,	09/10/87	(“Not	released	through	GIS”),	DTA:	S25281-E;	Whitaker	on	Thatcher,	and	“impressed”,	Chambers	2014:	240,	371	
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stated,	of	 the	 “concerted	efforts	by	all	 interests”	 to	 face	 “the	grave	 state	of	our	economic	and	social	 life”	and	 “regenerate	our	economy	and	 improve	 the	 social	equity	of	our	society”.	It	endorsed	the	“principles”	of	the	1986	NESC	Report	and	followed	its	structure.	Government	would	continue	“to	control	and	curtail	public	expenditure”	 to	 reduce	 borrowing	 and	 the	 National	 Debt,	 but	 also	 “increase	economic	activity,	reduce	interest	rates	and	stimulate	new	employment”.	Strong-EMS	alignment,	pay	moderation	and	tax	reform	would	deliver	low	interest	rates	and	“promote	investor	confidence	and	inhibit	speculative	capital	movements”.	It	detailed	a	range	of	specific	commitments	on	tax,	welfare	and	social	“equity”,	and	over	 a	 hundred	 infrastructure	 and	 industrial	 projects	 which,	 together	 with	 a	special	role	for	state	companies,	would	drive	economic	and	social	recovery.47			 Surprisingly,	 given	 its	 secondary	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 plan,	 the	 first	section	was	titled	“European	Community	Dimension”.	This	aligned	the	PNR	with	the	as	yet	un-concluded	Delors	plan,	embraced	the	single	market,	and	advocated	an	enlarged	EEC	budget	and	regional/social	strategies	“to	narrow	disparities	in	economic	development	and	 living	 standards”.	Achieving	 this	 consensus	on	EEC	strategy	 was	 a	 significant	 achievement	 by	 Haughey.	 Many	 employers	sympathised	with	Thatcher’s	 anti-centralisation	 stance	and	unions,	notably	 the	ITGWU,	 and	despite	 reservations	by	 ICTU	 leaders,	 had	opposed	 the	 SEA	 in	 the	April	referendum,	rehashing	their	1972	opposition	to	European	“capitalism”.48			 The	PNR	agreed	precise	tax	reform	targets	over	the	course	of	the	programme,	subject	 to	 improving	public	 finances,	 including	 reduced	 rates,	 an	 expanded	 tax	“net”,	 curbing	 the	 “black	 economy”	 and	 reforming	 collection	 systems	 to	“guarantee	 a	 significant	 improvement	 in	 compliance”,	 core	 issues	 for	 ICTU.	On	“social	 equity”,	 welfare	 would	 be	 ring-fenced	 regardless	 of	 public	 spending	pressures,	 long-term	 dependent	 rates	 increased,	 services	modernised,	 equality	legislation	 introduced,	 and	 voluntary	 organisations	 “consulted”	 on	 policy.	 A	strategy	 for	 an	 “equitable,	 comprehensive	 and	 cost	 effective	 health	 service”	would	be	produced,	 including	primary	care,	de-institutionalisation,	community-based	and	preventative	strategies,	reform	of	the	psychiatric	services,	and	other	areas.	The	 “considerable”	arrears	 in	health	 contributions	owed	by	 farmers	and																																																									47		 Government	of	Ireland	1987	48		 ICTU	position	on	SEA,	ICTU	ADC	1988:	220-1;	“European	capitalism”,	O’Dowd	1992:	iv	
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the	 self-employed	would	 be	 recouped.	On	 education,	measures	would	 increase	participation	 by	 “working	 class	 children”,	 the	 disadvantaged	 and	 those	 with	special	 needs.	 Vocational	 training	 was	 to	 be	 expanded	 and	 a	 Housing	 Bill	introduced.	 These	 reforms	 reflected	 ICTU	 positions	 developed	 over	 years,	 and	several	had	previously	featured	in	the	National	Understandings.			 Employment	and	industrial	policy	combined	Way	Forward	initiatives,	such	as	the	 IFSC,	 tourism,	 food,	 marine	 and	 forestry,	 with	 CII	 sectoral	 proposals	 and	ICTU	demands	for	the	semi-states.	An	overall	target	of	20,000	jobs	annually	was	set,	 each	 project	 allocated	 a	 specific	 target,	 from	 1,000	 in	 beef	 processing	 to	small	but	precise	figures	in	various	micro-projects.	The	strategy	hinged	on		state-driven	 growth	 of	 the	 indigenous	 industrial	 and	 services	 base	 by	 supporting	“selected	 Irish	 companies”	 to	 develop	 to	 be	 internationally	 competitive	 and	achieve	 the	 “size	 and	 vitality	 other	 small	 economies	 have	 achieved”.	 Inward	investment	(FDI),	which	had	performed	poorly	 in	 the	1980s,	was	not	seen	as	a	primary	 driver,	 but	 rather	 an	 auxiliary	 element	 supporting	 indigenous	expansion,	focused	“on	a	specialised	basis”	in	specific	sectors	and	“encouraged”	through	 re-fashioned	 fiscal	measures.	 This	was	 a	 compromise	with	 the	Telesis	position,	 hardly	 reflecting	 the	 driving	 role	 Haughey’s	 inner	 circle	 actually	foresaw	for	FDI.	The	whole	strategy	would	be	supported	by	a	drive	to	modernise	marketing	and	management,	target	high	technologies	and	new	skills,	undertake	a	“radical	 re-organisation”	 of	 agency	 supports,	 and	measures	 to	 reduce	 costs	 to	business	and	 remove	 restrictions	on	 state-company	expansion,	by	 legislation	 if	necessary.	It	was	a	programme	for	a	radical	overhaul	of	the	productive	economy.		 The	strategy	contained	one	notable	hostage	to	fortune	in	defining	precise	job	targets	and	stating	 these	 referred	only	 to	new	 jobs,	not	net	 job	outcomes.	This	represented	a	major	success	for	Haughey.	While	ICTU	had	insisted	on,	and	was	conceded,	concrete	targets,	that	bête	noire	of	Whitaker,	Haughey	insisted	that	job	losses	in	sunset	sectors	were	inevitable	and	the	state	could	not	act	to	save	them.		 Many	PNR	initiatives	met	partner-specific	demands.	While	the	PNR	promoted	a	 market-led	 expansion	 of	 food,	 forestry	 and	 horticulture,	 the	 IFA	 secured	commitments	 “to	 safeguard	 Irish	 agriculture	 and	 family	 farm	 income”	 by	defending	 CAP,	 expanding	 “headage”	 schemes	 and	 renewing	 the	 Eurocurrency	
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programme	 Finance	 had	 opposed.	 The	 CII	 secured	 commitments	 on	 lowering	costs	 to	business	and	expanding	 infrastructure.	While	 ICTU	goals	 to	end	health	cuts,	 a	 national	 anti-poverty	 strategy	 and	 national	 minimum	 wage	 were	 not	achieved,	it	secured	expansion	plans	for	state	industries,	social	policy	measures,	increased	welfare	benefits	and	an	ambitious	programme	of	legislative	reform.			 Finally,	 the	 PNR	 included	 provisions	 to	 ensure	 its	 delivery,	 especially,	 as	sought	by	ICTU	in	particular,	a	monitoring	committee	of	top	officials	and	partner	representatives,	chaired	and	supported	by	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach,	with	inbuilt	recourse	to	the	Taoiseach	and	ministers	for	resolving	problems.	
	
Political	high	stakes:	the	rocky	road	to	ratification	
		 Political	 partisanship	 and	 traditional	 party	dispositions	 towards	 tripartitism	shaped	party	political	responses	to	the	PNR.	It	was	soon	clear	there	would	be	no	“political	consensus”	on	it	as	sought	by	the	NESC,	the	CII	and	Haughey	himself.		 The	new	PD	party	simply	rejected	the	PNR	on	principle,	opposing	“deals”	with	“interest	 groups”.	 Fine	 Gael,	 because	 of	 rather	 than	 despite	 its	 “Tallaght	Strategy”,	 announced	 in	 September	 1987,	 also	 attacked	 it	 as	 compromising	monetary	autonomy	by	its	capitulation	to	“vested	interests”,	while	promising	to	support	the	1988	budget	if	it	continued	in	the	vein	of	1987.	In	a	more	traditional	partisan	pose,	Fine	Gael	in	several	Dáil	interventions	repeated	this	line	of	attack.	Dukes	condemned	the	PNR	as	“neither	a	plan	nor	a	programme”	but	a	“dickied	up	 public	 service	 agreement”	 with	 “a	 fungus	 of	 promises	 attached”.	 He	 urged	partner	organisations,	 then	balloting	on	 it,	 to	reject	 “the	 infamous	programme”	with	 its	“fictitious	 job	targets”.	Noonan	called	 it	“a	cynical	deal	by	public	sector	unions	 trading	 jobs	 for	 pay”.	 In	 the	 tradition	 of	 Whitaker’s	 and	 FitzGerald’s	fundamental	 antipathy	 to	 tripartitism,	 Dukes	 decried	 its	 “consensus”	 as	“illusory”,	leaving	“no	role	for	the	Dáil	in	this	process”.		“It	is	in	this	house	that	a	democratic	consensus	must	be	worked	out	…	and	that	the	implementation	of	the	action	required	to	reach	the	agreed	targets	must	be	designed	and	crafted”.49		 Labour’s	 initial	 response,	 reflecting	 its	 own	 historic	 internal	 contradictions,	saw	Spring	both	laud	Congress	for	seeking	to	secure	improvements	for	the	lower																																																									49		 Dukes,	“vested	interests”,	IT	03/09/87;	Dukes,	“neither	plan	nor	programme”,		Dáil	08/10/97;		“infamous	programme”	Dáil	20/10/97;	Noonan	in	Dáil	02/11/87;	“consensus	…	illusory”,	IT	24/10/87	
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paid	and	in	social	policy,	and	attack	the	PNR	for	its	“miserly”	pay	terms,	funded	by	“firing	…	public	servants”.	The	Workers’	Party	refrained	from	criticising	ICTU	directly,	but	generally	attacked	 “cuts”.	Labour,	which	had	been	badly	hit	 in	 the	election,	 barely	 returning	 twelve	 TDs,	 was	 convulsed	 by	 internal	 division	 as	Emmet	Stagg	mounted	a	leadership	challenge,	with	union	support,	on	a	left-wing	socio-economic	 policy	 platform.	 The	 embattled	 leadership	 of	 Spring,	 Desmond	and	 Finlay	 fought	 back	 with	 “a	 war	 to	 the	 death”.	 Bitter	 exchanges	 erupted	between	Desmond	and	Attley	at	Labour’s	September	1987	conference,	just	as	the	final,	 tense	 negotiations	 on	 the	 PNR	 were	 concluding.	 Attley	 defended	 ICTU’s	PNR	strategy	to	a	hostile	hall	and	shouts	of	“lies”	and	“not	true”,	while	Desmond	attacked	 the	unions	 and	 eviscerated	 the	PNR,	 pledging	 the	party’s	 unremitting	opposition.	 The	 Spring	 leadership	 saw	 off	 Stagg’s	 challenge,	 and	 immediately	positioned	the	party	to	oppose	on	principle	Haughey	and	all	he	represented.50			 Spring	 remorselessly	 attacked	 the	 PNR	 in	 the	 Dáil	 as	 “the	 con	 trick	 of	 the	century”,	 with	 its	 “sell-out”	 of	 natural	 resources,	 “firing”	 of	 public	 servants,	slashing	of	 services,	 “niggardly”	pay	 increases,	 and	 “cosmetic”	 tax	 reforms	 that	were	“an	insult”	to	workers.	ICTU	had	signed	a	deal	“hostile	to	working	people”	that	would	benefit	only	“yuppies	and	financial	services”	hiding	their	money	in	a	capitalist	 “Holy	 Grail”	 on	 “twenty-seven	 derelict	 acres	 of	 Dublin	 dockland”.	 As	unions	were	balloting,	Spring	encouraged	 ICTU’s	dissidents,	also	calling	 for	 the	Dáil	 to	reject	 the	PNR	and	government	 to	“re-open	negotiations	with	 the	social	partners”	to	rescind	“the	cuts”:	“We	intend	to	fight	this	plan”.51		 The	 political	 opposition’s	 hostility	 to	 the	 PNR,	 and	 encouraging	 of	 partner	organisations	 to	 reject	 it,	 chimed	with	 the	 views	of	 leading	 economists.	Kieran	Kennedy	of	ESRI,	despite	his	role	in	drafting	The	Way	Forward	in	1982,	damned	it	 with	 faint	 praise,	 its	 job	 targets	 “unconvincing”.	 Colm	 McCarthy,	 despite	heading	Haughey’s	“Bord	Snip”,	and	Paul	Tansey	attacked	“social	partnership”	as	an	out-dated	concept	and	threat	to	parliamentary	government.	A	Sunday	Tribune	editorial	called	it	a	“self-destructive”	plan	and	Sean	Barrett	of	TCD	a	pay	deal	“the	country	cannot	afford”.	The	nearest	to	a	positive	view	was	Business	&	Finance,	an																																																									50		 Spring	“miserly”,	Dáil,	07/10/87;	WP	position,	IT	08/10/87;	“war	to	death”	and	Desmond-Attley	conflict,	Finlay	1998:	38-61	also	Quinn	2005:	246-8;	“lies	…	not	true”,	IT	28/09/87,	Finlay	1998:	46-7	51		 Spring	in	Dáil,	12,	17	and	20/10/87	
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employer-friendly	organ,	which	gave	it	lukewarm	approval	for	containing	wages,	while	 Brendan	Keenan	 suggested	 its	marginal	merit	 in	 defusing	 conflict	 in	 the	semi-states.	The	“Doheny	and	Nesbitt	School”	was	not	impressed!	Almost	alone,	
The	Irish	Times,	in	editorials	contradicting	the	hostile	commentaries	it	published,	supported	both	the	partnership	concept	and	the	PNR	recovery	strategy.52		 Given	 the	 political	 and	 “expert”	 opposition,	 ratification	 of	 the	 PNR	 faced	 a	rocky	road.	The	ICMSA,	whose	leaders	had	walked	away	from	their	final	meeting	with	 Haughey	 on	 9	 October,	 the	 day	 the	 other	 partners	 signed	 it	 pending	ratification,	denounced	it	as	a	“capitulation”	to	the	unions,	causing	the	IFA	too	to	waver	 in	 its	 commitment.	 Haughey,	 under	 pressure	 from	 ICTU	 not	 to	 retreat	from	 the	principle	of	equitable	 taxation,	dispatched	MacSharry	 to	keep	 the	 IFA	on	board	by	conceding	that	farmers’	PRSI	would	be	based	on	their	declared	net	rather	than	gross	incomes,	enraging	the	ICTU.	But	it	mollified	IFA	leaders,	though	even	further	concessions	would	later	be	required	to	keep	them	onside.53		 Employers	wavered	too,	despite	the	major	concessions	they	had	secured.	The	divided	 FUE	 Central	 Council	 deferred	 its	 final	 decision	 until	 ICTU’s	 conference	had	 made	 the	 unions’	 position	 clear.	 With	 farmers	 exploiting	 their	 leverage	before	ratifying	 the	agreement,	and	 the	FUE	 fearing	 the	agreement’s	 impact	on	their	 credibility	 with	 members,	 the	 PNR’s	 survival	 was	 down	 to	 whether	 the	unions	would	ratify	 it.	The	 ICTU	Executive,	 in	accordance	with	practice,	agreed	that	 unions	 ballot	 their	 members	 and	 send	 mandated	 delegates	 to	 the	 19	November	conference	to	decide	the	final	stance	of	the	overall	movement.54			 As	 this	 balloting	was	 underway,	 opposition	 parties	 boosted	 the	 PNR’s	 trade	union	 opponents	 by	 intensifying	 their	 assaults	 on	 the	 PNR	 in	 the	 Dáil.	 Spring	declared	that	“before	the	ink	was	dry”	on	it,	government	had	capitulated	to	the	“bully	boy	tactics”	of	farmers,	“desperate	to	have	their	name	on	the	dotted	line”,	something	 “all	 trade	unionists	 should	 take	…	 into	 account”..	 Fine	Gael	 attacked	education	 cuts,	demanding	 that	 government	 “suspend	all	 further	action”	under																																																									52		 Kennedy,	IT	15/10/87;	McCarthy,	Irish	Independent;	Tansey,	ST	11/10/87;	ST	editorial	11/10/87;	Barrett,	IT	10/10/87;	Business	&	Finance	14/10/87;	Keenan,	II	10/10/87;	IT	editorials	10	and	11/10/87		53		 ICMSA	attack,	IT	13/10/87;	ICTU	pressure,	Cassells	to	Haughey,	19/10/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c;	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	to	Travers,	‘Meeting	between	Minister	for	Finance	and	IFA	re	PRSI’,	30/10/87,	DTA:	S25858-A;	‘Split	looming	over	PRSI	report’,	Irish	Farmers’	Journal	19/12/1987;	John	Hynes,	Dept.	Social	Welfare,	to	J.	Travers,	Dept.	Taoiseach,	10/12/87,	DTA:	S25858-C	54		 FUE	Bulletin,	Oct.	1987;	ICTU	EC	meeting	09/10/1987	(‘Special	Meeting’)		
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the	PNR	and	appealing	 to	unions	 to	 forego	pay	 increases	 to	save	 teaching	 jobs,	i.e.	reject	the	agreement.	A	PD	motion	demanded	a	statutory	wage	freeze.55			 Government	assisted	the	beleaguered	ICTU,	Haughey	having	officials	supply	it	with	 agency	 plans	 for	 specific	 PNR	 projects,	 instructing	 ministers	 to	 provide	details	 on	 projects	 within	 their	 remits,	 and	 launching	 several	 significant	 PNR	initiatives,	notably	the	Customs	House	site,	 the	new	semi-state	 forestry	agency,	Coillte,	and	the	new	Department	of	the	Marine,	and	starting	the	decentralisation	programme.	Cabinet	backed	down	on	primary	education	cuts,	 launching	a	 joint	INTO/Department	 “review”.	 The	 public	 service	 redundancy	 scheme,	 already	popular,	was	extended	to	all	releasable	public	officials	over	50	years	old.56		 ICTU	 ratification	 depended	 on	 how	 unions	 voted	 at	 the	 special	 delegate	conference	 (SDC),	 where	 individual	 union	 delegates	 would	 be	 bound	 by	 the	position	adopted	by	their	union	through	their	various	internal	procedures.	These	varied	 from	 democratic	 workplace	 or	 union	 hall-based	 secret	 ballots	 in	 most	public	service	and	larger	general	unions,	which	represented	the	great	majority	of	workers,	 to	 “democratic	 centralist”	 executive-determined	 decisions	 in	 craft	unions	–	some	of	whom,	in	advising	rejection,	told	their	members	the	terms	were	“confidential”	 and	 to	 simply	 follow	 their	 instruction	 -	 and	 some	employing	 the	arbitrary	 process	 of	 a	 “show	 of	 hands”	 at	 mostly	 sparsely	 attended	 branch	meetings.	 Few	 British-based	 unions	 balloted,	 relying	 instead	 on	 their	 “Irish	Region”	 or	militant-dominated	 local	 executive	 councils	 to	 reach	 an	 “informed”	position,	 a	process	 controlled	by	union	officials	 and	 shop	 stewards	who	would	follow	the	militant	line.	Even	in	large	unions	that	held	secret	ballots,	counting	of	votes	was	“in-house”.	But	the	binding	sense	of	class	across	all	unions	meant	that	even	the	most	“militant”	would	accept	and	abide	by	whatever	common	position	the	SDC	determined.	There	was	no	appetite	for	withdrawal	from	Congress.	While	not	 impeccable,	 the	 ratification	 processes	 across	 the	 movement,	 representing	500,000	workers	in	the	Republic,	was,	on	balance,	a	roughly	democratic	affair.57		
																																																								55		 Spring	in	Dáil	debates	20/10/87,	Fine	Gael	in	Dáil	12,	13,	17/11/87;	IT	13	and	14/11/87	56		 Ó	hUiginn	to	Pádraic	White,	IDA,	‘Background	Briefing’,	23/10/87,	CTT,	‘Sectoral	Development	Proposals’	n.d.,	DTA:	S25281-E;	‘Summary	Conclusions	of	Meeting	of	Ministers	and	Mins.	of	State’,	01/11/87	and	M/Finance	‘Aide-memoire	for	government	on	Decentralisation	Process,’	01/11/87,	DTA:	S25858-B;	‘Government	Statement’,	04/11/87,	GIS	57		 Individual	ratification	processes	in	Pádraig	Yeates,	unpublished	MA	research	paper,	2003,	Yeates	Papers	
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	 The	basic	divide	 in	 the	unions	was	 the	 same	as	 that	over	NWAs	 throughout	the	1970s,	on	the	principle	and	benefits	of	centralised	bargaining.	Sectional,	craft	and	British-based	unions	tended	to	oppose,	while	the	larger	national-orientated	general	and	most	public	service	unions	had	leaderships	generally	committed	to	central	 agreements.	 These	 could	 usually	 secure	 a	majority	 of	members	 behind	them,	however	precariously.	Some	factors	cut	across	unions.	Trade	unionists	in	strong	private	sector	firms	who	believed	they	could	secure	better	terms	through	local	bargaining,	for	instance,	including	in	general	unions	like	the	ITGWU,	tended	to	be	hostile	to	national	agreements	levelling	wages	down,	as	they	saw	it.			 But	any	agreement	to	secure	a	majority	at	 ICTU	level	had	to	have	the	public	service	and	larger	general	unions	-	especially	the	ITGWU	and	FWUI	-	behind	it	to	outweigh	 the	mass	 of	 smaller	 opposing	 groups.	 Teachers	 could	 go	 either	 way	depending	 on	 on-going	 disputes	 with	 government,	 with	 INTO,	 representing	national	schools,	and	TUI	technical	teachers,	tending	to	favour,	while	secondary	school	 teachers	 (ASTI)	 tended	 to	 oppose,	 resenting	 being	 “held	 back”	 in	 the	interests	of	the	low-paid.	Though	the	leaderships	of	the	ITGWU	and	LGPSU	had	been	instrumental	in	bringing	the	PNR	about,	it	was	unclear	how	their	members	would	vote,	with	much	internal	discontent	evident.	The	modest	wage	increases,	and	 the	 impact	 of	 left-wing	 agitation	 or	 calls	 for	 rejection	 by	 Labour	 and	 Fine	Gael	leaders	could	well	tip	a	majority	even	in	these	unions	against	ratification.58			 The	results	produced	an	uneven	pattern.	Unions	balloting	to	accept	included	most	 public	 servants,	 with	 civil	 service	 technicians	 (UPTCS,	 6,000	 members)	10:1,	 teachers	 (INTO,	 20,000,	 and	 ASTI,	 12,000),	 2:1,	 telecom	 workers	 (CWU,	9,000)	6:1	and	post	office	workers	(PTWU)	3:1	 in	 favour.	 In	 the	private	sector,	bricklayers	 and	 painters,	 usually	 opponents,	 surprisingly	 supported	 it,	 swayed	perhaps	by	hope	 for	a	 recovery	of	 their	battered	 sectors	 through	 the	plan.	But	the	opposition	initially	seemed	stronger,	with	the	ATGWU	(23,000),	on	the	basis	of	local	executive	decisions,	rejecting	it,	ostensibly	by	15:1.	It	was	also	rejected,	by	sometimes	similarly	questionable	means,	by	electricians	(ETU,	10,000),	white	collar/managerial	 staffs	 (ASTMS,	 14,000)	 and	 construction	 craftsmen	 (UCATT,	11,000).	Cutbacks	saw	vocational	 teachers	(TUI),	unusually,	 reject	 it,	as	well	as																																																									58		 unpublished	research	paper,	2003,	Yeates	Papers;	‘Unions	uncertain	on	national	plan’,	IT	02/11/1987	
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the	 small	 clerical-grade	 civil	 service	 union	 (FUGE).	 The	 great	majority	 of	 very	small	unions,	as	usual,	decided,	usually	by	leadership	fiat,	against.59			 With	this	near	equal	balance,	all	now	depended	on	how	the	three	large	unions	whose	 leaders	were	most	 identified	with	the	PNR	–	the	ITGWU	(Carroll),	FWUI	(Attley)	 and	LGPSU	 (Flynn)	 –	 all	 of	which	used	 secret	 balloting,	 voted.	Attley’s	traditionally	 well-disciplined	 pro-agreement	 FWUI	 (60,000),	 with	 its	 mainly	public	service	membership,	voted	2:1	in	favour.	But	in	the	largest	public	service	union,	 the	 LGPSU,	 whose	 general	 secretary,	 Phil	 Flynn,	 had	 been	 a	 primary	architect	and	passionate	advocate	of	the	PNR,	its	large	elected	Executive	decided	to	 recommended	 rejection.	 This	was	 due	 to	 the	 radical	 cuts	 in	 the	 health	 and	local	 government	 sectors,	 which	 dominated	 its	 membership.	 But	 despite	 this	recommendation,	 LGPSU	 members	 balloted	 to	 endorse	 the	 PNR,	 albeit	 by	 a	narrow	majority.	 The	 surprise	 result	 reflected	 both	 Flynn’s	 popularity	 and	 the	Fianna	Fáil	disposition	of	most	members.	In	the	ITGWU,	its	Executive,	following	a	long,	 heated	 meeting,	 recommended	 a	 “yes”	 vote,	 after	 its	 authoritative	President,	John	Carroll,	also	a	leading	architect	of	the	PNR,	urged	it	to.60				 The	 results	 in	 the	 LGPSU	 and	 ITGWU	 illustrated	 the	 key	 role	 of	 leaders	 in	determining	 union	 choices.	 This	 factor	 had	 also	 been	 critical	 in	 the	 unusual	decision	 by	 the	 bricklayers	 and	 secondary	 teachers	 to	 support	 the	 PNR.	 Both	unions	 were	 traditionally	 hostile	 to	 central	 agreements,	 but	 their	 general	secretaries,	Kevin	Duffy	and	Kieran	Mulvey,	were	persuasive	personalities	who	strongly	supported	the	politically-driven	pro-partnership	ICTU	leadership	circle.			 After	 the	 ITGWU	 counted	 the	 ballot	 of	 its	 110,000	 nominal	 members,	 the	union	 dramatically	 announced	 it	 would	 not	 reveal	 the	 result	 until	 the	 ICTU	conference,	ostensibly	so	as	not	 to	prejudice	how	other	unions	voted.	The	 Irish	
Times	reported	that	“it	is	understood	the	ballot	came	close	to	rejecting	the	deal”	and	some	in	Congress	certainly	doubted	a	majority	had	actually	voted	in	favour	at	all.	But	the	move	was	also	tactical	by	Carroll,	to	panic	opponents	of	centralised	deals	in	other	less	democratic	union	leaderships,	who	routinely	rejected	central	agreement	to	foster	their	“militant”	image,	but	in	reality	would	panic	if	an	ICTU	
																																																								59		 ‘Special	Delegate	Conference,	Liberty	Hall,	Dublin,’	19/11/87,	[unpublished	report	of	proceedings],	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c;	‘Union	votes’	IT	18	and	20/11/87	60		 On	ITGWU,	Irish	Times	19/11/87	and	Devine	2009;	on	LGPSU	vote,	Irish	Times	18	and	20/11/87.		
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majority	actually	rejected	it.	The	official	ITGWU	result	was	54	per	cent	in	favour,	in	a	poll	in	which	60	per	cent	poll	of	its	actual	90,000	members	voted.61		 The	tense	ICTU	conference	on	19	November	reproduced	these	deep	divisions.	Cassells,	on	behalf	of	the	Congress	Executive,	argued	defensively	that	the	PNR,	in	which	 some	 “central	 features	 of	 our	 approach	 are	 incorporated”,	 was	 entirely	separate	 to	 government’s	 “massive	 cuts	 in	 public	 expenditure”,	which	 had	 not	been	 negotiated,	 formed	 no	 part	 of	 the	 agreement,	 and	 would	 continue	 to	 be	opposed.	The	PNR	offered	the	only	realistic	alternative	to	a	triumph	of	the	“new	right”	 economics	 of	 Thatcherism,	 which	 many	 in	 the	 elite,	 he	 said,	 eagerly	awaited	an	opportunity	to	implement.	Attley	stressed	that	union	aims	of	decent	wages	and	living	standards	could	simply	not	be	achieved	by	“what	you	can	get	by	negotiating	 in	 a	 few	 profitable	 companies”,	 throwing	 “the	 lower	 paid	 to	 the	wolves”.	 Incoming	Congress	President,	Bill	Wallace,	 pleaded	 for	 the	 agreement	“for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 unemployed,	 …	 of	 our	 members	 and	 of	 those	 on	 social	welfare”.	With	delegates	voting	as	mandated,	 the	PNR	was	endorsed	by	181	 to	114.	This	was	a	comfortable	majority,	but	the	large	“no”	minority	in	unions	such	as	 the	 ITGWU	and	LGPSU	whose	majority	had	voted	“yes”,	meant	a	majority	of	union	 members	 overall	 opposed	 it,	 certainly	 if	 the	 results	 declared	 for	oppositional	unions	are	taken	at	face	vale.	The	ICTU	mandate	was	precarious,	the	
Irish	Times	describing	it	as	“effectively	swung	by	a	few	thousand	ITGWU	votes”.62		 But	 armed	with	 the	mandate,	 ICTU	 immediately	declared	 its	priority	 to	 “get	on”	with	“rebuilding	our	industrial	base”	by	ensuring	speedy	delivery	of	the	PNR	plan.	In	a	letter	to	Haughey	on	the	day	of	the	vote,	it	sought	an	urgent	meeting	on	the	 “immediate	 implementation	 of	 the	 Programme”	 and	 to	 establish	 the	structures	“to	monitor	achievement	of	targets	and	objectives”.63			 Employer	 endorsement	 followed	 two	weeks	 later,	 but	 only	 after	 a	 flurry	 of	background	activity	by	government.		The	FUE	had	been	alarmed	by	rumours	that	the	 Labour	 Court,	 whose	 exclusion	 from	 an	 “interpretative”	 role	 they	 thought																																																									61		 Irish	Times	19/11/87;	on	ICTU	doubts,	interview	with	S.	McCarthy;	on	ITGWU	strategy,	Interview	with	Attley;	actual	ITGWU	ballot	result	Devine	2009	62		 ‘Special	Delegate	Conference,	Liberty	Hall,	Dublin,’	19/11/87,	[unpublished	report	of	proceedings],	and	‘Remarks	by	the	President,	Mr.	Billy	Wallace,	at	the	close	of	the	Conference’,	19/11/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c;	ICTU	Annual	Report	1988:	216;	‘ICTU	accepts	national	plan	by	majority	of	63’,	IT	20/11/87	63		 ICTU	Press	Release,	‘Job	Creation	first	priority	says	Congress’,	19/11/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c;	Cassells	to	Haughey,	24/11/1987,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1d;		
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they	 had	 secured,	 intended	 to	 regard	 PNR	 rates	 as	 generally	 applicable.	Government	stressed	to	employers	the	PNR’s	“importance	for	national	recovery”,	with	“adherence	to	the	pay	norms	crucial”,	especially	as	it	effectively	subsidised	pay	increases	through	tax	reforms.	This,	as	will	be	seen,	had	been	Haughey’s	final	concession	 to	 ICTU	 to	 assist	 it	 secure	 a	 majority	 at	 its	 conference.	 But	 the	Department	of	Labour	warned	Ahern	that	the	FUE	was	rebelling	on	the	Labour	Court	 issue.	 The	 3	 per	 cent/£4	 “floor”	 had	 been	 the	 cause	 of	 “considerable	acrimony	 and	 negotiation”	 with	 employers,	 who	 had	 only	 finally	 agreed	 to	generally	apply	 it	on	a	 locally-agreed	voluntary	basis	and	“would	not	be	 forced	by	 the	…	Labour	Courts	 to	 do	 so”.	 A	 rumour	 circulated	 that	 the	 chairs	 of	 Joint	Labour	Committees	(JLCs)	 intended,	 in	the	event	of	 tied	employer/union	votes,	to	adopt	a	default	position	of	 issuing	binding	wages	orders	applying	PNR	rates.	This	 led	Dan	McAuley	of	 the	FUE	to	warn	the	Department	that	any	adoption	of	the	£4	as	 “mandatory	on	employers”	would	be	regarded	by	FUE	as	a	breach	of	trust.	 The	 Department	 warned	 Ó	 hUiginn	 of	 “a	 real	 risk	 the	 FUE	 would	 be	instructed	 to	 withdraw”.	 He	 therefore	 intervened	 to	 assuage	 employer	 fears,	stressing	the	government	position	that	the	Court	would	not	have	such	a	role.64			 While	 the	 Labour	 Court	 position	 was	 thus	 parked	 rather	 than	 resolved,	another	problem	for	employers,	indicating	the	limited	remit	of	the	FUE	in	more	dynamic	sectors,	was,	paradoxically,	companies	wanting	to	retain	freedom	to	pay	increases	 above	 PNR	 rates.	 It	 was	 a	 problem	 similar	 to	 ICTU’s	 in	 profitable	industries.	The	press	was	reporting	new	wage	deals	and	Labour	Court	awards	of	over	 5	 per	 cent,	 and	 the	 FUE	 confided	 its	 fear	 to	 a	 Department	 official	 that	“certain	employers	and	unions”	had	 “jointly	 indicated	 to	 the	Labour	Court	 that	they	want	to	opt	out	of	the	agreement”.	McAuley	secretly	lobbied	government	to	pressure	 such	 companies	 to	 comply.	 Although	 Finance	 reported	 that	 the	 cases	were	not	new	and	mostly	involved	the	last	phases	of	pre-PNR	deals	and	in	some	cases	 non-FUE-member	 companies,	 the	 Department	 warned	 Ahern	 that	 “any	continued	 divergence	 from	 the	 agreed	 norms	 …	 will	 ultimately	 make	 it	 more	difficult	 to	 hold	 the	 line	 in	 the	 public	 sector”,	 and,	 stressing	 government’s	insistence	 on	 “adherence	 to	 the	 pay	 norms	 as	 crucial”,	 suggested	 he	 have																																																									64		 Kevin	Murphy	[Sec.,	D/Lab.]	to	Minister	[for	Lab.],	‘Pay	in	the	Private	Sector’,	24/11/87,	Murphy	to	Ó	hUiginn	and	Travers,	01/12/87,	and	Travers	to	Teahon	and	Sec.	[=	Ó	hUiginn],	02.12.87,	DTA:	S25857-A	
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Haughey	 personally	 write	 to	 the	 MDs	 of	 the	 thousand	 largest	 companies	emphasising	the	agreement’s	“importance	for	national	recovery”.65			 The	FUE	also	worried	that	FDI	companies	reliant	on	high	skilled	labour	would	offer	 pay	 increases	 “over	 the	 odds”,	 again	 putting	 it	 under	 pressure.	 Although	such	firms,	as	advised	by	the	IDA,	tended	on	principle	not	to	go	against	national	norms,	the	FUE	believed	that	Howmedica,	a	US	pharmaceutical	firm,	not	an	FUE	member	 but	 a	 pay	 “trendsetter”,	 intended	 to	 exceed	 the	 PNR’s	 2.5	 per	 cent	“guideline”.	 He	 needn’t	 have	 worried	 for,	 as	 Ó	 hUiginn	 told	 Haughey,	 its	managing	director,	Dermot	Whelan	–	later	CII	President	and	Limerick	University	
luminatus	-	had	“assured	me	that,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	they	would	not	exceed	the	 guideline”.	 “They	 regard	 themselves	 as	 guests	 of	 the	 Irish	 economy	 and	would	not	wish	 to	 take	any	action	which	would	be	detrimental	 to	 the	national	interest.	Mr.	Whelan	also	asked	me	to	convey	his	regards	to	you”.66		 Finally	“assured”,	especially	through	the	“ample	scope	for	resolving	problems	and	taking	initiatives	at	local	level”,	the	FUE	Central	Council	announced	that	“in	general	members	were	prepared	to	support	the	Programme	…	in	the	interests	of	the	country	and	the	development	of	the	economy”.	While	the	FUE	was	finally	on	board,	 the	 construction	 industry	 needed	 a	 further	 nudge.	 To	 bring	 it	 over	 the	line,	government	confidentially	provided	“clarification”	that	the	1-hour	working	time	 reduction	 agreed	 in	 the	 PNR	 would	 be	 understood	 as	 applying	 in	construction	 only	 to	 workers	 on	 over	 40	 hours,	 and	 promising	 that	 public	contracts	would	be	adjusted	to	compensate	for	PNR	pay-increase	costs.67		 Fine	 Gael,	 after	 talks	 with	 whips	 on	 a	 common	motion	 opposing	 increased	pupil/teacher	 ratios	 failed	 due	 to	 the	 PDs,	 moved	 another	 motion	 in	 the	 Dáil	demanding	public	service	pay	increases	be	suspended	to	save	teaching	jobs	and	rejecting	the	PNR.	Haughey	sought	through	a	last	minute	amendment,	drafted	by	Ó	hUiginn,	to	secure	support	for	the	PNR	by	stressing	its	consensus	aspect.	But	this	failed	and	Fine	Gael’s	motion	was	carried.	As	it	was	not	a	confidence	vote	it																																																									65		 ‘Unions	uncertain	on	national	plan	support’,	Irish	Times	02/11/87;	Murphy	[Sec.,	D/Labour]	to	Minister	‘Pay	in	the	Private	Sector’,	24/11/87,	DTA:	S25857-A;	D/Finance,	‘Settlements	in	excess	of	Private	Sector	Pay	Agreement	associated	with	the	PNR’,	Dec.	1987,	DTA:	OHP	66		 On	IDA	guidance	to	TNCs,	Interview	with	Pádraic	White;	on	Howmedica,	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	‘National	Programme	-	Pay	Guidelines’,	11/11/87,	DTA:	OHP.	On	Whelan	also	www.ul.ie/ceremonies/dermot-patrick-whelan	67		 FUE	Bulletin,	Nov.	1987;	Thomas	Reynolds,	MD,	CIF,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	24/11/87,	DTA:	S25858-C	
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could	 not	 stop	 the	 PNR	 proceeding,	 but	 it	 showed	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 Tallaght	Strategy	and	ended	Haughey’s	hopes	of	a	“political	consensus”	on	the	PNR.68			 Last	minute	concessions	had	been	essential	to	securing	ratification	of	the	PNR,	including	 a	 rather	 dubious	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Labour	 Court’s	 remit	 and	 the	working	 hours	 clause	 of	 the	 PNR	 to	 appease	 employers.	 The	 agreement	 also	failed	 to	achieve	political	 consensus	 in	 the	Dáil.	 Its	 final	 ratification	by	partner	organisations,	however	close,	resulted	from	the	single-minded	determination	of	government	 and	 beleaguered	 pro-partnership	 ICTU	 leaders	 to	 achieve	 their	“consensus	plan”.	Despite	CII	enthusiasm,	considerable	political	intervention	had	been	 required	 to	 finally	 bring	 employer	 leaders	 on	 board.	 Haughey’s	 own	dramatic	interventions	meant	his	high-stakes	strategy	now	had	buy-in,	however	precarious.	Without	the	“few	thousand	votes”	of	the	ITGWU	his	political	position	might	 well	 have	 been	 fatally	 undermined,	 as	 the	 only	 alternative	 available,	 a	Thatcher-like	strategy	backed	by	Fine	Gael	and	the	PDs,	would	have	contradicted	everything	he	stood	for	in	politics.	Ensuring	the	success	of	the	PNR	as	more	than	simply	 a	 “dickied	 up	 public	 service	 agreement”	 with	 “a	 fungus	 of	 promises	attached”,	as	Dukes	contemptuously	described	it,	was	Haughey’s	next	challenge.			
	
																																																								68		 Ó	hUiginn	to	Chief	Whip	17/11/87,	DTA:	OHP;	Dáil	24/11/87;	Dáil	events	also	Irish	Times	25/11/1987	
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Chapter	7	
The	strategy	and	dynamics	of	partnership,	
1987-89	
	
Kick-starting	the	partnership	“system”,	December	1987			 Once	 the	 unions	 had	 ratified	 the	 agreement,	 Haughey	moved	 to	 embed	 the	new	system.	ICTU	was	just	as	determined,	intent	on	getting	the	“Central	Review	Committee”	 (CRC)	 up	 and	 running	 while	 simultaneously	 establishing	 political	distance	to	government	with	a	“Campaign	for	Jobs”	ahead	of	the	1988	budget.1		 Before	moving,	government	assessed	its	position.	The	economic	situation	was	precarious	following	the	London/New	York	stock	market	crises.	The	ESRI	urged	that	to	avoid	recession	PNR	expenditure	reduction	targets	had	to	be	met	“in	full”	which,	 it	 pessimistically	 opined,	 should	 lead	 “within	 a	 couple	 of	 years”	 to	 a	“return	 to	a	path	of	 steady	growth”.	The	 Irish	Times	warned	 that	 a	 “worst	 case	scenario”	might	require	re-negotiating	the	PNR	to	achieve	higher	cuts.	The	PNR’s	prioritising	of	monetary	stabilisation	allowed	government	a	gradualist	moderate	approach	on	tax	reform,	so	it	started	with	low-cost	commitments,	such	as	labour	law	reform.	But	MacSharry’s	reporting	to	cabinet	on	10	December	that	1987	ERB	reduction	 targets	 were	 “certain	 to	 be	 achieved”	 created	 budgetary	 space,	allowing	Haughey	order	that	Christmas	welfare	bonuses,	which	the	coalition	had	suspended	and	he	had	not	committed	to	restore,	be	paid.2			 This	 opened	 the	 door	 for	 ICTU	 to	 engage.	 But	 it	 had	 several	 “outstanding”	issues,	which	 PNR’s	 “umbrella”	 clause	was	 designed	 to	 resolve,	 it	 first	wanted	addressed.	 These	 included	 local	 authorities	 laying	 off	 workers	 for	 cost-saving	reasons,	 health	 boards	 cutting	 student	 nurse	 salaries,	 the	 pupil/teacher	 ratio	review,	and	 the	homelessness	bill	promised	 for	Christmas.	 It	was	also	 irritated	by	ministerial	 announcements	 of	 PNR	 initiatives	without	 consulting	with	 it	 or	mentioning	 their	 PNR	 context.	 These	 included	 the	 Gleeson	 Report	 which	 had	embarrassingly	 advised	 a	 15	 per	 cent	 salary	 hike	 for	 top	 state	 officials,	 an																																																											1	 Cassells	to	Haughey,	24/11/1987,	DTA:	S25857A;	‘PNR	-	ICTU	Continues	Campaign	for	Jobs	–Address	by	Peter	Cassells	…	to	SSISI’,	03/12/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c			2		 ESRI,	Mid-term	forecast,	Dec.	1987;	IT	(editorial)	20/11/87;	‘M/Labour	publishes	Review	of	Equality	Legislation,’	30/11/87,	GIS:	D/Labour;	D/Finance	to	D/	Taoiseach,	‘Budgetary	Developments’	n.d.	[10/12/87],	DTA:	S25862-A
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“efficiency	audit”	demanded	by	the	IFA	of	staff	and	services	at	the	Department	of	Agriculture,	and	solo	runs	by	Ahern	with	“discussion	documents”	on	law	reform.3			 Employers	also	had	concerns,	FUE’s	priority	being	 to	ensure	PNR	pay	 terms	were	not	a	national	“norm”	enforceable	by	the	Labour	Court.	Defining	PNR	pay	terms	as	subject	to	“local	conditions”	and	“local	negotiation”	had	been	vital	in	it	signing	the	PNR.	Any	attempt	to	re-open	the	subject	on	the	CRC,	Department	of	Labour	 officials	 warned,	 would	 only	 “muddy	 the	 waters	 on	 what	 the	 Pay	Agreement	 entails”	 and	 cause	 an	FUE	 “walk-out”.	 Congress,	when	 it	 learned	of	this,	was	alarmed	at	the	apparent	concession	to	employers	on	which	it	had	not	been	consulted.	The	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	knew	the	issue	would	have	to	be	resolved	in	ICTU’s	favour,	as	they	“had	‘sold’	the	Programme	to	their	members	on	[the]	basis,	inter	alia,	of	[its]	special	provisions	…	for	low-paid	workers”.4			 Haughey	arranged	to	meet	both	ICTU	and	CII/FUE	–	in	that	order,	as	ever.	He	assured	 Congress	 beforehand	 on	 some	 issues,	 explaining	 that	 the	 “efficiency	audit”	was	 a	 purely	Department-IFA	 affair,	 formed	no	 part	 of	 the	 PNR,	 and	he	had	not	ordered	it.	Action	would	also	be	taken	on	the	other	issues	they	raised.	He	had	 Ó	 hUiginn	 berate	 the	 Department	 of	 Environment	 over	 continued	 local	authority	lay-offs	and	the	housing	bill,	telling	them	inaction	“detracted	from	the	credibility	of	 the	Programme	and	the	Government’s	commitment	 to	 it”.	He	also	ordered	that	arrangements	to	establish	the	CRC	be	“expedited”.5				 Before	 meeting	 ICTU,	 Haughey,	 through	 Ó	 hUiginn,	 instructed	 ministers	 to	arrange	 “bilateral”	meetings	 to	 resolve	 its	 grievances.	 They	were	 also	 to	make	sure	 departments	 were	 “gearing	 their	 activities	 very	 firmly	 to	 secure	 the	employment	 targets	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Programme”	 and	 that	 unilateral	announcements	ceased.	The	ICTU	vote	had	been	“very	close”	and	“a	good	deal	of	scepticism	 among	 union	 members	 in	 relation	 to	 Government	 commitment”	remained.	 Their	 “perception”	 was	 of	 “Government	 Departments	 and	 State																																																											3		 J.T.	[=	Travers]	to	Sec.	[=Ó	hUiginn],	‘Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	…	with	Reps.	of	ICTU	on	10th	Dec.’,	03/10/87,	Cassells	to	Ó	hUiginn,	04/12/87	re	“efficiency	audit”,	DTA:	S25862-A;	‘Meeting	of	Taoiseach,	M/Finance	and	M/Agric.	with	IFA,	ICOS	and	Macra	na	Féirme’,	13/11/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach			4		 Travers	to	Teahon	and	Sec.	[=	Ó	hUiginn]	02.12.87,	and	J.T.	[=	Travers]	to	Sec.,	‘Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	…	with	Representatives	of	ICTU	on	10th	December’,	03/10/87,	DTA:	S25857-A			5		 h/w	note,	J.T.	[=	Travers]	of	telephone	conversation	between	“Sec.”	[=	Ó	hUiginn]	and	Peter	Cassells,	07/12/87,	‘Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	and	Employer	Bodies’,	14/12/87,	Dermot	Nally,	Sec.,	D/Taoiseach,	to	M/Finance,	08/12/87,	and	Ó	hUiginn	[to	Haughey],	‘Aide	Memoire	for	Government	-	PNR:	Proposed	Arrangements	for	Establishment	and	Operation	of	the	Central	Review	Committee’,	Ó	hUiginn,	h/w	note,	n.d.,	‘PNR	1987	Review	and	Mon.	Cttee’.,	DTA:	S25857-A	
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agencies	 not	 actively	 pursuing	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Programme”	 and	 this	“lackadaisical	approach”	must	change	to	an	“urgent	one”.	Congress’s	fears	must	be	 “allayed	 by	 firm	 implementation	 of	 the	 measures	 …	 and	 by	 demonstrating	early	progress”,	 essential	 “if	 the	programme	was	not	 to	disintegrate”.	Plans	 for	PNR	initiatives	in	their	remit	were	to	be	submitted	before	Haughey	met	ICTU.6			 At	 the	meeting	with	Congress,	Haughey	dominated	on	 the	 government	 side,	with	ministers	contributing	only	when	asked,	and	similarly,	and	despite	a	 large	delegation,	 Cassells	 and	 Flynn	 –	 as	 Attley	 couldn’t	 attend	 -	 provided	 most	 of	ICTU’s	 input.	 In	 front	 of	 his	 silent	ministers	 Haughey	 detailed	 how	 each	 ICTU	issue	was	being	“immediately”	addressed,	and	undertook	to	rein	in	solo	runs	and	defer	Gleeson.	He	gave	detailed	updates	on	measures	 initiated	and	the	plans	of	each	department,	and	assured	ICTU	of	 full	civil	service	cooperation.	Timescales	for	commencing	programmes	were	discussed,	bilateral	meetings	with	ministers	arranged,	 terms	 of	 reference	 for	 the	 CRC,	 which	 Ó	 hUiginn	 had	 drafted	 with	Haughey,	 agreed,	 and	 an	 inaugural	 date	 set	 for	 its	 first	 meeting	 the	 following	week.	In	a	major	coup	for	the	ICTU	that	disregarded	FUE	threats,	Haughey	said	government	considered	the	PNR’s	pay	terms	as	generally	applying,	unless	where	in	exceptional	 cases	a	 company’s	difficulties	prevented	 this.	He	 thus	effectively	conceded	Labour	Court	enforcement.	 ICTU	agreed	 to	 the	CRC	being	 focused	on	programme	delivery,	with	pay	a	matter	for	a	separate	forum.	A	government-ICTU	“Joint	 Statement”	 followed,	 listing	 the	 PNR	 measures	 already	 initiated,	welcoming	the	Customs	House	project,	and	noting	the	“bounce”	in	the	economy	already	apparent	due	to	the	stability	and	confidence	the	PNR	provided.7	
																																																										6		 Instructions	to	departments,	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	‘Meeting	with	ICTU	10/12/87’,	also	correspondence	between	Travers/Ó	hUiginn	and	various	Departments/agencies	B.	McDonagh,	D/Communications	to	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	09/12/87,	DTA:	S25862-A;	“ICTU	vote	very	close”,	J.T.	[=	Travers]	h/w	note	of	telephone	conversation	between	“Sec.”	[=	Ó	hUiginn]	and	Cassells,	07/12/87,	and	‘Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	and	Employer	Bodies’,	14/12/87,	DTA:	S25862-A			7		 h/w	minutes	of	Govt.-ICTU	meeting	of	10/12/87,	‘Documentation,	PNR’	[for	meeting	10/12/87],		J.T.	[=	Travers]	to	Sec.	[=Ó	hUiginn],	‘Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	…	with	Representatives	of	ICTU	on	10th	December’,	03/10/87,	DTA:	S25862-A;	D/I&C,	‘List	of	Industrial	Measures’,	Tourism	Section,	D/I&C,	‘Brief	for	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	ICTU	on	10	December’,	09/12/87,	John	Hynes,	D/Social	Welfare	to	Travers,	D/	Taoiseach,	‘Measures	being	implemented	by	D/Social	Welfare’,	10/12/87,	and	D/Taoiseach	memo,	‘Social	Policy	Aspect’,	DTA:	S25858-C;	ICTU,	‘Confidential	–	PNR,	Report	of	Meeting	with	the	Taoiseach,	10	December	1987’,		ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c;	Ó	hUiginn	[for	Taoiseach]:	‘Aide	Memoire	for	Government,	PNR,	Proposed	Arrangements	for	Establishment	and	Operation	of	the	Central	Review	Committee’,	Dermot	Nally,	Private	Sec.	D/Taoiseach,	to	M/Finance:	08/12/87	and	Ó	hUiginn	to	Taoiseach,	10/12/87,	DTA:	S25857-A;	‘Joint	Government-ICTU	Statement’,	10/12/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	
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	 Haughey	then	met	the	FUE,	CII	and	CIF.	While	expressing	his	“understanding”	for	 their	 position	 on	 the	 pay	 issue,	 he	 quickly	 moved	 on	 to	 the	 benefits	 to	business	of	budget	discipline,	the	economic	stability	provided	by	the	PNR,	and	its	growth	 and	 infrastructure	 plans,	 with	 which	 CII	 enthusiastically	 engaged.	 He	then	 met	 farming	 organisations.	 He	 remained	 hopeful	 the	 ICMSA	 could	 be	induced	 to	 re-engage,	 instructing	 that	places	be	 reserved	 for	 them	on	 the	CRC,	and	assured	a	nervous	IFA	that	PRSI	levies	would	be	deferred	until	the	Pensions	Board	had	completed	a	review	of	the	insurance	liabilities	of	the	self-employed.8			 With	the	main	partners	placated,	the	first	meeting	of	the	CRC	took	place	on	18	December.	 “Bilateral”	 pre-budget	meetings	were	 also	 arranged	 during	 January	1988.	 The	 budget	 continued	 MacSharry’s	 schedule	 of	 cuts	 and	 while	 the	 PDs	attacked	 concessions	 to	 “interest	 groups”,	 Fine	 Gael	 did	 not	 oppose	 it	 and	 the	FUE	 and	 CII	 welcomed	 it.	 Although	 it	 deferred	 farmers’	 PRSI	 and	 Spring	denounced	 it	 as	 “miserly	 and	 penny-pinching”,	 it	 included	 PAYE	 and	 welfare	improvements.	ICTU,	while	criticising	the	cuts,	welcomed	this	“first	step	towards	the	implementation	of	the	tax	reform	and	social	equity	elements”	of	the	PNR.9				 Partnership	 did	 not	 end	 the	 routines	 of	 class	 warfare,	 with	 Congress	responding	 to	 an	 employers’	 Christmas	 statement,	 which	 boasted	 of	 having	minimised	wages	and	costs	through	the	PNR,	by	attacking	“scrooge	employers”	resisting	 basic	 PNR	 increases	 and	 highlighting	 ICTU’s	 success	 in	 having	 the	minimum	rates	agreed	applying	generally.10		 Social	partnership	was	up	and	running.	
	
Institutional	drivers:	CRC,	NESC	and	the	State	
CRC:	a	“mechanism	unique	in	the	European	Community”		 A	1990	review	of	the	PNR	described	the	CRC	as	a	“mechanism	unique	in	the	European	Community”	 enabling	 “the	 social	 partners	 to	have	 an	on-going	 input	into	 Government	 decision-making	 on	 economic	 and	 social	 policy”.	 Those																																																										8		 Mtg.,Taoiseach	and	Ministers	and	Employer	Bodies.	14/12/87’,	Dermot	Nally,	Private	Sec.	D/Taoiseach	to	Min.	Finance:	08/12/87,	DTA:	S25857-A;	John	Hynes,	D/Social	Welfare,	to	J.	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	10/12/87,	DTA:	S25858-C;	‘Split	looming	over	PRSI	report’,	Irish	Farmers’	Journal	19/12/1987			9		 FUE	Bulletin	and	CII	Bulletin,	Jan.	1988;	ICTU	‘Statement	on	Budget’,	27/01/88,	in	ICTU	AR	1988:	223-5;	Dick	Spring,	‘Miserly	and	penny-pinching’,	and	Cassells,	‘First	step’,	Cork	Examiner,	28/01/88		10		 FUE	Bulletin,	Dec.	1987;	‘JLCs	£4	minimum	to	be	repaid’,	IRN	Report,	07.01.88;	ICTU,	‘Press	Release’,	22/12/87,	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1c	
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involved,	 from	 Ó	 hUiginn	 to	 Flynn,	 Cassells	 to	 Power,	 recall	 its	 meetings	 as	sometimes	gruelling	or	exasperating,	but	mostly	 collegial,	 innovative	and	quite	effective.	 It	 provided	 the	 PNR’s	 administrative	 dynamic,	 coaxing	 programme	delivery,	 trouble-shooting	 problems	 and	 resolving	 impasses.	 It	 met	 monthly	(except	 August)	 in	 the	 prestigious	 conference	 room	 of	 the	 Taoiseach’s	Department,	 over	 19	 months	 from	 December	 1987	 to	 September	 1990,	 when	negotiations	on	a	successor	agreement	began.	Its	modus	operandi	was	consensus	and	 confidentially	 though,	 as	 Haughey	 told	 opposition	 leaders	 criticising	 its	“secrecy”,	its	minutes	were	on	the	public	record,	available	in	the	Dáil	Library.11			 The	CRC,	chaired	by	Ó	hUiginn	who	never	missed	a	meeting,	consisted	of	six	members	 each	 from	 ICTU	 and	 business/employer	 groups	 (two	 each	 from	 CII/	FUE/CIF),	and	 four	 from	 farming	bodies	 (two	 IFA	and	one	each	 from	ICOS	and	Macra	 na	 Féirme),	with	 two	 held	 “open”	 for	 ICMSA.	 Civil	 servants	 –	 “assistant	secretary	 or	 higher”,	 as	 the	 terms	 of	 reference	 specified	 –	 were	 appointed	 by	Finance,	Labour	and	Industry	and	Commerce,	with	others	attending	as	required.	The	 CRC	 focused	 on	 monitoring	 programme	 delivery,	 accepting	 that	 pay	 and	other	issues	were	separate	matters	for	the	“negotiating”	and	“political	levels”.12		 ICTU’s	representatives	-	Attley,	Flynn,	Browne,	Kirwan	and	Quigley	-	were	all	strong	partnership	advocates,	and	members	of	either,	or	both,	the	NESC	and	the	Congress	Executive’s	GPC.	They	were	backed-up	by	full-time	officials	Nevin	and	Cassells	or,	following	Nevin’s	retirement,	Patricia	O’Donovan,	the	CRC’s	first	and	sole	woman	member.	Although	etiquette	prescribed	that	senior	elected	figures	–	“presidents”	etc.	-	represent	their	organisations,	it	was	the	full	time	officials	who	provided	most	input.	Congress	President	John	Carroll,	despite	his	key	role	in	the	PNR,	 attended	 only	 the	 “inaugural	 meeting”,	 as	 figures	 at	 this	 level,	 like	 their	political	counterparts,	did	not	to	attend	the	CRC	but	presided	instead	at	“political	level”	meetings	with	Haughey.	The	senior	 figures	who	attended	regularly	were	Attley,	Flynn	and	Browne	the	most	consistent	for	ICTU,	the	dominant	figure	for	employers	 Jim	 O’Brien,	 divisional	 director	 of	 FUE/FIE,	 until	 joined	 by	 John	Dunne	 in	 1989,	 for	 the	 CII	 Liam	 Connellan,	 Director	 General,	 and	 Con	 Power,																																																									11		 CRC	1990;	Interviews	with	Cassells,	Ó	hUiginn,	Power,	O’Sullivan,	Attley,	O’Donovan;	Dáil	library,	Haughey	in	Dáil,	02/03/88	12		 Ó	hUiginn	[for	Taoiseach]:	‘Aide	Memoire	for	Government,	PNR,	Proposed	Arrangements	for	Establishment	and	Operation	of	the	Central	Review	Committee’,	Dermot	Nally,	Private	Sec.	D/Taoiseach,	to	M/Finance:	08/12/87,	DTA:	S25857-A;	on	CRC	membership	see	Appendix	A	
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chief	economist,	and	for	the	IFA	Michael	Berkery,	its	general	secretary,	and	Con	Lucey,	 its	 chief	 economist.	 Similar	 level	 officials	 also	 attended	 for	 ICOS	 and	Macra.	Government	was	represented	by	Ó	hUiginn,	his	assistant	secretary,	Paddy	Teahon,	and	again	with	consistent	attendance,	assistant	secretaries	from	Finance	(Tutty	 and	 O’Gorman),	 Labour	 (Bonner)	 and	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 (Woulfe	and	 Dorgan).	 These	 were	 also	 government	 appointees	 on	 NESC.	 Typical	 CRC	meetings	involved	8	to	12	“social	partners”	and	from	12	to	20	state	officials.13		 In	February	1988,	Ó	hUiginn	proposed	a	“Secretariat	Group”	(SG)	to	convene	between	meetings	to	organise	the	agenda	and	free	CRC	of	mundane	bureaucratic	work.	A	somewhat	suspicious	CRC	agreed	to	it	“on	a	trial	basis”,	but	it	became	a	regular	ancillary	structure.	The	“SG”	was	chaired	by	Teahon	and	comprised	eight	“partner”	members	 -	 the	main	 full-time	 official	 for	 each	 organisation	 -	 and	 an	assistant	 secretary	 from	 each	 department.	 For	 ICTU	 this	 was	 Cassells,	 or	sometimes	O’Donovan,	but	given	their	activism	and	the	consensus	ethos,	the	fact	they	were	just	two	union	people	among	eight	partners	on	the	SG	did	not	dilute	the	 ICTU	 input.	To	 facilitate	open	discussion	and	efficient	decision-making,	 the	SG	 dispensed	 with	 minutes,	 producing	 only	 simple	 agreed	 “Action	 Points”	 for	consideration	 by	 the	CRC,	 though	 luckily	 for	 historians	 extensive	 hand-written	notes	of	most	Secretariat	Group	meetings	survive.14			 Haughey	had	planned	to	open	the	inaugural	CRC	meeting	with	a	high-minded	speech	on	its	historic	significance	and	the	“solemn”	commitment	of	government	to	deliver	on	PNR	goals.	But	it	turned	out	a	more	prosaic	affair	lacking	historical	resonance,	 as	 Haughey	 was	 again	 ill	 and	 could	 not	 attend.	 It	 discussed	departmental	 progress	 in	 resolving	 “outstanding”	 issues	 and	 a	 long	 composite	document	 of	 progress	 by	 departments	 on	 PNR	 commitments.	 The	 CRC’s	confidential	and	“consensus”	modus	operandi,	 far	from	nourishing	“groupthink”,	facilitated	 open	 and	 robust	 debate,	 with	 little	 grand-standing.	With	 no	 voting,	numbers	attending	was	irrelevant.	Consensus	was	far	from	always	possible,	but	only	 rarely	 did	 partners	 insist	 on	 their	 dissenting	 views	 being	 recorded.	More	usually,	minority	views	were	taken	by	partners	to	the	“political	level”.	That	this	
																																																								13		 Records	of	CRC	meetings	1987-89;	ICTU	EC	meeting	16/12/87,	Item	1371;	See	also	Appendix	A,	CRC	membership,	and	Appendix	B,	CRC	attendance	1987-90	14		 DTA	SG	and	CRC	records	
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modus	operandi	 worked	was	 assisted	 by	 the	 fact	 that	most	 CRC	members	 and	officials,	including	Ó	hUiginn,	knew	each	other	from	NESC	and	other	forums.15			 Ó	 hUiginn,	 a	 pro-active	 chairman,	 represented	Haughey,	with	whom	he	 had	close	almost	daily	contact,	rather	than	government	per	se	or	the	civil	service.	He	intervened	 to	 initiate	 or	 steer	 debates,	 support	 particular	 partner	 demands,	pressurise	 officials,	 or	 deflect	 partner	 claims	 to	 defend	 state	 interests.	 He	was	highly	 respected	 by	 all	 members	 and	 his	 authority	 –	 often	 “a	 weary	 stare”	sufficing	-	enough	to	ensure	compliance	from	the	most	recalcitrant	civil	servant.	When	divisions	arose,	his	support	 for	whichever	side	–	representing	Haughey’s	preference	 –	 determined	 the	 balance	 of	 “consensus”.	 Other	 civil	 servants	 also	actively	 debated	 propositions	 or	 defended	 their	 departmental	 interests.	 It	was	not	always	possible	to	leave	disputes	at	the	door,	causing	the	FUE	in	June	1988	to	again	insist	that	pay	and	disputes	be	excluded.	A	rare	exception	was	when	ICTU	protested	the	CIF’s	refusal	to	increase	pension	contributions.		Claiming	this	was	“contrary	 to	 the	 spirit	 and	 intent	 of	 the	 PNR”	 and	 warning	 of	 inevitable	“confrontation”,	 ICTU	 asked	 Ó	 hUiginn	 to	 use	 his	 “good	 offices”	 to	 ensure	 CIF	“respect[ed]	the	underlying	commitments”.	CIF	was	brought	quickly	to	heel.16		 Regular	disputes	arose	over	interpretation	of	PNR	policies.	When	the	IFA	and	ICTU	clashed	over	VAT	refunds	and	PRSI	for	farmers,	on	Ó	hUiginn’s	suggestion	the	CRC	parked	the	issue	by	advising	the	IFA	to	pursue	its	grievance	directly	with	government.	 On	 other	 partner	 clashes	 with	 government,	 the	 CRC	 sometimes	backed	aggrieved	partners,	as	when	Agriculture	Minister	O’Kennedy	insisted	on	appointing	directors	of	his	choice	to	the	new	Teagasc	board.	The	IFA	protested,	demanding	formal	representation,	and	ICTU	the	election	of	worker	directors.	On	Ó	hUiginn’s	advice,	Haughey	had	O’Kennedy	“take	account”	of	their	requests,	and	their	nominees	were	duly	included	among	O’Kennedy’s	appointees.17																																																									15		 ‘Draft	Statement	by	An	Taoiseach	at	the	Inaugural	Meeting	of	the	[CRC]	established	on	18	December	1987’,	DTA:	S25857-A,	Travers	to	Secretaries	of	all	Departments	–	02/12/87,	and	correspondence	with	Departments,	DTA:	S25858-C;	‘Specific	Measures	included	in	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery:	Summary	of	positions	as	reported	by	Government	Departments,	Dec.	1987’,	‘CRC,	PNR:	first	mtg.	Friday	18	December	1987,	Dept.	T	Room	116’,	Agenda	and	correspondence	for	first	meeting,	and	Minutes	First	meeting	of	the	CRC,	18/12/87,	DTA:	S25857-A	16		 “weary	stare”,	Attley	interview;	FUE	insistence,	h/w	notes.	‘Secretariat	Group	16/6/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	construction	industry,	Tom	McGrath,	ICTU,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	26/04/89:	‘Re:	Programme	for	National	recovery’,	DTA:	S25857-R	17		 farmer’s	PRSI	issue,	h/w	notes,	CRC	Secretariat	Group,	‘Sec.	Group	16/6/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	Teagasc	dispute,	CRC.	Summary	Report	of	Third	Meeting	held	on	Thursday,	18	Feb.	1988,	DTA:	S25857-B;	D/A&F,	memo,	‘Abolition	of	AFT’,	21/03/88,	S25857-C;	CRC	6th	Meeting	–	h/w	notes	for	Minutes,	n.d.	[26	May	
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	 ICTU	 ensured	 that	 the	 check-listing	 approach	 to	monitoring	 progress	 of	 the	programme,	which	Haughey	had	proposed	for	the	inaugural	meeting,	became	the	CRC’s	 standard	 operating	 procedure.	 Each	 meeting	 examined	 the	 bulky	composite	 document,	 updated	 monthly,	 “Specific	 Measures	 included	 in	 the	
Programme	 for	 National	 Recovery:	 Summary	 of	 positions	 as	 reported	 by	
Government	 Departments”.	 This	 rolling	 reporting	 process	 provided	 the	committee’s	monitoring	dynamic.	ICTU	also	insisted	on	precise	dates	“by	which	implementation	 of	 specific	 measures	 are	 to	 be	 achieved”,	 reflecting	 its	frustration	with	bureaucratic	“blocking”	and	evasive	replies	by	officials.18			 Despite	 Haughey’s	 centralised	 control,	 officials	 were	 prone	 to	 continue	 in	what	he	had	called	their	“lackadaisical	approach”.	The	Department	of	I&C,	while	establishing	 a	 special	 unit	 to	meet	 CRC’s	 reporting	 requirements,	 remained,	 to	the	 exasperation	 of	 Congress,	 often	 evasive,	 or	 vague	 on	 detail,	 while	 Finance	also	 tended	 to	 minimal	 reporting,	 quoting	 budget	 confidentiality,	 and	Environment	 listed	 other	 impediments.	 When	 John	 Travers	 of	 Taoiseach’s,	reflecting	 the	 CRC’s	 growing	 impatience,	 politely	 asked	 I&C	 to	 provide	 “more	active	follow-up	on	specific	commitments”	and	on	“precise	steps	being	taken	on	a	 sector	 by	 sector	 basis”,	 it	 responded	 that	 “while	 not	 wishing	 to	 be	uncooperative”	and	“while	satisfied	to	work	within	the	parameters	laid	down	by	the	 Taoiseach”	 for	 the	 PNR,	 it	would	 require	 time	 to	 study	 the	 issues,	 and	 for	“material	 to	be	prepared,	co-ordinated	and	cleared”.	Travers	promptly	“put	 the	Department	on	notice	that	detailed	progress	reports”	be	provided,	sarcastically	suggesting	leaving	“the	‘study’	to	follow	to	support	such	action	in	due	course”.19			 The	parties	most	committed	to	the	PNR	drove	the	CRC.	The	activism	of	the	CII	was	 especially	 impressive,	 presenting	 papers	 and	 pressing	 for	 action	 on	initiatives,	 from	export	 costs	 and	an	 international	 conference	 centre,	 to	 roads/	
																																																																																																																																																														1988],	Ó	hUiginn	to	Michael	O’Kennedy	TD,	M/A&F,	26/05/88	and	Sec	[Ó	hU]	to	Taoiseach,	30/05/88.	‘Board	of	Teagasc’,	DTA:	S25857-E	18		 CRC	Secretariat	Group,	‘Action	Points	arising	from	First	Meeting	[of	SG]’,	08/02/88’,	DTA:S25857-B	19		 On	departmental	reluctance,	CRC,	Summary	Report	and	h/w	minutes	3rd	Meeting,	18/02/88,	DTA:	S25857-B;	D/I&C,	Feb.	88,	‘CRC/14	–	Plans	for	Monitoring,	Implementation	of	Overall	Manufacturing/International	Services/Job	Creation	Targets’,	DTA:	S25857-B;	Michael	O’Connell,	D/Environment,	to	Travers,	16/02/88,	DTA:	S25858-E;	D/I&C	and	D/F	entries	in	‘Summary	Report,	Specific	Measures	…’,	15/02/88,	DTA:	S25857-B;	for	Travers/I&C	exchange,	Travers	D/T	to	Paul	Bates,	D/I&C	25/02/88,	and	to	Sec.	[Ó	hUiginn],	23/02/88,	inc.	CTT	draft,	‘PNR:	Automotive	Components	Exports’,	DTA:	S25857-B	
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infrastructure	projects	and	adult	education.	Its	proposal	to	market	Ireland	as	an	“International	Education	Centre”	advanced	once	Haughey	voiced	his	support.20		 The	Dáil	opposition	treated	the	CRC	as	an	easy	target,	Labour	calling	for	it	to	demand	a	reversal	of	education	cuts	-	absurdly	at	odds	with	its	purpose	-	and	the	Workers	 Party,	 ironically	 given	 its	 own	 history,	 querying	 its	 legitimacy	 as	 a	secretive,	 unaccountable	 body,	 and	 demanding	 its	 deliberations	 be	 subject	 to	public	scrutiny,	despite	the	CRC	minutes	being	available	to	it	in	the	Dáil	library.21		 The	 major	 constraint	 on	 the	 CRC	 were	 the	 boundaries	 government	 put	 to	information	provided	or	withheld,	as	examples	later	will	illustrate.	But	all	social	partners	 involved	 recall	 it	 as	 a	 heroic	 effort,	 an	 innovative	 institution	 that	generated	 inter-agency	 collaboration	 in	 what	 was	 a	 profound	 break	 with	traditional	disjointed	civil	service	tradition	and	decision-making	routines.		
NESC:	the	“appropriate	body”	for	national	strategy		 The	 NESC	 was	 the	 representative	 national-level	 strategic	 agency	 of	 social	partnership,	 forming	 its	 senate.	 Haughey	 elevated	 the	 “principles”	 of	 its	 1986	report	 to	 the	 framework	 for	 government	 socio-economic	 strategy	 and,	 when	addressing	the	body	in	1987,	restored	it,	as	he	had	previously	done	in	1980-82,	to	 a	 central	 role	 in	 further	 “elaborating”	 national	 strategy.	He	 underscored	his	support	 for	 the	 NESC	 by	 lauding	 its	 recommendations	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 state	social	 spending	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 its	 rival,	 the	 semi-private-sector	 ESRI,	 the	economic	think-thank	co-established	by	Whitaker	and	favoured	by	FitzGerald.22			 The	CRC	debated	how	the	partnership	system	could	be	 further	consolidated	and	the	emerging	partnership	architecture	“rationalised”,	such	as	by	merging	the	1980-era	tripartite	Sectoral	Development	Committee	and	other	institutions	with	it,	and	defining	the	mutually	complementary	roles	of	the	NESC	and	CRC.	Noting	how	 the	NESC’s	 advocacy	 of	 “a	well	 developed	 consensus	 approach	 in	 a	 small	country	 like	 Ireland”	 was	 “now	 recognised”,	 and	 how	 the	 use	 of	 the	 NESC	 by	previous	governments	 in	“commissioning	consultants’	reports	and	commenting	upon	them”	was	now	past,	 it	proposed	that	“for	the	future	[NESC]	should	focus																																																									20		 Memo,	John	Kenna	09/03/88	(‘from	Mr	Power	CII	for	CRC’,	10/03/88)	-	‘Freight	transport	Costs	to	UK	and	Continental	Europe’,	DTA:	S25857-C;	D/Marine,	‘Confidential.	Summary	of	Report	on	Initial	Meeting	with	CII	on	Access	Transport	Costs’,	26/08/88,	DTA:	S25857-G;	Power,	CII,	to	P	Teahon,	26/10/88	and	CRC,	Summary	Report	14th	Meeting,	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R	21		 Dáil	02	and	09/03/88	22		 ‘Statement	by	Government	on	Release	of	NESC	Report	No.	85’,	30/11/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	
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on	getting	agreement	on	[strategic]	priorities	and	submitting	them	through	the	system”.	Translating	NESC	proposals	 into	programmes,	 such	as	 the	PNR,	was	a	“political”	matter,	with	“one	of	the	strengths	of	the	NESC”	being	that	“politicians	could	 take	 or	 leave	 its	 recommendations”:	 “without	 a	 conscious	 political	initiative,	the	gap	between	NESC’s	…	Strategy	for	Development	and	negotiation	of	the	PNR	could	not	have	been	bridged”.	But	employers	resisted	any	deepening	of	partnership	 structures	 as	 “premature”,	 and	 the	 CRC	 agreed	 to	 await	 the	 re-constitution	of	NESC	in	1989	before	again	considering	institutional	changes.23		 Once	 the	 first-stage	 legislation	 freeing	capital	movement	under	 the	SEA	was	passed,	 Haughey	 and	 Ó	 hUiginn	 decided	 to	 request	 the	 NESC	 to	 undertake	 a	major	project	“elaborating”	 Irish	policy	on	the	EEC,	Haughey	telling	the	council	he	regarded	it	as	the	“appropriate	body”	to	undertake	such	a	strategic	review.	An	enthused	NESC	shelved	its	micro	projects	to	focus	on	the	“EEC	study”,	entrusting	the	 research	 and	 field-work	 to	 the	 talented	 young	 economist	 Rory	 O’Donnell,	who	 in	 a	 future	 era	would	 play	 a	 central	 role	 at	 the	NESC	 itself.	 Even	 the	 IFA	supported	the	upgrading	of	the	NESC	given,	as	its	chief	economist	Con	Lucey	put	it,	the	“restricted	[policy]	expertise	in	Departments”.	The	seriousness	with	which	the	 NESC	 took	 Haughey’s	 promotion	 of	 it	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 ICTU	 Executive	now	retiring	 its	 second-tier	NESC	 representatives	 (“due	 to	pressure	of	work”!)	and	 replacing	 them	 with	 senior	 partnership	 figures,	 Phil	 Flynn	 and	 Kieran	Mulvey,	and	CII	similarly	appointing	its	top	strategists,	Connellan	and	Power.24		 The	 first	 sections	 of	 the	 “EEC	 study”,	 already	 available	 by	 autumn	 1987,	examined	 Ireland’s	 comparative	 performance	 in	 the	 EEC,	 critiquing	 its	 poor	relative	 institutional	performance	and	short-term	policy	approach	compared	to	other	 “more	 successful”	 “small”	 states.	 NESC	meetings	 over	 the	 following	 year	scrutinised	successive	draft	chapters	and	their	conclusions.	A	consensus	position	quickly	emerged,	though	finalising	the	study	was	delayed	pending	EEC	approved	of	structural	fund	plans,	and	it	was	only	finally	published	in	August	1989.	ICTU	focused	on	industrial	policy	but	ensured	a	strong	endorsement	of	Delors’	“social																																																									23		 CRC	Sec.	Group.	Action	Points	arising	from	3rd	mtg.,	18/04/88,	DTA:	S25857-D;	h/w	notes.	‘Sec.	Group	16/6/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	‘Functions,	Membership	and	Work	Programme	of	the	CRC,	SDC	and	NESC’,	SG/70,	n.d.	[Sept.	1988],	DTA:	S25857-I;	h/w	notes,	SG	mtg.	13/12/88,	DTA:	S25857-M;	Ó	hUiginn	to	O’Sulivan,	‘CRC	Sec.	Group:	preliminary	discussion,	possible	rationalisation’,	13/12/88.	DTA:	S25857-R	24			Ó	hUiginn	to	Council	members,	21/05/1987,	Council	Minutes,	27/05/88,	Danaher	(Sec)	to	members,	04/10/87,	NESC	Archive,	Box	3;	h/w	notes,	CRC	Secretariat	Group.	meeting	10/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C;		
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dimension”,	while	 the	CII	promoted	sectoral	strategies	and	the	 IFA	agricultural	goals.	When	completed,	Tom	Toner	of	the	FUE	described	it	as	“our	latest	block-buster”,	the	fruit	of	“enormously	constructive	and,	I	hope,	useful	work”.25		 The	 NESC	 quickly	 reached	what	 it	 termed	 a	 “fundamental	 conclusion”	 that,	contrary	to	the	Commission	view,	the	working	of	the	internal	market,	on	its	own,	would	 not	 “narrow	 the	 income	 disparities	 between	 regions	 …	 let	 alone	 bring	about	convergence”.	Its	logic	would	rather	be	to	concentrate	wealth	at	the	“core”	at	 the	 expense	 of	 periphery.	Major	 interventionism,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	modest	structural	funding	proposed,	would	be	essential	to	counter	this	market	logic	and	achieve	 “convergence”.	 The	 Irish	 experience	 of	 EEC	 membership	 had	 been	 a	“constant	 attrition”	 of	 indigenous	 industry:	 “instead	 of	 integration	 stimulating	dominant	indigenous	firms	to	exploit	economies	of	scale	and	thus	eliminate	the	tail	of	high	cost	producers,	larger	Irish	manufacturers	would	seem	to	have	been	part	 of	 the	 tail	 eliminated	 by	 producers	 in	 other	 countries”.	 It	 concluded	with	polite	 understatement:	 “part	 of	 the	 rise	 in	 unemployment	 since	 accession	 is	attributable	…	to	the	trade	effects	of	EEC	membership”.26		 The	 absence	 initially	 of	 a	 credible	 EEC	 transfer	 strategy,	 and	 the	 negative	critique	 of	 single	 market	 planning	 by	 the	 European	 Trade	 Union	 Congress	(ETUC),	had	determined	ICTU’s	call	for	a	“No”	vote	in	the	SEA	referendum.	Union	economists	argued	that	in	an	open	market	“foreign	direct	investment	will	tend	to	move	 more	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 Europe	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 European	 industrial	policy”.	Another	result	of	an	“unfettered”	market	approach	it	 identified	was	the	trend	already	apparent	since	the	lifting	of	some	capital	controls	of	Ireland’s	forty	biggest	companies	beginning	to	expand	through	acquisitions	abroad	rather	than	investment	at	home.	ICTU	used	this	to	argue	that	only	the	semi-states	offered	a	credible	basis	for	a	large-scale	indigenous-based	“export-led	industrialisation”.27		 But	 another	 perspective	 on	 freeing	 capital	 controls	 as	 an	 opportunity	 for	Ireland	also	emerged,	even	before	the	rapid	freeing	of	capital	movements	came	on	 the	 European	 agenda.	 It	 should	 be	 stressed	 how	 unexpected	 this	 policy	departure	was.	The	SEA	 initially	had	 limited	objectives,	 and	 it	was	only	 in	 July																																																									25		 Council	Minutes,	27/05/88	and	subsequent	meetings	1988-89,	Toner	to	Ó	hUiginn,	24/10/90,	NESC	Archive,	Box	3;	Int.	Power	26		 NESC	1989:	160,	515	27		 Sweeney	1990:	204	
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1988	 that	 the	EC	Council	 agreed	 to	 a	new	 “Delors	Committee”	 to	 examine	 and	propose	steps	towards	EMU.	Reporting	in	April	1989,	it	proposed	moving	rapidly	to	achieve	it,	though,	as	Rory	O’Donnell	noted,	central	bankers	“probably	signed	the	 report	 believing	 it	 was	 primarily	 a	 descriptive	 document”	 which	 member	states	 would	 “quietly	 drop”	 when	 its	 political	 ramifications	 became	 clear.	Instead,	 the	Delors	Report	 “rapidly	underwent	a	metamorphosis	 and	was	 soon	seen	 as	 a	 prescriptive	 document”,	 leading	 to	 “a	 series	 of	 remarkable	 political	decisions”.	In	June	1989	the	EC	Council	decided	to	proceed	to	full	EMU,	with	the	first	 stage	 set	 for	 July	1990.	The	 context	was	 the	wholly	unexpected	 imminent	collapse	of	the	Eastern	European	states.	Ireland	came	to	the	fore	as	a	supporter	of	 the	EMU	plan	when	 it	emerged,	Haughey	agreeing	 to	all	Delors’	 “principles”,	particularly	 free	 movement	 of	 capital	 and	 labour.	 That	 course	 was	 opposed	initially	by	other	EC	states,	and	observers	were	amazed	when	Delors	proposed	in	July	1989	the	immediate	“complete	liberalisation	of	capital	transactions”.28			 A	 year	 earlier,	 in	 August	 1988,	 before	 that	 EC	 policy	 turnaround,	 Liam	Connellan	of	the	CII,	 in	one	of	the	first	airings	of	what	would	become	core	Irish	strategy,	 criticised	 early	 drafts	 of	 Rory	O’Donnell’s	 EEC	 report	 for	 treating	 the	single	market	as	a	“closed”	economy	to	which	Irish	companies	should	relate.	The	opportunity,	he	said,	 lay	 in	the	single	market’s	 function	 in	the	wider	process	of	global	opening.	“One	of	Ireland’s	main	advantages”,	he	continued,	was	its	unique	position	to	exploit	the	European	opening	to	establish	itself	“as	a	gateway	to	the	Single	Market	 for	companies	 from	the	United	States	and	Far	East”.	This	 radical	idea	 quickly	 gained	 acceptance,	 and	 the	 NESC	 report	 would	 combine	 the	 two	perspectives	–	urging	both	enlarged	EC	budgets	and	regional	transfers	to	effect	a	rapid	 convergence	 for	 Ireland	within	 the	 EEC,	 and	 a	 radical	 opening	 of	 capital	markets	to	enable	Ireland	become	a	base	for	global	capital	accessing	Europe.	To	achieve	these	twin	aims	Ireland	should	ally	with	the	pro-EMU	powers	and	adopt	a	“vigorous	pro-integration	position”	to	“enhance”	its	advantage	“in	the	practical	negotiations”.	 These	 conclusions	 emerging	 at	NESC	 already	 in	 1988	 reinforced	Haughey	in	continuing	his	1980-82	alliance	strategy	at	EC	Council	level.29																																																										28		 O’Donnell	1991:	9,	14	29		 CII	initiative,	Connellan	CII	to	Danaher,	NESC,	29/09/88,	‘Council	Meeting	16/12/88’,	NESC	Archive,	Box	2;	“NESC	combined	…”,	Danaher	to	Council	members,	n.d.	[16/12/88],	on	chapter	‘Historical	Performance	and	Future	Prospects’,	NESC	Archive,	Box	3	
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	 As	 the	 CRC	 had	 noted,	 however,	 the	 step	 from	 NESC	 proposals	 to	 practical	programmes,	 such	as	 the	PNR,	was	essentially	a	 “political”	matter,	 requiring	 “a	conscious	political	initiative”	to	“bridge	the	gap”	between	NESC	strategy	and	its	implementation.	 Even	 then,	 while	 the	 CRC	 could	 administer	 programme	implementation,	 impasses	would	 arise	 that	 could	 only	 be	 overcome	politically.	The	social	partners	were	acutely	aware	of	the	primacy	of	politics,	which	was	why	direct	recourse	to	political	power	was	written	into	the	PNR	as	a	delivery	driver.30	
	
Political	dynamic:	partnership	at	the	“political	level”			 Social	partnership	struggled	to	gain	traction	for	its	narrative.	While	Haughey’s	monetary	 policy	 determination	 won	 widespread	 approval,	 few,	 apart	 from	Brady’s	lonely	Irish	Times	editorials,	recognised	the	social-productive	or	“factor-mobilisation”	role	partnership	played.	Previous	Fianna	Fáil	 leaders	had	had	the	
Irish	 Press	 to	 communicate	 an	 authoritative	 narrative,	 but	 Haughey	 faced	 a	mostly	hostile	media	and	had	lost	even	the	Colley-supporting	Press	in	1980.	Once	far	more	 influential	 than	 the	 Irish	Times,	 the	Press,	 uncoupled	 from	 its	political	purpose,	was	 rapidly	 declining	 and	 finally	 shut	 in	 1995.	 Haughey	 had	 even	 to	convince	his	own	Árd	Fheis	of	the	“miracle	their	government	had	achieved”.31		 Fine	 Gael	 was	 bewildered	 by	 social	 partnership	 and	 the	 PDs	 ideologically	hostile.	 While	 this	 was	 understandable,	 Labour’s	 peculiar	 resentment	 of	 it	weakened	 ICTU’s	 bargaining	 position.	 Attley’s	 attempt	 at	 Labour’s	 1987	conference	 to	 explain	 it	 as	 a	 dynamic	 alternative	 to	 Thatcherism	 in	 achieving	recovery,	industrial	growth,	tripartite	planning,	and	welfare	and	state-enterprise	expansion	met	only	with	derision	and	contempt	from	a	“social	democratic”	party	peculiarly	 fixated	 on	 ridding	 Ireland	 of	 “Haughey”.	 Even	 within	 the	 unions,	whose	 members	 were	 more	 influenced	 politically	 by	 the	 general	 media	 and	political	 leaders	 than	 by	 internal	 ICTU	 discourse,	 Attley,	 Carroll,	 Flynn	 and	Cassells	struggled	 to	maintain	support	 for	 their	strategy.	While	partnership	 for	
																																																								30		 CRC	Sec.	Group.	Action	Points	arising	from	3rd	mtg.,	18/04/88,	DTA:	S25857-D;	h/w	notes.	‘Sec.	Group	16/6/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	‘Functions,	Membership	and	Work	Programme	of	the	CRC,	SDC	and	NESC’,	SG/70,	n.d.	[Sept.	1988],	DTA:	S25857-I;	h/w	notes,	SG	mtg.	13/12/88,	DTA:	S25857-M;	Ó	hUiginn	to	O’Sulivan,	‘CRC	Sec.	Group:	preliminary	discussion,	possible	rationalisation’,	13/12/88.	DTA:	S25857-R	31		 Irish	Press,	O’Brien,	M.	2001;	“miracle”,	‘Speech	at	Cáirde	Fáil	Dinner’,	04/12/1990,	DTA:	S25858-Z10		
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the	 PD	 right	 was	 an	 affront	 to	 market	 purety,	 for	 the	 Labour	 left	 it	 was	 a	reprehensible	“deal”	with	a	“right-wing	government”,	or	“class	collaboration”.32		 Although	 handicapped	 by	 this	 narrative	 conflict,	 interest	 leaders	 within	partnership	 understood	 its	 ultimately	 political	 dynamic.	 What	 during	 the	negotiations	was	called	the	“political	level”	was	integrated	in	the	PNR	in	the	form	of	 direct	 recourse	 to	 government	 or	 the	 Taoiseach	 to	 resolve	 impasses	 and	conflicts.	 The	 CII	 and	 ICTU	 constantly	 lobbied	 Haughey	 and	 his	 ministers	 to	advance	 projects	 or	 overrule	 bureaucratic	 obstinacy.	 This	 differed	 from	traditional	 lobbying	 in	 that	 rather	 than	 favour-seeking	 it	 sought	 to	 realise	consensus-agreed	measures,	even	if	the	consensus	had	sometimes	been	minimal.		 An	example	was	ICTU’s	meetings	with	Ahern	to	advance	industrial	relations,	worker	 participation	 and	 other	 agreed	 areas	 of	 reform,	 or,	 more	 rarely,	 with	MacSharry,	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 state-owned	 assurance	 company,	 Irish	 Life,	given	 the	 “role	 of	 the	 State	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 financial	 services	 sector	provided	for	in	the	PNR”.	In	was	from	this	time	that	Ahern,	who	had	previously	played	a	secondary,	ancillary	role,	emerged	to	prominence,	being	now	referred	to	by	the	media	as	“one	of	the	chief	architects	of	the	programme”.	ICTU	used	this	ever-closer	 relationship	 to	 have	 departments	 stalling	 on	 PNR	 commitments	 to	act,	such	as	Environment	on	the	issue	of	local	authority	redundancies,	which	was	putting	ICTU	leaders	“under	severe	pressure	from	their	membership”.33			 Conflicts	 on	 such	 issues,	 some,	 though	 not	 all,	 relatively	 minor,	 consumed	much	CRC	time,	but	this	was	one	of	its	vital	functions.	Ultimate	resolution	often	required	 “political	 level”	 intervention.	The	 ITGWU	warned	government	 that	 its	inaction	 over	 issues	 in	 semi-autonomous	 agencies	 such	 as	 health	 boards,	 local	authorities	 and	 the	OPW,	which	 it	 had	 repeatedly	 raised	 on	 the	 CRC,	 “posed	 a	growing	 problem	 of	 credibility	 for	 them	 vis-à-vis	 their	 stance	 on	 the	 PNR”.	MacSharry	had	OPW	redundancy	notices	rescinded	but	they	were	later	re-issued	despite	 the	 Labour	 Court	 concluding	 they	 were	 “probably	 in	 breach	 of	 that	agreement”.	The	union	 finally	had	 to	have	 recourse	 to	 a	direct	 intervention	by	Haughey	to	have	the	issue	resolved.	ICTU	insisted	in	1989	that	the	public	service																																																									32		 ICTU	ADC	1988	33		 “role	of	the	State	…”,	ICTU	AR:	223-4;	“chief	architects”,	IT	09/02/90;	Arthur	O’Malley	D/Labour	to	Pat	O’Sullivan	D/Taoiseach,	24/05/88,	encl.	‘Report	of	Meeting	between	M/Labour	and	ICTU	…	on	commitments	in	the	PNR’,	20/04/88,	DTA:	S25857-E	
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staff	 embargo,	 whose	 continuation	 at	 Finance’s	 insistence	 it	 said	 was	 another		“breach	of	the	whole	spirit”	of	the	PNR,	be	urgently	reviewed,	leading	in	January	1990	to	a	summit	with	Haughey	where	he	finally	agreed	to	end	the	measure.34		 A	 political	 driver	 of	 the	 system	was	 also	 provided	 by	 the	 Dáil	 opposition’s	relentless	criticisms	of	 job	 losses	despite	 the	“so-called”	PNR.	Haughey	 insisted	that	 delivery	 of	 the	 1988	 target	 of	 20,000	 new	 jobs	was	 on	 course,	 explaining	that	 the	 target	 referred	 to	 new	 jobs,	 not	 old	 ones	 being	 shed	 or	 overall	 net	employment.	Although	this	was	set	out	in	the	text	of	the	PNR,	ICTU	was	alarmed	by	the	negative	discourse,	and	requested	Carroll	and	Flynn	to	press	on	Haughey	the	urgency	of	progressing	PNR	projects	or	otherwise	it	would	“look	seriously	at	its	position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Programme”.	Haughey	responded	by	convening	a	highly	publicised	“summit”	between	his	core	cabinet	and	the	full	ICTU	Executive,	which	concluded	with	a	formal	“agreement”	to	publish	an	update	on	progress	in	PNR	 jobs	 initiatives	 and	 to	 appoint	 a	 “designated”	 official	 to	 “co-ordinate	development	 projects”	 in	 the	 semi-states	 and	 report	 to	 the	 CRC.	 Following	ministerial	interventions,	within	two	weeks	stalled	initiatives	were	re-activated,	especially	 in	 the	 semi-states,	 and,	 following	 several	 drafts,	 a	 report	 satisfying	ICTU	(Nevin:	“exactly	what	we	wanted”),	was	published.	A	further	meeting	and	“Joint	statement”	followed,	stating	the	PNR	was	delivering	on	its	commitments.35		 A	 further	political	 dimension	was	provided	by	 internal	pressures	 in	partner	organisations.	 ICTU	at	 its	1988	annual	conference	only	narrowly	headed	off	an	attempt	 to	 force	 the	 Executive	 to	 hold	 a	 special	 conference	 “with	 a	 view	 to	withdrawal	if	the	Programme’s	targets	and	commitments	are	not	fulfilled”.	Attley	argued	 that	 job	 creation,	 while	 slow,	 was	 on	 course,	 and	 “for	 our	 State																																																									34		 ‘Report	of	Meeting	between	M/Labour	and	ICTU	…	on	commitments	in	the	PNR’	and	CRC,	Summary	Report	of	6th	mtg.,	26/05/88’,	DTA:	S25857-E;	D/Taoiseach,	‘Redundancies/Short-time	working	in	OPW’,	11/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C;	D/Taoiseach,	note	‘re	AOB_’,	n.d.	[June	1988],	DTA:	S25857-F;	Browne,	ITGWU	to	Haughey,	20/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J;	D/Health:	‘Remuneration	of	Student	Nurses’,	Note	for	CRC,	21/06/88;	D/Finance,	‘Point	4	of	ICTU	document	–	Public	Service’,	n.d.	[Dec.	89],	DTA:	S25857-Z;	O’Sullivan	to	O’Gorman,	D/Finance,	03/05/89,	DTA:	S25858-S;	CRC,	Summary	Reports	and	h/w	notes	of	14th	–	20th	meetings,	April	1988-Sept.	1989,	DTA:	S25857-R	to	Y;	CRC	SG	mtg.	02/05/89	(h/w	notes),	DTA:	S25857-S;	‘’Briefing	Material	for	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	M/Finance,	I&C	and	Labour	with	reps	EC	of	ICTU’,	23/01/90,	‘Position	in	Relation	to	ICTU	30	Point	Plan’	and	h/w	report	of	meeting	ICTU-Government,	23/01/90,	D/Finance,	DTA:	S25862-F	35		 On	“new	jobs”,	Haughey	in	Dáil	02	and	09/03/88;	ICTU	“concern”,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	20/04/88,	item	1419;	Haughey-ICTU	meeting,	‘Joint	Government-ICTU	statement’,	18/05/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach,	CRC	Summary	Report	of	6th	mtg.,	held	26/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E,	Internal	D/Taoiseach	h/w	note,	‘re	ICTU	document’,	26/5/88,	and	Nevin	in	Internal	D/Taoiseach	h/w	note,	‘re	ICTU	document’,	26/5/88,	DTA:	S25870-C;	‘Joint	Government-ICTU	statement	on	job	creation	developments	under	the	Programme	for	National	recovery’,	27/05/88,	with	attached	‘Progress	on	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27/05/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	
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companies,	 we	 have	 started	 the	 process	 of	 stopping	 their	 run-down,	 and	returning	them	to	what	they	were	intended	to	be,	vehicles	for	job	creation”.	The	alternative	to	a	“negotiated”	recovery	was	confrontation,	the	exclusion	of	unions	and	the	dismantling	of	welfare,	as	was	happening	in	Britain.	But	he	won	time	by	conceding	that	the	Executive	had	“warned	Government	that	if	sufficient	progress	was	not	made	in	particular	areas”,	it	would	hold	a	Special	Conference	where	the	Executive	would	“recommend	…	that	we	withdraw	from	this	Programme”.36		 ICTU	continually	employed	this	threat	of	a	membership	revolt,	Nevin	warning	Haughey	of	Congress’s	determination	to	oppose	privatisation	on	that	basis.	Most	importantly,	 anti-PNR	 sentiment	 was	 strong	 even	 in	 the	 ITGWU,	 causing	 Ed	Browne	 to	 remind	Haughey	 that	 assurances	 the	 previous	 year	 on	 ending	 local	authority	 redundancies	 had	 been	 “of	 major	 significance	 in	 determining	 our	members’	vote	to	accept	the	Programme”	and	Carroll	writing	to	Ó	hUiginn	that	it	had	 been	 “no	 easy	 job	 for	 the	 platform	 to	 convince	 [the	 recent	 ITGWU]	Conference	 of	 the	 bona	 fides	 of	 all	 concerned”.	 “Early	 and	 positive	 indications	that	 the	PNR	 is	working	and	 is	now	going	 to	deliver”	were	needed,	and	a	mid-term	review	would	be	a	“major	step	to	this	end”.	Ó	hUiginn	used	this	pressure	to	force	departmental	action	and	convince	Haughey	to	agree	to	a	full-scale	review.37			 On	the	business	side,	CII’s	membership	accepted	the	ultimate	potential	of	the	PNR,	and	its	leaders	were	under	little	apparent	pressure	from	members.	But	the	FUE	 remained	 less	 engaged	 and	 more	 single-mindedly	 focused	 on	 defending	employer	interests.	This	FUE-CII	divergence	was	replicated	in	the	farming	sector,	where	 smaller	 non-negotiating	 partners	 such	 as	 Macra	 and	 the	 ICOS	 engaged	actively	on	the	CRC,	especially	on	rural	development	and	enterprise	plans,	while	the	 IFA,	 under	pressure	 from	 the	 ICMSA	outside	 the	 system,	 remained	 its	bête	
noire,	 engaging	 little	 other	 than	 to	 oppose	 threats	 of	 tax	 or	 social	 insurance	reforms	 or	 the	 strengthening	 of	 market	 dynamics	 in	 agriculture.	 When	 Tom	Clinton	was	 elected	 IFA	 President,	 joining	 the	 CRC,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 sent	 Haughey	 a	gloomy	 profile,	 concluding	 that	 Clinton	 would	 continue	 the	 IFA’s	 defensive	stance.	 Clinton	didn’t	 disappoint	 and	 intervened	on	 the	CRC	mainly	 to	 seek	 an																																																									36		 ICTU	ADC	1988:	97-9,	113	37		 Nevin	ICTU	to	Haughey,	13/09/88,	DTA:	S25858-M;	Browne	at	CRC,	Summary	Report	of	8th	mtg.,	08/09/88’	and	h/w	note,	‘CRC	meeting	8	Sept	1988’,	DTA:	S25857-H;	Browne	to	Haughey,	20/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J;	Carroll,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	27/09/88,	DTA:	S25858-K	;	Teahon	h/w	note	of	SG	meeting,	05/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-I	
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expansion	of	CAP,	despite	Agriculture	warning	that	this	was	already	“at	its	limit”.	Confrontation	 over	 farmer	 taxation	 dominated	 the	 1989	 budget,	 Ó	 hUiginn	telling	Albert	Reynolds,	the	new	Minister	for	Finance,	that	farm	lobby	resistance	meant	only	a	slow,	incremental	approach	to	farmer	taxation	would	be	possible.38			 At	“bilateral”	meetings	with	the	IFA,	Haughey	continued	to	promote	his	ideas	for	a	commercialised	agriculture,	but	the	IFA,	facing	similar	member	scepticism	as	 the	 ICTU,	 spoke	 only	 of	 tax,	 support	 schemes	 and	 CAP.	 In	 response	 to	Department	 of	 Agriculture	 requests	 for	 proposals	 to	 expand	 the	 cattle	 herd	 to	overcome	 shortages	 inhibiting	 expansion	 of	 the	 beef	 industry	 –	 a	 PNR	 target	sector	–	the	IFA	suggested	that	“a	tax	incentive	to	dairy	farmers”	to	produce	beef	calves	 “might	 be	 appropriate”.	 To	 keep	 farmers	 on	 board,	 government	 had	 to	slow,	though	not	stop,	farmer	tax	reform.	While	securing	the	principle	of	farmer	social	insurance	contributions	in	the	PNR,	and	announcing	a	more	than	doubling	of	the	farmer	tax	yield	to	£80m	in	1988,	Haughey	later	had	to	admit	it	was	a	slow	process,	 with	 that	 figure	 being	 “inclusive	 of	 the	 [tax]	 amnesty”	 and	 the	 1989	intake	expected	to	be	just	over	the	1987	figure	of	£36m.39		 The	 “political	 level”	 partnership	 dynamic	 was	 vital	 to	 both	 maintaining	 or	reviving	momentum	in	the	PNR	and	addressing	particular	grievances	animating	partners	 outside	 the	 policy	 consensus.	 If	 lobbying	 is	 the	 bread	 and	 butter	 of	politics,	 in	 Haughey’s	 social	 partnership	 it	 had	 the	 added	 role	 of	 a	 corrective	lever	to	impasses	in	the	system’s	administrative	and	economic	drivers.		
	
Partnership	as	mobilisation	of	Total	Factor	Productivity				 Social	partnership	was	itself	an	economic	driver.	The	PNR	was	predicated	on	economic	 success,	 and	 the	 collaboration	 contributed	 at	 many	 levels	 to	 what	economists	call	“Total	Factor	Productivity”	(TFP),	 including	through	“intangible	capital”,	factors	often	more	critical	to	success	than	purely	fiscal	measures.40																																																									38	 Interviews	with	Power,	O’Sullivan;	‘Row	over	PRSI	Report’,	Irish	Farmers’	Journal,	09/01/88;	‘Woods	Receives	Pension	Board’s	Report	on	Extension	of	Social	Insurance	to	the	Self-employed’,	14/01/88,	GIS:	D/SW;	J.T	[=	Travers].	‘Meeting	between	An	Taoiseach	and	Tom	Clinton,	President	designate	of	IFA’,	06/01/88:	h/w	memo	–	“for	file”.	DTA:	S25858-D;	CRC,	Summary	Report	of	6th	mtg.,	26/05/88,	and	D/A&F,	‘Beef	Cow	Herd.	Material	for	Reply	to	CRC’	25/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Albert	Reynolds,	Min/I&C,	28/02/89,	and	to	Ó	Mary	O’Rourke,	M/Education,	31/01/90,	DTA:	S25857-R	39		 ‘Meeting	of	the	Taoiseach,	M/F	and	M/A&F	with	reps	of	IFA,	ICOS	and	Macra	na	Feirme	under	the	PNR’,	13/11/87,	DTA:	S25857-B;	‘Specific	Measures	….’,	15/02/88,	DTA:	S25857-B;	Haughey	in	Dáil,	02/03/88;	‘CRC:	Summary	Report	of	8th	mtg.’,	08/09/88’,	DTA:	S25857-H;	Haughey	in	Dáil,	01/02/89	40		 Klein	and	Ventura	2019	
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	 Economic	 policy	 was	 tightly	 controlled	 by	 Haughey’s	 inner	 cabinet,	 a	triumvirate	 of	 gifted	 ministers	 –	 MacSharry	 (Finance),	 Ahern	 (Labour)	 and	Reynolds	(Industry	and	Commerce).	Reynolds	was	to	be	promoted	to	Finance	in	January	 1989	when,	 as	 Haughey	 had	 agreed,	 MacSharry,	 having	 overseen	 two	budgets	 to	 secure	 the	 decisive	 monetary	 adjustment,	 would	 move	 to	 the	 EC	Commissioner	 role.	 Other	 ministers,	 senior	 or	 junior,	 were	 kept	 far	 from	 the	levers	of	little	more	than	petty	patronage,	or	brought	into	line	when	they	caused	problems,	as	in	O’Kennedy’s	climb-down	over	his	Teagasc	board	appointments.41			 Haughey	 saw	 government’s	 primary	 role	 as	 managing	 a	 credible	 monetary	adjustment	 and	 encouraged	 the	 social	 partners	 to	 be	 pro-active	 in	 economic	planning.	The	CRC	 relentlessly	 studied	 industrial	data,	 analysing	 successes	and	failures.	 Its	 meeting	 of	 26	 October	 1988,	 which	 would	 mark	 a	 turning	 point,	focused	 on	 job	 creation,	 with	 members	 interrogating	 officials	 from	 across	departments.	The	documentation	Ó	hUiginn	ensured	was	provided	detailed	 job	gains	and	losses	by	sector	and	region,	with	the	IDA’s	Pádraic	White	reporting	on	these	 and	 “pipeline	projects”.		 Industry	 and	Commerce	was	 adamant	 that	new-job	targets	were	being	met	and	that	the	20,000	target	for	1988	would	just	about	be	delivered.	But	demographic	 factors	meant	 that	unemployment	would	barely	fall.	 The	 CRC	was	 as	 determined	 to	 highlight	 success,	 even	 accepting	 casuistry	such	 as	 I&C’s	 explanation	 that	 target	 achievement	 would	 involve	 combining	13,000	actual	new	jobs	and	7,000	“recoveries	of	jobs	lost”.	That	“old”	jobs	would	continue	 to	 be	 lost	 in	 declining	 sectors	was	 accepted.	 All	 partners	 agreed	 to	 a	“Joint	Statement”	confirming	that	the	PNR	was	delivering	as	planned.42			 ICTU	 urged	 that	 the	 PNR	 successes	 be	 publicised,	 but	 employers	 refrained	from	extolling	partnership	and	 initially	opposed	a	 Joint	Statement.	But	when	Ó	hUiginn	 stressed	 the	 need	 to	 counter	 relentless	 media	 negativity,	 which	 was	dampening	investor	confidence,	the	FUE	conceded	the	need	to	“get	the	message	across”	 that	 there	 was	 “lots	 of	 good	 news”.	 Agreeing	 the	 media	 was	 “not	presenting	a	very	favourable	picture	on	the	progress	…	achieved”,	FUE	leader	Jim																																																									41			 See	Chapter	6		42		 ‘Statement	by	CRC	on	Progress	in	Job	Creation,	revised	Draft’	24/11/88,	and	D/I&C,	’20,000	Target	for	Manufacturing/International	Services	-	Progress	Report	‘,	Aug.	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	IDA,	‘Updated	Progress	on	Provision	of	Jobs	under	PNR’,	21/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J;	CRC,	Summary	Report	of	9th	mtg.,	26/10/88,	‘Review	of	Progress	…	and	evaluation	of	their	impact	on	the	objectives	of	the	programme’,	21/10/88,	and	Padraic	White,	IDA,	‘Presentation.	PNR.	CRC.	October	1988’,	DTA:	S25857J-2	
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O’Brien	agreed	 to	 sign	 the	Statement.	Another	FUE	official	 afterwards	 told	The	
Irish	Times:	“Today	cleared	all	the	hot	air.	There	was	a	general	acceptance	of	the	figures	…	[and]	solid	evidence	that	new	jobs	are	developing	…	The	scale	might	be	modest	 but	 the	 trickle	 was	 gaining	 momentum”.	 Even	 farmers’	 groups	 were	enthused,	 with	 IFA	 obstinacy	mellowing	 as	 farming	 enjoyed	 its	 best	 year	 in	 a	decade,	output	exceeding	£3bn	for	the	first	time	and	incomes	rising	17	per	cent.	Seán	Dorgan,	I&C	Department	secretary,	stated	simply:	“It’s	working”.43			 A	 particular	 concern	 of	 ICTU	 was	 the	 role	 of	 state	 industries,	 where	 it	organised	88,000	workers,	the	most	powerful	force	in	the	movement	apart	from	the	 public	 services.	 In	 1987	 it	 had	made	 the	 semi-states	 its	main	 issue	 in	 the	election,	 circulating	 100,000	 copies	 of	 a	 leaflet	 opposing	 privatisation	 and	extolling	 the	 potential	 of	 the	 semi-states.	 Haughey	 had	 assured	 it	 of	 his	commitment	 to	 an	 “efficient	 and	 effective	 semi-State	 Sector	 as	 a	 major	instrument	of	economic	development”.	He	cited	the	Aer	Lingus	engine-overhaul	subsidiary,	Airmotive,	which	he	had	opened	in	1981,	as	“an	example	of	the	type	of	development	we	had	in	mind”.	David	Begg,	leader	of	the	telecom	union	CWU,	reflected	the	view	of	many	public	sector	trade	unionists	when	he	declared:	“we	favour	a	centrally-planned	and	controlled	economy	relying	heavily	on	State-led	investment	to	the	semi-State	Companies	to	create	jobs”.	Official	ICTU	policy	was	more	 nuanced	 and	 supported	 sectoral	 expansion	 through	 joint	 ventures	 with	private	capital,	an	aim	whose	inclusion	in	the	PNR	it	secured.44			 ICTU	was	not	 the	alone	 in	advocating	 for	 state	 industries,	with	 the	business	group,	the	CII,	which	had	most	such	companies	as	members,	championing	their	expansion	while	seeking	stricter	performance	criteria	and	joint	ventures,	as	well	as	calling	for	increased	sub-contacting	and	outsourcing	of	public	services.45		 When	 negotiating	 the	 PNR,	 Haughey	 boosted	 his	 credibility	 with	 ICTU	 by	convening	 semi-state	 executives	 to	 impress	 on	 them	 “the	 importance	 which																																																										43		 ‘Jobs:	ICTU	keeps	up	the	pressure’,	Irish	Independent,	27/10/88;	‘’14,500	new	jobs	created’,	Irish	Times	27/10/88;	‘Vigorous	job	creation	programme	needed’,	Cork	Examiner,	27/10/88;	‘Statement	by	Michael	O’Kennedy	…	launching	the	Annual	Review	for	the	Agriculture	and	Food	Industry’,	18/01/89,	GIS:	D/A&F:	CRC,	Summary	Report	9th	mtg.,	26/10/88	and	h/w	notes	CRC	26/10/88,	DTA:	S25857J-2	44			 O’Dowd,	J.	ed.	1989:	51;	ICTU	1987;	ICTU	EC	mtg.	18/02/87;	Haughey	to	Cassells,	20/01/1987,	DTA:	S25862-F;	Begg	at	ICTU	ADC	1988:	117;	PNR	V	and	Appendix,	‘State-Sponsored	Bodies	–	Proposals’	45	 ‘The	Complementary	Roles	of	Public	and	Private	Enterprise’,	CII	Newsletter,	13/04/82;	‘Growth	Industries	with	Employment	Potential,’	CII	8th	Annual	Careers	in	Industry	Conference,	19/09/86,	Power	Papers;	‘Participation	in	State	Enterprise’,	CII	Newsletter,	24/02/87;	‘Swedish	Example	backs	State	Participation	Case’,	CII	Newsletter,		28/04/87;	Power	2009:	93	
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Government	 attached	 to	 the	 developmental	 potential	 of	 the	 State-sponsored	sector”	and	seeking	proposals	for	expansion	through	joint	ventures	with	private	capital	 to	 “contribute	 to	 the	Programme”.	He	established	a	 “Working	Group”	of	semi-state	 chiefs	 to	 report	 on	 the	 sector’s	 “developmental	 potential”.	 Many	specific	projects	resulting	from	this	process	were	included	in	the	PNR	and	from	early	1988,	assisted	by	the	IDA,	many	were	operationalised.	ICTU’s	stubbornness	bore	fruit,	with	Aer	Lingus,	already	Ireland’s	largest	company	both	in	capital	and	employment	terms,	outperforming	all	private	sector	companies	in	1988.46		 A	key	factor	 in	1988-89	was	a	decline	 in	disputes	and	the	achieving	of	wage	certainty	 and	 “industrial	 peace”.	 That	 pay	 disputes	 rarely	 surfaced	was	 due	 to	how	the	PNR	was	structured	and	other	factors,	examined	in	chapters	8-10.	The	PNR	 set	 wages	 and	 disallowed	 strikes	 over	 “cost-increasing”	 claims.	 Although	most	strikes	in	the	1980s	had	been	in	the	public	sector,	the	PNR	gave	employers	wage	 certainty	 and	prevented	 a	wage-inflation	 “spiral”.	 The	 role	 of	 the	Labour	Court	 and	 acceptance	 of	 its	 application	 of	 PNR	 terms	was	 critical.	 Compliance	with	the	PNR	across	industry,	by	both	“sides”,	was	almost	total,	and	strike	days	plummeted	spectacularly	 in	1988	 to	a	 tenth	of	 the	1979	 figure,	and	 in	1989	 to	“their	lowest	level	since	the	State	was	founded”,	as	Ahern	put	it.	The	few	strikes	that	did	occur	concerned	redundancy	terms	or	changed	work	practices.47		 Ireland’s	 newfound	 “industrial	 peace”	 made	 the	 PNR	 the	 talk	 of	 the	 global	business	world	and	a	“key	factor”	enabling	the	IDA	secure	the	first	growth	in	FDI	since	 1980.	 This	 was	 intangible	 capital	 of	 major	 value,	 enabling	 partners	 and	government	to	consider	a	fundamental	reform	of	industrial	relations	such	as	had	eluded	 them	 for	 decades.	 The	 PNR	 agreed	 “discussions”	 to	 create	 “a	 better	framework	 for	 collective	 bargaining	 and	 dispute	 settlement”	 conducive	 to	“employment-generating	investment”.	Ahern,	eager	to	make	his	mark,	used	this	modest	phrase	to	initiate	a	major	reform.	He	started	the	“discussions”	as	the	PNR																																																									46	 ‘Statement	on	Meeting	of	Taoiseach	with	Chief	Executives	of	State-sponsored	bodies’,	22/06/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	‘Aide	Memoire.	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Consultative	Group	of	Chief	Executives	of	State	Agencies,	22	June	1987:	Main	Conclusions’,	DTA:	S25857-E;	‘Development	Proposals	–	Mechanical	Engineering	Sector.	Notes	arising	from	meeting	at	IDA	offices	on	15	February	1988’,	S25857-C;	J.	Lloyd,	IDA’:	“Engineering	Proposal	for	SSBs	is	going	well	…”,	n.d.	[April	1988],	DTA:	S25858-G;	Malcolm	Taylor,	D/T&T,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taois.,	07/03/88:	re	Aer	Lingus-Aeroflot	talks,	DTA:	S25858-F;	Sweeney	1990	47		 ‘Strikes,	Redundancies	and	Unemployment	fell	in	1989	–	Annual	Report	of	the	D/L’,	30/03/90,	GIS:	D/Labour;	CRC,	‘Progress	Report.	Preliminary	Draft’,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	D/Lab.	‘Briefing	for	T’s	
meeting	with	the	ICTU	on	24	Nov.’,	DTA:	S25862-D;	Sweeney	1990:	26;	‘Speech	by	Mr	Bertie	Ahern	…	at	the	formal	announcement	of	the	Framework	Agreement	on	Hours	of	Work’,	17/02/89,	GIS:	D/Labour	
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was	still	being	negotiated,	and	in	February	1988	the	Irish	Press,	reporting	a	Bill	in	preparation	for	autumn,	stated	that	“his	approach	would	be	completely	different	to	that	of	the	British	Government	-	Their	aim	was	to	smash	the	unions:	his	was	to	strengthen	 the	position	of	union	executives”.	The	bill	was	not	presented	 to	 the	Dáil	as	employers	initially	rejected	it	and	both	Fine	Gael	and	Labour	threatened	to	 oppose	 some	 of	 its	 provisions,	 for	 opposite	 reasons.	 Though	 not	 legislated	until	 1990,	 its	 proposals	 curbing	 picketing,	 strengthening	 union	 authority	 and	instituting	 a	 ‘Labour	 Relations	 Commission’	 as	 a	 powerful	 conciliation	 tool,	signalled	 the	determination	of	 government	 to	 establish	 a	north	European-style	industrial	 relations	 system.	The	1990	 Industrial	Relations	Act	was	unthinkable	without	social	partnership,	and	provided	a	further	economic	growth	driver.48			 Through	 its	 role	 in	 planning,	 co-determining	 semi-state	 development,	deferring	social	and	wage	costs,	calming	industrial	relations	and	providing	wage	certainty,	social	partnership	contributed	key	TFP	factors	 to	economic	recovery.	Haughey’s	attempt	to	explain	this	to	the	Dáil	was	met	with	opposition	derision,	Bruton	scoffing	at	this	“programme	of	so-called	national	recovery”	and	de	Rossa	demanding	 to	 know	 following	 the	 historic	 October	 1988	 CRC	 meeting	 if	 “the	question	of	disadvantaged	people	in	our	society	[had	been]	raised	by	any	of	the	social	partners”.	Partnership	was	still	a	besieged	concept.49		 Measuring	the	economic	role	of	total	factor	productivity	is	complicated	by	the	sometimes	 protracted	 and	 complex	 nature	 of	 such	 “intangibles”	 as	 “labour	quality”,	one	of	the	elements	of	it	highlighted	by	Klein	and	Ventura.	The	delayed	impact	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 free	 secondary	 education	 in	 the	 late	 1960s	 –	recognized	 already	 in	 the	 1990s	 -	 is	 a	 case	 in	 point.	 This	 had	 effectively	 been	forced	 on	 government	 by	 Donogh	 O’Malley’s	 surprise	 announcement	 in	 1966,	though	 in	 coordination	 with	 Lemass,	 during	 the	 absence	 abroad	 of	 the	 then	Finance	 Minister,	 Jack	 Lynch	 and	 against	 the	 advice	 of	 an	 “appalled”	 T.K.	Whitaker,	 who	 in	 what	 Carl	 O’Brien	 called	 a	 “scalding	 memo”	 to	 Lemass	 had	“raged	against	the	proposal”.	While	secondary	school	completion	grew	by	leaps	and	 bounds,	 it	 was	 still	 only	 60%	 by	 1979.	 A	 network	 of	 regional	 technical																																																									48	 Interviews	with	White	and	Ahern;	PNR,	Section	VI/5;	‘Discussion	Document’,	30/11/87,	GIS:	D/Labour;	
The	Irish	Press	04/01/88;	CRC,	‘Specific	Measures	…’,	15/02/88,	item	125,	DTA:	S25857-B;	Dáil	debates,	10/03/88;	‘Minister’s	Proposals:	Mixed	Reactions	Likely’,	IRN	Report,	25/02/88	49		 Dáil,	08	and	26/10,	08/11/88	
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colleges	initiated	under	the	Third	Programme,	along	with	initiatives	like	the	two	NIHEs,	provided	an	expanding	tertiary	skill	production	base,	but	these	too	only	came	to	fruition	by	the	1980s.	The	coming	to	maturity	of	the	first	generation	to	widely	benefit	from	this	educational	widening	accounted	for	much	of	the	“labour	quality”	aspect	in	Klein	and	Ventura’s	study.	Access	to	3rd	level	education	places	was	still	restricted	in	the	1980s,	but	the	PNR	inaugurated	a	further	expansion	of	provision	and,	as	importantly,	of	access	that	would	widen	the	skill	base	greatly.	Education,	however,	was	only	one,	if	a	major	TFP	factor.50				 Other	 TFP	 factors	 provided	 through	 social	 partnership	 included	 a	 range	 of	“intangible	 capital”	 inputs	 such	 as	 co-ordinated	 long-term	 planning	 across	departments	 and	 new	 support	 programmes	 in	 welfare,	 education	 and	 social	policy.	 These	 delivered	 value	 growth	 in	 human	 resource	 factors	 critical	 to	 the	reconfigured	higher-value	economic	model	being	pursued,	especially	expanding	the	labour	force	participation	of	women	and	previously	excluded	social	groups.			 Analysing	 the	 1980-2005	 period	 in	 terms	 of	 TFP	 effect,	 Klein	 and	 Ventura	show	that,	contrary	to	widespread	assumptions,	only	a	subordinate	proportion	of	23%	of	output	growth	was	attributable	to	business	tax	changes	alone:			
		 Further	controlling	for	expenditure	cuts,	they	find	the	combined	impact	of	tax	and	state	expenditure	changes	in	1987-2005	rising	only	marginally,	to	27%.	But	when	TFP	 factors	 from	1988	are	 included	–	especially	capital	opening	policy	 -	these	alone	account	for	76	per	cent	of	output	growth,	i.e.	the	great	bulk	of	it:																																																									50		 “TFP”,	Klein	and	Ventura	2019;	“recognised	in	the	1990s”,	Kennedy,	K.	2001;	“free	education”	Chambers	2015:	176-78;	“appalled”,	Des	O’Malley,	Irish	Independent,	05/01/17;	“scalding	memo”,	Carol	O’Brien	quoted	in	O’Riordan	2019,	Pt.	7	
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		 In	other	words,	 “intangible	capital”	and	policy	matter,	much	of	 it	enabled	by	social	 partnership,	 which	 was	 thus	 not	 only	 an	 important	 but	 arguably	 a	decisive	factor	in	the	economic	take-off.	As	a	set	of	co-ordinated	policy	and	input	changes,	 partnership	 represented	 a	 significant	 policy	 paradigm	 shift	 in	 itself.	Klein	and	Ventura	also	contend	that	even	without	capital	opening,	the	other	TFP	factors	 added	 in	 1988-89	 –	which	 this	 thesis	 groups	 as	 the	 social	 partnership	effect	 –	would,	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 tax/consumption	 policy	 changes,	 have	caused	significant	GDP	growth	anyway,	of	55	per	cent,	i.e.	half	the	extraordinary	growth	actually	achieved.	Thus,	even	without	the	opportunity	of	globalization,	a	less	 dramatic	 but	 still	 substantial	 economic	 improvement	 would	 have	 been	achieved	due	to	the	1987-89	policy	departures,	including	social	partnership.		 But	 the	 optimism	 of	 the	 CRC	 meeting	 of	 26	 October	 1988,	 despite	 the	continued	negativity	of	the	media	and	Dáil	opposition,	aso	had	a	further	basis	-	a	breakthrough	achieved	that	very	same	day	in	Brussels	which,	as	Haughey	would	later	describe	it,	would	take	the	recovery	plan	to	“a	new	plane	of	development”.	
	
Leveraging	Europe:	the	“National	Development	Plan”	(NDP)			 The	nature	of	the	PNR	and	of	the	social	partnership	structure	it	created	would	change	 dramatically	 in	 1989.	 Its	 interaction	with	 new	 opportunities	 emerging	through	European	policy	exemplified	the	flexibility	of	the	PNR	as	a	policy	system.		 The	PNR’s	economic	plan	was	focused	initially	on	national-economic	drivers.	Irish	living	standards	were	just	over	60	per	cent	of	the	then	EEC-12	average	and	the	 “EC	 Dimension”	 of	 the	 PNR	 was	 notably	 cautious,	 committing	 only	 to	implement	 the	 SEA,	 defend	 CAP,	 protect	 the	 indirect	 tax	 base	 in	 EC	
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harmonisation,	 and	 seek	 an	 expanded	 EC	 education	 programme.	 But	 it	 also	 –	decisively	–	agreed	to	fully	support	the	“Delors	Plan”.	That	consensus	on	this	was	achieved	was	a	significant	feat	in	itself.	That	statement	would	form	the	basis	for	a	far	more	 ambitious	 policy	 departure	 as	Haughey	 aligned	 Ireland,	 and	 the	 PNR	partners,	with	one	side	in	an	opening	fundamental	European	policy	conflict.		 The	“Delors	Plan”,	published	in	February	1987,	was	a	Commission	proposal	to	complete	the	internal	market	by	1992.	It	sought	an	increased	EC	budget	-	highly	contested	 by	 net-contributor	 states	 -	 to	 double	 structural	 and	 social	 funding	(ERDF/ESF)	to	offset	the	single	market’s	centripetal	economic	dynamic	through	a	 “convergence”	 process	 by	 funding	 regional/social	 infrastructure	 in	 “less	developed	 regions”.	 Irish	 Commissioner	 Peter	 Sutherland	 sided	 with	 the	 free	marketers	 in	 opposing	 “anti-competitive”	 tendencies	 and	 social	 policy	“impositions”	in	the	Delors	Plan.	But	even	before	the	plan	appeared,	Haughey,	in	opposition,	 criticised	 FitzGerald	 for	 supporting	 a	 “one	 sidedly	 …	 monetarist”	single	 market	 project,	 demanding	 strong	 regional	 and	 social	 investment	programmes.	European	trade	unions,	including	the	ICTU,	shared	this	view.51			 The	EC	Council,	after	much	wrangling,	with	the	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	pessimistic	 of	 the	 outcome,	 finally	 adopted	 a	 diluted	 version	of	Delors’	 plan	 in	February	1988,	 five	months	after	 the	PNR	was	signed.	The	content	of	 the	plan,	managed	by	 the	 Commission	 and	 involving	 “multi-annual”-funded	 “operational	programmes”	 (O/Ps)	 -	 a	 novelty	 for	 Ireland	with	 its	 strictly	 annualised	budget	tradition	-–	was	to	be	clarified	during	1988,	but	member	states	were	to	prepare	proposals,	 for	 submission,	 negotiation	 and	 eventual	 sign-off	 by	 early	 1989.	Precise	programmes	would	then	be	agreed,	and	transfers	begin	in	1990.52		 When	the	Delors	Plan	first	appeared,	just	weeks	before	he	became	Taoiseach,	Haughey	 had	 grasped	 its	 potential:	 “The	 far-reaching	 significance	 of	 that	 Plan	and	the	historic	opportunity	it	presented	…	to	accelerate	our	economic	and	social	development	was	immediately	obvious”.	At	his	first	European	Council	 in	March	1987,	 which	 was	 still	 divided	 over	 the	 plan,	 he	 unequivocally	 backed	 Delors’	proposals,	saying	a	successful	single	market	depended	on	“greater	economic	and	
																																																								51		 EC	Commission	1987b;	Sutherland	1999;	Dølvik	1999:	24-7;	ICTU	AR	1987	52		 On	D/FA	“pessimistic”,	F.M.	Hayes,	Dep.	Secretary,	D/Foreign	Affairs,	to	J.	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	17/12/87,	DTA:	S25858-C	
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social	 cohesion”.	 Helmut	 Kohl,	 in	 discussion	 with	 Haughey,	 admitted	 that	Germany	realised	that	“the	latter	[was]	a	necessary	condition	of	the	former”.53			 Structural	funding	had	hitherto	provided	a	minor,	if	growing,	contribution	to	Ireland’s	Public	Capital	Programme	(PCP).	In	1986	the	NESC	did	not	yet	foresee	it	playing	more	than	a	minor	role	in	development.	ERDF	had	increased	from	just	1.6	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 PCP	 in	 1976	 to	 a	 significant	 but	 still	 ancillary	 10	 per	 cent	(£239m)	 in	 1988,	 the	 last	 pre-Delors	 allocation.	 Finance	 prided	 itself	 on	 how	“Ireland	 has	 consistently	 been	 one	 of	 the	 most	 successful	 Member	 States	 in	taking	up	 the	money	available	 from	the	ERDF”.	But	under	Delors,	which	would	more	 than	 double	 Ireland’s	 allocation	 to	 30+	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 PCP	 given	 its	weighting	to	“less	developed”	regions,	Finance	believed	ERDF	would	henceforth	drive	the	PCP,	and	urged	credible	projects	to	ensure	full	drawdown.54		 Haughey	had	a	 radical	 idea	 for	 combining	 the	usually	diffuse	ERDF	 funding,	ingenuously	 proposing	 Ireland	 apply	 as	 a	 single	 region,	 with	 seven	 “sub-regional”	programmes,	but	framed	as	a	whole	as	a	“National	Development	Plan”	(NDP).	He	 further	 proposed,	 in	 line	with	Delors’	 thinking,	 that	 it	 be	 developed	involving	 local	 interests	 and	 agencies,	 and	 include	 the	 private	 sector.55		 The	government	 intention,	 he	 told	 the	 Dáil,	 was	 “to	 avail	 of	 the	 opportunity	 to	formulate	 a	 comprehensive	 investment	 plan	…	 to	 overcome	 the	 economic	 and	social	deficiencies	that	are	holding	us	back”.	All	planning	was	to	be	aligned	and	integrated	with	the	PNR	and	social	partnership	made	central	to	it.	This	framing	of	disparate	structural	 fund	projects	as	a	“national	plan”	was	utterly	novel,	and	greatly	 enthused	 Delors.	 Haughey	 described	 the	 NDP	 as	 an	 “extension”	 of	 the	PNR,	 “consistent	 with	 its	 objectives”	 and	 bringing	 it	 to	 a	 “new	 plane	 of	development”.	 He	 established	 a	 “Committee	 on	 EC	 Coordination”	 of	 senior	officials	and	CRC	“social	partners”	to	prepare	for	the	single	market.56			 The	 mandarins	 at	 Finance	 were	 appalled	 at	 Haughey’s	 extending	 social	partnership	over	what	they	saw	as	their	preserve,	warning	Teahon	to	disabuse																																																									53	 Haughey	in	Dáil,	01/02/89	and	23/03/87	54	 NESC	1986;	D/Finance,	‘Future	Development	of	ERDF’,	14/03/88,	S25857-C	55	 EC	Commission	1987b;	W.	Kirwin	to	Pat	O’Sullivan	D/Taoiseach,	23/03/88	attaching	‘Programmes	for	E.C.	Funding’	and	‘Revised	Draft	Framework	Regulation	issued	16/03/88,	CRC	39,	DTA:	S25857C;	O’Connell,	D/Env.,	to	Helen	Kehoe,	D/Taoiseach,	12/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E	56	 Haughey	in	Dáil,	12/04/89;	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	5th	mtg.,’	28/04/88’,	S25857-D.	CRC	members	of	the	Joint	Committee	were	Connellan	(CII),	Cassells	(ICTU),	O’Brien	(FUE),	Hennessy	(CIF),	Collier	(Macra),	Whelan	(ICOS)	(D/Taoiseach,	‘Preparation	for	Completion	of	EEC	Internal	Market‘,	DTA:	S25857-E)	
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the	CRC	of	the	idea	that	 it	would	play	a	substantial	role:	“no	decisions	have	yet	been	 taken	on	how	the	overall	national	development	plan	…	will	be	prepared”.	To	avoid	antagonising	Finance,	Ó	hUiginn	told	the	CRC	it	might	at	best	expect	to	be	consulted,	and	instructed	officials	to	refrain	from	mentioning	a	social	partner	role.	 But	 he	 advised	 government	 that	 it	would	 be	 “difficult	 to	 see	 how	we	 can	avoid	consulting	CRC	bodies	on	any	plan	involving	an	evolution	of	the	PNR”.57			 Following	Haughey’s	statement	of	his	intention	to	integrate	the	NDP	and	PNR,	the	CRC,	seeing	itself	as	“the	appropriate	forum	in	which	to	consider	the	overall	…	plan”,	now	demanded	a	 role	 in	drafting	 it.	 In	 July	1988	government	ordered	that	 structures	 representing	 social	 partners	 and	 local	 interests	 be	 formed	 to	advise	 and	 assist	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 “sub-regional”	 plans,	 and	 that	 the	 overall	NDP	 on	 completion	 be	 submitted	 to	 the	 CRC	 for	 approval	 before	 finalisation.	Finance,	 as	 yet,	 would	 retain	 the	 chairmanship	 of	 the	 planning	 groups,	responsibility	for	coordination,	and	“a	final	say”	on	programme	specifics.58		 A	 first	 draft	 NDP	was	 produced,	 following	 a	 similar	 format	 to	 the	 PNR	 and	aligned	with	 it.	 Its	 aim	was	 to	 stimulate	 growth	 locally	 and	 nationally,	 reduce	unemployment	 and	 “raise	 per	 capita	 incomes	 towards	 average	 Community	levels”.	 Additional	 training	 and	 labour	market	 programmes	would	 be	 financed	through	 the	 European	 Social	 Fund	 (ESF).	 Haughey	 urged	 CRC	 partners	 to	mobilise	 their	 local	 structures	 in	 the	 planning	 process,	 which	 they	 did.	 This	participative	 planning	was	 unique	 in	 Europe,	 and	 so	 impressed	Delors	 that	 he	promoted	it	to	other	countries	as	a	model	to	emulate.59			 The	CRC	meeting	of	26	October	1988	which,	as	described	in	the	 last	section,	had	trawled	through	government	and	IDA	reports,	confirmed	the	economy	had	“turned	 a	 corner”	 and	 publicly	 endorsed	 Dorgan’s	 view	 of	 the	 PNR	 (“it’s	
																																																								57	 Tutty	to	P	Teahon,	20/04/88,	S25857-D;	Ó	hUiginn	in	h/w	notes	for	mins.,	4th	CRC	meeting	24/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C;	W.	Kirwan	to	Teahon,	‘Paper	for	meeting	of	the	CRC	28	April’,	26/04/88,	S25857-D	58	 CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	6th	mtg.’,26/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E;	h/w	notes,	Secretariat	Group,	‘SG	CRC	29/7/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	Government	decision	in	Dermot	Nally,	Runaí	an	Rialtais,	to	an	Runaí	Príobháideach/An	tAire	Airgeadais,	26/07/88,	DTA:	S25857-F;	D/Finance,	‘Confidential	-	Background	Briefing	for	SRC	Secretariat	Meeting’,	24/8/88,	and	D/Finance,	‘Note	for	CRC	Secretariat:	Consultative	Process	on	Regional	Programmes	for	EC	Funding’,	26/8/88,	DTA:	S25857-G;	Nally	to	Private	Sec.,	M/Finance	23/09/88,,	attaching	D/Finance	‘Aide	Memoire’	agreed	by	government,	DTA:	S25857-	59	 D/Finance,	‘Outline	of	National	Development	Plan’,	July	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	on	Haughey	and	local	social	partner	engagement,	h/w	note	of	meeting,	SG,	05/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-I	and	‘Action	Points	…	from	SG	mtg.	of	5	October’,	12/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J;	‘EC	Structural	Funds:	Discussion	at	CRC	Sec.	Group,	5	Oct_	1988’	(internal	D/Taoiseach	use	only);	‘Statement	by	the	Taoiseach	on	NESC	Report	Ireland	in	the	
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working”),	also	reviewed	preparations	for	the	NDP.	Ó	hUiginn	told	it	of	a	major	breakthrough:	 civil	 servants	 who	 had	 just	 met	 Delors	 had	 been	 told	 how	 the	Commission	was	 “very	 impressed”	with	 the	PNR	and	would	 fund	 the	proposed	NDP	sectoral	plans	aligned	with	it	with	a	£700m	package.	Furthermore,	Brussels	had	agreed	an	extra	programme	to	“create	jobs	in	employment	blackspots”.60			 Drafting	 the	NDP	 brought	 the	 PNR,	 in	Haughey’s	words,	 to	 a	 “new	 plane	 of	development”,	with	the	NESC	tasked	with	developing	European	strategy,	the	CRC	given	oversight	of	the	NDP,	and	local	social	partners	integrated	into	planning	its	“sub-regional	programmes”.	Haughey	described	the	NDP’s	as	aimed	to	overcome	the	“costly	impediment	of	our	peripheral	location”	and	the	wide	involvement	in	its	planning	“generat[ing]	a	great	country-wide	effort	…	in	support	of	this	plan”.	Speaking	 for	 him	 in	 the	 Dáil,	 Lenihan	 said	 the	 approach	 would	 “become	 an	integral	part	of	the	State’s	whole	economic	and	social	planning	in	the	future”.61		 	
Partnership	and	the	Haughey-Delors	“alliance”	
		 The	October	1988	breakthrough	when	Brussels	endorsed	Ireland’s	“NDP”	was	the	 result	 of	 a	 deliberate	 strategy.	 On	 the	 EC	 Council	Haughey	 had	 nurtured	 a	rapport	with	Francois	Mitterand,	who	he	had	hosted	on	a	private	visit	to	Ireland	in	 March,	 and	 successfully	 pressed	 Ireland’s	 case	 on	 Helmut	 Kohl.	 Framing	Ireland’s	 ERDF/ESF	 programme	 as	 a	 “National	 Plan”	 enthused	 Delors.	 These	three	leaders	were	determined	to	progress	EC	integration	against	opposition	led	by	Britain,	with	Kohl	and	Mitterand	sealing	their	alliance	at	a	symbolic	renewal	of	the	1963	De	Gaulle/Adenauer	Élysée	Treaty.	Thatcher’s	famous	Bruges	speech	opposing	a	“new	state	…	imposed	at	a	European	level"	had	been	made	just	weeks	earlier,	in	September,	and	both	the	Commission	and	the	Franco-German	leaders	needed	allies.	Haughey	assured	them	that	Ireland	would	be	one	of	these.62			 Haughey’s	 enthusiasm	 for	 Europe	 had	 always	 gone	 beyond	 the	 generalised	small-state/Commission	confluence	of	 interest	often	ascribed	to	Irish	policy.	As	Minister	 for	 Finance	 in	 1967	 he	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 the	 renewed	 EEC	application,	 during	 which	 he	 was	 present	 at	 de	 Gaulle’s	 reiteration	 of	 his																																																									60		 CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	9th	mtg.’,	26/10/88,	DTA:	S25857J-2;	‘14,500	new	jobs,	Irish	Times,	27/10/88	61		 Haughey,	‘Speech	at	launch	of	“NDP	1989-1993’,	31/03/89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	Lenihan,	Dáil	26/10/88	62	 Élysée	Treaty,	…;	Thatcher,	‘Speech	to	the	College	of	Europe’,	20/09/88,	https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332	
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opposition	 to	 British	membership,	 and	 in	Dublin	 argued	 in	 favour	 of	 pursuing	membership	regardless	of	Britain.	As	Taoiseach	in	1979-82	he	had	aligned	with	Germany,	 agreeing	 at	 a	meeting	with	 Chancellor	 Schmidt	 that	 rapid	 European	integration	was	an	existential	necessity.	On	again	becoming	Taoiseach	 in	1987,	and	 against	 considerable	 opposition	 from	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 he	moved	 European	policy	 to	 the	Department	of	 the	Taoiseach,	appointing	Máire	Geoghegan	Quinn,	who	would	later	become	Ireland’s	first	woman	cabinet	member	since	Markievicz,	to	co-ordinate	European	policy.	As	soon	as	the	SEA	was	passed,	he	mandated	the	NESC	to	draft	a	European	strategy	and,	in	a	remarkable	feat	given	social	partner	divergence	 over	 the	 SEA	 six	 months	 earlier,	 succeeded	 in	 having	 a	 consensus	integrationist	position	on	the	“EC	Dimension”	included	in	the	PNR.63		 Haughey	 personally	 led	 European	 strategy,	 launching	 a	 “new	 departure	 in	Irish	governmental	organisation”	by	establishing	a	“Committee	of	Ministers	and	Secretaries”,	chaired	by	himself,	to	“take	control	and	direct	preparations”	for	the	Single	Market.	Following	Brussels’	approval	of	the	NDP,	he	presented	it	as	a	plan	jointly	 developed	 through	 the	 “unique”	 Dublin-Brussels	 “partnership”.	 Delors	reciprocated	 and,	 in	 Dublin	 to	 “cement	 and	 deepen”	 what	 he	 called	 the	 new	“partnership	 between	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	 Irish	 Government”,	issued	an	unprecedented	joint	statement	with	Haughey	describing	this	“historic	partnership”	 as	 based	 on	 a	 common	 will	 to	 both	 “integrate	 European	 and	national	policies	in	a	common	plan	to	develop	the	Irish	economy”,	and	progress	European	 “economic	 and	 social	 cohesion”.	 “By	 our	 actions,	 the	 policies	 of	 the	Community	and	 those	of	 the	 Irish	nation	will	be	 fully	and	effectively	combined	and	 integrated”.	 Ireland	 would	 “fully	 coordinate	 its	 policies	 with	 those	 of	 the	Community	to	create	an	efficient	and	competitive	[Irish]	economy”.	It	was	agreed	that	Haughey’s	EC	Committee	collaborate	with	a	Commission	“task	force	headed	by	President	Delors”,	 that	the	two	would	“meet	regularly”	to	ensure	policy	was	“fully	co-ordinated”	on	both	the	NDP	and	European	integration,	and	that	Ireland	would	support	rapid	freeing	of	capital	movements.	Delors	also	assured	Haughey	
																																																								63		 On	Ireland/Commission	relationship,	FitzGerald	1991	and	Brennan	2008;	on	Haughey,	France,	Germany	and	EEC	membership,	see	chapter	2;	on	D/FA	“resistance”,	Delaney	2001;	‘EC	Dimension’,	PNR,	I;	on	social	partners	and	SEA,	Hourihan	1996:	90-1	
	 206	
that	 NDP	 approval	 deadlines	 would	 be	 met.	 This	 “partnership”	 was	unprecedented,	the	Commission	describing	it	as	“so	far	unique”	in	EC	history.64		 In	developing	the	NDP,	Haughey	used	this	“unique	partnership”	to	secure	key	policy	 goals.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 sought	 a	 front-loading	 of	 1989	 current-round	 ERDF	funding	to	free	budget	provision	to	meet	PNR	commitments	in	1990.	He	argued	this	on	the	basis	of	the	need	for	continued	“restraint	on	Exchequer	borrowing	…	in	 line	 with	 Community	 guidelines”,	 warning	 that	 “we	 are	 likely	 to	 have	difficulties	with	 the	 social	 partners,	 particularly	 the	…	unions,	 unless	 the	1989	Budget	can	indicate	…	additional	resources	for	job	creation”.	While	this	was	not	disclosed	 to	 the	 CRC,	 such	 was	 the	 new	 relationship	 with	 Brussels	 that	 the	request	was	approved.	Ireland	also	secured	the	maximum	intervention	rate	of	75	per	cent	and	a	per-capita	allocation	far	in	excess	of	any	other	member	state.	65		 The	final	draft	NDP	was	completed	by	the	January	1989	deadline.	Following	a	lengthy	 meeting,	 the	 CRC	 issued	 a	 “Joint	 Statement”	 “endorsing”	 it	 and	committing	 to	 cooperate	 in	 developing	 its	 “sub-regional	 programmes”.	 The	Commission,	 impressed	 by	 Ireland’s	 focused	 planning,	 its	 intention	 “to	 spread	the	 projects	 of	 the	 [NDP]	 Programmes	 throughout	 the	 country”	 and	 its	integration	 of	 the	 structural-funded	 NDP	with	 the	 PNR,	 praised	 the	 “thorough	and	 comprehensive	 work	 presented	 by	 the	 Irish	 Government”.	 Delors	 was	particularly	taken	with	its	local	and	social	partner	involvement,	which	Haughey	stressed	were	Irish	innovations	the	Commission	had	not	specifically	sought.66		 Government	 proposed	 another	 innovation	which,	 in	 a	 series	 of	 concessions,	Brussels	also	approved.	This	was	for	private	investment	to	be	eligible	for	EC	co-finance,	 prohibited	 under	 the	 1986	 ERDF	 regulation.	 Haughey	 argued	 it	 was	indispensible	 to	 enable	 the	 NDP	 proceed	 while	 maintaining	 budget	 discipline,	though	 it	 also	 of	 course	 reflected	 the	 private	 sector-centred	 ethos	 of	 the	 PNR.	Government	 first	 sought	 this	 for	 the	 plan’s	 roads	 programme,	which	 it	 argued																																																									64	 On	EC	Coordination	Committee,	Haughey	in	the	Dáil	01/02/89’;	Haughey-Delors,	‘Joint	Declaration	by	the	Taoiseach,	Charles	J.	Haughey,	TD,	and	President	Delors	on	the	Economic	and	Social	Development	of	Ireland	within	the	European	Community’,	28/10/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	on	Delors’	“persona	assurance”,	h/w:	‘Notes	–	CRC	SG	31/8/88’,	DTA:	S25857-G;	and	“so	far	unique”,	‘Joint	Declaration	after	the	Meeting	between	the	Commission	and	the	Members	of	the	Irish	Government’,	Bxl.	16/01/89.	Comm.	IP	(89)	13	65	 Ó	hUiginn	to	Antonio	Costa,	DG	II,	Commission	of	the	EC,	19/12/88,	and,	on	secret	strategy,	O’Sullivan	to	Sec.	[=	Ó	hUiginn],	‘re	CRC	mtg.	11	January’,	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	66	 CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	11th	mtg.’,	11/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N;	‘Government	Statement’,	11/01/89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	‘Joint	Declaration	after	the	Meeting	between	the	Commission	and	the	Members	of	the	Irish	Government’,	Bxl.	16/01/89;	Haughey	in	Dáil	01/02/89	
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the	Exchequer	alone	could	never	finance.	Delors	approved	it	in	principle	within	weeks.	 It	 then	 sought	 and	 secured	 the	 same	 exemption	 for	 infrastructure	generally,	 especially	water	 facilities	 for	which	 an	 extensive	modernisation	was	planned.	 Government	 had	 secured	 EIB	 loans	when	 establishing	 Coillte	 to	 fund	PNR	forestry	and	timber	industry	projects,	which	had	enabled	“record	planting”	and	new	industrial	plants	in	1988.	Haughey	now	sought	approval	for	this	sector	too	to	be	eligible	for	private/ERDF	co-financing,	securing	an	amendment	to	the	relevant	ERDF	regulation.	Dublin	similarly	and	successfully	lobbied	for	the	same	for	tourism	projects,	which	Ó	hUiginn	triumphantly	reported	to	the	CRC	in	June	1989	the	Commission	now	“fully	accept[ed]”.	The	principle	was	later	extended	to	private/community	co-financing	of	local	development	projects.67			 The	socio-economic	strategy	of	the	PNR,	as	with	those	of	Lemass,	was	focused	solely	on	the	economy	of	the	Republic.	While	having	an	“EC	Dimension”,	it	made	no	mention	of	Northern	Ireland.	Business	organisations	had	neither	a	presence	nor	members	in	the	North,	and	viewed	the	attritional	conflict	mainly	in	terms	of	its	impact	on	southern	economic	development,	deterring	investment	and	foreign	trade.	Although	ICTU	had	a	third	of	its	membership	and	played	a	significant	role	in	the	North,	it	kept	this	separate	from	its	activities	in	the	south.	But,	like	Pádraic	White	 of	 the	 IDA,	 ICTU	 leader	Phil	 Flynn	had	 grown	up	 in	 a	 depressed	border	county.	 A	 prominent	 republican	whose	 father	 had	 endured	 discrimination	 and	unemployment	 in	 the	 North,	 it	 was	 Flynn	who	 first	 raised	 the	 potential	 of	 EC	funding	 for	 cross-border	 projects	 under	 the	 NDP.	 Finance	 had	mentioned	 this	possibility,	 but	 dismissed	 it	 as	 probably	 limited	 to	 minor	 initiatives.	 Flynn	persisted,	 stressing	 that	 the	 single	 market	 meant	 the	 border	 would	 be	 “gone	other	than	[for]	security”,	but	Finance	countered	that	more	ambitious	initiatives	would	 be	 “difficult	 to	 implement”.	 But	 Ó	 hUiginn,	 who	 was	 a	 republican	 in	 a	similar	sense	to	White	and	Haughey,	called	the	Finance	secretary,	Tutty,	to	task,	reminding	him	of	the	AIA	study	groups,	which	could	develop	relevant	proposals.																																																									67	 Discussion	of	ERDF	regulation	and	Irish	strategy,	h/w	notes	‘CRC	meeting’	08/09/88’,	DTA:	S25857-H;	Haughey’s	justification	in	Dáil,	12/04/89;	on	Delors	approval	for	roads,	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	7th	mtg.’,	30/06/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	extended	to	infrastructure,	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	8th	mtg.’,	08/09/88’,	DTA:	S25857-H;	on	EIB	loans	for	forestry/timber,	‘European	Investment	Bank	funds	for	Forestry’,	15/12/88,	GIS:	D/Energy,	and	Denis	Mehigan,	Private	Sec.,	to	Pauline	O’Shaughnessy,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Briefing	material	for	D/Taoiseach	for	reply	to	letter	from	P.	Cassells	regarding	Leinster	Paper	Mills’,	06/02/89,	DTA:	S25857-O;	on	private/ERDF	extension	to	forestry/timber,	‘EC	Action	Programme	to	aid	Irish	forestry’,	29/05/89,	GIS:	D/Forestry;	and	tourism	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	16th	mtg.’,	22/06/89,	DTA:	S25857-U	
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This	was	a	small	beginning,	but	would	lead	to	a	growing	cross-border	economic	element	in	the	NDP	that	would	later	be	of	significance	in	the	“Peace	Process”.68		 If	 the	NDP	and	Delors	Plan	were	the	 framework	for	the	beginnings	of	a	new	aspect	of	North-South	development,	they	also	shaped	a	new	left/right	alignment	in	 Europe	 that	 brought	 the	 ICTU,	 and	much	 of	 the	 Irish	 Left,	 closer	 to	 the	 EC.	Following	 union	 opposition	 across	 Europe	 in	 1987	 to	 the	 “one-sided”	 free-market	orientation	of	the	SEA,	Delors	sought	to	win	labour	to	the	single	market	by	dramatically	announcing,	at	the	ETUC	conference	in	May,	the	re-activation	of	EC-level	“collective	bargaining”	through	a	“European	Social	Dialogue”	he	had	first	announced	 in	1985	and	had	 included	provision	 for	 in	 the	SEA.	Even	 in	Britain,	where	 the	 TUC	 had	 long	 been	 hostile	 to	 the	 EEC,	 he	 enthused	 trade	 unionists	with	 his	 call	 to	 them	 to	 join	 in	 building	 a	 “Social	 Europe”,	 unveiling	 at	 their	conference	 in	 September	 1988	 his	 proposed	 “European	 Charter	 of	 Workers’	Rights”,	which	he	promised	would	 form	part	of	 the	1992	Treaty.	His	speech,	 to	which	 Thatcher’s	 Bruges	 address	 the	 following	 week	 was	 a	 direct	 riposte,	reportedly	 “electrified”	 delegates,	 who	 gave	 him	 a	 standing	 ovation,	 singing	
“frere	 Jacques!”	 (Delors	 was	 a	 former	 union	 official).	 Unions	 across	 Europe,	including	 Britain,	 rallied	 to	 Delors	 as	 representing	 a	 “social	 capitalism”,	 the	“optimistic”	 opposite	 pole	 to	 Thatcherism.	ICTU	was	 equally	 enthused,	 and	 its	endorsement	at	the	October	1988	CRC	meeting	of	the	NDP	and	the	government’s	case	that	an	Irish	recovery	was	underway	was	critically	influenced	by	it.69	 		 Both	business	and	unions	 in	 Ireland	 threw	 themselves	 into	planning	 for	 the	NDP.	 The	 promise	 of	 Europe	 dissipated	 residual	 sympathies	 for	 Thatcherite	policies	 among	 Irish	 employers,	 though	 these	 had	 always	 been	more	muted	 in	the	 CII.	Planning	workshops	 by	 partner	 organisations	 on	Europe	 followed.	 The	newly	 optimistic	 farming	 groups	 hosted	 meetings	 on	 CAP	 and	 rural	development,	and	ICTU	a	large	event	on	the	European	“social	dimension”,	which	Delors	himself	addressed.	Haughey	was	also	due	to	attend	but	could	not	due	to																																																									68		 On	the	North	and	the	economy,	Reynolds	2009:	124-5;	CII	view,	Power	2009:	25;	on	ICTU	Northern	role,	ICTU	ARs	1971-89;	Tutty	on	the	possibility,	in	‘£239	million	Regional	Fund	assistance	for	Ireland’,	06/01/88,	GIS:	D/Finance;	Tutty,	Flynn	and	Ó	hUiginn	in	h/w	notes	for	Minutes	4th	CRC	meeting	24/03/88,	W.	Kirwin	to	O’Sullivan	D/Taoiseach,	‘re	‘rogrammes	for	EC	Funding’,	23/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C,	h/w	notes	of	Secretariat	Group	mtg.,	‘SG	CRC	29/7/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F,	and	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	9th	mtg.’,	26/10/88,	DTA:	S25857J-2	69		 EC	Comm.	1988b,	c;	Lee,	D.	2010;	Lange	and	Teague,	1992:	24;	Hourihan	1996:	70;	McGinley	1999:	128-9	
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illness,	 his	 speech	 being	 delivered	 by	 Lenihan.	 While	 the	 ICTU	 quibbled	 with	aspects	 of	 the	Delors	 Plan,	 especially	 the	 “inadequate”	 scale	 of	 ERDF	 transfers	envisaged	in	terms	of	Irish	needs,	it	embraced	Delors	and	the	“Social	Charter”.70		 The	Dublin-Brussels	 “special	 partnership”	did	not	preclude	more	 traditional	practices,	 the	 Department	 of	 the	 Environment,	 for	 example,	 reporting	 its	continued	 “strictly	 confidential”	 policy	 in	 defiance	 of	 EC	 rules	 of	 covertly	“promoting	import	substitution”	by	favouring	Irish	materials	suppliers	in	public	construction	 contracts.	 Nor	 did	 the	 “partnership”	 deter	 government	 from	dissenting	 from	Commission	proposals	 it	disliked,	 strongly	 resisting	hasty	VAT	harmonisation	or,	to	the	relief	of	civil	servants	and	business,	when	Ahern	joined	Britain	in	opposing	the	Vredling	Directive	on	worker	directors	in	July	1988.71			 But	the	“alliance”	with	the	Commission	was	a	very	real	one,	of	mutual	benefit.	Ireland	reciprocated	the	special	consideration	it	received	by	–	as	NESC	advised	–	consistently	supporting	Franco-German	 integration	policy	and	 fast-tracking	 the	liberalising	 of	 capital	 movements	 ahead	 of	 others,	 though	 this	 accorded	 with	government	strategy	anyway.	As	already	the	“most	open	economy	in	Europe”,	Ó	hUiginn	told	the	CRC,	Ireland	stood	only	to	gain	from	open	EC	public	tendering,	a	position	also	advocated	by	the	Department	of	Finance,	CII	and	government.72		 Before	 the	 finalised	 NDP	 was	 approved	 by	 Brussels	 in	 March	 1989,	 it	 was	again	 sent	 for	 CRC’s	 “consideration”	 and	 only	 submitted	 following	 its	endorsement.	Additional	Social	Funding	(ESF)	for	unemployment	measures	was	added	in	June.	The	NDP	involved	a	total	investment	of	£9.7bn,	including	£3.9bn	ERDF,	but	with	much	of	the	Irish	input	from	the	private	sector.	Haughey	hailed	the	75	per	cent	intervention	rate	and	eligibility	of	private	investment,	saying	the	NDP	would	thus	achieve	its	goals	without	being	“a	burden	on	the	Exchequer”.73		 With	Brussels’	final	approval	of	the	NDP	in	April	1989,	and	following	the	role	of	 the	 unions	 in	 drafting	 it,	 Congress	 seized	 on	 Haughey’s	 commitment	 to	partnership	as	“an	integral	part	of	the	State’s	…	planning	in	the	future”	to	secure																																																									70		 On	CII/FUE,	Power	2009	and	Interviews	with	O’Sullivan	and	Power;	for	ICTU	event,	ICTU	1988b	and	c	71		 On	“import	substitution”,	Michael	O’Connell,	D/Env.	to	John	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	16/02/88,	DTA:	S25858-E;	on	opposition	to	Vredling,	Irish	Times,	20/07/88,	and	civil	service	relief,	Seán	Dorgan,	note	to	Travers,	“material	for	Taoiseach’s	speech	on	1992	campaign’,	22/06/88,	DTA:	S25281-E	72	 CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	8th	mtg.’,	08/09/88,	DTA:	S25857-H;	D/Finance,	‘Implementation	Programme	for	National	Recovery:	Areas	of	Responsibility	of	D/Finance’,	March	1988,	DTA:	S25858-F	73	 CRC	debate,	approval	of	NDP	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	13th	mtg..’,	13/03/89,	DTA:	S25857-Q	NDP	funding	in	‘Government	Statement’,	22/03/89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	Haughey	in	Dáil	12/04/89	
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a	monitoring	role	in	the	implementation	of	the	National	Plan,	similar	to	the	role	it	 achieved	on	 the	CRC	 in	 relation	 to	 the	PNR.	Ó	hUiginn,	under	Department	of	Finance	 pressure,	 demurred.	 While	 he	 conceded	 that	 Brussels	 required	 a	monitoring	 system,	 he	 for	 once	 countered	 ICTU,	 warning	 that	 an	 agreed	 plan	with	Brussels	 involving	public	monies	was	a	 “political	matter”	and	partnership	should	not	overreach	 itself	by	 infringing	on	Dáil	 sovereignty.	But	 ICTU	had	not	only	 other	 partners’	 but	 also	 Haughey’s	 support,	 and	 Ó	 hUiginn	 relented,	“recommending”	 to	 Reynolds,	 now	Minister	 for	 Finance,	 that	 he	 accommodate	their	wishes.	Finance	reluctantly	agreed,	establishing	a	“small	unit”	for	the	NDP,	reporting	to	both	the	“Committee	of	Ministers	and	Secretaries”	(CMS)	and	social	partnership’s	 CRC.	 As	 the	 Commission	 required	 a	 “Committee”	 for	 each	programme	anyway,	it	philosophised,	the	“advisory	groups”,	on	which	the	social	partners	were	“heavily	represented”,	should	be	merged	with	the	planning	groups	for	the	purpose.	This	proposal	was	adopted	by	Government	in	May	1989,	placing	a	social	partnership	structure	over	the	NDP	and	each	of	its	sub-programmes.74		 Haughey	 defined	 the	 PNR’s	 objective	 as	 “real	 convergence	 [with	 Europe]	 in	employment	 level,	 incomes	 and	 general	 prosperity”.	 Structural	 funds,	 he	 told	Fianna	Fáil	trade	unionists,	were	vital,	but	“only	one	leg	of	a	tripod”:	“In	the	final	analysis,	 no	 amount	 of	 EC	 support	 will	 compensate	 for	 inadequate	 policies	 at	home	…	 The	 fruitful	 relationship	 that	 now	 exists	 between	 social	 partners	 and	Government	 is	 the	 key	 to	 economic	 success.	 I	 would	 like	 to	 see	 it	 firmly	established	as	a	permanent	structure	for	the	future	so	that	economic	and	social	progress	can	be	planned	in	a	constructive	atmosphere”.75		 The	NDP,	developed	as	an	“extension”	of	the	PNR,	was	a	triumph	for	Haughey.	Its	 enthusiastic	 approval	 by	Brussels	 and	extensive	positive	media	 coverage	 at	home	was	followed	within	a	week	by	his	decision	to	call	a	surprise	election.			
																																																								74	 “integral	part”,	Haughey	in	Dáil	26/10/88;	ICTU	demand	monitoring	role	and	“Ó	hUiginn	conceded”,	CRC	‘Summary	Report	of	14th	mtg.’	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	“countered	ICTU”,	‘13/3/89’	[i.e.	h/w	notes	for	13th	meeting	CRC,	13/03/89],	DTA:	S25857-Q;	Haughey’s	support,	O’Sullivan	to	Ó	hUiginn,	‘re	Agenda	item	4	–	Consultative	Process	on	Monitoring	Implementation	of	EC	Structural	Fund	Assistance’,	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	“recommends	to	Reynolds”,	Ó	hUiginn	to	Reynolds	M/F,	28/02/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	Finance	“reluctantly	agrees”,	D/Finance,	‘CMS	166.	Revised.	Monitoring	the	National	Development	Plan.	Suggested	Arrangements’,	DTA:	S25857-S	75		 Haughey,	‘Speech	to	Fianna	Fáil	Trade	Union	Conference,	Lucan’,	07/05/89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach		
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Chapter	8	
Green	shoots:	economic	recovery	and	policy	
innovation,	1987-89	
	
“Turnaround”:	a	pattern	emerges		 The	 28	October	 1988	CRC	meeting	was	 the	 turning	 point	 of	 the	 PNR,	when	what	 ICTU	 leader	 John	Carroll	 had	 called	 its	 “gamble”	was	 agreed	 finally	 to	be	“working”.	Despite	the	US/UK	market	crisis,	an	Irish	“turnaround”	was	occurring,	with	growth	 reviving,	new	 jobs	being	 created,	 “the	haemorrhage	of	 substantial	job	losses	…	ended”,	and	agriculture	recovering.	As	a	senior	FUE	official	put	it,	the	recovery	“might	be	modest”,	but	on	jobs	“the	trickle	was	gaining	momentum”.1			 A	 core	 aim	 of	 the	 PNR	 agreement,	 as	 Haughey	 had	 told	 Phil	 Flynn,	 was	 to	“restore	 investor	 confidence”.	 The	 CRC,	 government	 and	 Europe	 now	 all	concurred	 that	 the	 PNR	 was	 generating	 a	 “resurgence	 of	 investment	 by	 Irish	industry”	following	“lean	and	difficult	recent	years”:	“the	days	of	real	output	and	jobs	growth	have	returned”.	MacSharry	reported	exports	 rising	 in	1988	 to	 two	thirds	 of	 output,	 compared	 to	 just	 half	 in	 1986,	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 EC,	 while	Delors	said	the	PNR	had	led	to	a	“substantial	inward	flow	of	capital”.2		 But	 rather	 than	 a	 general	 phenomenon,	 the	 recovery	was	 occurring	 in	 very	specific	areas.	The	social	partners	had	overlapping	but	divergent	interests.	While	ICTU	 sought	 job	 creation	 and	 industrial	 expansion	 to	 reduce	 mass	unemployment	 and	 boost	 wages,	 and	 business	 a	 recovery	 of	 profitability	 and	trading	 growth,	 Government	 needed	politically	 to	 achieve	 both.	 The	pattern	 of	industrial	recovery	and	its	economic	structure	becoming	apparent	by	the	end	of	1988,	while	mirroring	the	profile	and	targets	of	the	PNR,	took	a	form	different	to	it,	with	the	three	targeted	“business	areas”	performing	in	a	manner	not	foreseen.	Nevertheless,	 while	 external	 factors,	 notably	 early	 forms	 of	 globalisation,	 and																																																											1		 D/I&C.	’20,000	Target	…	Progress	Report	of	Mid-Year’.	August	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	FUE	official	quoted	in	The	Irish	Times	27/10/88			2		 Haughey	to	Flynn,	in	Hastings	et	al	2007:	31;	PNR	Section	II	(6);	[IDA],	‘Updated	Progress	on	the	Provision	of	Jobs	under	PNR’,	21/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J;	McSharry,	‘Address	to	General	Humbert	Summer	School’,	26/08/88,	GIS:	D/Finance;	‘Joint	Declaration	by	the	Taoiseach,	Charles	J.	Haughey,	TD,	and	President	Delors	on	the	Economic	and	Social	Development	of	Ireland	within	the	European	Community’,	28/10/88,	GIS:	D/Taoisecah	
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inherent	economic	factors,	such	as	the	nature	of	the	rationalisation	“shake-out”,	were	 important,	 sectoral	 performance	was	 decisively	 shaped	by	policy	 choices	by	both	government	and	the	social	partners,	not	only	in	macro-economic	terms,	but	 in	 the	specifics	of	 industries.	The	politics	of	 social	partnership,	 rather	 than	exogenous	factors,	became	the	vital	driver	of	the	Irish	economic	turnaround.	
	
Policy	tested:	“indigenous”	industry’s	uneven	performance		 PNR	industrial	strategy	prioritised	a	take-off	of	indigenous	industry.	The	IDA	described	 its	 “central	 objective”	 as	 to	 “stimulate	 and	 assist	 Irish	 controlled	companies	 to	 be	 internationally	 competitive”	 and	 “become	 European	 market	leaders”.	 Critics	 later	 dubbed	 this	 “crony	 capitalism”,	 although,	 as	 examined	 in	the	 introduction	 to	 this	 thesis,	 state-industry	 integration	 was	 the	 essence	 of	“successful	small	open	economy”	theory.	FDI,	which	had	been	performing	poorly,	was	 seen	 as	 ancillary,	 assisting	 the	 “central	 objective”	 by	 upgrading	 industrial	quality	 and	 “linkages”	 with	 Irish	 firms.	 The	 IDA	 pursued	 whatever	 mobile	investment	it	could	on	this	basis	(with	a	new	“special	focus	on	Japan”	given	the	US/UK	 recession),	 but	 did	 not	 expect	 a	 dramatic	 breakthrough.	 Its	 immediate	priority,	the	Department	of	I&C	reported,	was	improving	export	capacity	among	the	900	overseas	 firms	 “still	 in	 Ireland”.	 Supporting	 small	 start-ups,	which	had	also,	 despite	 considerable	 state	 investment,	 shown	 poor	 results	 in	 the	 1980s,	was	 another	 secondary	 objective.	 Privately,	 Haughey	 and	 his	 circle	 were	sceptical	of	this	ordering	of	priorities,	having	already	identified	a	substantial	FDI	growth	as	the	key	driver,	but	accepted	it	in	the	interests	of	the	PNR	consensus.3			 In	 line	 with	 PNR	 strategy,	 agency	 supports	 were	 re-directed	 from	 general	start-up	 and	 fixed	 asset	 grants	 to	 selected	 larger	 companies	 to	 promote	 their	presence	 abroad	 and	 modernise	 their	 capacity,	 marketing,	 company	 planning	and	management	techniques.	John	Bruton	claimed	this	had	already	been	“central	core”	 coalition	 policy,	 citing	 the	Goodman	 example,	 but	 government	 dismissed	this	 as	 having	 been	 little	 more	 than	 aspiration.	 Pádraic	 White	 described	 the	policy	 re-orientation	 now	 underway	 as	 the	 “biggest	 shake-up	 in	 industrial																																																											3		 IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N;	D/I&C,	‘Progress	in	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27	May	1988,	DTA:	S25857-E;	on	Haughey	circle’s	preferences,	Ó	hUiginn	to	Haughey,	n.d.,	with	memo,	Travers,	‘Presentation	to	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance	and	Labour	on	April	27th	[1987]	on	Industrial	Policy’,	DTA-OHP	(see	also,	chapter	4)	
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incentives	since	the	foundation	of	the	IDA”.	The	help	to	targeted	firms	was	very	considerable,	a	Department	of	I&C	official	describing	it	as	difficult	“to	imagine	a	greater	 degree	 of	 intervention	 short	 of	 a	 substantially	 enlarged	 State	 sector”,	though	also	warning	it	would	be	years	before	its	concrete	success	was	apparent.4			 Both	business	and	unions	accepted	that	the	promise	of	the	PNR	lay	in	the	new	future	 sectors	 it	 would	 drive,	 not	 old	 industry.	 The	 on-going	 “shake-out”	 was	extreme.	Most	of	manufacturing	in	the	1970s	had	been	for	the	home	market,	and	a	 third	 of	 those	 jobs	 had	 disappeared	 by	 1985,	 displaced	 by	 imports,	 as	 the	industrial	base	of	the	Lemass	era	collapsed	in	the	absence	of	a	new	strategy.	Only	firms	 in	non-traded	sectors,	 such	as	 food,	 survived,	 though	still	over-reliant	on	UK	markets	 and	with	 only	 an	 eighth	 exporting	 elsewhere	 in	 Europe.	 Ireland’s	EEC	 “transition”	 had	 ended	 in	 1978	 with	 the	 last	 protections	 -	 apart	 from	 a	further	4	years	for	the	car	industry	–	removed,	precipitating	a	decade	of	severe	manufacturing	 decline.	 ICTU	 privately	 accepted	 that	 old-industry	 loss-leaders	were	doomed.	When	government	withdrew	subventions	to	Leinster	Paper	Mills,	Haughey	 adamant	 it	 could	 not	 become	 “financially	 involved	 again”,	 ICTU	protested	publicly	but,	 as	Ó	hUiginn	noted	 to	Haughey,	 “the	 fact	 [they]	did	not	raise	the	issue	[on	the	CRC]	…	suggests	they	understand	the	reality”.5			 Besides	 large-scale	 exporting,	 the	 PNR	 also	 hoped	 for	 quick	 employment	dividends	from	services	and	from	sectors	such	as	tourism,	whose	planned	grant-assisted	expansion	aimed	for	25,000	new	jobs	by	1993	achieved	by	a	promotion	campaign,	upgrading	the	“product”	and	exploiting	European	liberalisation	of	air	transport.	Although	this	target	was	ridiculed	by	the	Dáil	opposition,	government	established	 a	 “Tourism	 Task	 Force”	 whose	 tax-incentive/marketing-based	strategy	 was	 energetically	 implemented	 in	 1987-88.	 This	 fulfilled	 Haughey’s	prediction	 of	 a	 “bumper	 year	 for	 tourism”,	with	 visitor	 numbers	 increasing	 15	
																																																										4		 PNR	V	(11);	D/I&C,	‘Proposals	for	Further	Re-organisation	and	Simplification	of	Industrial	Promotion	Agencies’,	Feb.	1988,	S25858-E;	IDA	Ireland,	Your	Partners	in	Development,	Jan.	1988;	Bruton,	‘Speech	to	the	lunch	of	Small	Firms	Association’	(Fine	Gael	Press	Release),	18/02/88;	on	coalition	“aspiration”,	Travers	D/T	to	Paul	Bates,	D/I&C,	25/02/88,	DTA:	S25858-E;	on	“shake-up”,	IDA,	‘Introductory	Comments	by	Padraic	A	White’,	07/04/88,	DTA:	S25870-C;	on	“state	intervention”,	Paul	Bates,	D/I&C,	encl:	‘Poor	Response	from	Private	Sector	to	Job	Creation.	Mfr./Ind.	Policy’,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25862-D			5		 On	“shake-out”,	O’Dowd	1996:	43;	NESC	1989:	515;	on	Paper	Mills,	Denis	Mehigan,	Pvte	Secretary	to	the	Taoiseach,	to	Cassells,	ICTU,	29/03/89,	and	Internal	D/T	memo,	O’Sullivan	to	Sec	[Ó	hUiginn],	‘Representation	to	Taoiseach	from	Mr	P.	Cassells,	re	Leinster	Paper	Mills’,	06/03/89,	with	h/w	note,	Ó	hUiginn	for	Taoiseach,	14/03/89,	DTA:	S25857-Q	
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per	cent	and	5,000	“direct	and	indirect”	new	jobs	created	by	1989.	The	CRC	was	confident	targets	for	succeeding	years	would	also	be	exceeded.6			 The	 trawl	 to	 increase	 net	 employment	 led	 to	 every	 area	 of	 government	activity	 being	 scrutinised	 for	 its	 potential.	 When	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 like	 all	departments,	was	asked	 to	 report	 to	CRC	on	 the	 jobs	 impact	of	 its	 activities,	 it	listed	 overseas	 development	 aid	 (ODA)	 as	 its	 “contribution”.	 When	 the	Department	 of	 the	Taoiseach	 queried	ODA’s	 “balance	 of	 advantage	 to	 Ireland”,	Foreign	Affairs	demonstrated	how	its	£39m	budget	had	resulted	in	contracts	for	Irish	private	and	semi-state	suppliers	of	£86m,	with	70	per	cent	of	all	bilateral	aid	 expended	 on	 goods	 and	 services	 from	 them,	 producing	 1,200	 direct	 and	indirect	jobs.	Ó	hUiginn	solemnly	told	Haughey	that	while	the	CRC	was	aware	of	the	“moral	and	other	non-economic	reasons	why	[ODA]	should	be	maintained	or	increased”,	 the	 “flows	 of	 contract	 income”	 were	 nevertheless	 favourable	 and	apart	from	their	value,	“perhaps	more	importantly”,	provided	“a	training	ground	and	image	vital	to	increasing	the	flow	of	income	from	other	sources”.7		 The	 uneven	 development	 of	 indigenous	 large-scale	 industry	 under	 the	 PNR	was	 exemplified	 by	 the	 food	 sector.	 Ireland	 had	 a	 competitive	 advantage	 in	grass-based	 production	 and	 was	 already	 Europe’s	 largest	 beef	 producer,	exporting	75	per	cent	of	product	predominantly	 to	Britain	and	 third	countries.	But	production	was	inefficient	and	quality	poor.	The	future,	as	both	the	NESC	and	ministers	 repeatedly	 stated,	 lay	 in	 quality	 processing	 and	 away	 from	 “volatile”	third-country	markets	to	selling	high	value-added	product	into	Europe.8				 Haughey	exhorted	 farmers	 to	 “wean”	 themselves	 from	EEC	 intervention	and	seasonal	 production,	which	were	 “constraining”	 growth,	 and	move	 from	 being	“primarily	commodity	traders	…	to	marketers	of	[quality]	products”,	supplying	“a	highly	 competitive	 and	 technologically	 sophisticated	 agri-food	 industry	 …	competing	on	the	world’s	food	market”.	On	the	processing	side,	IDA	collaborated	with	the	Department	for	the	first	time	in	developing	a	detailed	industry	strategy,	two	 semi-state	 boards	were	 founded,	 Teagasc	 to	 drive	 a	 professionalization	 of																																																											6	 PNR	V	(27);	Bord	Fáilte	1988;	Haughey	in	Dáil17/05/88;	CRC,	Progress	on	Job	Creation,	n./d.	[Dec.	1988]			7	 John	Swift,	Asst.	Sec.,	D/FA,	to	Travers,	D/Taoiseach,	13/01/88,	DTA:	S25858-D;	D/FA,	untitled	memo,	on	‘Aid	and	Trade’	(for	CRC),	n.d.	[Sept.	88],	DTA:	S25857-H;	Sec.	[Ó	hUiginn]	to	Taoiseach,	‘Bilateral	Aid	Programme’,	Oct.	1988,	DTA:	S25857-J2			8		 “volatile”,	NESC	1986;	Michael	O’Kennedy,	M/A&F	‘Statement	…,	launching	Annual	Review	and	Outlook	for	the	Agriculture	and	Food	Industry’,	18/01/89,	GIS:	D/A&F	
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agriculture	and	Bord	Glas	horticultural	production,	and	a	horse	industry	strategy	was	developed.	Ultimate	 employment	was	 forecast	 in	 the	 thousands,	with	beef	processing	 alone	 targeted	 to	 deliver	 1,000	 by	 1993.	 Selected	 beef	 firms	 –	principally	Hibernian	 and	AIBP	 (Goodman)	 -	were	 identified	 and	 assisted	with	EC-approved	IDA	modernisation	plans.	Describing	the	strategy,	Haughey	warned	the	Dáil	it	would	also	“inevitably”	involve	closing	older	inefficient	plants.9			 Despite	 quality	 challenges	 and	 inefficiencies,	 IDA	 reported	 “very	 significant	progress”	 in	 restructuring	 beef	 companies,	 updating	 production,	 modernising	management	 and	 training	 farmers	 during	 1988.	 Rationalisation	 and	 plant	closures	created	both	unemployment	and	new	jobs.	Though	by	1988	there	were	just	300	more	employed	in	the	industry	than	in	1986,	this	excluded	a	burgeoning	sub-contract	sector.	The	industry	faced	many	problems,	both	internal,	 like	slow	product	quality	improvement	and	farmers	persisting	in	seasonal	production,	and	external,	 like	 continued	 protectionist	 practices	 in	 target	 European	 markets,	notably	Germany.	To	expand	third-country	trade	in	the	meantime,	export	credit	insurance	was	restored	for	Mid-East	markets	in	January	1988.10			 In	 addition	 to	 the	 as	 yet	 unanticipated	disastrous	 Iraqi	 default	 of	 two	 years	later,	 this	 meant	 newly	 emerging	 Far-Eastern	 opportunities	 could	 not	 be	exploited	as	export	credit	 insurance	was	fully	committed.	But,	by	 leveraging	its	new	political	capital	 in	Brussels,	 Ireland	succeeded	in	having	Germany	agree	 in	early	1989	to	finally	open	its	market	to	Irish	beef,	and	the	EC	also	established	an	intervention	 “safety	 net”	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 sudden	 closure	 of	 third-country	markets.	But	the	joint	impact	of	the	British	BSE	crisis	and	US/UK-led	“Gulf	War”	in	 1990	 collapsed	 beef	 export	 trading.	 The	 CRC	 nevertheless	 remained	optimistic,	 judging	 IDA-driven	 restructuring	 to	 be	 on	 target	 to	 grow	 quality	
																																																											9		Haughey	in	Dáil	24/10/89;	on	beef	industry	plan,	‘Draft.	Outline	of	the	Current	State	of	the	Irish	Beef	Industry’,	n.d.,	[1990],	DTA:	S26694,	PNR	14;	IDA	Ireland	1987:	25-31;	on	other	food	industry	plans,	PNR	V	(14-21);	IDA	Ireland	1987;	An	Bord	Glas	(1988);	CTT	‘Food	Ireland’	1988;	Colin	McCrea,	Chief	Executive,	CTT,	‘CTT	and	Food	in	1989.	Speech	to	the	Guild	of	Agricultural	Journalists,	19/01/89,	DTA:	S25858-O;	on	IDA	plans	in	Hibernian	and	Goodman,	D/I&C,	‘Progress	on	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E;	D/I&C,	‘20,000	Target	...	Progress	Report	of	Mid-Year’.	August	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	D/T,	O’Sullivan	to	Sec	[Ó	hUiginn],	‘Beef	Industry’,	14/10/91,	DTA:	S26694;	Haughey	in	Dáil	16/06/88		10		 D/A&F	(for	CRC)	‘Beef	Industry	Problems’,	11/09/90,	DTA:	S26694;	Haughey	in	Dáil	17/05/88;	on	German	protectionism	lifted,	‘Summary	Report	of	Meeting	on	Beef	Industry’,	held	Wed.,	12/09/90,	DTA:	S26694;	O’Toole	1995	
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exports	 to	 Europe,	 with	 ICTU	 seeing	 “major	 opportunities	 for	 the	 creation	 of	employment	and	wealth”.	As	in	other	areas,	realising	this	would	take	time.11			 A	 different	 development	 pattern	 emerged	 in	 another	 PNR-target	 food	industry,	dairy	processing,	with	different	external	factors	producing	unforeseen	results.	Government	saw	the	sector’s	potential	constrained	by	the	co-op	system,	but	ICOS	proposed	overcoming	this	through	capitalisation	to	create	a	“globalised	industry”.	 By	 1988	 IDA-assisted	 rationalisation	 had	 already	 seen	 employment	contract	 over	 the	 decade	 from	 10,100	 to	 7,200,	 leading	 the	 ITGWU,	 which	organised	 co-op	 creameries,	 to	 suggest	 government	 “approach	 Brussels”	 for	“special”	supports	analogous	to	that	for	the	European	coal	and	steel	industries.12			 An	 ICOS	 plan	 proposed	 rationalising	 the	 fifty	 larger	 co-ops	 into	 three	 giant	capitalised	 companies	 “to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 improve	 product	 development	 and	marketing	 to	 international	 competitive	 levels”.	 An	 impressed	 Haughey	 had	brought	ICOS	into	the	CRC,	and	the	IDA	too	supported	the	plan,	investing	£4.5m	in	 Kerry	 Foods,	 formed	 in	 1988,	 to	 assist	 it	 “become	 a	 major	 large-scale	international	 food	company”.	By	 late	1988	the	Department	of	 I&C	reported	 the	sector	“on	course”	to	achieve	its	2,000	new-job	target,	though	warned	that	“some	shakeout”,	 as	 already	 apparent	 in	 the	 newly	 consolidated	 Kerry	 plc.,	 would	probably	result	 in	a	net	decline	of	2,000	by	1992.	The	report,	which	Ó	hUiginn	withheld	 from	 the	 CRC,	 admitted	 that	 “competitive	 pressures	 are	 such	 that	rationalisation	 and,	 as	 part	 of	 this,	 employment	 contraction,	 is	 inevitable”.	 Ó	hUiginn	told	ICTU	jobs	growth	depended	on	quality	product	diversification.13			 But	 the	 strategy	worked,	 if	not	 in	net	employment	growth.	New	“large	scale	indigenous	 companies”	 emerged	 in	 the	 dairy	 sector	 to	 become	 “European	leaders”,	diversifying	 through	quality-upgraded	product.	Haughey	praised	 their	spectacular	 success	 while	 noting	 the	 “disappointing”	 jobs	 outcome.	 The	 dairy	companies’	successful	stock	market	floatation	indicated	a	“new	confidence”	and																																																									11		 On	Ireland	securing	EC	“safety	net”,	D/A&F	(for	CRC)	‘Beef	Industry	Problems’,	11/09/90,	and	ICTU	assessment,	Cassells,	ICTU,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	30/08/90,	DTA:	S26694	12		 Whelan	(ICOS)	in	h/w	notes	CRC	Secretariat	meeting	10/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C;	D/A&F,	‘Employment	in	the	Dairy	Processing	Industry’,	16/06/89,	DTA:	S25857-T;	ITGWU	intervention	in	h/w	notes	CRC	15th	Meeting,	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S	13		 ICOS	1987;	Kerry	Foods	in	IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N;	“shake-out”	in	h/w	notes	of	CRC	meeting,	30/11/88,	DTA:	S25857-L;	jobs	decline	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	15th	mtg.’	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	“competitive	pressures”	in	D/A&F,	‘Employment	in	the	Dairy	Processing	Industry’,	16/06/89,	DTA:	S25857-T;	Ó	hUiginn	to	ICTU	in	h/w	notes	of	CRC	15th	mtg.,	18/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-S	
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the	 “market-led	 approach”	 would	 finally	 “eliminate	 many	 of	 the	 problems	mentioned	in	the	NESC	report”.	By	1989	another	feature	of	the	new	growth	was	manifested	 when,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 opening	 capital	 markets	 following	 the	SEA,	the	new	dairy	corporations	began	to	expand	and	earn	growing	profits	more	through	acquisitions	and	investments	abroad	than	production	growth	at	home.	It	was	a	model	trend	replicated	in	other	sectors.14			 The	 “central	 objective”	 of	 PNR	 industrial	 strategy	 –	 scaling	 selected	indigenous	 companies	 up	 to	 “international	 competitiveness”	 -	 was	 certainly	being	achieved,	but	its	consequences	were	not	those	envisaged,	as	technological	modernisation	 -	what	 the	 IDA	 called	 “the	 greatest	 single	 influence	on	 the	poor	overall	 employment	performance	 in	manufacturing”	 -	 reduced	workforces.	The	Department	of	I&C	reported	that	while	“in	the	very	first	year	of	the	PNR”	all	new-job	targets	were	being	achieved,	the	logic	of	restructuring,	together	with	public	service	 contraction	 and	 the	 on-going	 “shake-out”	 in	 old	 industry,	 meant	“disappointing”	 job	 results.	 An	 industrial	 take-off	 was	 occurring,	 producing	better	 quality	 higher-paying	 jobs,	 but	 the	 creative	 “churn”	 meant	 net	manufacturing	employment	remained	“static”	at	200,000	across	all	sectors.15			 Net	 jobs	 growth	 occurred	 elsewhere,	 as	 already	mentioned	 in	 tourism	 and,	due	to	the	gradual	general	recovery,	service	businesses.	Indeed,	and	contrary	to	expectations,	 it	was	 the	 “small	 industry	 sector”,	whose	prospects	had	not	been	rated	 highly	 or	 given	 PNR	 priority,	 which	 IDA	 reported	 showing	 “surprising	buoyancy”	 and	 “running	 ahead	 of	 expectations”,	 with	 over	 ten	 new	 start-ups	weekly	nationwide,	creating	over	5,000	jobs	in	the	PNR’s	first	year.	These	were	in	niche	 industries	and	services,	supplying	to	growth	sectors.	But	the	emerging	pattern	 further	 nudged	 policy	 away	 from	 the	 “large	 indigenous	 sector”,	 which	suffered	 further	reputational	damage	when	 in	March	1989	Labour	and	the	PDs	demanded	a	“public	enquiry”	into	favouritism	towards	the	beef	industry.16	
																																																									14	 Haughey	in	Dáil	24/10/89	15		 “greatest	single	influence”	in	IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N;	“disappointing”	in	Paul	Bates,	D/I&C,	encl:	‘Poor	Response	from	Private	Sector	to	Job	Creation’,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25862-D;	“churn”	in	D/I&C.	’20,000	Target	…	Progress	Report	of	Mid-Year’.	August	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G	16		 D/I&C.	’20,000	Target	…	Progress	Report	of	Mid-Year’.	August	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	White,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	and	‘Updated	Progress	on	the	Provision	of	Jobs	under	PNR’,	21/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J;	Barry	Desmond	quoted	in	Ryle	Dwyer	1995:	135	
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Growth	drivers:	new	sectors	and	EC	leverage			 The	PNR	promised	a	major	expansion	of	the	jobs-intensive	building	industry,	a	 traditional	 Fianna	 Fáil	 driver	which	 had	 contracted	 drastically	 in	 the	 1980s.	The	scale	of	urban	dereliction	was	compounded	by	contracting	property	prices	and	widespread	vacancy.	Apart	from	new	city	council	offices	at	Wood	Quay,	not	a	single	new-build	or	restoration	had	occurred	on	Dublin’s	quays	since	1975.	The	PNR	 construction	 revival	 was	 planned	 to	 come	 from	 the	 general	 recovery,	infrastructure	plans	and	especially	the	regeneration	of	derelict	urban	areas.	The	CRC’s	 partners	 moved	 early	 to	 establish	 a	 tripartite	 “Construction	 Industry	Development	Board”	(CIDB)	to	generate	development	proposals.17			 The	 Haughey	 government	 of	 1980-81	 and	 1982	 had	 begun	 regeneration	through	some	high-profile	projects	such	as	the	Royal	Hospital,	and	just	before	it	fell	in	1982	published	a	bill,	agreed	in	the	“Gregory	Deal”,	establishing	a	“Dublin	Inner	 City	 Development	 Authority”.	 This	 also	 initiated	 housing,	 industrial	 and	training	projects.	After	the	fall	of	the	1982	Haughey	government,	the	coalition,	at	the	instigation	of	Ruairí	Quinn,	an	architect	and	urban	planner,	revived	the	bill,	finally	 establishing	 a	 “Customs	 House	 Dockland	 Development	 Authority”	(CHDDA)	in	December	1986,	a	month	before	leaving	office.18		 Haughey’s	 government	 retained	 the	 CHDDA,	 but	 also	 produced	 a	 first	programme	 designating	 urban	 districts	 nationwide	 for	 “renewal”,	 with	 the	Docklands	project,	reconfigured	around	the	IFSC,	the	flagship,	but	with	projects	in	other	centres	also	qualifying	for	tax-incentives.	The	CIDB	advocated	a	blanket	extension	 of	 these	 incentives	 to	 all	 urban	 renewal	 areas,	 a	 position	 the	 CRC	endorsed,	 as	 well	 as	 time-limiting	 planning	 appeals,	 100	 per	 cent	 capital	allowances	on	commercial	developments,	 and	re-configuring	 the	CHDDA	 into	a	semi-state	“Renewal	Authority”	with	powers	to	override	local	government.	When	the	 new	 round	 of	 EC	 structural	 funds	was	 being	 negotiated,	 the	 CIF	 and	 ICTU	urged	it	be	used	to	extend	the	CHDDA	to	the	whole	of	central	Dublin.19																																																										17		 PNR	V	(25);	CRC	mtgs.,	Feb.-May	1988	18		 Quinn	2005	19	 Dermot	Nally,	Sec	to	Government,	to	Sec.,	D/F,	09/08/87	–	re	memo	PD	118	of	08/06/87,	Ó	hUiginn,	h/w	note	on	‘Cruinniú	Rialtais:	Finance	Bill	1987.	Amendment	to	extend	Designated	Areas	Scheme’,	09/06/87,	DTA:	S25306;	Travers	to	Teahon	and	Sec.,	D/T,	03/03/88;	h/w	on	this	by	O’Sullivan	21/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C;	D/T	memo,	O’Sullivan	n.t.,	25/11/88,	DTA:	S25857-K;	h/w	notes	of	CRC	meeting,	26/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J2	
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	 Haughey	 saw	 the	 IFSC	as	 the	 centrepiece	of	 the	 largest	 rebuilding	of	Dublin	since	 Georgian	 times.	 Combining	 the	 IFSC’s	 “high	 end	 jobs”	 with	 regeneration	would	 transform	 the	 poverty-stricken	 city	 core	 into	 a	 “New	Bloomusalem”	 –	 a	reference	to	Joyce’s	Ulysses.	He	had	long	advocated	reforming	local	authorities	to	act	 as	 “development	 corporations”,	 and	 the	 CIF	 welcomed	 the	 new	 CHDDA’s	“more	 commercially	 oriented”	 structure	 and	 “quicker	 approval	 procedures”	compared	to	both	its	predecessor	and	local	government	processes.20				 But	 as	 other	 planned	 Dublin	 projects	 failed	 to	 materialise,	 an	 irritated	Haughey	summoned	city	officials	to	cajole	them	to	kick-start	them.	Teahon	of	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	told	the	CRC	of	Haughey’s	frustration	with	Dublin	Corporation	 and	 his	 scepticism	 that	 it	 had	 the	 “competence”	 to	 drive	 re-development.	 Haughey	 was	 also	 amenable	 to	 CRC	 proposals	 to	 extend	 the	CHDDA	to	the	whole	Inner	City,	but	relented	in	the	face	of	obstinate	Corporation	resistance.	 The	 CRC	 supported	 the	 CIDB’s	 advocacy	 of	 extending	 compulsory	purchase,	 100	 per	 cent	 capital	 allowances	 and	 curtailing	 planning	 appeals,	though	had	 to	drop	 the	 latter	as	 “probably	unconstitutional”.	Despite	Finance’s	objections	 that	 extending	 tax	 incentives	 “greatly	 weakened”	 their	 impact	 and	that	 given	 the	 limited	 capital	 “pool”	 available	 “it	would	 be	 pointless	 diluting	 it	thinly	over	a	large	number	of	areas”,	sixteen	districts	were	selected	nationwide	for	 such	 incentives,	 including	 four	 in	 Dublin.	 The	 strategy	 of	 tax-incentivised	developers	driving	Dublin’s	 chronically	needed	 regeneration	 thus	 emerged	not	through	 a	 developer/political	 nexus	 as	 often	 claimed	 but	 rather	 through	 a	proposal	 from	 social	 partnership.	 The	 general	 recovery,	 but	 especially	regeneration	measures,	saw	the	construction	industry	grow	for	the	first	time	in	a	decade,	 commercial	 construction	 alone	 increasing	 in	 1988	 by	 fifty	 per	 cent,	creating	2,000	jobs	–	a	tenth	of	total	new	employment	-	despite	the	curtailing	of	the	Public	Capital	Programme.21																																																									20	 On	building	Dublin,	Haughey,	‘Address	…	at	launching	of	Planning	Scheme	for	the	Customs	House	Docks’,	04/06/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	on	“Bloomusalem”,	Haughey,	‘Address	…	at	laying	of	foundation	stone	for	IFSC’,	22/09/88,	GIS.	D/Taoiseach;	on	“development	corporations”	Haughey	to	Cassells	ICTU,	20/01/1987,	DTA:	S25862-F;	on	CIF,	D/F	memo,	‘Inner	City	Renewal	Authorities	–	CIDB	and	CII	proposals’,	DTA:	S25857-K	21	 Haughey	summons	Dublin	Manager,	‘Urban	Renewal:	Designated	Areas	Scheme.	Progress	on	Major	Development	Proposals.	Position	at	7	November	1988’,	DTA:	S25857-K;	on	Haughey	frustration	with	Corporation,	h/w	notes	CRC-SG	mtg.,	03/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	and	N.	Callan,	D/Env.	to	O’Sullivan,	Sec.	to	CRC.,	24/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-O;	on	“relented”,	Ec.	&	Social	Policy	Div.,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Internal	Note	only:	Dublin	Inner	City	Renewal	Authority’,	07/02/89	and	h/w	notes,	SG	mtg.,	n.d	[07/02/89],	DTA:	
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	 The	 securing	 of	 increased	 EC	 funding	 in	 1988,	 though	modest	 compared	 to	later	 programmes,	 was	 viewed	 by	 the	 Department	 of	 Finance	 as	 a	 significant	input	to	the	Public	Capital	Programme	(PCP),	especially	in	developing	telecoms,	tourism,	 cross-border	 initiatives,	 roads	 and	 other	 infrastructure.	 Haughey	exploited	his	alliance	with	Delors	to	enhance	PNR	sectoral	target	plans	in	several	key	 areas.	 As	 described	 in	 chapter	 7,	 after	 securing	 an	 unprecedented	 ERDF	front-loading,	government	also	secured	Commission	agreement	to	amend	ERDF	regulations	to	allow	private	 investment	as	“national	 funding”	 for	EC	co-funding	purposes	first	in	the	roads	programme,	then	infrastructure	generally,	and	finally	for	 non-infrastructure	 programmes,	 notably	 forestry,	 tourism	 and	 local	enterprise.	 These	 were	 all	 PNR	 target	 sectors,	 and	 this	 opening	 to	 private	investment	would	drive	their	development.			 Irish	forestry,	for	historical	colonial	reasons,	had	one	of	the	lowest	afforested	land	 ratios	 in	 Europe,	 just	 4	 per	 cent	 compared	 to	 over	 20	 per	 cent	 in	 many	member	states.	Timber	was	overwhelmingly	imported.	The	PNR	aimed	to	greatly	expand	 reforestation	 and	 timber	 production,	 driving	 a	 potentially	 export-	 and	employment-rich	 processing	 industry.	 In	 opposition	 Haughey	 had	 proposed	transforming	 the	 Department	 of	 Forestry	 into	 a	 commercial	 semi-state	 and	opposed	 the	 sale	 of	 semi-mature	 forests.	 Even	 before	 the	 PNR	 was	 signed	 he	established	Coillte	 Teo	 to	manage	 forestry	 assets	 to	 this	 end.	 As	 in	 all	 sectors,	government	plans	depended	on	private	sector	involvement,	and	in	preparing	the	Forestry	 Bill	 an	 Inter-Departmental	 Group	 led	 by	 Finance	 evaluated	 “the	comparative	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 to	 the	 State	 of	 private	 and	 public	investment	 in	forestry,	 taking	account	of	the	need	for	a	high	and	stable	 level	of	planting	and	the	present	state	of	exchequer	finances”.	Unsurprisingly,	it	strongly	advised	an	emphasis	on	private	planting.	In	1988	government	secured	EIB	loans	for	 Coillte	 and	 the	 timber	 processing	 industry,	 enabling	 “record	 planting”	 and	processing	 expansion	 through	 upgraded	 and	 new	 plants	 that	 very	 year.	When																																																																																																																																																															S25857-O;	CRC	support	for	CIDB	proposals	and	D/Finance	views	in	h/w	notes	CRC-SG	mtg.,	03/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N,	CRC-SG,	‘Action	Points:	Updates	arising	from	11th	mtg.’	03/01/89,	Ec.	&	Social	Policy	Div.,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Extension	on	Time	Limits	and	Increases	in	Capital	Allowances	for	Commercial	Development	in	Designated	Areas’,	07/02/89,	and	N.	Callan,	PO,	D/Env.	to	O’Sullivan,	Sect.	to	CRC.,	24/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-O;	D/Finance	views	and	areas	designated	in	Ec.	&	Social	Policy	Div.,	D/T,	‘Internal	Note	only:	Identification	of	Items	for	next	CRC	mtg.’,	07/02/89,	DTA:	S25857-O;	on	developer/political	nexus,	Connolly,	F.	2014;	jobs	created	in	CRC,	Programme	for	National	Recovery,	
Progress	on	Job	Creation,	n./d.	[Dec.	1988]	
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the	 amended	 ERDF	 regulation	 permitting	 private	 co-funding	 in	 forestry	 and	timber	was	secured	in	May	1989,	the	NDP	incorporated	plans	to	double	forestry	and	further	expand	processing	through	a	public/private/ERDF	investment	mix.22			 In	a	similar	process,	the	tourism	plan	of	the	PNR	was	greatly	expanded	in	the	NDP	 following	 Brussels	 approval	 for	 a	 similar	 investment	 mix.	 Ireland	reciprocated	Brussels’	special	consideration	by	being	to	the	fore	in	legislating	the	liberalisation	 of	 competition	 and	 capital	 restrictions,	 though	 it	 had	 already	decided	to	exploit	this	opening	with	a	daringly	innovative	strategy.	
	
Innovation:	IFSC	“pipe-dream”	and	the	FDI	“surge”		 As	 with	 many	 policies	 Haughey	 adopted,	 that	 for	 an	 international	 financial	services	centre	(IFSC)	in	Dublin’s	docklands	was	fortuitous.	Such	an	idea	was	not	new,	with	analogous	projects	underway	 in	London,	Boston	and	elsewhere.	The	CII	advocated	a	services	centre	near	Dublin	airport.	But	Dermot	Desmond	had	a	novel	plan	to	realise	it	in	the	derelict	docklands,	and	after	meeting	a	Fianna	Fáil	supporter	 in	 a	 Dublin	 pub,	 was	 brought	 to	 Kinsealy	 to	 present	 it	 to	 Haughey.	Desmond	 had	 tried	 to	 interest	 Bruton,	 but	 he,	 on	 the	 advice	 of	 Fine	 Gael	industries	 spokesman	 Fergus	 O’Brien,	 had	 dismissed	 it	 as	 a	 “pipe	 dream”.	Haughey	 too	 was	 initially	 sceptical,	 but	 this	 changed	 when	 he	 witnessed	 the	eager	 response	of	 Irish-American	 financiers	 to	Desmond’s	presentation	 in	New	York.	Haughey	then	included	it	as	a	flagship	project	in	his	1987	manifesto.23			 Haughey	combined	the	idea	with	the	CHDDA’s	regeneration	plans	to	create	an	entirely	 new	 economic	 sector	 and	 simultaneously	 transform	 inner-city	 Dublin.	Describing	financial	services	as	“one	of	the	fastest	growing	sectors	of	economic	activity	 in	 the	world”,	Haughey	said	his	government	aimed	“to	put	 Ireland	 into	the	main	stream	of	that	growth”.	An	“IFSC	Committee”,	chaired	by	Ó	hUiginn	and	prominently	including	members	of	CII’s	“Financial	Services	Industry	Association”	(FSIA),	was	established	within	weeks	of	the	government	being	formed,	to	drive																																																									22	 Forestry	plan	in	PNR	V	(22);	Haughey	and	Coillte,	Dáil	05/12/89;	Inter-Dept.	Cttee.,	in	Dermot	Nally,	Sec	to	Government,	to	Private	Sec.,	M/Energy,	29/03/88,	encl.	aide	memoire	of	25/03/88	from	M/Finance	re	establishing	state	forestry	company,	DTA:	S25858F;	on	EIB	loans,	Minister	Michael	Smith:	‘European	Investment	Bank	funds	for	Forestry’,	15/12/88,	GIS:	D/Energy	and	Denis	Mehigan,	Private	Sec.	[to	Taoiseach],	to	Pauline	O’Shaughnessy,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Briefing	material	for	the	D/Taoiseach	for	reply	to	letter	from	P.	Cassells	regarding	Leinster	Paper	Mills’,	06/02/89,	DTA:	S25857-O;	on	plan	submitted	Minister	Aylward,	‘EC	Action	Programme	to	aid	Irish	forestry’,	29/05/89,	GIS:	D/Forestry	23		 On	the	events	surrounding	the	initiation	of	the	IFSC,	Power	2009,	Reddan	2006,	Keena	2003,	FF	1987	
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the	 project	 and	 advise	 on	 a	 regulatory/incentive	 package.	 A	 special	 IDA	 unit,	headed	by	David	Hanna,	was	created	to	promote	it.24			 The	Centre	was	 initially	restricted	 to	securities	and	bond	trading.	 Incentives	to	locate	in	it	included	zero	capital	gains	tax,	a	10-year	rates	remission	and	free	capital	 movement	 in	 non-IR£	 currencies.	 The	 Department	 of	 Finance	 was	instructed	to	draft	a	regulatory	framework	modelled	on	other	European	centres.	GPA,	an	early	 Irish	 financial	multinational	whose	board	would	 include	recently	retired	EC	Commissioner	Peter	Sutherland,	suggested	a	10	rather	than	0	per	cent	tax	rating,	as	that	would	at	least	“impl[y]	some	form	of	control	and	supervision”	and	therefore	be	more	acceptable	to	investors	and	foreign	governments	alike.25				 Irish-owned	finance	companies	urged	Ó	hUiginn	to	“play	to	our	strengths”	by	using	 the	 IFSC	 as	 a	 base	 to	 grow	 the	 domestic	 accountancy	 industry,	 already	“second	 to	none	 in	 the	world”.	A	strategy	 like	 “the	Goodman	meat	 investment”	could	make	the	centre	a	“launching	pad	to	force	…	this	resource	into	the	export	business”,	 transforming	 conservative	 Irish	 stock	 brokers	 into	 global	 market	traders.	 But	 the	 committee	 rejected	 this,	 remaining	 firmly	 FDI-focused.	 It	targeted	 “influential	 and	 very	 powerful	 people	 in	 [US]	 financial	 circles”,	especially	with	 Irish	 personal	 or	 business	 connections,	 and	 arranged	meetings	between	them	and	the	IDA,	or	even	with	Haughey	personally.26		 Securing	 a	 “big	 player”	 proved	 elusive,	 however,	 and	 with	 US/UK	 markets	stalled,	 potential	 clients	 in	 Germany	 and	 Japan	 were	 wooed.	 When	 Finance	produced	a	bill	setting	the	terms	for	the	centre,	Ó	hUiginn,	as	urged	by	NCB	and	GPA,	suggested	extending	the	special	tax	rate	to	property	fund	management	and	trade	with	Shannon	Zone	companies.	This	was	to	both	facilitate	and	woo	GPA’s	partner,	Mitsubishi,	Japan’s	largest	bank.	But	Haughey,	despite	being	urged	that	
																																																								24	 “fastest	growing”	in	Haughey,	‘Address	at	launching	the	Planning	Scheme	for	the	Customs	House	Docks’,	04/06/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	on	IFSC	committee,	Oifig	an	Taoisigh	S.	25150	[Ó	hUiginn],	‘Memorandum	for	Government.	Establishment	of	an	IFSC	Committee’,	30/03/87	and	Draft	of	G.20/8,	Government	Minutes	31/03/87,	DTA:	S25150-A	25	 D/Finance,	‘Performance	and	other	Criteria	required	for	Certification	of	Companies	in	the	IFSC	at	the	Customs	House	Docks	Site’	[FSC/099],	18/06/87,	FSIA,	‘Customs	House	Docks,	Dublin,	IFSC,	Preliminary	Brief’,	n.d.	[June	1987],	DTA:	S25150-A;	IFSC	Committee,	‘Summary	Report	on	11th	mtg.’,	18/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A;	Peter	Denison-Edson,	Senior	Vice-President,	GPA	Corporate	Affairs	Japan,	to	Dermot	Desmond,	11/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A	26	 Alex	Spain,	chairman,	ZEUS,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	19/06/87,	CII-FSIA,	circular	to	member	companies,	‘Re.:	IFSC	Dublin’,	29/06/87,	Spain,	chair,	CII-FSIA,	to	Ó	hUiginn	19/06/87,	and,	on	Irish-American	financiers,	‘Note	on	telephone	conversation	with	Mr	Peter	Owens’	04/06/87,	and	“Peter	Owens	26/6/87”,	with	h/w	note	re	Foley,	DTA:	S25150-A		
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the	 amendment	 would	 “solve	 the	 Mitsubishi	 problem”,	 did	 not	 intervene,	 and	Finance’s	view,	which	anyway	suspected	GPA	of	special	pleading,	prevailed.27			 Building	of	the	IFSC	commenced	in	late	1987,	entirely	private-sector	funded,	with	 surprisingly	 strong	 initial	 interest	 reported.	 Desmond,	 who	 had	 since	become	a	friend	of	Haughey,	stepped	down	from	Ó	hUiginn’s	committee	to	avoid	accusations	 of	 a	 conflict	 of	 interest,	 but	 still	 funded	 the	 first	 IFSC	 “block”.	 The	whole	project	was	necessarily	one	of	future	potential,	with	just	200	building	jobs	involved	at	first,	expected	to	rise	to	500	in	1988.	The	IDA	reported	securing	over	fifty	financial	companies	interested	in	locating	(its	“1988	target”),	with	a	promise	of	1,300	financial	jobs,	but	by	the	end	of	1988	the	site	was	still	being	prepared,	the	first	block	not	due	for	completion	until	the	end	of	1989,	and	the	IDA	verifying	just	23	companies	employing	a	modest	120	actually	trading	under	IFSC	licenses.	The	 only	 “big	 player”	 as	 yet	 confirmed	 was	 AIB’s	 international	 branch,	 which	government	talked	up	as	the	strong	local	anchor	essential	to	success.28				 The	 faltering	 progress	 attracted	 widespread	 criticism.	 Michael	 Lafferty,	 a	London-based	 expert	 commissioned	 by	 Ó	 hUiginn	 to	 assess	 options,	 reported	that	experience	of	other	small	countries	indicated	that	a	wholesale-based	centre	would	fail	and	recommended	instead	a	secret	retail	banking	model	on	the	Swiss/	Luxembourg	 model.	 Cabinet	 rejected	 the	 advice,	 but	 did	 change	 strategy	 in	 a	significant	 step	 when	 new	 EC	 single	 market	 reforms	 introduced	 in	 December	1988	removed	restrictions	on	foreign	portfolio	investments	by	residents.29			 The	 IFSC	now	changed	 focus	 to	 targeting	mobile	unit	 funds,	 though	warned	that	the	10	per	cent	CGT	rate	was	proving	“a	real	disincentive”	against	competing	European	centres.	Ó	hUiginn	urged	a	zero	CGT	rate	and	the	IDA	advised	income	on	 such	 funds	 for	 non-residents	 also	 be	 zero-rated,	 despite	 the	 “risks	 of	 ‘tax	
																																																								27		 ‘Ireland	an	ideal	location	for	Japanese	investment	–	Reynolds’,	20/01/88,	GIS:	D/I&C;	Anthony	Ryan	to	Haughey,	‘Personal	&	Confidential’,	15/06/87	and	Tony	[Ryan]	GPA	to	Haughey,	22/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A;	J.	Cantwell	D/T	to	Sec.	[Ó	hUiginn],	‘Telephone	call	from	Mr	Dermot	Desmond	re.	Finance	Bill	Amendment’	23/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A;	Mullarkey,	D/Fin.	to	Ó	hUiginn,	25/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A	28		 on	“surprisingly	strong	interest”,	Irish	Times,	‘Business	Review	1987’.	31/12/87;	on	Desmond	“stepping	down”	Reddan	2006:	16;	IDA	report	for	‘Draft	material	on	IFSC	for	inclusion	in	Taoiseach’s	[1988]	budget	speech’,	DTA:	S25306;	IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	News	Release,	05/01/89;	‘Government	Statement	of	Progress	with	the	IFSC’,	09/12/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	29		 on	Lafferty,	Ronald	Bolger	SKC	to	Ó	hUiginn	06/02/89,	DTA:	S25306		and	‘IFSC	can	yield	£70m	tax	by	1992,	despite	gloomy	report’,	Sunday	Tribune	05/02/89;	government	response	and	policy	change,	CRC,	‘Specific	Measures	…’,	03/02/89,	Section:	‘EC	Dimension’,	DTA:	S25899-A,	and	‘Comment	by	the	chairman,	IFSC	Committee.,	on	the	Lafferty	Research	Paper	on	International	Private	Banking	published	today’,	07/02/89,	DTA:	S25858-P	
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haven’	connotations”.	Finance	opposed	this	because	such	“haven”	criticisms	had	already	emerged	at	the	OECD:	“the	further	one	goes	in	extending	tax	concessions	in	the	IFSC,	the	greater	…	the	dangers	of	jeopardising	[its]	acceptability	…	in	the	international	arena”.	But	cabinet	sided	with	Ó	hUiginn	and	the	IDA.30		 Fine	Gael,	which	taunted	government	on	its	failure	to	secure	a	“major	player”,	claimed	that	“changing	the	rules	…	at	this	stage”	showed	the	whole	project	was	not	 “going	 anywhere	 very	 fast”.	 Lafferty	 joined	 the	 criticisms,	 resurrecting	 his	retail-banking	 concept,	 which	 Ó	 hUiginn	 rejected	 as	 a	 recipe	 for	 “criminal	money”.	Haughey,	the	morality	of	whose	own	personal	finances	at	this	time	was	questionable,	 was	 nevertheless	 clear	 that	 the	 public	 good	 required	 a	 tightly	regulated	 wholesale	 model	 at	 the	 IFSC:	 government	 would	 “not	 permit	 or	encourage	undesirable	secret	banking	or	any	other	similar	activities	-	the	highest	standards	of	financial	probity	will	be	rigidly	enforced	in	the	Centre”.31			 The	 tax	 changes	 and	 re-orientation	 to	managed	 funds	proved	 an	 immediate	success.	 The	 global	 financial	 press	 excitedly	 reported	 that	 the	 IFSC	 was	 now	giving	 competitor	 locations	 “a	 real	 run	 for	 fund	managers’	money”.	 An	 upbeat	IDA	announced	its	best	month	yet,	with	thirty	new	funds	and	100	new	jobs	in	the	pipeline	by	February.	It	confidentially	predicted	a	corporation	tax	yield	from	the	centre	of	£70m	by	1992.	While	the	companies	the	IDA	hoped	to	secure	included	the	oft-chased	Mitsubishi,	and	the	list	of	firms	declaring	an	interest	extended	to	Chase	Manhattan,	Citibank,	Bruxelles	Lambert	and	others,	the	continued	absence	of	a	“big	player”	in	situ	meant	that	all	potential	investors	were	avidly	pursued.	In	May	 1989,	 a	 “major	 player”	was	 finally	 secured	when	AIG,	 the	world’s	 leading	commercial/industrial	 underwriter,	 opted	 to	 locate	 to	 the	 IFSC,	 identifying	 as	key	factors	Ireland	as	a	base	for	accessing	the	single	market	as	well	as	its	“helpful	Government”	and	educated,	available	workforce.32																																																										30		 D/Fin.,	‘Memo	for	Govt.	-	Taxation	of	Funds	under	Management	in	the	IFSC’,	for	Government	meeting	of	05/12/88,	and	Dermot	Nally,	Sec.	to	Government,	to	Private	Sec.	of	M/Finance	05/12/88,	DTA:	S25306	31		 Transcript	of	interviews	[inc.	with	O’Brien	and	Lafferty]	from	‘This	Week’,	RTÉ	radio,	04/12/88	and	‘Comment	by	Chairman,	IFSC,	Mr	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn,	on	the	Lafferty	Business	Research	Paper	on	International	Private	Banking	published	today’	07/02/89,	DTA:	S25306;	Haughey	in	Dáil	14/02/89	32	 Quoting	international	press,	David	Hanna,	Financial	Services,	IDA	to	Ó	hUiginn	12/02/89,	DTA:	S25306;	IDA	predictions	in	‘IFSC	can	yield	£70m	tax	by	1992,	despite	gloomy	report’,	Sunday	Tribune	05/02/89;	on	Mitsubishi,	Brendan	Russell,	FS	Unit,	IDA,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	02/02/89,	with	attached	list	of	projects,	“Strictly	Confidential”,	DTA:	S25306;	on	banks	secured,	CRC:	PNP,	Progress	on	Job	Creation,	n.d.	[Dec.	1988]:	8;	focus	to	Germany/Japan,	‘Government	Statement	of	Progress	with	the	IFSC’,	09/12/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	and	Haughey	in	Dáil	02/05/89;	on	investors	“pursued”,	‘Draft	material	on	IFSC	for	inclusion	in	the	Taoiseach’s	speech	at	launch	of	Ireland	Chamber	of	Commerce	in	the	United	States’,	n.d.	[01/89],	
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	 This	modest	 take-off	of	 the	 IFSC	 in	early	1989	marked	 the	 turning	point	 for	the	 centre,	 though	 it	 would	 take	 several	 years	 before	 the	 its	 viability	 was	assured.	 It	had	been	achieved	by	adroitly	exploiting	the	 liberalisation	of	capital	markets	 following	 the	SEA.	A	similar	approach	would	soon	be	applied	 to	other	areas	of	foreign	investment,	involving	another	change	of	strategy.		 FDI	had	contracted	in	the	1980s,	accused	of	being	unreliable	and	overly	costly	per	 job.	New	projects,	as	the	IDA	had	put	 it,	had	slowed	to	a	“trickle”.	The	PNR	had	therefore	focused	on	the	large	indigenous	sector	and	treated	FDI	as	ancillary.	In	line	with	this,	the	IDA	was	instructed	by	I&C	to	move	from	attracting	new	FDI	to	 improving	 the	 export	 capacity	 of	 the	 900	 FDI	 firms	 “still	 in	 Ireland”.	 But	Haughey’s	Way	 Forward	 circle	 had	 been	 sceptical	 of	 this	 re-focusing,	 and	 its	planning	in	early	1987,	as	already	described,	identified	FDI	as	the	real	potential	driver	of	a	quality	industrial	take-off.	Haughey	had	sensed	this	potential	in	1986	when	 observing	 the	 eager	 reaction	 of	 Irish-American	 financiers	 to	 Desmond’s	IFSC	proposal.	The	same	policy	change	which	unleashed	the	“wave”	of	interest	in	the	IFSC	in	January	1989	now	also	came	into	play	regarding	FDI	generally.	The	IDA	reported	how	FDI	“surged”	after	strategy	switched	to	marketing	Ireland	as	a	“key	 location	…	 for	1992	and	 the	Single	Market”.	The	CII,	 traditionally	 close	 to	government	and	the	IDA,	had	urged	this	change	at	the	NESC.	Liam	Connellan	had	criticised	Rory	O’Donnell’s	draft	EEC	report	for	portraying	the	Single	Market	as	a	“closed	 economy”	 with	 the	major	 opportunity	 being	 industrial	 exports	 into	 it,	rather	 than	as	a	 lever	 to	a	global	capital	opening.	He	urged	 the	NESC	 to	advise	liberalise	capital	movement	ahead	of	competitor	states	and	exploiting	 Ireland’s	location	and	to	make	it	“a	gateway	to	the	Single	Market”	for	the	US	and	Japan.33				 Executives	of	GPA	had	already	urged	such	a	course	on	Haughey	in	1987	and	he	 had	 seized	 on	 the	 idea,	 legislating	 the	 removal	 of	 capital	 controls	 and	pursuing	 mobile	 investment.	 With	 the	 Single	 Market	 identified	 as	 Ireland’s	“major	opportunity	to	capture	further	overseas	investment”,	the	IDA	noted	how																																																																																																																																																															Lyons,	D/FA	to	Sec.,	D/Taoiseach,	14/01/89	and	Pat	Nolan,	D/Taoiseach	to	David	Hanna	IDA	20/01/89	-	re	D/FA	note	on	approaches	to	Irish	Ambassador	in	Australia,	DTA:	S25306;	on	AIG,	‘American	International	Group	(AIG)	to	Establish	in	IFSC’,	30/05/89,	GIS:	D/Finance	33				“overly	costly”,	NESC	1982a	and	b;	“new	projects”	and	“still	in	Ireland”,	D/I&C,	‘Progress	in	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E;	on	Way	Forward	scepticism,	see	chapter	4;	on	FDI	“surge”,	IDA	Ireland,	News	Release,	‘IDA	review	of	1988	and	outlook	for	1989’,	05/01/89	and	Minister	Ray	Burke,	‘PNR	Recovery	Job	Target	Exceeded	in	1988:	End-Year	Statement	on	Industry	Performance’,	29/12/88,	GIS:	D/I&C;	Connellan	CII	to	Danaher,	NESC,	29/09/88,	‘Council	Meeting	16/12/88’,	NESC	Archive,	Box	2	
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it	 was	 now	 “raised	 by	 nearly	 all	 [US]	 companies	 we	meet”,	 with	 interest	 also	strong	in	Japan,	“much	of	it	…	also	attributed	to	the	Single	Market”.	The	IDA	was	“specifically	 exploiting	 all	 these	 opportunities”,	 promoting	 Ireland	 as	 a	 “key	location	…	 in	 preparation	 for	 1992”.	 By	mid-1989,	 I&C	 secretary	 Noel	 Dorgan	was	predicting	a	further	“potentially	significant	surge”	in	inward	investment.34		 In	contrast	to	the	“disappointing”	jobs	growth	in	indigenous	industry,	the	IDA	reported	4,700	new	jobs	through	FDI	by	October	1988,	a	net	 increase	of	2,700,	with	 even	 existing	 companies,	 such	 as	 the	 Shannon-based	 De	 Beers,	 EI	 and	Molex,	 expanding	 despite	 the	 imminent	 end	 of	 Shannon’s	 special	 tax	 status.	 In	government	plans,	the	ancillary	role	of	FDI	in	the	PNR	was	quietly	discarded.	IDA	reported	 that	 the	 “criticism	of	 overseas	 industry”	had	proven	 “misplaced”,	 and	incentive	costs	and	“high	levels	of	repatriated	profits”	should	be	accepted	given	the	“actual	economic	activity”	and	“value	added”	it	was	generating	in	Ireland.35			 There	was	also	radical	thinking	in	government	on	a	new	high-risk	FDI	formula	which	would	only	finally	be	pursued	in	1990.	It	was	first	proposed	by	executives	of	 GPA	 who	 argued	 the	 potential,	 combined	 with	 low	 tax,	 to	 exploit	 Ireland’s	“network	of	double	taxation	agreements	which	provide	for	favourable	treatment	…		of	profits	accumulated	in	or	repatriated	from	Ireland”	to	drive	an	investment	dynamic.	The	CII	also	favoured	this	formula,	but	it	was	highly	sensitive	and	the	strategy	would	await	a	majority	government	before	being	pursued.36		
	
A	mixed	economy	model:	Haughey,	the	unions	and	the	“semi-states”	
		 No	issue	had	greater	potential	to	derail	the	PNR	than	state	companies.	These	had	been	critical	in	Irish	economic	development,	but	now	played	a	declining	role.	Privatisation	had	begun	under	 the	Fine	Gael	coalition	 in	 Irish	Shipping,	Ceimici	Teo	and	social	housing,	investment	was	cut	drastically	at	CIÉ	and	Irish	Sugar,	and	loss-making	by	private	companies	nationalised	because	of	strategic	factors,	such																																																									34	 Peter	Denison-Edson,	Senior	VP,	GPA	Corp.	Affairs	Japan,	to	Dermot	Desmond	11/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A;	‘Effects	of	Internal	Market	in	Inward	Investment’	encl	with	h/w	note,	from	Lonergan,	D/I&C,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	10/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	IDA	Ireland,	News	Release,	‘IDA	review	of	1988	and	outlook	for	1989’,	05/01/89	and	Minister	Ray	Burke,	‘PNR	Recovery	Job	Target	Exceeded	in	1988:	End-Year	Statement	on	Industry	Performance’,	29/12/88,	GIS:	D/I&C;	Dorgan	in	h/w	notes	of	meeting	of	CRC	‘Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’,	n.d.	[h/w	notes	1	of	meeting	28/06/89],	DTA:	S26122-A	35		 on	new	FDI	jobs,	IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	and	D/I&C.	’20,000	Target	…	Progress	Report	of	Mid-Year’,	August	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	on	Shannon,	Bates,	D/I&C,	to	CRC,	encl:	‘Poor	Response	from	Private	Sector	‘,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25862-D	36	 Peter	Denison-Edson,	Senior	VP,	GPA	Corp.	Affairs	Japan,	to	Dermot	Desmond	11/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A	
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as	 ICI,	 B&I,	 Irish	 Steel	 and	 Dublin	 Gas.	 These	 issues	 had	 made	 the	 1980s	 a	“traumatic	decade”	for	the	sector,	with	employment	falling	25	per	cent	to	67,000.	But	by	1988	it	still	accounted	for	6	per	cent	of	total	employment,	18	per	cent	of	investment	 and	19	per	 cent	 of	GDP	 (or	 10	per	 cent	GNP).	Aer	 Lingus	 and	ESB	were	not	only	Ireland’s	largest	but	also	its	top	industrial	performers.37			 Commercialisation	 and	 privatisation	 of	 state	 enterprises	 was	 not	 yet	 a	dominant	 trend	 in	 a	 Europe	 which,	 apart	 from	 the	 UK,	 remained	 wedded	 to	
dirigisme.	But	 it	had	been	advocated	by	the	OECD	since	1977,	and	in	the	1980s	monetary	 crisis	 the	 selling	 of	 state	 “assets”,	 though	 most	 extreme	 in	 the	 UK,	increased	 only	 slowly	 across	 the	 OECD.	 The	 Single	 European	 Act	 nevertheless	foresaw	 the	opening	of	national	markets	by	ending	 state	monopolies	and	state	aids	to	both	private	and	public	industry,	an	issue	long	tracked	by	Brussels.38			 Irish	 governments	 since	 the	1960s	had	 sought	 to	 increase	 the	 “commercial”	dynamic	in	state	enterprises	by	reforming	their	financing	structures	and	seeking	out	entrepreneurs	to	head	them,	as	in	Lynch’s	appointment	of	Jefferson	Smurfit	to	Bord	Telecom.	 In	1980-82	Haughey	 changed	 “boards”	 such	Telecom	and	An	Post	into	corporations	and	before	that,	as	Minister	for	Health,	had	initiated	semi-state	 consultancies,	 such	as	PARC,	 to	develop	hospitals	 in	 the	Middle	East,	 and	joint	 ventures	 to	 co-fund	 Irish	 hospital	 expansion,	 as	 at	 Beaumont	 in	 his	 own	constituency.	 The	 Way	 Forward	 proposed	 further	 such	 developments.	 In	opposition	in	the	1980s	Haughey,	not	unreasonably,	presented	Fianna	Fáil	as	the	party	 of	 the	 state	 sector,	 criticising	 the	 sale	 of	 Irish	 Shipping	 (“a	 furtive	 act	 of	national	sabotage”)	and	of	forests,	as	well	as	underinvestment	in	Telecom,	saying	“if	 this	 process	 of	 dismantling	 the	 State	 sector	 is	 brought	 much	 further,	 the	Government	will	get	to	the	point	of	dismantling	the	State	itself”.	“Our	approach”,	he	told	the	Dáil,	would	be	“totally	different”.39			 In	the	1987	election	parties	adopted	contrary	positions	on	the	issue.	The	PDs	advocated	 wholesale	 privatisation	 while	 Labour	 opposed	 any.	 With	 business	opinion	 leaders	 like	Moore	McDowell	 and	 Brendan	Walsh	 advocating	 absolute	
																																																								37		 Sweeney	1990	38	 OECD	1990;	on	EEC	monitoring	state-aids,	Directive	80/723/EEC,	Official	Journal	OJ	L195,	29/07/80	39		 Smurfit	2014:	14	Sweeney	1990:	93-5;	Fianna	Fáil	1982;	Haughey	in	Dáil	on	Irish	Shipping	14/11/84	and	forestry	14/12/84,	and	“totally	different”	14/05/86	
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commercial	 criteria	and	 the	 sale	of	 suitable	 sectors,	Fine	Gael	proposed	selling	minority	 holdings.	 Fianna	 Fáil	 saw	 semi-states	 as	 “essentially	 national	development	 corporations”,	 and	 undertook	 to	 “retain	 all	 profitable	 parts”	 of	them.	 Early	 in	 the	 1987	 government,	 Des	 O’Malley	 tested	 government	 resolve	with	 a	motion,	 supported	 by	 Fine	 Gael,	 to	 sell	 companies	 apart	 from	 strategic	ones.	Reynolds	responded	by	saying	 that	while	privatisation	had	become	“very	fashionable”,	 Fianna	 Fáil	 had	 no	 “doctrinaire	 view”.	 While	 the	 motion	 was	defeated	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Labour	 and	 Workers’	 Party	 votes,	 it	 illustrated	 the	government’s	precarious	position	on	issues	other	than	strictly	monetary	policy.40			 The	NESC	 advocated	 strengthening	 state	 companies,	 though	 since	1980	had	also	urged	they	“be	given	a	sound	financial	basis	from	the	start”.	Kieran	Kennedy	of	 the	 ESRI,	 however,	 doubted	 that	 “the	 political	 process	 …	 is	 capable	 of	maintaining	 the	 kind	 of	 freedom	 and	 accountability”	 this	 required.	 Given	 this	climate,	ICTU,	whose	80,000	semi-state	members	formed	its	most	powerful	block	after	 the	public	services,	made	the	protection	of	semi-states	 its	central	election	issue	in	1987.	Haughey	assured	it	of	his	commitment	to	an	“efficient	and	effective	semi-State	Sector	as	a	major	instrument	of	economic	development”.	He	cited	Aer	Lingus’s	semi-autonomous	subsidiary,	Airmotive,	which	he	had	opened	in	1981,	as	“the	type	of	development	we	had	in	mind”,	and	assured	ICTU	“that	Fianna	Fáil	has	no	intention	of	privatising	any	semi-State	body”.41			 The	business	 interest	CII	equivocated	on	the	issue,	not	surprisingly	as	 it	had	most	 state	 bodies	 in	 membership.	 “Ireland	 is	 not	 doctrinaire	 on	 nationalised	industry”,	 it	 stated,	 proposing	 further	 commercialisation,	 “value-for-money”	criteria	 and	 contracting	 out	 of	 services,	 though	 also	 a	 new	 “Development	 Co-operation”	company	to	sell	technical	assistance	to	emerging	countries.42		 A	 positive	 policy	 on	 state	 industry,	 combining	 ICTU	 and	 CII	 views,	 was	included	 in	 the	PNR.	During	 its	negotiation	Haughey	built	 credibility	with	both																																																									40	 ‘Private	Investment	in	State	Companies’,	CII	Newsletter,	27/01/87;	McDowell	1987;	Walsh	1987;	Fine	Gael	1987);	Fianna	Fáil	1987;	Labour/WP	in	Dáil	7-8/04/87	41			 Kennedy,	‘Introduction’	to	Sweeney	1990:	ii;	union	power	O’Dowd	1989:	51;	ICTU	1987a	and	ICTU-EC	meeting	18/02/87;	Haughey	to	Cassells	ICTU,	20/01/1987,	DTA:	S25862-F		42	 CII,	‘The	Complementary	Roles	of	Public	and	Private	Enterprise’,	CII	Newsletter,	13/04/82	and	‘Growth	Industries	with	Employment	Potential,	CII	8th	Annual	Careers	in	Industry	Conference’,	19/09/86,	Power	Papers,	IT	Sligo;	CII,	‘Private	Investment	in	State	Companies’,	CII	Newsletter,	27/01/87;	‘Participation	in	State	Enterprise’,	CII	Newsletter,		24/02/87;	‘Swedish	Example	backs	State	Participation	Case’,	CII	
Newsletter,		28/04/87;	Power	2009:	93	
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groups	 by	 summoning	 semi-state	 chiefs	 to	 impress	 on	 them	 “the	 importance	which	 Government	 attached	 to	 the	 developmental	 potential	 of	 the	 State-sponsored	 sector”	 and	 “requesting”	 them	 to	 submit	 plans	 for	 expansion,	 joint	ventures	 and	 overseas	 consultancy	 contracts	 to	 “contribute	 to	 the	 Programme	for	National	Recovery”.	A	 “Working	Group”	of	executives	was	 to	report	 “on	 the	role	 and	 purpose	 of	 State-sponsored	 bodies”	 and	 their	 “developmental	potential”.	 Haughey	 also	 supported	 rationalising	 the	 sector,	 privately	 assuring	semi-state	leaders	he	would	back	them	in	“standing	firm”	on	pay	and	approving	the	splitting	of	CIÉ	into	three	companies	in	a	process	that	would	reduce	its	staff	in	a	decade	from	16,500	to	11,000.	The	PNR	included	various	semi-state	projects	proposed	by	companies,	the	CII	and	ICTU,	some	with	specific	jobs	targets.	From	early	1988,	with	extensive	IDA	assistance,	these	began	to	be	activated.43			 In	1988	David	Begg,	 leader	of	 the	 telecom	union	CWU,	spoke	 for	many	state	sector	 unions	 by	 declaring	 that	 “we	 favour	 a	 centrally-planned	 and	 controlled	economy	relying	heavily	on	State-led	investment	to	the	semi-State	Companies	to	create	 jobs”.	The	PNR	“was	a	compromise,	embodying	some	of	these	concepts”.	But	official	 ICTU	policy	was	 in	 fact	more	nuanced,	 advocating	 expanding	 semi-states	activity	including	through	joint	ventures	and	international	consultancies.44			 ICTU	 nevertheless	 suspected	 government	 of	 having	 covertly	 decided	 on	 a	course	 of	 privatisation.	 Discussion	 papers	 circulating	 in	 the	 civil	 service	advocated	dismantling	Ireland’s	“extreme	version”	of	a	welfare	state	and	for	the	state	to	withdraw	from	enterprise	entirely.	Disputes	over	measures	which	ICTU	saw	as	weakening	state	enterprise	continually	arose	on	the	CRC,	such	as	the	out-sourcing	of	cargo-handling	at	Dublin	Airport	and	the	IDA’s	refusal	of	a	grant	for	an	expansion	at	Airmotive,	which	ICTU	criticised	as	“contrary	to	the	spirit”	of	the	PNR.	The	 IDA	had	 in	 fact	 supported	 the	Airmotive	project	but,	 as	 if	 to	 confirm	ICTU’s	 suspicions	 -	 though	 it	 was	 not	 informed	 -	 this	 had	 been	 over-ruled	 by																																																									43	 Haughey	“request”	in	‘Statement	on	Meeting	of	Taoiseach	with	Chief	Executives	of	State-sponsored	bodies’,	22/06/87,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	“standing	firm”	in	‘Aide	Memoire.	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Consultative	Group	of	Chief	Executives	of	State	Agencies,	22	June	1987:	Main	Conclusions’,	DTA:	S25857-E;	splitting	CIE	in	Sweeney	1990:	26;	on	CIE	rescue	plan	TSSA	leader	at	ICTU	ADC	1988:	58;	on	IDA	assistance,	‘Development	Proposals	–	Mechanical	Engineering	Sector.	Notes	arising	from	meeting	at	IDA	offices	on	15	February	1988’,	S25857-C,	J.	Lloyd,	IDA,	‘The	Engineering	Proposal	for	SSBs	is	going	well	…”,	n.d.	[April	1988],	DTA:	S25858-G	and	Malcolm	Taylor,	D/T&T,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	‘re	Aer	Lingus-Aeroflot	talks’	and	attch	‘Note	and	AL-AF	Memo	of	Understanding’,	07/03/88,	DTA:	S25858-F	44		 Begg	in	ICTU	ADC	1988:	117;	ICTU	1984;	PNR	V	and	Appendix	
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cabinet.	 The	 dispute	 festered,	with	 government	 protesting	 disingenuously	 that	the	IDA	grant-aided	semi-states	on	the	same	criteria	as	private	firms.45		 Government	 was	 determined	 to	maintain	 the	 option	 of	 privatisation.	When	Coillte	was	established,	ICTU	protested	at	the	power	the	bill	gave	the	minister	to	dispose	 of	 shares	 and	 the	 absence	 of	worker	 representatives	 on	 the	 board,	 as	also	at	Teagasc.	It	insisted	that	the	1983	Telecom	Act	be	the	model	for	all	boards,	which	Cassells	claimed	Haughey	had	assured	him	of	when	negotiating	the	PNR.	But	 the	 minister,	 John	 Wilson,	 supported	 by	 cabinet,	 resisted,	 confidentially	telling	Ó	hUiginn	that	while	he	would	accept	“participative	arrangements	at	sub-board	level”	as	agreed	in	the	PNR,	it	was	“the	strong	view	of	Government	…	that	members	of	[the	Coillte]	Board	be	appointed	on	their	own	merits	and	in	a	non-representative	 capacity”.	 The	 issue	 was	 provisionally	 resolved	 at	 Coillte	 and	Teagasc	by	ministers	accepting	IFA	and	ICTU	“proposals”	in	appointing	boards.46			 ICTU	also	 criticised	 the	 slow	pace	of	 job	 creation	 in	 semi-states,	 urging	 that	companies	be	“pressured”	to	show	results,	and	as	its	annual	conference	loomed,	it	 sought	 a	 direct	 meeting	 with	 Haughey.	 He	 agreed	 to	 appoint	 a	 designated	official	from	his	Department,	answering	to	the	CRC,	“to	co-ordinate	development	projects	 in	 the	 State	 Sponsored	 area”	 and	 a	 “Joint	 Statement”	 on	 the	 state’s	commitment	 to	 the	 sector	 with	 a	 lengthy	 report	 on	 progress	 with	 semi-state	initiatives	 was	 published.	 Haughey	 again	 met	 semi-state	 chiefs	 to	 urge	 “rapid	progress	on	 their	development	proposals”	 and	a	 flurry	of	 activity	ensued,	with	the	CRC	updated	on	a	range	of	expansion	initiatives.47																																																										45	 On	ICTU	“suspicions”,	Attley	ICTU	ADC	1989;	on	“papers”,	Declan	McDonagh,	Conference	Director,	IPA,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	03/11/88,	attch.	William	A	Niskanen,	Chairman,	Cato	Institute,	‘The	Failure	of	the	Fabian	State’,	DTA:	S25306;	on	cargo-handling,	Nevin	to	Haughey,	21/12/87,	‘Urgent’,	encl.	Nevin	to	M/T&T	John	Wilson,	21/12/87,	‘Urgent’,	and	Barry	Murphy,	Private	Sec,	Min/T&T,	to	Nevin,	20/01/88,	DTA:	S25858-D,	and	CRC	4th	Meeting,	Mar	1988,	DTA:	S25857-C;	“contrary	to	spirit”	in	Bates,	D/I&C	to	O’Sullivan	D/Taoiseach,	21/03/88,	S25857-C	and	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	5th	mtg.’,	28/04/88	and	D/I&C,	‘IDA	Assistance	to	Public	Enterprises’,	26/04/88,	DTA:	S25857-D;	cabinet	“overruling”	in	Draft,	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	to	Pádraic	White,	IDA,	May	1988,	‘Re	Airmotive	Ireland	Ltd.’,	with	h/w	notes	29/04/88	by	Cantwell,	Dorgan	and	Ó	hUiginn,	DTA:	S25857-D;	issue	at	CRC	in	D/Taoiseach,	note,	n.d.	[for	June	1988	CRC],	‘IDA	Grant	Assistance	to	Public	Enterprises’,	DTA:	S25857-F	46	 On	Coillte	board,	h/w	notes.	‘Secretariat	Group	16/6/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	on	successful	development	Airmotive,	Sweeney	1990:	76;	on	Teagasc	Ó	hUiginn	CRC	to	Minister	O’Kennedy,	26/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-F;	on	Telecom	“model”,	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	7th	mtg.’	30/06/88’,	DTA:	S25857-F;	M/Forestry	to	Ó	hUiginn	in	Smith	to	Ó	hUiginn,	CRC,	07/07/88,	DTA:	S25857-F	47	 ICTU	criticism,	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	5th	mtg.’,	28/04/88,	and	“pressure”	h/w	notes	‘CRC	[5th	mtg.]”,	28/04/88,	S25857-D;	“designated	official”	in	Haughey	in	Dáil	24/05/88	and	Joint	Government-ICTU	statement	on	job	creation	developments	under	the	PNR’,	27/05/88,	with	attached	‘Progress	on	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27/05/88’,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	on	Haughey	and	CEOs	of	SSBs,	CRC,	‘	Summary	Report	of	6th	mtg.’,	26/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E	and	‘Progress	on	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27/05/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	
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	 Haughey	remained	consistent	on	policy,	curbing	costs	at	state	companies	such	as	 CIÉ	 and	 Irish	 Sugar	 while	 encouraging	 expanded	 activities	 by	 others	 and	legislating	to	enable	ACC	bank	to	lend	outside	the	agricultural	sector	and	the	ESB	to	 engage	 in	 international	 ventures.	 He	 also	 established	 new	 state	 bodies,	notably	 Coillte,	 though	 also	 Teagasc,	 Bord	 Glas	 and	 FÁS.	 The	 ESB	 launched	 a	range	 of	 new	 ventures,	 in	 fish	 farming,	 fuel-ash	 for	 cement	 production,	 and	international	 consultancy,	 securing	 “sizeable	 assignments	 in	 three	 new	countries”	within	a	month.	A	public-private	“Overseas	Services	Group”	marketing	consultancy	work,	as	proposed	by	CII,	was	also	launched,	reporting	to	Haughey.	Liberalisation	 under	 the	 SEA	 also	 continued,	 with	 government	 assisting	 the	establishment	of	private	broadcasting,	air	transport	and	telecom	companies.48		 ICTU’s	 conference	 in	 July	 1988	 proved	 a	 stormy	 affair.	 Attley	 countered	hostility	to	the	PNR	“compromise”	on	public	enterprise	by	stating	that	unions	did	“not	have	political	power”	and,	whatever	the	shortcomings	of	the	agreement,	“by	and	large	…	it	[represented]	a	real	attempt	by	this	movement	to	get	the	policies	in	which	it	passionately	believes	implemented”.	The	only	alternative	government	was	 an	 FG-PD	 coalition	 of	 “unfettered	 Thatcherism”,	 which	 would	 make	 “this	debate	…	redundant”.	“Is	that	what	you	want?”	Under	the	PNR,	he	said,	ICTU	had	secured	the	semi-states	and	“started	the	process	of	stopping	their	run-down	and	returning	them	to	what	they	were	intended	to	be,	vehicles	for	job	creation”.	With	the	 issue	of	pay	muted,	 the	executive	narrowly	 secured	a	mandate	 to	 continue	with	the	PNR,	not	least	on	the	basis	of	projects	underway	in	state	companies.	It	succeeded	in	having	a	motion	passed	that	“the	public	sector	should	be	defended,	but	 not	 uncritically”	 and	 that	 accepted	 commercial	 criteria	 for	 semi-states,	though	opposing	further	contracting-out	of	public	services.49			 Despite	 the	 April	 1988	 agreement	 with	 Haughey,	 ICTU-government	 clashes	continued.	 The	 Turf	 Industry	 Bill,	 which	 the	Minister	 for	 Energy	 described	 as	“the	most	fundamental	change	in	the	Board’s	remit	to	date”,	 incorporated	Bord	na	Móna	 and	 authorised	 it	 to	 expand	 its	 activities,	 particularly	 in	 horticulture,																																																									48	 P.	J.	Moriarty,	Chief	Executive,	ESB	to	J.	Cantwell,	Secretary,	CRC,	11/05/88.	‘PNR’,	DTA:	S25857-E;	CRC,	SG	39:	‘Overseas	Services	Group’,	n.d.	[April	1988],	DTA:	S25857-D;	on	liberalising	measures,	Government	of	Ireland,	Electricity	Supply	(Amendment)	Act	1988	and	Agricultural	Credit	Act	1988;	‘The	1988	closedown:	How	a	legal	loophole	led	to	an	explosion	in	Irish	pirate	radio’,	www.thejournal.ie,	29/12/2018;	Murphy,	G.,	2016:	85;	Smurfit	2014:	141-52	49	 Attley,	ICTU	ADC	1989:	54,	96-7;	executive	motion	debate	ADC	1988;	ICTU	strategy	O’Dowd	1989:	viii-ix	
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and	 engage	 in	 joint	 ventures,	 but	 also	 provided	 for	 sub-contracting	 and	 the	closing	of	uneconomic	activities.	This	provoked	 fury	 from	union	 leaders,	as	 the	company	had	been	closing	plants	and	shedding	thousands	of	jobs	since	1982.	Its	chief	 executive	 pleaded	 with	 Ó	 hUiginn	 that	 its	 “rescue	 plan”,	 which	 unions	within	the	company	accepted,	sought,	through	redundancies	and	out-sourcing,	to	put	 the	 company	on	a	 competitive	 footing:	 “far	 from	breaking	any	 spirit	of	 the	PNR,	Bord	na	Móna	has	enshrined	the	spirit	of	the	PNR	in	its	plans”.50			 Another	 conflict	 that	 arose	 was	 over	 Department	 of	 Environment	 plans	 for	local	authorities	to	contract	out	waste	services.	An	official	advised	Ó	hUiginn	that	“it	would	be	as	well	to	avoid	any	specific	reference	to	this”	at	the	CRC,	but	if	he	had	 to,	 he	 could	 defend	 it	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 “decisions	 of	 this	 nature	 are	 the	essence	 of	 local	 democracy”	 and	 to	 sweeten	 the	 pill	 could	 mention	 the	involvement	of	local	authority	engineers	in	overseas	projects!	Concerned	further	at	 out-sourcing	 in	 the	 health	 services,	 ICTU	 sought	 a	 “central	 agreement”	with	the	Department	of	Health	to	regulate	it.	But	Health	warned	Ó	hUiginn	to	head	off	any	 such	 suggestion,	 which	 would	 not	 only	 be	 “difficult	 …	 and	 unwieldy”	 but	would	 lead	 to	 “a	 clawing	 back	 of	 savings”.	 Cabinet	 was	 intent	 on	 further	 out-sourcing	-	widespread	in	voluntary	hospitals	anyway	-	and	had	instructed	health	boards	 to	 pursue	 it.	 It	was,	 said	 the	Department	 of	Health,	 an	 issue	 best	 dealt	with	“locally”,	and	instead	of	any	“central	agreement”	Ó	hUiginn	might	suggest	a	“forum”	be	established	to	discuss	“difficulties	experienced	on	the	ground”.51		 As	state	companies	were	reviewed,	selling	off	poorly	performing	ones,	such	as	the	 Great	 Southern	 Hotel	 Group	 (GSHG),	 was	 increasingly	 recommended.	 But	Haughey	 hesitated	 to	 take	 such	 a	 course.	 The	 semi-state	 TV	 film	 company,	Telegael,	was	restructured	to	allow	for	private	sector	involvement,	despite	union	complaints	 of	 “privatisation	 by	 stealth”.	 There	 was	 also	 hostility	 to	 alleged	government	 favouring	 of	 Ryanair.	 The	 struggling	 airline	 had	 secured	 a	 license	under	the	Coalition	but	had	as	yet	 to	succeed	 in	starting	a	single	route	 in	what																																																									50	 On	turf	industry,	Ray	Burke,	‘Turf	Development	Bill	1988’,	20/10/88,	GIS:	D/Energy;	ICTU	reaction,	Cassells	to	Teahon,	D/Taoiseach,	‘re:	Future	Organisational	structure	of	Bord	na	Móna’	15/11/88	and	Sean	S.	O’Muiri,	AS,	D/Energy,	to	Teahon,	CRC,	16/12/88,	DTA:	S25858-N;	BnM	job	“shedding”,	Sweeney	1990:	96-100;	BnM	response,	E.	O’Connor,	MD,	Bord	na	Móna,	to	Teahon,	CRC,	23/11/88,	DTA:	S25858-N	51	 On	“advised”,	D.	McKenna,	APO,	D/Env.	to	The	Sec.,	D/Taoiseach,	24/11/88,	DTA:	S25858-M;	on	ICTU	and	“general	agreement”,	John	Hurley,	AS,	D/Health	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	attch.	D/Health,	‘Confidential:	Note	on	Contracting’,	14/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-Q	
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was	 a	 highly	 protected	 market.	 Cabinet	 agreed	 to	 give	 it	 one	 of	 Aer	 Lingus’s	Stansted	slots,	which	ICTU	decried	as	favouritism	damaging	the	national	carrier.	On	 the	 CRC,	Macra	 na	 Féirme	 attacked	 ICTU’s	 position,	 accusing	Aer	 Lingus	 of	“demolishing	Ryanair”.	The	Stansted	slot	was	a	minor	concession,	Wilson	saying	he	only	wanted	“to	be	 fair	 to	Ryanair”	and	give	 it	a	 “reasonable	opportunity	 to	establish	a	presence”.	Given	the	CRC	stand-off,	Haughey	tried	to	assist	Ryanair	in	other	ways,	including	-	unsuccessfully	–	by	trying	to	persuade	Mitterand	to	allow	it	 fly	 into	 Paris.	 The	 whole	 incident	 illustrated	 Haughey’s	 social-democratic	
dirigiste	preference	-	while	government	had	given	Ryanair	minimal	assistance,	it	simultaneously	pursued	new	routes	for	Aer	Lingus,	into	Munich	and	Vienna.52		 Despite	 the	 privatising	 zeal	 of	 some	 civil	 servants	 and	 state	 company	executives,	 Haughey	 thus	 kept	 government	 action	 within	 the	 PNR	 framework.	But	 from	 the	 state’s	 perspective	 Ryanair	 was	 important	 and	 when	 Ó	 hUiginn	outlined	 the	CRC’s	 concerns	 to	 the	Minister	 for	Transport,	 the	 latter	 replied	 in	“strict	confidence”	that	while	cabinet	was	determined	to	support	competition	in	airways	in	line	with	EC	policy,	its	priority	was	to	support	Irish	airlines	capable	of	withstanding	“foreign	carriers”.	A	few	slots	would	enable	Ryanair	grow,	but	Aer	Lingus	would	also	be	assisted	to	exploit	any	opening	opportunities.53		 As	 state	 companies	 expanded	 and	 “commercialised”,	 it	 soon	 emerged,	 as	 in	private	 industry,	 that	 this	 produced	 as	many	 job	 losses	 as	 gains.	 A	 June	 1989	update	 for	 the	CRC	by	 the	“Special	Projects	Officer”,	which	Teahon	suppressed,	detailed	 the	 array	 of	 new	 projects	 underway,	 but	 also	 restructuring	 and	 sub-contracting	plans	virtually	all	involving	staff	reductions.	ICTU,	through	its	unions	in	these	companies,	was	well	aware	of	this	and	while	welcoming	new	projects	it	complained	that	 jobs	were	being	“destroyed	as	fast”,	Ed	Browne	lamenting	this	as	“contrary	to	the	spirit	of	the	PNR”	and	“against	the	national	will”.	Struggling	to																																																									52	 On	GSHG,	[Dignam],	Ec.	&	Social	Policy	Div.,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Development	Proposals	of	State	Bodies’,	n.d.	[June	1988],	DTA:	S25857-G;	on	union	complaints,	Donncha	Ó	hÉallaithe,	Meitheal	Oibre	Theilefis	na	Gaeltachta	to	Cassells,	ICTU,	20/10/88,	DTA:	S25858-O;	Ryainair	“struggling”,	Aldous	201:	104-119,	182-4;	Stansted	“slot”	debate,	CRC,	‘Summary	Report’	and	h/w	notes	of	15th	mtg.’,	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	MnF	comments,	h/w	notes	Secretariat	Group	mtg.,	10/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C;	Minister	“to	be	fair	to	Ryanair”,	O’Sullivan	D/Taoiseach	to	Ó	hUiginn,	‘Agenda	Item	5	–	AOB,	Dublin-Stansted’,	18/05/89,	encl.	D/T&T,	‘re:	PNR	-	CRC	Mtg.,	18th	May:	Note	for	Chairman,	Dublin-London	Route’,	17/05/89’,	and	D/T&T,	06/06/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	‘Haughey	insisted	Mitterrand	stop	off	at	his	home	for	champagne’,	Irish	Times,	29/12/2019;	Ryanair/Aer	Lingus	supports,	Ó	hUiginn,	Chair,	CRC,	to	John	Wilson	TD,	Min	T&T,	04/07/89,	John	Wilson	TD,	M/T&T,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	Chair	CRC,	‘Confidential’,	12/07/89,	DTA:	S25857-V	53	 Ó	hUiginn	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	16th	mtg.’	22/06/89,	DTA:	S25857-U;	Ó	hUiginn	to	Wilson	M/T&T,	04/07/89,	Wilson	to	Ó	hUiginn,	Chair,	CRC,	12/07/89,	‘Confidential’,	DTA:	S25857-V	
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maintain	coherence	in	government	strategy,	MacSharry	stressed	to	ICTU	its	PNR	commitment	 to	 a	 “profitable	 and	 successful	 commercial	 state	 sector”,	 but	 also	that	 companies	 “must	 have	 flexibility”	 to	 reform.	 “The	 general	 question	 of	privatisation	 per	 se	 is	 not	 currently	 under	 consideration”	 but	 it	 would	 be	“unreasonable	and	unrealistic”	 to	 rule	 it	out	entirely	as	government	 “could	not	subscribe”	to	any	service	“currently	in	public	hands	remain[ing]	so	for	ever”.54		 ICTU	 disingenuously	 claimed	 the	 PNR	 aimed	 to	 maintain	 and	 increase	employment,	 not	 reduce,	 it,	 but	 it	 was	well	 aware	 that	 semi-state	 commercial	success,	 which	 it	 espoused,	 was	 incompatible	 with	 such	 criteria.	 Irish	 Sugar	(CSET)	had	been	prevented	from	closing	uneconomic	plants	in	the	1970s,	and	in	the	 1987	 election	 Michael	 O’Kennedy	 had	 campaigned	 specifically	 against	 the	closure	 of	 its	 Thurles	 plant	 in	 his	 constituency,	 threatening	 to	 prevent	 it	 by	appointing	 directors	 from	 the	 local	 area.	 CSET	 plans	 required	 the	 closure	 of	Thurles	 however,	 and	 unions	 had	 accepted	 this	 on	 the	 premise	 of	 alternative	industrial	 projects.	But	 these	proved	 slow	 in	materialising,	 creating	 a	 situation	Browne	 warned	 was	 “intolerable	 …	 [and]	 could	 be	 explosive”.	 O’Kennedy	intervened	in	time-honoured	fashion,	forcing	the	company’s	hand	by	expressing	“surprise”	 at	 its	 decision.	 As	 the	 sole	 shareholder	 he	 “requested”	 CSET	 to	 halt	closure	 pending	 examination	 of	 alternatives.	 This	 remained	 the	 situation	throughout	early	1989	as	alternative	projects	were	sought.55				 The	semi-states	became	if	anything	more	crucial	to	ICTU	as	job-creation	in	the	private	sector	remained	“disappointing”.	SIPTU	argued	that	as	the	single	market	would	 mean	 investment	 would	 concentrate	 at	 “the	 centre	 of	 Europe	 in	 the	absence	of	a	European	industrial	policy”,	and	with	Irish	companies	expanding	by	acquisitions	 abroad	 rather	 than	 through	domestic	 investment,	 state	 companies	were	the	only	reliable	base	for	an	indigenous	“export-led	industrialisation”.56			
																																																								54	 Colm	Regan,	SPO,	[“Special	Development	Projects	Officer,	D/Taoiseach”],	‘State	Sponsored	Bodies’,	16/06/89,	with	h/w	note	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	30/06/89	[“Not	circulated	at	direction	of	Asst.	Sec.	Mr	Teahon	–	P.O’S],	DTA:	S25857-T;	Browne	in	h/w	notes	of	14th	CRC	meeting	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	MacSharry,	M/Finance,	‘Reply	dated	18	October	1988	to	Mr	Donal	Nevin’,	ICTU’,	DTA:	S25858-M	55	 CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	14th	mtg.’	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	O’Kennedy,	“Open	Letter”,	09/02/87,	quoted	in	Sweeney	1990:	64;	“explosive”	in	h/w	notes	14th	CRC	meeting	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	O’Kennedy	“request”,	‘Thurles	Sugar	Factory’,	20/01/89,	GIS:	D/A&F;	h/w	notes	14th	CRC	meeting	19/04/89,	‘Commercial	SSB’,	DTA:	S25857-R	56		 Sweeney	1990:	204	
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	 Government	 held	 its	 hand,	 halting	 the	 Thurles	 closure	 and	 in	 early	 1989	talking	up	semi-state	expansion	successes	 such	as	by	 the	ESB	and	Aer	Rianta’s	acquisition	 of	 hotel	 chains	 and	 duty-free	 shops	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Haughey	refined	his	position,	welcoming	those	semi-states	performing	“impressively”,	for	whom	“the	future	can	be	bright	and	rewarding”,	while	warning	at	his	Árd	Fheis	that	this	would	depend	“entirely	on	their	ability	to	perform	efficiently	and,	where	appropriate,	 profitably”.	 Non-performing	 companies	 could	 no	 longer	 expect	“huge	 subsidies	 [from]	 the	 hard-pressed	 taxpayer”,	 nor	 the	 country	 “afford	 to	leave	large	amounts	of	scarce	resources	of	capital	and	professional	skills	locked	up	uselessly	in	out-dated	structures”.	It	was	a	statement	of	intent.57			 Social	partnership	both	enabled	and	blocked	government	plans	 in	the	highly	politicised	semi-state	sector.	But	the	impasse	could	not	continue,	especially	given	problems	 in	 distressed	 companies	 and	Haughey’s	 intention	 to	 release	 creative	potential	through	partial	denationalisation.	He	was	to	finally	achieve	a	resolution	ending	 the	 impasse	 in	1990	when,	with	 the	strength	of	a	majority	coalition,	he	would	secure	ICTU	acquiescence	to	a	broad,	flexible	strategy	towards	the	sector.		 Nevertheless,	in	no	area	more	than	the	semi-states,	Haughey’s	activism	belies	any	simple	characterisation	of	him	as	a	free	market	dogmatist.	Through	various	initiatives	since	the	1960s	he	had	been	to	the	fore	 in	reforms	to	commercialise	the	 sector,	 but	 under	 his	 1987-89	 government	 not	 alone	 was	 the	 widespread	clamour	 for	 privatisation	 resisted,	 but	 a	 near	 moribund	 sector	 facing	remorseless	decline	was	revived	as	a	key	development	driver,	with	new	agencies	and	enterprises	 founded,	companies	restructured	through	commercial	opening,	new	 ventures	 and	 international	 enterprises	 initiated	 and	 private	 capital	 input	expanded.	This	commitment	to	and	realisation	of	a	mixed-economy	model	was	a	product	 of	 the	 state/business/union	 alliance	 of	 social	 partnership,	 without	which	the	ventures	outlined	in	this	chapter	would	likely	not	have	occurred.				
																																																								57	 Ray	Burke,	‘Statement	…	at	the	official	launch	of	a	new	State	Industrial	Overseas	Consultancy	Company’,	09/01/89,	GIS:	D/I&C;	Burke	in	Dáil	25/01/89;	Árd	Fheis,	Haughey	1989	
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Chapter	9																			
The	politics	of	pay	and	social	compensation	
1987-89		
	
Deferring	reward:	partnership	and	the	politics	of	pay		 Pay	had	been	at	the	heart	of	the	PNR	negotiations,	for	unions,	government	and	employers	alike,	a	sine-qua-non	for	 its	signing,	 the	 indispensible	“core	deal”	on	which	the	PNR	“consensus”	depended.	Achieving	“industrial	peace”,	especially	in	the	 public	 service	 and	 wider	 public	 sector,	 was	 critical	 to	 restoring	 economic	confidence	and	implementing	a	consistent	monetary	adjustment.1			 The	“separate”	pay	agreements	for	the	public	and	private	sectors	had	similar	terms.	With	 inflation	 falling	 towards	 3	 per	 cent,	 these	 involved	 a	 first-“phase”	from	July	1988	of	3	per	cent	on	earnings	up	to,	and	2	per	cent	on	earning	above,	£120	p.w.,	with	a	basic	minimum	of	£4/p.w,	followed	by	an	similar	second	phase	in	 July	 1990.	 Additional	 “cost	 increasing	 claims”	 were	 disallowed	 and	implementation	was	subject	to	“local	negotiation”	and	company	competitiveness.	For	 traditional	 reasons	 pay	 agreements	 were	 voluntary	 and	 not	 legally	enforceable,	 but	 through	 the	 PNR	were	 linked	 to	 quid-pro-quos	 on	 tax	 reform	increasing	take-home	pay	and	on	expanding	welfare.	The	“phases”	paralleled	the	budgetary	 cycle,	 following	Acts	giving	effect	 to	 tax	and	welfare	decisions.	 ICTU	welcomed	the	1988/89	budgets	as	progressing	the	pay/tax	commitment.2		 A	public	pay	agreement	was	essential	for	government,	but	no	less	for	ICTU,	for	while	 the	 public	 service	 accounted	 for	 just	 over	 a	 quarter	 of	 all	 workers,	 it	composed	 over	 half	 all	 union	 members,	 forming	 the	 most	 powerful	 block	 in	Congress.	 The	 agreement’s	 treatment	 of	 “special	 claims”	 was	 crucial,	 a	 key	determinant	of	government/union	relations.	The	PNR	restored	the	C&A	system	and	 allowed	 such	 claims	 be	 heard,	 though	 their	 actual	 payment	was	 deferred.	Government	was	 intent	 on	 an	 initial	 six	month	 pay	 pause	 and	 reducing	 public	employment	levels.	Agreement	on	the	first	phase	taking	effect	only	in	July	1988																																																											1		 “core	deal”,	interviews	with	Cassells,	Attley,	O’Donnell			2		 Terms,	ICTU	and	FUE-CIF	1987;	not	legally	enforceable,	Kerr	2006;	‘Statement	on	1988	Budget’,	27/01/88,	ICTU	AR:	223-5;	‘1989	Budget	and	PNR’,	ICTU	EC	meeting	30/01/89	
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provided	the	pay	pause	–	even	 if	softened	by	tax	reforms	taking	effect	earlier	 -	and	the	voluntary	redundancy	programme	achieved	the	staff	reduction.	This	was	bartered	against	a	 formula	 for	“special	awards”	which	deferred	payment	of	 the	initial	40	per	cent	of	any	such	awards	to	July	1989,	with	the	balance	to	be	agreed	subsequently.	 In	 the	 event	 of	 “serious	 financial	 or	 budgetary	 consequences”,	government	 and	 ICTU	 would	 “consult”	 “with	 a	 view	 to	 arriving	 at	 a	 mutually	acceptable	solution”	and	timescale	for	payment	of	the	balance.3			 The	 redundancy	 scheme	 ended	 compulsory	 lay-offs	 while	 targeting	 a	reduction	of	20,000	public	service	posts.	The	coalition’s	“complete	embargo”	on	recruitment,	except	to	“key	posts”,	and	non-replacement	of	staff	exiting	through	early	 retirement	 or	 career	 breaks,	would	 remain	 in	 place,	 to	 be	 “reviewed”	 in	1989.	 The	 Department	 of	 Finance	 reported	 the	 unexpected	 popularity	 of	 the	redundancy	scheme	and	the	certainty	of	reaching	its	target	by	the	end	of	1989.	This	would	 reduce	 the	 civil	 service	 to	 the	 “more	 sustainable”	 figure	 of	 27,000	where	 it	had	been	 “immediately	prior	 to	 the	 [1977]	 ‘job	 creation	programme’”	(sic),	and	should	be	”consolidated”	at	that	level,	as	should	the	overall	reduction	of	 the	 public	 service	 to	 197,000.	 Small	 issues	 remained	 to	 upset	 public	 pay	calculations,	 such	as	 the	 “unavoidable”	payment	of	 the	balance	of	a	 legacy	pre-PNR	special	award	to	teachers.	The	refusal	by	the	coalition	to	implement	this	had	been	 the	 start	 of	 that	 government’s	 unravelling.	 But	 otherwise	 government	needed	 only	 budget	 in	 1988	 for	 the	 initial	 general	 2	 per	 cent	 phase,	 which	 Ó	hUiginn	had	confided	 to	Haughey	 in	1987	would	be	 covered	by	Department	of	Finance	over-estimates	not	revealed	to	ICTU.	The	redundancy	scheme	delivered	additional	cost	reductions,	and	special	awards	were	not	due	until	July	1989.4			 This	complex	formula	resolved	public	sector	pay,	even	if	unions	had	to	accept	considerable	deferral.	But	tax	reform	in	the	meantime	blunted	the	impact	of	this.	The	LGPSU	President	described	the	deal	as	a	“great	step	forward	in	the	context	of	the	 climate	 that	 existed	 in	 1987”	 and	 as	 having	 “returned	 the	 Trade	 Union	
																																																										3		 Government	of	Ireland	1987a			4		 PNR	II	(11);	CRC,	‘Specific	Measures	…’,	03/02/89,	DTA:	S25899-A;	D/Finance,	‘re	Point	4	of	ICTU	document	–	Public	Service’,	n.d.	[Dec.	89],	DTA:	S25857-Z;	McGuire,	D/Educ.,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	14/04/89,	attchd,	‘CRC	Queries:	Financial	Provision	for	VEC	Colleges’,	DTA:	S25857-Q	
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Movement	to	its	rightful	place	centre-stage	in	national	life	from	the	position	from	which	it	had	been	marginalised	over	the	previous	decade”.5		 Pay	 issues	 in	 the	private	 sector	were,	 if	 anything,	 even	more	 complex.	 ICTU	had	insisted	on	the	private	sector	being	in	the	agreement	as	it	was	determined	to	reverse	 the	15	per	cent	decline	 in	post-tax	wages	since	1980.	 Its	 chief	 concern	was	low	pay	and	it	had	sought	a	statutory	minimum	wage	to	set	a	floor	to	this,	but	employers,	and	therefore	government,	were	adamantly	opposed.	Haughey’s	intervention	had	 ensured	FUE	participation	 in	 the	PNR,	 but	 only	 by	 conceding	conditionality	 on	 the	 minimum	 rate,	 and	 only	 secured	 construction	 industry	participation	by	promising	“compensation”	in	public	contracts	for	the	PNR	wage	costs.	 In	 contrast	 to	 public	 service	 “special	 claims”,	 “cost-increasing	 claims”	 in	private	industry	above	PNR	rates	were	rigorously	excluded.			 These	conditions	were	galling	particularly	 for	workers	 in	strong	private	and	semi-states	companies.	Both	government	and	 the	FUE	 feared	 that	 such	groups,	with	employer	 connivance,	 could	undermine	 the	PNR	by	 “locally”	agreeing	pay	top-ups.	 Government	 worried	 that	 any	 “divergence	 from	 the	 agreed	 norms”	would	 “ultimately	make	 it	more	 difficult	 to	 hold	 the	 line	 in	 the	 public	 sector”,	causing	the	public	deal	“to	come	apart	at	the	seams”.	It	therefore	pressured	FUE	to	accept	the	PNR	as	a	“national	norm”,	apart	from	in	distressed	companies,	and	urged	strong	companies	to	see	the	“importance	for	national	recovery”	of	holding	to	the	PNR,	“a	package	embracing	not	only	pay	but	also	tax	concessions”.6		 Most	in	the	ICTU	accepted	the	balance	achieved,	though	anti-PNR	unions	with	members	 in	 strong	 firms	 complained	 loudly	 of	 such	 employers	 “hiding	 behind	the	national	interest”	in	controlling	wages	while	enjoying	rising	profits.	But	they	adhered	 to	 the	 agreement,	 Ahern	 declaring	 that	 “the	 great	 majority	 of	 pay	settlements”	 in	 1988	 had	 been	 “within	 the	 terms”	 of	 the	 PNR.	 Strikes	 fell	 to	 a	tenth	 of	 the	 1980	 level	 and	 those	 that	 occurred	 were	 seldom	 about	 pay,	 but	rather	redundancies	or	work	practices.	SIPTU	noted	only	one	in	ten	of	companies	it	 organised	 conceding	 local	 terms	 “over	 and	 above”.	 Cases	 before	 the	 Labour	
																																																										5		 Reporter	(LGPSU),	June	1989			6		 Murphy	to	Minister	(for	Labour)	‘Pay	in	the	Private	Sector’,	24/11/87,	and	to	Ó	hUiginn,	01/12/87,	DTA:	S25857-A;	Keegan,	Sec.	D/Lab.	to	Ó	hUiginn,	04.12.87,	‘Joint	Labour	Committees:	Pay	Provisions	of	Agreement	between	ICTU/	FUE/CIF’,	DTA:	S25857-A	
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Court	 fell	 from	1,000	 in	 1986	 to	 708	 in	 1988	 and	 just	 450	 in	 1990.	 Industrial	conflict,	not	just	over	pay	but	also	other	issues,	was	declining	rapidly.7			 The	 transition	 to	PNR	pay	 terms	 in	 the	private	 sector	was	delayed	 in	many	companies	 for	 several	 years	 as	 pre-PNR	 agreements	 ran	 their	 course.	 At	 least	600	such	agreements	were	signed	in	1987	alone	prior	to	the	PNR,	many	running	to	 1990	 or	 later,	 greatly	 relieving	 pay	 pressures.	 Besides	 these	 companies	effectively	still	outside	the	PNR,	at	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	were	numerous	distressed	companies	where	unions	had	accepted	“rescue	plans”	involving	actual	pay	cuts,	where	PNR	terms	would	therefore	not	yet	apply.	When	a	rescue	plan	in	B&I,	a	semi-state	ferry	company,	came	up	for	review	in	1989,	ICTU	even	sought	CRC	support	for	the	company	deferring	PNR	terms	as	“space	needs	to	be	created	…	 to	 be	 able	 to	 respond	 in	 a	 positive	 manner	 to	 the	 needs	 which	 the	 unions	genuinely	 have	 to	 keep	 the	 show	 on	 the	 road”	 (sic.).	 Private	 companies	 in	 a	similar	 position	 included	Waterford	 Glass,	 where	 ICTU	 offered	 to	 end	 a	 strike	over	rescue	plan	terms	by	trading	a	wage	freeze	for	a	workers’	shareholding.8			 ICTU’s	 overriding	 priority	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 were	 the	 lower-paid,	 who	predominated	 among	 its	 membership.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 National	 Minimum	Wage,	 it	had	accepted	Haughey’s	adamant	assurance	that	the	PNR	terms	would	be	 enforced	 as	 a	 “national	 norm”.	 As	 claims	 to	 apply	 PNR	 rates	 began	 to	 be	lodged	with	 the	 Labour	 Court	 as	 pre-PNR	 agreements	 expired	 during	 1988,	 a	satisfied	ITGWU	found	it	ruling	“consistently”	against	recalcitrant	employers	and	ordering	 PNR	 “norms”	 to	 be	 applied.	 It	 equally	 ruled	 against	 unions	 seeking	above-PNR	terms,	and	in	claims	for	increases	for	productivity	or	changed	work	practices,	excluded	by	the	PNR,	it	regularly	advised	unions	“to	await	expiry	of	the	Programme	 before	 pressing	 [such]	 claims”.	 The	 issue	 of	 industry-wide	application	of	PNR	terms	was	also	soon	 tested	when	a	 threatened	strike	 in	 the																																																											7		 ICTU	AR	1988:	58;	Ahern,	‘Speech	…	at	the	formal	announcement	of	the	Framework	Agreement	on	Hours	of	Work’,	17/02/89	and	D/Lab.,	‘Strikes,	Redundancies	and	Unemployment	fell	in	1989	–	Annual	Report	of	the	Dept.	of	Labour’,	30/03/90,	GIS:	D/Labour;	[Manus	O’Riordan],	‘Review	of	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery	and	the	role	of	the	Labour	Court’,	Research	Dept.,	SIPTU,	n.d.	[1990],	[fax	dated	23/10/90],	ICTU	Archive:	Folder	PN-1			8		 ICTU-FUE-CIF	(1987);	D/Taoiseach	report	in	CRC,	‘Specific	Measures	…’,	03/02/89;	McGinley	(1999):	117;	[Manus	O’Riordan],	‘Review	of	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery	and	the	role	of	the	Labour	Court’,	Research	Dept.,	SIPTU,	n.d.	[1990],	[fax	dated	23/10/90],	ICTU	Archive:	Folder	PN-1;	O’Sullivan	D/Taoiseach	to	Murphy,	D/T&T,	and	to	O’Gorman,	D/Finance,	19/09/89,	re	B&I,	attch.	Stephen	McCarthy,	ICTU	to	Cassells,	‘re:	B&I	Wage	Negs_’,	14/06/89,	DTA:	S25857-V;	ICTU	Press	Statement	04/03/89,	Labour	Comment,	29/04/89;	on	Waterford,	Cook	1992	
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clothing	sector	-	covered	by	a	JLC	–	caused	employers	to	accept	the	PNR	£4	rate	across	the	industry.	This	was	followed	by	a	similar	JLC	agreement	in	the	contract	cleaning	sector.	The	Labour	Court	thereafter	consistently	applied	the	£4	national	“norm”	across	 industries.	The	 strong	FUE	 resistance	of	1987	against	minimum	rates	 thus	 evaporated,	 with	 the	 recovering	 economy	 doubtlessly	 lessening	pressures	on	many	employers	who	had	so	fiercely	resisted	them	in	1987.9			 Low	 pay	 and	 precarious	 work,	 especially	 among	 women,	 was	 a	 growing	reality	in	the	1980s.	From	1983	ICTU	pursued	a	national	minimum	wage	(NMW)	to	 counter	 it,	 unsuccessfully	 seeking	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	 PNR.	 Some	 unions	opposed	a	NMW	as	creating	a	low	“floor”	and	undermining	bargaining	power,	as	had	happened	in	the	US.	But	the	ITGWU	in	particular,	which	had	pioneered	the	“flat	 rate”	 in	 pay	 bargaining	 to	 benefit	 the	 low	 paid,	 now	 sought	measures	 to	counter	what	Des	Geraghty	called	 the	 “New	Wave	 flexibility”.	Unions	must	end	their	 “ambivalence”	 on	 “marginal	 workers’,	 and	 rather	 than	 rely	 on	 industrial	organising	“concentrate	our	energies”	on	improving	their	position	through	“legal	reform,	tax	reform	and	social	reform”.	This	shaped	ICTU	strategy	in	the	PNR.10			 A	 further	 concession	 sought	 by	 ICTU	 for	 pay	 moderation	 and	 also	 as	 an	employment-boosting	measure,	was	reduced	working	hours,	then	a	major	theme	across	 the	 EC.	When	 the	 FUE	 resisted	 this	 in	 negotiating	 the	 PNR,	Haughey	 in	exasperation	 threatened	 a	 government-union	 alliance	 applying	 it	 in	 the	 public	service	 that	 would	 force	 them	 to	 follow	 suit.	 A	 typical	 PNR	 compromise	 was	achieved,	 agreeing	 “discussions”	 between	 the	 social	 partners	 and	 government	“on	a	general	framework	within	which	the	issue	…	can	be	dealt”	(sic).11			 A	boardroom-type	conflict,	often	typical	of	partnership,	erupted	at	the	initially	friendly	 first	meeting	of	 the	 “working	hours	 committee”,	 chaired	by	Ó	hUiginn.	This	 had	 only	 finally	 met	 in	 October	 1988	 and	 when	 employers	 proposed	 a	further	drawn-out	 talks	process,	 a	 furious	Attley	 changed	 the	 “whole	 tenor”	 of	the	meeting,	accusing	the	FUE	“of	extreme	foot-dragging”.	Turlough	O’Sullivan	of																																																											9		 Labour	Court	Recommendation	No.	11940;	Reporter	(LGPSU),	June	1989;	[Manus	O’Riordan],	‘Review	of	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery	and	the	role	of	the	Labour	Court’,	Research	Dept.,	SIPTU,	n.d.	[1990],	[fax	dated	23/10/90],	ICTU	Archive:	Folder	PN-1	10		 Cordova	1986;	ICTU	1989c;	ICTU	AR	1988:	143;	Attley	in	McGinley	1999:	245-6;	Blackwell	John	and	Nolan	Brian	1989;	Geraghty	in	ICTU	ADC	1988:	58	11		 McGinley	1999:	124,	135;	PNR	II	(9)	
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the	FUE	reciprocated	by	refusing	to	continue	until	Ó	hUiginn	restored	decorum.	The	Department	 of	 Finance,	 siding	with	 employers,	 reported	 to	 cabinet	 how	 it	had	acted	“to	safeguard	Exchequer	 interests”	by	ensuring	 that	“net”	hours	only	were	calculated	(“excluding	lunch	breaks”)	and	that	“‘spin-off’	claims	would	“not	be	entertained”.	“Another	most	important	feature”,	it	reported,	was	that	despite	ICTU’s	demand	for	a	July	1989	deadline	for	the	reform,	employers	had	“refused	to	concede”,	insisting	on	“local	negotiation”.	But	after	several	meetings	an	agreed	“General	 Framework	 on	 Working	 Hours”	 emerged.	 This	 conceded	 a	 one-hour	reduction	 phased	 in	 over	 three	 years,	 subject	 to	 “local”	 or	 JLC	 sector/industry	negotiation	and	competitiveness	 “implications”.	Launching	 it	 in	February	1989,	Ahern	stressed	the	role	of	the	Labour	Court	in	ensuring	a	smooth	introduction.12			 The	Department	of	Finance	estimated	 that	 the	measure	would	cost	£24m	 in	the	public	sector	annually,	with	 the	main	cost	 falling	 in	 the	health	services	and	local	 authorities.	 But	 the	 “budgetary	 allocations	 for	 special	 pay	 increases	generally”	 for	 1989	 (including	 the	 Gleeson	 report’s	 “interim	 award”	 for	 senior	officials)	 included	no	 provision	 for	 this.	 Government	 therefore	 stalled	 in	 “local	negotiations”	on	it,	with	talks	still	on-going	in	many	bodies	into	1990.	With	this	pace	set	by	government,	employers	followed,	with	few	private	sector	agreements	on	reduced	hours	concluded	by	late	1989,	covering	just	18,000	workers.13			 The	complex	agreements	on	pay	and	working	hours	on	which	the	entire	PNR	depended,	however	drawn	out,	nevertheless	delivered	both	“industrial	peace”	-	a	key	 factor	 in	 economic	 stability	 -	 and	 reduced	 budgetary	 pressures.	While	 the	state	 and	 private	 employers	 achieved	 a	 notable	 deferring	 of	 cost	 inputs	 –	 art	from	tax	-	until	1989,	unions	secured	an	ideal	public	service	agreement,	even	if	subject	 to	 considerable	 deferral	 and	 budget	 conditionality.	 For	 private	 sector	unions,	the	achievement	of	minimum	PNR	rates	and	working	hour	reductions	as	nationally	 applicable,	 and	 on-going	 tax,	 welfare	 and	 social	 policy	 reforms																																																									12		 [O’Sullivan,	D/Taois.],	‘Drafting	Group	on	Reduction	of	Working	Hours’,	n.d.	[Jan.	89],	DTA:	S25858-O;	Office	of	M/Fin.,	‘Aide	Memoire	for	Govt.	Mtg.	on	10	February.	Framework	Agreement	on	reduction	in	working	hours’,	DTA:	S25858-P;	PNR,	General	Framework	on	Working	Hours,	[17]	February	1989	13		 Office	of	the	M/Fin.,	‘Aide	Memoire	for	Government	Meeting	on	10	February	1989’,	DTA:	S25858-P;	N.T.	O’Gorman,	D/Finance,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	21/11/89:	‘Re:	ICTU	meeting	with	Taoiseach’,	24/11/89,	encl.	‘Briefing	Note	re	reduction	of	working	hours’;	CRC,	‘Report	of	Bilateral	Meeting	[Departments]	with	Representatives	of	ICTU	on	8	Nov.	1989’,	and	h/w	notes	of	the	meeting,	DTA:	S25862-D;	D/Environment	fax	to	D/Taoiseach,	06/07/90:	n.t.,	DTA:	S25858-Z6;	h/w	notes,	‘CRC,	Bilateral	Meeting	[Departments]	with	ICTU’,	08/11/89’,	DTA:	S25862-D	
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providing	incremental	improvements,	benefited	many	hundreds	of	thousands	of	working	class	families.	For	government,	the	deferral	of	special	award	payments,	the	 continued	 reduction	 of	 public	 employment	 and	 the	 recruitment	 embargo,	pending	“review”,	were	major	benefits.	The	slack	provided	by	the	overlap	of	pre-PNR	pay	agreements	in	many	strong	companies	meant	unions	in	the	private	and	semi-state	sectors	were	relieved	of	pressures	from	the	PNR	ban	on	local	add-on	claims.	 But	 these	 private	 sector	 pay	 and	 public	 service	 pressures	 were	 only	deferred,	 cushioned	 by	 tax	 reforms	 and	 pre-PNR	 arrangements	 running	 their	course,	and	would	forcefully	return	to	the	partnership	agenda	from		late	1989.		
	
New	paradigms:	Rural	Development	and	Long-term	
unemployment			
		 Already	 from	 1988	 the	 focus	 of	 social	 partnership	 began	 to	 shift	 from	 core	economic/industrial	 policy	 as	 the	 “turnaround”	 saw	 the	PNR	 recovery	 formula	gain	 wide	 acceptance.	 Continued	 high	 unemployment	 and	 a	 realisation	 that	 it	would	 not	 be	 solved	 quickly	 moved	 centre	 stage.	 The	 integration	 through	 the	NDP	of	 the	EC	 structural	 funds	with	 the	PNR	 further	 strengthened	 the	 shift	 to	compensatory	social	policy.	Two	particular	interventions	to	emerge	were	firstly	“integrated	 rural	 development”	 (IRD)	 and	 secondly	 measures	 to	 combat	 what	was	 identified	as	 a	 “new	phenomenon”	of	 long-term	unemployment	 (“LTU”)	 in	deprived	urban	areas.	This	occurred	as	a	new	economy	with	new	growth	sectors	rather	 than	 a	 recovering	 old	 economy	 emerged.	 Compensatory	 policies	 on	 tax	compliance	and	social	reforms	also	assumed	greater	prominence.	How	initiatives	in	these	areas	evolved	is	critical	to	the	re-shaping	of	partnership	that	ensued.		 On	 IRD,	 Haughey	 had	 long	 been	 an	 advocate	 of	 promoting	 off-farm	 rural	enterprise,	 even	 before	 CAP	 reform.	 Both	 Macra	 na	 Feirme	 and	 ICOS	 had	developed	ideas	on	how	local	interests	might	drive	a	process	of	socio-economic	regeneration	through	an	“Integrated	Rural	Development”	programme	(IRD)	and,	with	 IFA	 support,	 pilot	 IRD	 projects	 were	 included	 in	 the	 PNR.	 While	 this	approach	meshed	with	thinking	in	Brussels,	it	pre-dated	the	EC	programme	and	had	domestic	roots.	Local	initiatives	building	on	co-operative	traditions	had	been	supported	 by	 government	 through	 the	 Combat	 Poverty	 Agency	 (CPA),	 for	
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example	 in	 North	 Mayo.	 Many	 local	 development	 groups	 campaigned	 to	 be	included	 in	 the	 programme.	 Macra	 na	 Feirme	 saw	 the	 potential	 of	 IRD	 to	overcome	 the	 “fundamental	 weakness	 in	 our	 structures”	 of	 local	 government,	especially	 their	 impact	 on	 socio-economic	 development.	 Haughey	 had	 been	acerbic	 in	 his	 scepticism	 of	 local	 government	 having	 the	 competence	 to	 drive	development	 in	Dublin,	 and	was	no	 less	 so	 in	 relation	 to	 rural	 Ireland.	He	had	welcomed	Macra’s	proposals,	 included	 their	pilot	 IRD	projects	 in	 the	PNR,	 and	had	expanded	these	pilots	into	a	nationwide	programme	under	the	NDP.14		 In	preparing	 the	NDP,	government	had	asked	 the	Department	of	Agriculture	for	 proposals	 for	 this	 IRD	 programme.	 When	 it	 returned	 with	 a	 plan	 for	 a	Department-run	scheme	of	 “programme	activators”	overseeing	 “local	economic	and	 social	 improvement”,	 Haughey	 intervened	 furiously	 through	 Ó	 hUiginn	 to	scupper	 it.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 told	 Agriculture	 that	 while	 it	 was	 unprecedented	 for	 a	Taoiseach	 to	 criticise	departmental	plans,	 it	was	 to	note	his	views	on	 this.	The	purpose	of	 IRD	was	 to	 generate	 enterprise	 in	 a	 post-CAP	 reform	environment,	with	projects	focused	on	disadvantaged	areas	and	building	on	existing	initiatives.	Government	officials	would	only	“stifle	 local	 initiative”	rather	 than	stimulate	 it.	Local	bodies,	both	state	and	voluntary,	should	instead	be	“mobilised”	by	outside	“co-ordinators”	to	“lead,	stimulate	and	foster	local	initiative”	rather	than,	“as	you	put	 it”,	 oversee	 “improvement”.	 The	model	Haughey	 “envisaged”	was	 the	 CPA-funded	project	in	Mayo	or	that	proposed	by	the	West	Kerry	Development	group.	The	Delors	Plan	was	only	in	preparation,	but	had	the	Department,	he	asked,	even	sought	“advance	drafts”	of	its	ideas?	If	not	it	should	do	so,	and	return	with	fresh	proposals	incorporating	Commission	“thinking”	and	what	might	“fit	in	with	it”.15		 In	 1987	Delors	 had	 launched	 a	 discussion	paper	The	Future	of	Rural	Society	which,	 as	 agriculture	 minister	 O’Kennedy	 put	 it,	 rejected	 the	 “US	 model”	 of	abolishing	 rural	 subsidies	 due	 to	 the	 “intolerable	 social	 and	 economic	 cost”	involved,	 promoting	 instead	 strengthening	 the	 “economic	 and	 social	 fabric	 in	rural	areas”	through	off-farm,	quality	 local	enterprise.	Delors	foresaw	an	“area-
																																																								14	 PNR	V	(20);	Dr	Fergus	O’Ferrall,	Chief	Executive,	Macra	na	Feirme,	to	Pat	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	13/09/88,	‘Re:	Structural	Funds’,	DTA:	S25857-I;	h/w	note	of	meeting	SG,	05/010/1988,	DTA:	S25857-I	and	‘Action	Points	from	SG	mtg.	on	5	October’’,	12/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J	15	 Ó	hEigeartaigh,	for	Sec.,	D/Taoiseach,	to	Sec.,	D/A&F,	for	attn..	Dr	Ted	Atwood,	15/01/88,	DTA:	S25858.D	
	 244	
focussed”	programme	 to	 “harness	 local	 energies,	 imagination	and	enthusiasm”,	supported	by	central	and	local	government	and	the	private	sector.16			 The	 Department	 of	 Finance	 seized	 on	 the	 focus	 in	 draft	 EC	 guidelines	 on	assisting	 poorer	 and	 converting	 regions	 and	 “speeding	 up”	 agricultural	adjustment	 and	 rural	 development	 in	 anticipation	 of	 CAP	 reform,	 to	 propose	structural	 fund	 co-financing	 for	projects	 involving	 the	private	 sector.	Macra	na	Feirme	sought	the	inclusion	of	community	resourced	projects,	and	once	this	was	achieved,	Government	“subsumed”	its	IRD	plans	within	the	ERDF	programme,	as	a	chapter	of	the	NDP.	But	various	agencies	had	already	been	re-oriented	towards	“local	development”.	In	1988,	for	example,	Shannon	Development	(SFADCo)	was	re-directed	 to	 support	 voluntary	 enterprise	 groups,	 community	 co-operatives	and	other	projects	on	a	county	“enterprise	plan”	basis	across	the	South-West,	as	well	as	in	Limerick	city,	where	it	partnered	with	the	City	Renewal	Scheme.17			 The	 IRD	 programme	 thus	 emerged	 organically,	 but	 adjusted	 to	 “fit	 in”	with	Commission	thinking.	What	emerged	in	Ireland	would	rapidly	became	a	“model”	for	 how	 IRD	was	developed	by	 the	Commission	 as	 a	Europe-wide	programme.	One	of	the	most	successful	rural	development	programmes	since	the	foundation	of	 the	 state	 thus	 took	 form	 through	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 PNR	 and	 NDP,	 and	became	a	model	for	European	rural	regeneration	and	economic	organisation.		 In	urban	social	regeneration,	a	unique	model	also	emerged	to	tackle	the	very	different	issue	of	long-term	unemployment.	It	would	be	shaped	by	a	combination	of	European	policy	 re-think,	 organic	 local	 responses	 to	 social	 crisis,	 and	policy	innovation	by	the	organisations	of	the	CRC	under	the	PNR.		 	The	 social	 impact	 of	 de-industrialisation	 had	 led	 the	 OECD’s	 minister-level	Social	Affairs	Committee	in	1986	to	identify	a	“new	phenomenon”	of	“long-term	unemployment”	and	propose	targeted	measures	of	special	education	and	“active	labour	market	policy”	to	tackle	it.	Creating	industrial	jobs	and	training	people	to	fill	 them	 was	 seen	 as	 no	 longer	 functional	 in	 addressing	 this	 unemployment																																																									16	 O’Kennedy,	‘Statement	…	launching	the	Annual	Review	and	Outlook	for	the	Agricultural	and	Food	Industry’,	18/01/89,	GIS:	D/A&F;	EC	Commission,	1988a;	D/Finance,	‘Future	Development	of	the	ERDF’,	14/03/88,	S25857-C	17	 D/Fin.,	‘Future	Development	of	ERDF’,	14/03/88,	S25857-C;	O’Ferrall,	MnF,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	13/09/88,	‘Re:	Structural	Funds’,	DTA:	S25857-I;	Tom	Dunne,	MD,	Shannon	Development,	‘Partnership	approach	positions	Shannon	region	for	the	1990s’	[Press	Release],	03/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	
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given	its	geographic	concentration	and	the	type	of	skills	the	emerging	economy	required.	The	term	“LTU”	was	coined	to	refer	to	people	with	obsolescent	skills,	over	a	year	unemployed	and	caught	 in	a	cycle	of	 joblessness.	A	 “ratchet	effect”	meant	 that	 while	 LTU	 increased	 in	 recessionary	 periods,	 it	 did	 not	 similarly	decline	when	growth	resumed,	and	 this	group	became	 trapped	 in	a	downward	spiral	 of	 labour	market	 exclusion	 and	 disadvantage.	 Unemployment	 in	 Europe	declined	in	the	1980s,	but	 long-term	unemployment	remained	stubbornly	high,	accounted	for	nearly	half	of	all	those	out	of	work	in	Ireland	by	1988.18		 The	 OECD	 declared	 the	 supply-side	 vocational	 training	 solution	 of	 the	 full-employment	era	 redundant,	promoting	 instead	an	area-based	approach	 to	LTU	and	labour	market	“disadvantage”.	The	methodology	it	proposed	was	one	of	“re-orientating”	 programmes	 to	 “particularly	 disadvantaged	 groups”,	 “improving	motivation,	life	skills	and	job	search	techniques”,	compulsory	testing,	jobs	clubs,	self-employment,	 “social	 employment”	 projects	 supplying	 non-economic	 but	socially	 useful	 services,	 and	 “additional	 and	 still	 ‘heavier’	 forms	 of	 aid”	 for	 the	“more	 seriously	 disadvantaged”.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	 re-integrate	 the	 unemployed	through	new	service	jobs,	or	to	occupy	them	to	produce	“societal	benefits	in	the	form	of	reduced	unsocial	behaviour,	lower	levels	of	ill	health	etc”.19			 This	OECD	policy	was	controversial	and		only	finally	adopted	in	1989,	before	the	EC.	The	European	Social	Fund	 (ESF)	had	been	established	by	 the	Treaty	of	Rome	 as	 a	 “compensatory	measure”	 to	 assist	workers	 dislocated	 by	 industrial	restructuring	 to	 retrain	 for	 new	 jobs.	 But	 policy	 drift	 saw	 it	 increasingly	 used	from	the	1970s	to	counter	youth	 joblessness	and	social	marginalisation.	By	the	1980s	 Irish	 vocational	 training	was	 fully	 one-third	 funded	 by	 ESF,	 the	 highest	rate	in	the	EC.	In	1988	Delors	questioned	the	fitness	of	Europe’s	social	protection	systems	to	counter	the	new	social	rather	than	economic	phenomenon	of	poverty,	“a	cancer	growing	away	in	our	society”	that	allowed	the	new	poor	“slip	through	the	meshes	of	the	social	protection	net”.	Measures	under	the	ESF	specifically	to	“combat	social	exclusion”,	then	a	new	term,	were	only	finally	adopted	in	1989.20	
																																																								18	 OECD	1988a;	Bond	1993b:	26-9	19	 OECD	1988a:	34,	48,	96	20	 On	ESF,	Ó	Cinnéide	1993b:	14;	“financed	by	ESF”	Mangan,	I.,	1993:	64-5;	“meshes”	Mangan,	G.	1993d:	44;	ESF	reg.	Council	of	the	EC,	1989,	‘Resolution	of	29/09/1989	on	combating	social	exclusion’,	89/C	277/01		
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	 As	these	EC	policies	had	yet	to	clarify,	the	PNR	initially	adopted	a	traditional	approach	to	unemployment,	assuming	that	job	creation	would	gradually	erode	it	as	 the	 collapsed	 industries	 of	 the	 Lemass-era	 recovered.	 It	 referred	 to	“disadvantaged	areas”	only	in	terms	of	educational	needs,	and	made	no	mention	of	 geographic	 concentrations	 or	 “long-term	 unemployment”.	 But	 as	 industrial	strategy	under	 the	PNR,	 for	all	 its	successes,	hardly	dented	unemployment,	 the	issue	began	to	dominate	the	CRC,	especially	after	the	Structural	Fund	regulations	appeared	 proposing	 investment	 in	 “converting	 regions”	 affected	 by	 industrial	decline	 and	 urban	 concentrations	 of	 high	 unemployment.	 The	 ESF	 was	 re-designated	“to	combat	 long-term	unemployment	and	 facilitate	 the	occupational	integration	of	young	people”,	with	proposals	to	be	submitted	by	June	1989.21			 Following	 the	 EC	 Council’s	 adoption	 of	 the	 Delors	 Plan	 in	 early	 1988,	 ICTU	raised	the	issue	of	“unemployment	‘blackspots’”	on	the	CRC,	proposing	supports	be	 “concentrated	on	…	 [the]	 long-term	unemployed	 areas	 of	 big	 cities…	 rather	than	spreading	them	across	the	country”.	The	IFA	opposed	this	on	the	basis	that	average	rural	incomes	were	lower	than	urban	ones,	but	government,	siding	with	the	ICTU,	commissioned	a	“study	on	Dublin”	from	such	a	perspective.	The	1988	ICTU	conference	was	dominated	by	the	jobs	question	and	demanded	that	social	investment	be	focused	on	“unemployment	blackspots”.22			 The	 CRC	 debated	 the	 grim	 prognoses	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 “LTU	 report”	 and	 its	recommendations.	Ó	hUiginn	told	government	that	concrete	projects	along	such	lines	were	now	essential	for	ICTU,	which	was	under	pressure	to	“show	that	their	membership	of	the	CRC	is	fruitful”.	After	the	Commission	unveiled	its	proposed	“Community	Action	Programme”	to	“foster	the	Economic	and	Social	 Integration	of	 the	 Least	 Privileged	 Groups”	 in	 December	 1988,	 Cassells	 proposed	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 CRC	 “Sub-Group	 on	 Job	 Creation”	 to	 evaluate	 job	 creation	measures	 and	 develop	 proposals	 to	 address	 “the	 position	 of	 the	 long-term	unemployed”.	The	CII	supported	this	as	“a	logical	extension	of	PNR	strategy”	and	government	readily	endorsed	it.23																																																									21		 PNR	IV	(15)-(17);	D/Finance,	‘Future	Development	of	the	ERDF’,	14/03/88,	S25857-C	22	 CRC,	‘Summary	Report’	and	h/w	notes	of	4th	mtg.’	24/03/88,	DTA:	S25857-C	23			 “LTU	Report”	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	15th	mtg.’,	18/05/89,	“fruitful”	in	O’Sullivan	to	Sec	[Ó	hUiginn],	D/Taois.,	‘Job	Creation:	Proposal	to	establish	Group	to	examine	initiatives	to	create	additional	jobs’,	19/05/89	in	DTA:	S25857-S;	Commission	proposal	in	EC	Commission	1988d;	Sec.	[=	Ó	hUiginn]	to	
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	 The	CRC	 “Sub-Group”	met	 twenty	 times	over	 six	months.	 It	 consisted	of	 the	same	personnel	as	the	“Secretariat	Group”,	which	suspended	its	activities	for	the	duration.	Its	objective	was	to	assess	likely	job	creation	under	the	PNR/NDP	and	propose	“feasible	measures	to	improve	the	level,	and	speed	up	the	process	of	job	creation	 (productive	 and	 social)	 and	 training,	 having	 particular	 regard	 to	 the	position	 of	 the	 long-term	 unemployed”.	 It	 was	 supplied	 with	 material	 by	 all	departments,	especially	on	widening	education	access,	as	well	as	analyses	by	the	OECD	 and	 reviews	 of	 pilot	 projects	 in	 other	 EC	 countries.	 The	 Department	 of	Labour	 supported	 the	 OECD	 proposals	 for	 “targeting”	 groups,	 while	 ICTU	pressed	 for	an	area	based	 focus.	The	group	concluded	 that	even	 if	PNR	 targets	were	met,	 unemployment	would	 remain	 above	200,000	beyond	1992,	 that	 the	long-term	unemployed	would	benefit	least	from	new	jobs	being	created,	and	that	well-resourced	social	programmes	were	therefore	essential	in	target	areas.24			 A	 “Ministerial	 Committee	 on	 Employment”	 chaired	 by	 Ahern	 adopted	proposals	emerging	from	the	Sub-Group	and	incorporated	them	into	NDP	plans.	National	 regulations	 were	 changed	 to	 enable	 educational	 access	 for	 the	unemployed	 and	 new	 education	 initiatives	 targeting	 deprived	 urban	 areas,	notably	Youthreach.	Ahern	urged	ICTU	in	the	sub-regional	NDP	planning	groups	to	“ensure	the	needs	of	unemployment	blackspots	are	taken	into	account”.	Civil	servants	 offered	 some	 resistance	 on	 cost	 grounds	 and	 fearing	 disincentives	 to	job	 seeking,	 but	 they	 also	 realised	 the	 value	 of	 such	measures	 in	 suppressing	unemployment	 figures,	 especially	 given	 demographic	 pressures,	 the	 need	 for	widespread	upskilling	and	the	undeniably	high	rate	of	youth	unemployment.	The	new	employment/training	agency,	FÁS,	 re-oriented	 from	traditional	 training	 to	developing	“integrated	area	plans”	that	prioritised	LTU	measures.25																																																																																																																																																																Taoiseach.	‘Subject:	Sub-Group	of	the	CRC	to	examine	initiatives	to	create	additional	jobs’,	22/05/89,	DTA:	S26122-A;	O’Sullivan	to	Ó	hUiginn,	D/Taoiseach,	‘re	Agenda	item	2	–	Job	Creation’,	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	CII	on	“logical	extension”	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	15th	mtg.’	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S;	government	endorsement	in	Cruinniú	Rialtais	23/05/89,	DTA:	S26122-A	24	 CRC	Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’	(SG-JC),	‘Summary	Report	of	1st	mtg.’,	27/06/89,	and	documentation	for	the	2nd	CRC	SG	mtg.	inc.	Sexton	1988,	OECD	1988b,	Prof	Kennedy	(ESRI)	paper	on	Swedish	labour	market	policy	and	the	CSO	1988	Finance	Survey;	D/Labour	position	in	h/w	notes	1st	mtg.,	‘Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’,	n.d.	[28/06/89],	and	SG	“conclusions”	in	h/w	notes	1st	meeting,	all	in	DTA:	S26122-A	25	 ‘Ministerial	Committee	on	Employment.	Summary	of	Recommendations	and	Conclusions’,	n.d.	[June	1989],	DTA:	S26122-A;	‘Government	Statement’	[on	ESF	priorities],	22/03/89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	h/w	notes	of	14th	CRC	meeting	19/04/89,	and	D/SW,	‘Options	to	allow	the	unemployed	to	engage	in	education	courses’,	02/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	on	Youthreach	and	other	measures,	Mary	O’Rourke,	‘Address	to	TUI	Conference’,	29/03/89,	GIS:	D/Educ.;	on	Haughey	urging	ICTU	in	NDP	planning	groups,	
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	 This	speedy	response	and	the	raft	of	new	measures	launched	occurred	in	the	run-up	 to	 the	 “surprise”	 election	 of	May	 1989,	 but	 nevertheless	 represented	 a	strategic	re-orientation	of	labour	market	policy	and	programme	reform,	and	was	welcomed	by	the	CRC.	But	re-focusing	the	CRC	to	this	policy	area	also	reflected	the	re-orientation	of	social	partnership	 itself	 from	its	original	primary	focus	on	macro-economic	policy	to	measures	of	social	compensatory	adjustment.		
	
The	politics	of	“unemployment	black-spots”		 The	 PNR	 had	 not	 included	measures	 on	 long-term	 unemployment	 or	 urban	“black-spots”.	 But	 the	 confluence	 of	 the	 OECD	 policy	 departure,	 the	 CRC	 “Sub-Group”	and	the	opportunity	of	the	EC-co-funded	NDP	saw	them	now	emerge	as	a	priority.	This	 led	to	 initiatives	by	a	receptive	government	willingly	adopting	an	approach	urged	on	it	by	an	alliance	of	the	ICTU	and	a	new	“community	sector”.			 Haughey’s	view	of	the	relationship	between	economic	and	social	progress	saw	the	 economic	 as	 primary,	 as	 reflected	 in	 his	 interventions	 on	 rural	 and	 urban	renewal	strategy	as	already	described.	Ó	hUiginn	made	this	ordering	of	priorities	clear	 in	 a	 clash	with	 the	CHDDA.	When	his	 IFSC	Committee	 criticised	CHDDA’s	rents	policy	for	dis-incentivising	finance	firms	from	locating	to	the	docklands,	its	chairman,	 Frank	 Benson,	 responded	 that	 his	 remit	 was	 physical	 regeneration,	funded	 by	 rent	 receipts.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 put	 him	 on	 notice	 that	 the	 IFSC	 was	 “the	major	Government	concern	 in	 regard	 to	 the	Docks	development	 [and]	must	be	seen	to	be	the	objective	of	the	development	and	not	the	other	way	around”.26			 The	CRC	for	its	part	criticised	the	CHDDA	from	another	perspective,	wanting	its	remit	expanded	from	physical	renovation	to	social	objectives,	and	extended	to	the	 inner	 city	 generally	 while	 focusing	 on	 “employment	 black-spots”.	 Unions’	concern	for	such	crisis	areas	was	due	to	their	historic	roots	and	base	in	them.	But	the	old	leadership	role	of	union	activists	in	these	communities,	where	long-term	unemployment	now	often	topped	40	per	cent,	was	disappearing,	and	replaced	by	a	new	movement	of	community	activists.	Some	of	the	new	groups	still	emerged																																																																																																																																																															NT	O’Gorman,	D/Finance,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	03/11/,	DTA:	S25858-M;	on	emographics	and	youth	unemployment,	OECD	1988b	and	Power	2009:	167;	re-direction	of	FÁS,	D/Labour,	‘CRC	Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation,	Information	requested	at	1st	mtg.’,	27/06/88’,	DTA:	S26122-A;	Ahern	‘Speech	at	launch	of	FAS	Dublin	Regional	Plans’,	08/06/89	GIS:	D/Labour	26		 Benson	to	Ó	hUiginn	[18]/12/88,	and	Ó	hUiginn	to	Benson,	04/01/89,	DTA:	S25306	
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from	the	labour	movement,	like	the	Larkin	and	Ballymun	Jobs	Centres,	but	others	like	Tony	Gregory’s	NCCCAP,	the	Ballyfermot	Action	Group	and	Tallaght	Welfare	Society	were	more	often	 led	by	community	or	social	workers,	college-educated	and	 espousing	 an	 “empowerment”	 philosophy.	 This	was	 shaped	 not	 by	 labour	movement	traditions	but	US	civil	rights	thinking	and	social	psychology	theory.	A	major	 influence	was	 Dr.	 Ivor	 Browne’s	 “Foundation	 for	 Human	Development”,	which	 sponsored	 projects	 in	 the	 city	 promoting	 “empowerment”	 through	community	 development.	 The	 new	 groups	 networked	 through	 the	 Community	Workers	Co-op,	which	aimed	“to	build	on	the	principles	of	local	community	level	participation”	towards	“a	radical	reshaping	of	democracy	at	the	national	level”.27		 Despite	unions’	 strong	attachment	 to	 tradition,	 the	unifying	 class	 identity	of	the	labour	movement	was	fracturing	with	the	rise	of	middle	class	public	service	interests	 in	 the	 ICTU	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	working	 class	 stratum	 detached	both	 from	 regular	 work	 and	 the	 union	 movement.	 In	 1987	 the	 Irish	 National	Organisation	 of	 the	 Unemployed	 (INOU)	 was	 formed	 on	 the	 lines	 of	 similar	initiatives	 of	 the	 past,	 seeking	 a	 structured	 role	 in	 the	 ICTU.	 But,	 despite	 its	aspirations	to	mass	mobilisation,	it	was	soon	dominated	by	community	activists.	In	 the	 1980s	 ICTU	 sought	 the	 support	 of	 the	 new	 community	 movements	 to	reinforce	its	social	policy	credibility	while	resenting	their	encroachment	onto	its	territory	 and	encouraging	 local	 trades	 councils,	which	 had	 lost	 their	 industrial	relations	 function,	 to	 revive	 the	 movement’s	 community	 leadership	 role	 by	forming	“unemployed	action	groups”	and	“centres	 for	 the	unemployed”.	 It	only	finally	 agreed	 in	 late	 1987	 to	 meet	 the	 INOU	 to	 discuss	 “possible	 links”	 but	avoided	 the	 formal	 tie-up	 “envisaged”	 in	 the	 INOU	 constitution.	 By	 1989	 talks	had	advanced	only	to	“consultation”	on	“issues	of	mutual	interest”.28		 Given	 the	 tensions	 in	 this	 alliance	 and	 its	 state	 orientation,	 the	 ICTU	 in	proposing	 how	 local	 initiatives	 in	 “black-spots”	 should	 be	 organised	under	 the	NDP	 initially	 foresaw	 joint	 “task-forces”	 solely	 of	 social	 partners	 and	 state																																																									27	 CRC	view	of	CHDDA,	h/w	notes	CRC	mtg.	26/10/88,	DTA:	S25857-J2;	Irish	Times,	27/10/88;	on	the	Larkin	and	Ballymun	Centres,	O’Connor,	P.	2009	and	inf.	Michael	Creedon;	on	the	“Foundation”,	Browne,	I.,	2009	and	Rafferty	and	McCarthy	eds.	2019:	27-32;	“aspirations”,	Larragy	2006:	383	28	 Allen	at	ICTU	ADC	1988:	41;	Chabanet	and	Royall	2009:	286;	on	predecessor	movements,	Kilmurray	1987;	on	INOU	membership,	Int.	Monks;	INOU-ICTU	relations	also	Chabanet	and	Royall	2009:	273-4	and	McGinley	1999:	158;	on	“Centres”,	ICTU	ARs	1984-8;	Royall	2009:132;	“envisaged	in	constitution”	ICTU,	AR	1988:	281	and	“mutual	interest”	ICTU	AR	1990:	3	
	 250	
agencies	such	as	FÁS,	local	government	and	the	VEC.	But	soon	Haughey’s	much-derided	“Gregory	Deal”	of	1982,	with	its	integrated	community-based	approach	of	school,	community	and	social	employment	projects,	overseen	by	a	coalition	of	agencies	 and	 community	 groups,	 emerged	 as	 the	 preferred	model.	 Many	 such	micro-projects	had	 survived	with	EC	poverty	 funding,	 and	 community	activists	urged	ICTU	to	support	the	approach,	which	it	did	finally	promote	on	the	CRC.29			 Haughey	 immediately	 responded	 to	 this	 CRC	 proposal	 when	 launching	 the	Custom	 House	 project	 in	 September	 1988.	 An	 “integral	 feature”	 of	 inner	 city	renewal	 would	 be	 to	 “provide	 local	 employment	 and	 help	 create	 in	 the	 local	community	a	sense	of	 involvement	…	[in]	the	creation	of	this	new	environment	in	 their	 area”.	 This	 “commitment	 to	 involving	 the	 local	 community”	 through	“established	local	groups”	would	extend	to	“preferential	consideration”	for	local	residents	 in	 job	 recruitment,	 and	 cooperating	 “with	 developers	 and	 statutory	agencies”	to	provide	“appropriate	education	and	training	programmes”.30		 A	 range	 of	 sub-areas	 of	 Dublin,	 Limerick	 and	 other	 towns	were	 designated	“disadvantaged”	on	the	basis	of	unemployment	level.	An	initial	pilot	project	was	developed	 for	Tallaght,	a	deprived	working	class	suburb	declared	a	 “social	and	economically	 disadvantaged	 area”.	 In	 addition	 to	 tax-incentivised	 construction,	including	a	new	“town	centre”,	the	project	involved	social	interventions	under	an	“Integrated	Area	Development	Plan”	delivered	by	local	community	organisations.	At	 ICTU	 instigation,	 the	 FÁS	 social	 employment	 scheme	 was	 re-configured	 to	combine	social	with	training	objectives,	despite	Ó	hUiginn	cautioning	that	the	EC	was	likely	to	resist	any	such	change	to	a	social-	rather	than	economic	focus.31		 	“Integrated”	social	planning	in	Dublin	Inner	City,	Limerick	and	Tallaght	thus	already	 began	 under	 social	 partnership	 in	 1988,	 before	 their	 usually	 assumed	initiation	 by	 later	 EC	 programmes.	 The	 new	 schemes,	 like	 rural	 development,	had	 a	 strong	 organic	 origin,	 mobilising	 local	 groups	 as	 their	 driving	 element.	Ahern	 articulated	 this	when	 he	 described	 FÁS’s	 role	 in	 the	 Tallaght	 plan	 as	 to	“provide	 a	 flexible	 response	 to	 the	 pressing	 needs	 of	 the	 new	 town”	 and	 “co-																																																								29			 ICTU	proposals	for	local	bodies,	Sub-Grp	on	Job	Creation,	‘Report	to	the	CRC,	October	1989’,	DTA:	S26122-E;	“Gregory	Deal”,	Lee	1989:	508;	projects	with	EC	funding,	Interview	with	Inner	City	Group	30	 Haughey,	‘Address	laying	foundation	stone	for	the	IFSC’,	22/09/88,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	31	 ‘Tallaght’,	n.d.	[Nov.	1988],	DTA:	S25858-M;	h/w	notes	of	CRC	15th	mtg.’,	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-S	
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operate	with	 all	 relevant	 community	 groups	…	 to	promote	 employment	 and	…	the	 development	 of	…	 small	 businesses”.	 This,	 he	 said,	 pre-dated	EC	proposals	now	emerging,	but	would	 fit	 “admirably”	with	 them.	 In	 their	early	years,	 these	projects	would	attract	widespread	acclaim	for	their	innovative	impact.32	
	
Managing	despair:	government	policy	and	“anti-poverty”	politics		 The	 beginnings	 of	 the	 integrated	 local	 development	 plans	 described	 above	were	 accompanied	 by	 an	 overhaul	 of	 social	 policy-making	 at	 the	 institutional	level.	One	of	ICTU’s	major	tactical	aims	in	the	PNR	had	been	to	ring-fence	welfare	spending.	While	this	was	achieved,	its	larger	objective	of	a	fundamental	welfare	state	 reform	 proved	 more	 difficult.	 As	 with	 its	 alliance	 with	 the	 community	sector	 on	 local	 development	 strategy,	 to	 overcome	 how	 it	 often	 found	 itself	“alone”	 in	 social	 partnership	 on	 social	 policy	 ICTU	 formed	 an	 alliance	 with	campaigning	 poverty	 groups	 to	 force	 the	 pace	 of	 institutional	 reform.	 These	groups	 had	 mostly	 evolved	 from	 Church-based	 charities,	 traditionally,	 as	dramatized	in	James	Plunkett’s	novel,	Strumpet	City,	hostile	to	unions.	But	since	the	 1960s	 liberalisation	 of	 Catholic	 doctrine,	many	 had	 turned	 to	 campaigning	for	system	change	and	“social	justice”,	raising	demands	similar	to	the	ICTU.33			 Ireland’s	 health	 and	 welfare	 systems	 involved	 extensive	 subcontracting	 to	voluntary	 organisations.	 This	 gave	 such	 groups	 significant	 leverage,	 with	 the	NESC	noting	in	1981	how	welfare	provision	had	evolved	in	“pragmatic	piecemeal	reaction	 to	 perceived	needs,	 often	 as	 advocated	 by	 organised	 interest	 groups”.	Welfare	minister	Michael	Woods,	 a	 conservative	 Catholic,	 commented	how	 the	St.	Vincent	de	Paul	Society	had	“changed	enormously”	from	providing	charity	for	poor	 people	 to	 “attempting	 to	 get	 to	 grips	 with	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 poverty”	through	policy	change	and	economic	projects	in	deprived	areas.	Fr.	Seán	Healy,	head	of	the	“Justice	Office”	of	the	Conference	of	Major	Religious	Superiors	(later	CORI),	emerged	as	a	prominent	advocate	of	a	“minimum	income”	as	a	response	to	poverty	given	what	he	saw	as	the	unlikely	return	to	full	employment.34																																																									32		 Ahern,	‘Speech	at	launch	of	the	three	FAS	Regional	Plans	for	Dublin’,	08/06/89,	GIS:	D/Labour	33			 “alone	on	social	policy”,	Interview	O’Donovan;	on	Catholic	social	reform,	Dorr,	D.	1992:	228-317;	Interviews	with	Fr.	Frank	Sammon	and	Bill	Toner	SJ	34		 On	health	system,	Carey	2007;	NESC	1981c	;	‘Saint	Vincent	de	Paul	to	create	1,000	Jobs’,	n.d.	[05/89],	GIS:	D/SW;	on	Healy	and	“minimum	income”,	Larragy	2006:	384	
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	 In	1986	the	coalition	government	had	established	the	Combat	Poverty	Agency	(CPA)	to	 liaise	with	voluntary	groups	and	advise	on	welfare	reform.	CPA	urged	implementation	 of	 the	 Commission	 on	 Social	Welfare’s	 recommendations,	 and	the	introduction	of	a	“basic	minimum	income”	and	a	“national	anti-poverty	plan”.	As	 the	 PNR	 was	 being	 negotiated,	 CPA	 urged	 that	 “the	 plight	 of	 the	 poor”	 be	given	 “equal	 importance”	 to	debt	 reduction	and	 job	creation,	and	 lobbied	 ICTU	for	 “closer	 liaison”	 between	 government	 and	 the	 voluntary	 “sector”	 in	determining	policy.	The	sector	was	supported	by	 the	Left,	with	Workers’	Party	leader	 Proinsias	 de	 Rossa	 championing	 CORI’s	 objectives	 and	 proposing	 a	“rainbow	coalition”	of	 “progressive	 forces”	 to	 transform	welfare	policy.	 Similar	calls	were	made	by	WP-affiliated	union	figures,	notably	Des	Geraghty.35		 ICTU	had	sought	the	inclusion	of	CPA	proposals	on	social	and	budget	policy	in	the	 PNR,	 and	 secured	 a	 commitment	 to	 structured	 policy	 consultation	 with	voluntary	groups.	Its	preference	was	for	a	CPA-led	approach,	given	CPA’s	formal	statutory	status	and	ICTU’s	chequered	history	with	voluntary	organisations,	and	urged	 that	 CPA	be	 given	 a	 central	 role	 “coordinating”	 the	 sector.	 In	November	1988	the	first	“Pre-Budget	Forum	on	Social	Welfare”	under	the	PNR	took	place,	hosted	by	Minister	Woods	and	attended	by	nine	invited	groups	from	Vincent	de	Paul	to	the	INOU.	ICTU,	in	liaison	with	CPA,	then	sought	a	permanent	“advisory	body”,	 under	 CPA	 “auspices”,	 of	 “groups	 concerned	 with	 poverty”	 to	 advise	government	on	reform.	While	the	CRC	supported	this,	Woods	opposed	it,	though	agreed	 to	 post-budget	 “dialogue”	 and	 instituted	 the	 pre-budget	 “forum”	 as	 an	annual	 event.	 In	 what	 a	 dissident	 Labour	 journal	 dubbed	 “a	 Vincent	 de	 Paul	budget”,	 he	 also	 greatly	 expanded	 state	 grants	 to	 voluntary	 groups,	 cementing	what	would	become	a	symbiotic	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	sector.36		 ICTU’s	 relationship	with	 the	 CPA	 developed	 into	 a	 firm	 alliance.	 Before	 the	1989	budget,	it	met	with	CPA	and	“various	groups	and	organisations	concerned																																																									35	 CPA	programme	in	CPA	1987;	“equal	importance”	in	Noreen	Kearney,	CPA,	to	Nevin	ICTU,	09/09/87,	in	ICTU	Archive:	GS-PA-1a,	National	Talks,	1987;	de	Rossa	in	Dáil	…/01/89;	Geraghty	in	ICTU	ADC	1988:	58	36	 PNR	IV	(6);	‘Pre-Budget	Forum	on	Social	Welfare’,	25/11/88,	GIS:	D/SW;	ICTU	seeks	“advisory	body”	in	Cassells	ICTU	to	Ó	hUiginn,	28/02/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	D/SW,	‘Establishment	of	an	Advisory	Body	on	Social	Welfare’,	in	documents	for	14th	CRC	meeting	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	14th	mtg.’,	19/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	O’Sullivan,	CRC,	to	Colm	O’Neill,	D/SW,	24/05/89,	and	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	15th	mtg.’,	18/05/89,	DTA:	S25858-S;	Colm	O’Neill,	D/SW,	to	O’Sullivan,	Sect	to	CRC,	D/Taoiseach,	31/01/89,	DTA:	S25858-O;	‘A	St.	Vincent	de	Paul	Budget!’,	Labour	Comment,	04/02/89;	on	state	funding	of	vol.	organisations,	‘Saint	Vincent	de	Paul	to	create	1,000	Jobs’,	n.d.	[January	1989],	GIS:	D/SW	and	Mangan,	I.,	1993:	79	
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with	 poverty	 and	 low	 pay”	 to	 agree	 a	 joint	 “Anti-Poverty	 Campaign”.	 The	 CPA	coordinated	 the	 sector’s	 input	 and	 ICTU	 brought	 this	 to	 government	 through	social	partnership.	The	ICTU	and	CPA	hosted	a	joint	conference	on	poverty	and	unemployment	 and	 ICTU’s	 own	 budget	 submission	 included	 many	 CPA	proposals	for	tackling	poverty,	including	a	national	anti-poverty	strategy.37		 As	with	 the	new	community	 role	 in	urban	regeneration,	Haughey	welcomed	the	 inclusion	 of	 campaigning	 groups	 in	 social	 policy	 making	 through	 social	partnership.	 While	 this	 was	 the	 start	 of	 this	 new	 sector’s	 role	 in	 the	 system,	reinforcing	 the	 shift	 to	 a	 social	 policy	 compensatory	 focus,	 it	 also	 benefited	government	 by	 providing	 new	 policy	 input	 to	 rectify	 system	 dysfunctions.	 Its	involvement	 initiated	 the	 overhaul	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 that,	 through	 the	 1990	PNR	review	process,	would	form	a	key	element	of	the	follow-on	PESP	agreement.	
		
Social	compensations	and	state	modernisation	 		 		 Besides	 local	 economic	 development	 and	 welfare	 state	 reform,	 other	 PNR	inputs	which	combined	social	compensatory	and	state	developmental	functions	included	 the	 reform	 of	 tax	 enforcement,	 the	 black	 economy	 and	 business	regulation.	 Since	 the	 1979	 tax	 revolt,	 tax	 reform,	 as	 variously	 interpreted,	 had	remained	high	on	the	political	agenda.	Besides	core	PNR	commitments	reducing	taxes	on	workers	and	businesses,	 the	 ICTU	and	NESC	had	stressed	 the	need	 to	achieve	 tax	 “equity”	 by	 extending	 the	 tax	 base	 and	 combating	 evasion	 among	privileged	 groups	 such	 as	 farmers,	 the	 professions	 and	 self-employed,	 and	improving	 regulatory	 compliance	 generally.	 Finance	 had	 disputed	 many	 of	ICTU’s	 demands	 but	 government	 conceded	 legal	 reforms,	 expanded	 Revenue	powers	and	new	instruments	for	compliance	enforcement.38		 The	 full	 extent	 of	 tax	 evasion	 was	 later	 revealed,	 not	 least	 widespread	registering	 by	 citizens	 as	 “non-resident”	 for	 tax	 purposes	 and	 use	 of	 offshore	accounts.	 Government	 surprised	 many	 by	 honouring	 its	 PNR	 commitments,	expanding	 Revenue’s	 powers	 in	 1988	 and	 changing	 regulatory	 controls	 to	improve	 compliance.	 Systemic	 tax	 dysfunction	 led	 to	 MacSharry’s	 1988	 “Tax																																																									37		 ICTU	EC	mtg.	15/02/89,	item	160;	Callan	et	al	(ESRI)	1989;	ICTU	budget	proposals,	ICTU	Spec.	EC	mtg.	30/01/89,	item	1584;	ICTU	1989b	38		 PNR	III	(3)-(5),	(9)-(15)	
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Amnesty”	which	 enabled	 evaders	 avoid	 penalties	 by	 settling	 liabilities,	 netting	£200m.	Farmers	were	for	the	first	time	made	liable	for	PRSI	on	the	same	basis	as	the	self-employed	and	company	law	on	directors’	responsibilities	was	reformed	as	initially	planned	by	the	1980s	coalition.	Establishing	the	new	systems	proved	slow,	but	a	comprehensive	reform	was	begun,	union	leaders	even	defending	the	amnesty	as	“vindicate[ing]	totally”	their	claims	on	the	extent	of	tax	evasion.39		 Partnership	shielded	government	politically	in	implementing	these	unpopular	reforms,	 presented	 as	 ICTU’s	 price	 for	 partnership.	 But	 the	 modernisation	process	 greatly	 benefited	 the	 state	 both	 in	 revenue	 terms	 and	 institutional	credibility.	MacSharry,	announcing	the	measures,	said	the	“scandal	of	tax	default	and	tax	evasion	must	end”:	“There	is	a	growing	feeling	of	confidence	that	a	fairer	and	 more	 effective	 system	 is	 possible”	 and	 “the	 present	 year	 will	 be	 seen	 in	retrospect	 as	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 our	 efforts	 to	 improve	 our	 tax	 system”.	 The	tougher	regulatory	regime	was	of	a	kind	with	cabinet’s	rejection	of	a	secret	retail	model	 for	 the	 IFSC.	 Though	 the	 tax	 system	 would	 later	 be	 further	 tightened,	making	it	an	international	model,	this	was	another	area	where	the	decisive	initial	steps	towards	reform	and	modernisation	were	instigated	under	the	PNR.40		 The	modernising	function	of	the	PNR	was	also	reflected	in	 its	tackling	of	the	endemic	 “black	 economy”.	 When	 the	 CIF	 announced	 its	 withdrawal	 from	 a	monitoring	body	set	up	under	the	PNR	for	its	industry,	government	pressured	it	to	 remain,	 “in	 the	 interests	 of	 the	PNR”,	 by	 threatening	 to	 tighten	 tax	 rules	 on	public	 contracts	 if	 it	 didn’t.	 The	Department	 of	 Labour’s	 inspectorate	was	 also	strengthened	and	particularly	targeted	illegal	practices	in	the	hospitality	sector.	There	was	considerable	resistance	to	this,	“a	major	problem”	being	that	“the	full	co-operation	of	the	employee	is	needed	and	this	is	not	always	forthcoming”.	The	PNR	nevertheless	began	the	rolling	back	of	the	large	illegal	economy.41		 Contrary	 to	a	 common	perception	of	Haughey’s	government	as	 inaugurating	an	 era	 of	 “light-touch	 regulation”	 and	 “corruption”,	 the	 PNR	 in	 fact	 heralded	 a																																																									39	 Reporter	(LGPSU),	June	1989		40	 MacSharry	‘Address	at	launch	of	Institute	of	Taxation’s	1988/89	Summary	Booklet’,	20/10/88,	GIS:	D/Finance;	on	IFSC	taxation	debate,	see	chapter	6	41	 On	CIF	threat	to	withdraw,	Cassells	ICTU	to	Ó	hUiginn,	25/04/89,	and	Ó	hUiginn	to	Tom	Reynolds,	Director	General,	CIF,	27/04/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	on	D/Labour	enforcement,	D/Labour,	‘Note	on	Enforcement	of	Hotels	and	Catering	EROs	and	the	Protection	of	Young	Persons	Employment	Act,	1977’,	attached	by	Bonner,	D/Labour,	to	Teahon,	D/Taoiseach,	08/09/89,	DTA:	S25857-V	
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turn	towards	a	significantly	tightened	regulatory	regime.	Indeed,	as	if	to	dispute	the	 popular	 view,	 ex-Finance	 Minister	 Charlie	 McCreevy,	 in	 an	 injudicious	statement	shortly	before	the	2008	crash,	claimed	that	it	was	only	from	1997	that	Ireland	moved	from	a	high	regulatory	environment	to	a	regime	of	“low	taxation,	light-touch	regulation	and	open	and	flexible	markets”.42		
Irish	model:	a	state-dirigiste	globally	active	mixed-economy			 In	 summary,	 by	 spring	 1989	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 emerging	 “Irish	 economic	model”	were	becoming	apparent.	This	was	shaped	by	a	confluence	of	exogenous	influences,	 opportunities	 and	 constraints	 and	 how	 these	 interacted	 with	 the	policies	of	an	activist	government,	autonomous	economic	development	and	the	constraints,	agendas	and	constituency	pressures	of	social	partnership.		 The	exogenous	opportunities	were	first	and	foremost	the	emergence	of	the	EC	Single	Market,	though	until	mid-1989	this	was	hesitant	and	disputed,	with	the	EC	Council	 prevaricating	 on	 fully	 committing	 to	 it.	 The	 contested	 Delors	 Plan	nevertheless	 calmed	 markets,	 halted	 inflation	 and	 stabilised	 interest	 rates,	providing	an	ideal	environment	for	an	active	interventionist	Irish	government.		 The	 Haughey	 government	 early	 identified	 the	 opportunity	 the	 European	development	 presented,	 not	 only	 the	 potential	 through	 EC	 “convergence”	strategy	 for	 infrastructure	 modernisation,	 but	 also	 by	 exploiting	 the	 putative	single	market	not	primarily	for	exports	of	goods	and	services	–	though	also	that	-	but	as	a	lever	to	position	Ireland	as	the	prime	entry	point	for	global	capital	into	it.	It	thus	pursued	a	dual	strategy	of	EC	investment	and	pre-emptively	opening	to	capital	movement,	aligning	closely	with	the	pro-integrationist	powers	at	EC	level.		 The	 PNR	had	 assumed	 the	 primary	 driver	 of	 an	 industrial	 and	 employment	recovery	 would	 lie	 in	 selected	 large-scale	 indigenous	 industries	 supported	 to	attain	international	competitiveness.	The	travails	of	the	beef	industry	has	tended	to	obscure	successes	achieved	by	1989	in	other	areas	of	this	strategy,	in	tourism,	forestry	and	timber,	the	arts,	dairy	foods,	marine,	horticulture	and	construction.	Successful	 internationally	 trading	 indigenous	 companies	 emerged	 for	 the	 first	time,	though	growing	more	by	exploiting	the	opportunity	of	capital	opening,	with																																																									42	 “common	view”,	e.g.	Fintan	O'Toole,	‘The	corruption	of	Irish	banking	goes	back	30	years’,	The	Irish	Times,	24/10/2017;	McCreavy	in	‘Foreword’	to	Power	2009:	xviii	
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their	 employment	 impact	 “disappointing”.	 The	 initially	 secondary,	 quality-driving	 role	 envisaged	 for	 FDI	 –	 of	 which	 Haughey’s	 close	 circle	 remained	sceptical	 –	 was	 soon	 seen	 to	 have	 been	 “misplaced”	 as	 FDI	 “surged”	 past	domestic	 industry	 in	 growth	 and	 employment.	 Policy	 switched	 to	 exploit	 this,	targeting	 specific	 FDI	 sectors.	 At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 small-scale	ventures,	initially	not	prioritised	in	national	strategy,	also	proved	a	“surprising”	success	 sector,	 and	 by	 early	 1989	 policy	 also	 began	 to	 change	 to	 support	 this.	The	 third	 success	 were	 the	 semi-states	 which,	 freed	 to	 expand	 commercially,	enjoyed	rapid	business,	though	also	not	employment,	expansion.		 Social	partnership	provided	both	a	stable	economic	environment	attractive	to	investors	 in	 both	 its	 medium-term	 planning	 and	 intangible	 capital	 inputs,	establishing	 historically	 unprecedented	 wage	 certainty	 and	 social	 peace,	 and	boosting	 labour	 quality	 through	 a	 host	 of	 state-subsidised	 social,	 educational,	labour	market	access,	regeneration	and	production	modernisation	programmes.		 The	new	economy	being	generated	through	the	confluence	of	opening	global	opportunities	and	state	activism	was	a	mixed-economy	model,	characterised	by	an	activist	state	sector	and	a	level	of	state	interventionist	dirigisme	of	the	private	sector	which	an	I&C	official	described	as	hardly	short	of	socialist	planning.	The	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	November	1989	and	further	global	opening	arising	from	it	would	drive	a	final	economic	strategy	change	in	1990,	examined	in	chapter	11.		 But	 the	 combination	 of	 late-industrialisation	 restructuring,	 demographic	labour-force	pressures	and	globalising	expansion	meant	 that	 as	 the	 jobs	of	 the	future	 began	 to	 emerge	 through	 new-job	 development	 in	 often	 entirely	 new	sectors,	closures,	under-	and	unemployment,	obsolescent	skills	and	socially	and	geographically	 concentrated	 long-term	 unemployment	 presented	 a	 growing	challenge.	 Social	 partnership	 responded	 with	 social-compensatory	 strategies.	Rather	than	passive	amelioration,	the	unemployment	crisis,	which	was	accepted	would	 last	 several	 years,	was	 used	 to	 initiate	 innovative	 programmes	 in	 areas	such	 as	 welfare	 expansion	 and	 institutional	 reform,	 local	 development,	 urban	regeneration,	 community	 enterprise,	 educational	 access	 and	 training.	 A	transformation	 of	 the	 Irish	 welfare	 state	 towards	 an	 enabling	 labour	 and	enterprise-activating	development	model	was	thus	already	begun	by	1988.		
	 257	
	
	
	
	
Part	4:	
	
Consolidation,	1989-92	
	
	 	
	 258	
Chapter	10	
Institutionalising	Social	Partnership,	1989-91	
	
Haughey’s	commitment	to	partnership	as	a	“permanent	system”		 During	 the	 first	 18	 months	 of	 the	 PNR,	 as	 analysed	 in	 Part	 3,	 its	 principal	stakeholders	–	Haughey’s	Way	Forward	circle	and	the	CII/ICTU	pro-partnership	leaders	 –	 saw	 themselves	 as	 initiating	 a	 radical	 transformation.	 Programme	delivery	had	been	managed	while	minimising	conflict	through	the	CRC	or	direct	political	 exchange.	 Major	 divisions	 had	 been	 avoided	 as	 system	 consolidation	was	 prioritised.	 Less	 committed	 stakeholders	 -	 employers,	 farmers	 and	 some	union	leaders	-	had	acted	more	in	interest-defence	than	policy-innovation	mode.			 The	second	18	months,	from	the	formation	of	the	Fianna	Fáil/PD	coalition	in	July	 1989	 to	 the	 signing	 in	 February	 1991	 of	 the	 successor	 Programme	 for	
Economic	and	Social	Progress	 (PESP),	 is	 the	subject	of	Part	4.	 It	was	a	period	of	high	 drama	 and	 union	mobilisation,	 involving	 no	 fewer	 that	 two	 ICTU	 annual	conferences	and	three	national	“special	delegate	conferences”.	The	political	and	institutional	dynamics	driving	programme	delivery	 remained	similar	 to	before,	but	a	union	revolt	in	1990	threatening	to	end	the	system	had	first	to	be	carefully	managed	 through	 a	 programme	 “review”,	 ultimately	 requiring	 significant	adjustments	to	the	PNR.	This	was	followed	by	a	conflict	over	the	future	of	semi-state	 industries	 which	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 derail	 the	 agreement.	 How	 these	crises	were	resolved,	and	their	consequences,	demonstrated	that	the	priority	of	the	principle	stakeholders	was	to	maintain	and	consolidate	social	partnership.			 During	 the	1989	election,	Fianna	Fáil	was	heavily	criticised	 for	 its	 “austerity	policies”,	particularly	in	health.	Labour	and	the	PDs	also	made	a	“golden	circle”	of	businessmen	 allegedly	 corruptly	 benefiting	 from	 public	 policy	 through	 close	association	 with	 Haughey	 a	 central	 election	 issue.	 This	 began	 with	 Barry	Desmond’s	 assault	 on	 fraud	 in	 the	beef	 industry,	 though	 this	 related	mostly	 to	events	 in	 the	Goodman	Group	 that	had	begun	under	 the	previous	government.	
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The	 favouritism	 shown	 particular	 companies,	 including	 Goodman,	 was	 also	notably	a	key	NESC/PNR	strategy,	though	now	attacked	as	“crony	capitalism”.1			 The	 Fianna	 Fáil	manifesto	 committed	 to	 continuing	 the	 PNR	 and	 upholding	the	 NESC/CRC	 system,	 adding	 new	 policies,	 such	 as	 on	 tackling	 long-term	unemployment,	 from	 proposals	 that	 had	 emerged	 from	 the	 CRC.	 It	 advocated	also	following	the	PNR	with	a	successor	agreement	and	for	the	system	to	become	“a	permanent	way	of	managing	our	affairs”.	Labour	proposed	an	alternative	 ill-defined	“statutory”	system	of	“consultative,	flexible	and	de-centralised”	planning,	Fine	Gael	“a	concerted	development	programme	for	1992”,	with	“arrangements	…	to	involve	the	major	political	parties	and	social	partners”.	These	would	consist	of	 a	 “Select	 Committee”	 of	 politicians	 joined	 by	 NESC	 partners	 in	 a	 “National	Forum	for	1992”,	while	pay	would	be	negotiated	separately	“in	accordance	with	existing	 procedures”.	 Decisions	 on	 policy	 would	 be	 solely	 a	 matter	 for	government.	 Any	 of	 these	 opposition	 party	 proposals,	 if	 implemented,	 would	have	collapsed	the	social	partnership	system	created	in	1987.2		 Fianna	Fáil	returned	with	77	seats,	down	4,	Fine	Gael	55,	up	4,	Labour	15,	up	3,	the	Workers’	Party	9,	up	6,	and	the	PDs	just	6,	down	8.	With	this	outcome,	Fine	Gael,	whose	pre-election	coalition	pact	with	 the	PDs	 lacked	sufficient	numbers,	nevertheless	 declined	 to	 renew	 its	 “Tallaght	 Strategy”	 and	 Labour	 declared	against	coalition	or	supporting	a	minority	government.	The	Dáil	re-convened	on	29	 June	 and	 with	 the	 PDs	 fearing	 extinction	 in	 a	 re-run	 election,	 a	 FF-PD	coalition,	clearly	the	only	option,	was	formed	after	two	weeks’	negotiation,	with	Haughey	again	Taoiseach.	Its	Programme	combined	the	two	parties’	manifestos,	with	Haughey	making	a	continuation	of	social	partnership,	regardless	of	the	PDs’	declared	hostility	 to	 it,	 his	 only	non-negotiable	 condition.	The	 first	 page	of	 the	PfG	 committed	 to	 “fully	 honour”	 the	 PNR,	 secure	 a	 successor	 agreement	 and	“build	social	consensus	into	a	permanent	way	of	managing	our	affairs”.	This	was	further	evidence	of	Haughey’s	overriding	commitment	to	social	partnership	as	a	permanent	institution	framing	socio-economic	strategy	and	policy-making.3		
																																																										1		 Ryle	Dwyer	1992:	135-6;	Desmond	2000;	PD	position,	O’Malley,	D.	2014:	178-80			2		 Fianna	Fáil	1989b;	Labour	1989;	Fine	Gael	1989			3		 Programme	for	Government,	PD	1989;	PD	choices,	O’Malley,	D.	2014:	181-4	
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	 But	 social	 partnership	was	 far	 from	 achieving	 institutional	 equilibrium.	 The	week	the	PfG	was	being	negotiated,	ICTU,	meeting	at	its	annual	conference,	was	a	house	divided.	With	the	prospect	of	a	“right-wing”	FF-PD	government,	anti-PNR	unions	exploited	ICTU	vulnerability	to	mobilise	sentiment	to	end	the	PNR.			
ICTU	and	programme	delivery:	the	leveraging	of	discontent	
		 Pro-partnership	union	leaders	were	as	determined	as	Haughey	to	see	through	the	PNR	and	establish	partnership	as	a	permanent	system.	Given	the	“right	wing”	majority	 in	 the	Dáil	 and	 the	weakness	of	 the	political	Left,	 despite	 its	 electoral	advances,	they	argued,	the	PNR	was	the	only	means	to	advance	the	tax,	welfare,	industrial	 and	 social	 policies	 and	 protection	 of	 state	 industries	 the	movement	sought.	But	they	also	proposed	an	underpinning	of	partnership	through	a	radical	restructuring	 of	 unions,	 with	 amalgamation	 into	 fewer	 larger	 organisations,	 a	strengthened	Congress	as	its	“general	staff”,	biennial	policy	conferences	in	place	of	the	usual	annual	conference	set-pieces	and	re-basing	union	power	on	workers’	participation,	 at	 national	 level	 through	 the	 NESC	 and	 CRC,	 and	 in	 companies,	forming	a	new	unionism	to	replace	“out-dated”	confrontational	representation.4		 These	 reform	 proposals	 reflected	 the	 ICTU’s	 1975	 Schregle	 report	 and	reforms	proposed	by	political	economists	such	as	Hardiman	as	prerequisites	for	effective	corporatism.	Outside	the	arena	of	Congress,	preparations	for	what	ICTU	called	a	“wave	of	amalgamations”	were	already	well	advanced,	especially	among	pro-partnership	unions.	Conference	nodded	through	the	reform	plan	with	 little	debate	 but,	 reflecting	 wariness	 at	 enhancing	 Congress’s	 powers,	 also	 adopted	motions	 contrary	 to	 its	 spirit,	 defending	 the	 autonomy	 of	 trades	 councils,	rejecting	enhanced	positive	action	to	increase	women’s	under-representation	in	union	structures,	and	deferring	the	proposed	move	to	biennial	conferences.5			 But	it	was	rancour	over	the	PNR	that	most	starkly	divided	opinion.	The	line-up	 was	 the	 traditional	 2:1	 divide	 over	 confrontation	 versus	 cooperation,	 free	bargaining	or	“class	collaboration”,	with	largely	the	same	unions	on	either	side.	Specific	issues,	usually	of	a	divisive	political	nature	such	as	the	wages	stand-still																																																											4		 “right-wing	majority”,	ICTU	1989d	and	ICTU	ADC	1989:	45;	re-organisation	plan,	ICTU	1989e			5		 Schregle	1975;	Hardiman	1988;	“wave	of	amalgamations”,	ICTU	AR	1991:	2;	amalgamation	plans,	Devine	2009;	Maguire	1998,	2010,	2017;	motions,	ICTU	ADC	1989;	ICTU	1987b	
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order	of	1941	or	 the	 ITGWU	changing	sides	on	 the	1976	NWA,	had	always	 the	potential	to	reverse	the	2:1	divide,	changing	the	majority	preference.			 Having	failed	to	prevent	the	PNR,	in	1989	anti-agreement	unions	and	the	Left	mobilised	discontent	over	various	issues	to	achieve	a	critical	mass	to	overturn	it.	These	 ranged	 from	 PNR	 constraints	 on	 pay	 bargaining	 in	 strong	 sectors	 to	 its	poor	 jobs	 performance	 and	 industrial	 relations	 and	 apprenticeship	 reforms.	Several	 straight	 anti-PNR	 motions	 were	 easily	 defeated,	 but	 the	 British-based	journalists’	 union,	 a	 rather	 privileged	 group,	 following	 a	 similar	 but	 failed	“premature”	attempt	by	it	the	previous	year,	proposed	a	tactically	astute	motion.	With	 the	PDs	now	 in	power,	 it	 argued,	 a	 “Special	Conference”	 (SDC)	within	 six	months	 should	 be	 held	 to	 “consider	 withdrawal”	 from	 the	 PNR	 should	 its	commitments	not	be	honoured.	This	struck	a	chord	with	many	delegates,	being	adopted	by	139:125	against	 the	pleas	of	 ICTU	 leaders	 that	 such	a	move	would	represent	a	breach	of	trust	and	exclude	unions	from	future	political	influence.6			 Dáil	 opposition	 parties	 fanned	 the	 flames	 of	 union	 discontent,	 Spring	 and	Rabbitte	 taunting	 Haughey	 that	 the	 vote	 on	 withdrawal	 demonstrated	 the	“obvious	 failure”	of	 the	PNR	and	gave	 the	 lie	 to	 “this	consensus	…	he	 is	 talking	about”.	 Just	as	Haughey	was	negotiating	a	 coalition	programme,	 the	Left	 in	 the	Dáil	 not	 only	 sought	 to	 undermine	 social	 partnership	 –	 in	 any	other	 country	 a	left-wing	cause	–	but	also	Congress’s	strategy	and	credibility	with	 its	members.	But	 ignoring	 this	betrayal	by	 the	political	Left,	 ICTU	congratulated	Haughey	on	becoming	Taoiseach	and	sought	an	urgent	meeting	with	him	to	ensure	the	CRC	was	“retained	and	used	to	best	advantage”.	A	joint	government-ICTU	statement	followed	the	meeting,	re-affirming	the	PNR	and	its	NESC/CRC	governing	system.7			 But	 leveraging	 its	 internal	 dissenters,	 ICTU	 turned	 its	 conference	 defeat	 to	advantage	by	using	the	looming	special	conference,	scheduled	for	early	1990,	to	accelerate	 programme	 delivery.	 Whenever	 government	 took	 steps	 it	 opposed,	such	as	 assisting	Ryanair	 at	 the	 expense	of	Aer	Lingus	without	 consulting	 it,	 it	warned	that	it	“will	shortly	be	reviewing	its	participation	in	the	Programme”	and	“these	decisions	and	the	manner	in	which	Congress	was	treated”	did	“not	auger																																																											6		 ICTU	ADC	1989:	50-55;	“premature”,	Dooley	2019:	168			7		 Spring/Rabbitte	in	Dáil	10/07/89;	Cassells	to	Taoiseach,	13/07/89,	DTA:	S25281-E;	‘Joint	Government-ICTU	Statement’,	25.07.89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach,	
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well	for	a	favourable	outcome	to	that	review”.	In	the	run-up	to	the	SDC,	it	became	ever	 more	 aggressive	 on	 the	 CRC,	 complaining	 of	 government	 failures	 on	 job	creation	 and	 obstruction	 by	 Finance	 and	 other	 departments.	 One	 civil	 servant,	bewailing	 ICTU’s	 truculence,	noted	how	when	 the	CRC	 Job	Group’s	Report	was	being	compiled,	ICTU,	“apart	from	suggesting	an	expanded	role	for	State	bodies”,	had	disengaged	and	“played	only	a	minimal	part	in	framing	the	proposals”.8			 But	Haughey’s	reputation	depended	on	the	PNR,	and	ministers	accelerated	its	delivery	 to	 re-assure	 ICTU.	 In	 autumn	 1989	Ahern	 finally	 launched	 the	Health	and	 Safety	Authority,	 announced	 a	 schedule	 of	 labour	 law	 reform	 and	 assured	ICTU	of	a	union-friendly	agenda	under	the	Irish	EC	Presidency,	an	EC	programme	on	long-term	unemployment	based	on	the	CRC’s	proposals	and	Irish	support	for	the	EC	“Social	Charter”.	But	Finance’s	opposition	to	many	CRC	proposals	which,	it	said,	“in	the	spirit	of	consensus”	it	had	“refrained	from	indicating	up	to	now”,	was	nonetheless	real.	In	an	intervention	perhaps	reflecting	a	more	bullish	attitude	at	Finance	under	Albert	Reynolds,	its	secretary,	Seán	Cromien,	upbraided	Ó	hUiginn	for	not	opposing	CRC	proposals,	especially	on	expanding	the	SES,	as	a	threat	to	budget	 discipline,	 to	which	 “the	 response	 of	 the	markets	 [would	 be]	 swift	 and	severe”.	 The	 key	 to	 jobs	 growth,	 he	 opined,	 was	 lower	 taxes	 which	 “in	 turn	requires	the	greatest	discipline	in	public	expenditure”.9		 Congress	 took	 the	 offensive,	 telling	 Haughey	 that	 a	 PNR	 “mid-term	 review”	and	 “Progress	 Report”	 were	 essential	 to	 head	 off	 opposition	 at	 their	 special	conference.	Haughey	willingly	conceded	this,	again	stressing	his	desire	also	for	a	successor	programme.10	ICTU	used	the	promised	“review”	to	leverage	additional	measures	 on	 unemployment,	 tax	 and	 social	 equity.	 Cassells	 told	 government																																																										8		 “shortly	be	reviewing”,	Cassells	to	Ó	hUiginn,	21/09/89,	DTA:	S25857-W;	‘Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation.	Draft	Report	to	CRC.	Sept,	1989’,	DTA:	S25857;	ICTU	input,	CRC,	h/w	notes	of	19th	mtg.,	19/10/89,	and	“minimal	part”,	D/Taoiseach,	internal,	O’Sullivan,	E&S	Pol	Div.,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	‘Re:	Report	of	Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’,	18/10/89,	DTA:	S25857-X		9		 On	Ahern’s	initiatives,	‘Minister	announces	package	of	measures	for	employment	creation	and	help	to	the	disadvantaged’,	27/09/89,	GIS:	D/Labour;	W;	‘Ahern	launches	Programme	of	Events	of	the	Institute	for	Personnel	Management’,	29/09/89,	GIS:	D/Labour;	Ahern,	‘	Speech	at	launch	of	National	Authority	for	Occupational	Safety	and	Health’,	02/10/89,	GIS:	D/Labour;	‘Long	term	unemployed	to	be	priority	for	the	Irish	Presidency’,	20/10/89,	GIS:	D/Labour;	INOU	Bulletin,	Nov	89;	ICTU	EC	mtg.	20/12/89,	item	1803;	ICTU	AR	1990:	66;	Ahern,	‘Speech	at	Seminar	‘United	States	of	Europe’,	22/09/89,	GIS:	D/Labour;	“refrained	from	indicating”,	D/Taois.,	O’Sullivan	to	Ó	hUiginn,	‘Re:	Report	of	Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’,	18/10/89,	DTA:	S25857-X;	Cromien	to		hUiginn,	28/11/89,	DTA:	S25857-Y	10		 ICTU	EC	mtg.	15/11/89,	item	1776.	ICTU	Archive,	EC	minutes;	Haughey	to	Cassells,	01/11/89,	DTA:	S25862-D;	D/Taoiseach,	O’Sullivan	to	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn],	08/11/89:	‘Re:	Meeting	with	Representatives	of	the	Executive	Council	of	ICTU	on	8	Nov.,	1989’;	Haughey,	Dáil,	24/10/89	
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officials	that	Congress	“acknowledged	the	success	of	the	Programme	in	meeting	the	 targets	 agreed”	 but	 it	 was	 essential	 to	 be	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 it	 was	succeeding.	He	discouraged	talk	of	a	successor	programme	“at	this	stage”,	saying	the	 “review”	 must	 include	 new	 measures	 to	 ensure	 “soaring	 profits”	 were	“translated”	 into	 jobs,	 profit-sharing	 and	 further	 tax	 reform.	 Government	conceded	there	was	scope	to	examine	“what	improvements	could	be	made”.11		 Before	meeting	Haughey,	 ICTU	 issued	a	widely	reported	30-point	document,	
Sharing	 the	Benefits,	 seeking	 new	measures.	 “Tax	 reform	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	poverty	must	be	moved	to	 the	top	of	 the	agenda”,	 it	said,	and	budget	decisions	would	determine	the	outcome	of	its	conference.	Reflecting	internal	pressures	on	local	pay,	it	criticised	employer	“inflexibility”.	While	not	seeking	a	restoration	of	local	bargaining,	it	suggested	amending	legislation	on	profit	sharing	so	“workers	could	share	in	the	‘enormous	profits’	being	made	by	some	companies”.12			 Allaying	fears	that	ICTU	was	losing	its	authority,	Ó	hUiginn	advised	Haughey	that	 “what	 is	 in	 question	 is	 a	 review	 of	 progress,	 not	 a	 re-negotiation”,	 but	government	should	concede	 “new	actions	or	measures	consistent	with	existing	targets	 and	 commitments”.	 Haughey	 agreed	 and	 Finance	 conceded	 it	 was	 “of	course	a	matter	for	Government	to	decide”.	Finance	was	an	equal	opportunities	enforcer,	having	also	warned	against	projects	proposed	by	other	partners,	such	as	CII’s	 international	education	proposal.	Ó	hUiginn	reminded	Haughey	that	“as	positive	 as	 possible”	 a	 Progress	 Report	 would	 “be	 a	 key	 element	 in	 the	 ICTU	conference	 on	 withdrawal”	 where	 leaders	 would	 “want	 to	 be	 able	 …	 to	demonstrate	more	progress	on	jobs	and	on	the	tax/wage	relationship”.	Haughey	assured	ICTU	of	his	commitments	on	this,	and	agreed	to	press	state	companies	to	accelerate	expansion	plans,	expand	SES	and	training	programmes,	discuss	his	tax	and	 other	 plans	 with	 ICTU	 before	 the	 budget,	 and	 not	 publish	 the	 “Progress	Report”	until	just	after	the	budget	and	before	Congress’s	SDC13																																																									11		 ‘CRC.	Report	of	Bilateral	Meeting	with	Representatives	of	the	ICTU	on	8	Nov.	1989’,	“for	circulation	
official	side	only”,	DTA:	S25862-D;	‘ICTU	raps	failure	to	create	jobs’,	Cork	Examiner,	09/11/89	12		 Sharing,	ICTU	1989f	;	“workers	could	sgare”,	II,	24/11/89;	Also	IT	and	Daily	Star,	24/11/89,	ICTU	‘A	New	Phase	for	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery’,	Press	Release	23/11/89,	ICTU	Archive,	PN-1	13		 Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn]	to	Taoiseach.	‘Subject:	Meeting	with	ICTU’,	23/11/89,	D/Finance	‘Note	on	Assessment	and	Costing	of	Various	“Employment”	Proposals	Submitted	to	the	CRC	Sub-Group’,	21/12/89,	(Internal)	O’Sullivan	to	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn],	‘Agenda	Item	5:	Report	of	the	Working	Group	on	Ireland	as	an	Education	Centre’,	20/12/89,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	Connellan,	CII,	to	Teahon,	‘CRC	Job	Creation	Committee’,	15/01/90,	and	CII,	‘Proposal	to	Create	Additional	Third	Level	Places	in	Private	Educational	Institutions’,	DTA:	S25857-Z1;	“reminded	Haughey”,	Secretary	to	Taoiseach.	‘Subject:	
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	 ICTU	and	CII	proposals	were	now	progressed,	Ó	hUiginn	telling	Cromien	that	government	 was	 “obliged	 to	 consider	 them”.	 Employer	 leader	 John	 Dunne,	emboldened	 by	 Finance’s	 stance	 to	 initially	 also	 oppose	 the	 SES	 proposal,	relented,	agreeing	to	endorse	it	once	“the	private	sector	[was]	not	picking	up	the	tab”.	 Government	 moved	 to	 resolve	 other	 issues.	 An	 inter-departmental	committee	proposed	that	employers	be	pressed	to	meet	ICTU	“concerns”	on	local	pay	 “flexibilities”	 by	 expanding	 profit	 sharing	 schemes,	 that	 the	 budget	 amend	regulations	for	such	schemes	“in	the	context	of	bridge-building	between	the	PNR	and	a	further	Programme”,	and	that	Government	“facilitate”	the	introduction	of	the	39-hour	week	in	the	public	service.	The	working	hours	agreement,	which,	as	has	 been	 seen,	 had	 stalled	 in	 1988,	was	now	 implemented,	 re-framed	 as	 a	 39-hour	week,	with	even	the	private	sector	also	agreeing	to	proceed	on	it.14		 In	 January	 1990	 a	 wave	 of	 initiatives	 followed	 in	 industrial	 policy,	 tax	 and	welfare,	 profit	 sharing,	 education,	 unemployment,	 joint	 ventures	 by	 state	companies,	 and	 construction	 and	 forestry	 contracts.	 The	 “black	 economy”	monitoring	group	was	put	on	a	permanent	basis,	employers	agreed	to	consult	on	“anomalies	 in	 private	 sector	 pay”,	 pension	 and	 health	 service	 reforms	 were	initiated,	and	talks	began	on	parent-teacher	ratios,	worker	participation	and	the	rights	of	disabled	people.	Haughey	 confirmed	 “Ireland’s	 full	 support	 [at	 the	EC	summit]	to	the	adoption	of	the	[Social]	Charter”,	conceded	a	CRC	request	for	NDP	monitoring	committees	to	elect	their	own	chairs	in	place	of	Finance	appointees,	and	 agreed	 with	 Delors	 a	 special	 scheme	 for	 Irish	 semi-states	 to	 provide	technical	assistance	to	emerging	East	European	economies.	The	Commission	on	the	Status	of	Women	was	announced,	a	“framework”	for	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill	 published	 and	 the	 public	 service	 reduction	 programme	 ended,	 Haughey	telling	 the	 Dáil	 it	 had	 been	 “a	 necessary	 reform	which	 is	 now	 over”.	 The	 CRC	received	a	stream	of	updates	on	government	action	on	Congress’s	“30	points”.15		
																																																																																																																																																														Meeting	with	ICTU’,	23/11/89,	and	“Haughey	assured”,	Report	of	Meeting	of	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance,	I&C	and	Labour	with	Representatives	of	Executive	Council	of	ICTU’,	24/11/89,	DTA:	S25857-Y	14		 “obliged	to	consider”	and	“picking	up	the	tab”,	Ó	hUiginn	to	Cromien,	Sec	D/Finance,	28/11/89,	and	h/w	notes	of	‘CRC	on	16/11/89’,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	“Government	moved”,	‘Conclusions	of	Inter-Departmental	Committee	Meeting	on	8	December	1989	in	relation	to	Point	12	in	ICTU’s	30	Point	Plan’,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	ICTU	AR	1990:	51;	‘PNR.	CRC.	Progress	Report.	Preliminary	Draft’,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	h/w	note	Jim	O’Brien,	FIE,	‘Observations	[on	draft	CRC	Progress	Report]’,	n.d.,	DTA:	S25862-F	15		 Patricia	O’Donovan,	ICTU,	‘Responses	from	Government	Departments	to	Proposals	in	the	ICTU	Document	‘Sharing	the	Benefits’’,	05/01/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	h/w	notes	of	Inter-Departmental	mtg.	of	
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	 At	 ICTU’s	 “confidential”	 pre-budget	meetings	with	 the	Ministers	 for	 Finance	and	Social	Welfare,	Cassells	told	Dr.	Michael	Woods	that	ICTU	demands	“should	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	forthcoming	Special	Delegate	Conference	to	review	continued	 participation	 in	 the	 Programme”,	 with	 the	 budget	 “an	 input	 to	 that	review”.	Woods	assured	him	ICTU	positions	“were	regarded	as	‘core’	views”	and	that	he	would	implement	all	Commission	on	Social	Welfare	recommendations	he	could.	Just	before	the	budget,	ICTU	again	met	the	cabinet	leaders,	stressing	“the	link	 between	 the	 Budget	 and	 continuation	 of	 the	 Programme”.	 Reynolds,	expressing	the	government’s	desire	to	complete	the	PNR	and	agree	a	successor	programme,	said	it	was	essential	that	“success	not	[be]	thrown	away”.16			 The	 extraordinary	 pace	 of	 government	 action	 in	 response	 to	 ICTU	 pressure	just	before	its	special	conference	shows	the	determination	of	both	union	leaders	and	 the	Haughey	 government	 for	 the	 PNR	 to	 succeed.	 After	 the	 budget,	which	satisfied	 Congress	 with	 further	 improvements	 in	 tax,	 welfare	 and	 other	 areas	while	 remaining	within	monetary	 targets,	 a	 succinct	 PNR	Progress	Report	 was	signed	off	by	the	CRC	a	day	before	the	ICTU	conference.	Listing	progress	on	all	commitments,	notably	40,000	new	jobs	created	in	PNR	target	industries	in	1987-88	following	years	of	contraction,	it	 judged	the	PNR	to	be	achieving	and,	on	tax	and	job	creation,	“overachieving”	its	aims,	and	extolled	the	CRC	as	a	“mechanism	unique	in	the	European	Community”	enabling	“the	social	partners	to	have	an	on-going	 input	 into	 Government	 decision-making	 on	 economic	 and	 social	 policy”.	ICTU	 also	 published	 a	 separate,	 more	 critical	 review	 of	 its	 own,	 outlining	 the	PNR’s	“Strategy”	but	also	its	“Shortcomings”,	and	circulating	both	its	own	and	the	CRC	reports	to	its	conference’s	delegates.17																																																																																																																																																															04/12/1989,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	ICTU	EC	mtg.	17/01/90;	Haughey	to	ICTU,	‘Social	Charter’,	n.d.	(January	1990),	in	ICTU	AR	1990:	66;	on	Delors	initiative,	Haughey,	‘Statement’,	04/12/89	[meeting	with	semi-state	companies],	in	GIS:	Dept/Taoiseach,		and	on	SCSW,	Dáil	07/11/89;Ahern,	‘Industrial	Relations:	Framework	for	the	future	Industrial	Relations	Bill	1989	published’,	07/12/89,	GIS:	D/Labour;	D/Finance,	‘Point	4	of	ICTU	document	–	Public	Service’	[Nov.	89],	DTA:	S25857-Y;	Haughey	in	Dáil,	15/12/89;	departmental	responses	to	Sharing	the	Benefits	in	DTA:	S25857-Y;	‘Industrial	Performance’,	ICTU	AR:	59-61;	D/I&C	to	O’Sullivan,	13/12/89,	‘Review	of	industrial	performance’,	DTA:	S25857-Y	16		 ‘CRC.	Summary	Report	of	22nd	Meeting,	16	January	1990’,	DTA:	S25857-Z1;	‘Confidential.	Meeting	between	Min/Social	Welfare	and	ICTU,	18	January	1990’,	DTA:	S25862-F;	Cassells,	‘Briefing	Note	for	Meeting	with	Government	-	23	January	1990’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	‘’Briefing	Material	for	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance,	I&C	and	Labour	with	representatives	of	the	Exec.	Council	ICTU’,	23/01/90,	‘Position	in	Relation	to	ICTU	30	Point	Plan’	and	‘Report	of	Meeting	of	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance,	I&C	and	Labour	with	representatives	of	ICTU,	23	January	1990’,	23/01/90,	and	h/w	report,	‘ICTU-Government.	meeting’,	23/01/90,	DTA:	S25862-F		17	 CRC,	PNR.	Progress	Report	of	the	CRC,	Feb.	1990;	ICTU	1990b;	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	to	Kieron	O’Carroll,	Govt.	Supplies	Agency,	21/01/90,	and	h/w	note,	no	title,	n.d.,	circulation	list,	DTA:	S25862-F	
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Who’s	“Left”?	ICTU	and	its	rebels		 The	 union	 divide	 over	 partnership	 was	 reflected	 on	 the	 ICTU	 Executive	 in	conflicts	over	how	to	approach	the	special	ICTU	conference	of	8	February	1990.	Pro-partnership	 leaders	employed	every	means	 to	save	 the	agreement.	To	pre-empt	 an	 anti-PNR	 opposition	 “withdrawal”	 motion,	 the	 Executive’s	 “General	Purposes	Committee”	(GPC)	proposed	that	the	Executive	present	a	motion	of	its	own	 that	 ICTU	 remain	 in	 the	 PNR	 but	 under	 instruction	 to	 “ensure	 that	commitments	…	are	fully	implemented	by	the	end	of	the	year”	and	authorised	to	take	appropriate	action	should	 this	not	 succeed.	The	stark	divisions	within	 the	ICTU	 Executive	 were	 reflected	 in	 a	 full	 seven	 of	 its	 27	 members	 absenting	themselves	 from	the	meeting	debating	 this	proposal	and	 in	 the	bitter	divisions	among	 those	 present.	 Of	 the	 20	 who	 attended,	 just	 11	 –	 a	 majority	 of	 those	present	but	a	minority	of	the	full	Executive	-	backed	the	GPC	proposal.18			 Having	 barely	 secured	 this	 mandate	 to	 even	 put	 a	 motion	 to	 conference,	 a	further	crisis	arose	when	it	emerged	that	major	anti-PNR	unions	were	planning	to	 attend	 the	 conference	 with	 delegations	 representing	 their	 full	 North/South	memberships	to	definitely	tip	the	balance	against	the	PNR.	Few	southern	unions	apart	 from	 the	 ITGWU	 and	 INTO	 had	 northern	memberships,	 and	 those	 were	quite	 small,	 but	 eleven	 mostly	 British-based	 and	 craft	 unions,	 including	 the	largest	 anti-PNR	 ones,	 had	 substantial	 northern	memberships.	While	 Congress	rules	did	not	preclude	Northern	delegates	attending,	the	GPC	argued,	this	would	breach	 ICTU	 traditions	 of	 non-involvement	 in	 matters	 relating	 purely	 to	 one	jurisdiction,	 and	 threaten	 to	 split	 the	 movement	 “at	 the	 border”.	 Following	heated	 debate	 on	 the	 Executive	 and	 attempted	 tactical	 amendments,	 a	 GPC	motion	 that	 unions	 be	 “requested”	 to	 send	 delegations	 representing	 their	Republic-based	members	only	was	passed	by	13	to	4,	again	a	majority,	but,	with	many	 absentees	 and	 abstentions,	 a	 minority	 of	 the	 Executive.	 The	 GPC	 had	argued	that	its	position	was	in	the	interests	of	the	“common	good”	of	preserving	the	“national”	unity	of	the	movement,	but	it	also	threatened	that	“in	the	event	of	any	 Union	 not	 agreeing	 to	 this	 request”	 the	 Executive	 should	 consider	postponing	the	SDC	altogether.	That	a	“majority”,	however	tight,	was	secured	for																																																									18		 ICTU	Special	EC	mtg.	01/02/90,	item	1830.	ICTU	Archive:	EC	minutes	
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this	 GPC	 proposition	 was	 due	 to	 several	 key	 Northern	 leaders	 who,	 while	strongly	opposing	the	PNR,	shared	the	CPI	perspective	that	prioritised	all-Ireland	trade	union	unity	above	all	else.	The	GPC	position	was	a	high-stakes	ultimatum	that	 demonstrated	 the	 utter	 determination	 of	 SIPTU	 and	 the	 public	 service	leaders	to	continue	with	social	partnership.19			 The	day	before	the	special	conference,	the	Executive	reconvened	in	what	the	press	predicted	was	“set	to	be	a	stormy	affair”.	Cassells	had	contacted	the	eleven	relevant	unions	with	the	Executive’s	“request”,	and	most	had	complied,	but	four	with	 large	 cross-border	memberships	 refused	as,	 alone	 among	 trades	 councils,	did	 the	 “Trotskyist”-led	Derry	Council.	A	motion	 from	Kieran	Mulvey	 (ASTI)	 to	now	postpone	 the	conference	was	put	and	 lost,	but	a	solution	proposed	by	 the	GPC	 to	 bridge	 the	 divide	 succeeded.	 This	 suggested	 that	 the	 conference	 be	opened	 by	 John	 Freeman,	 leader	 of	 the	 anti-agreement	 ATGWU	 but	 a	 former	Congress	 President	 committed	 to	 all-island	 union	 unity,	who,	 speaking	 for	 the	Executive,	would	formally	request	Northern	delegates	attending	not	to	vote.20			 Haughey	added	his	weight	to	assist	the	besieged	ICTU	leaders.	Describing	the	PNR	as	 “a	 new	and	 sophisticated	 form	of	 economic	management”	 as	 “found	 in	many	Continental	 countries”,	 driving	progress	 towards	 “living	 standards	 and	 a	quality	of	 life	enjoyed	by	most	of	our	[EC]	partners”,	he	said	 it	was	“difficult	 to	understand	…	why	 there	would	be	any	attempt	 to	undermine	 it”,	 and	made	an	impassioned	plea	for	its	continuation.	The	PNR’s	“outstanding	characteristic”,	he	said,	 was	 that	 “almost	 all	 of	 its	 objectives	 have	 been	 achieved,	 something	 not	very	 common	 with	 national	 economic	 plans	 here	 or	 elsewhere”.	 The	 press	editorialised	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 agreement	 and	 reported	 final	 concessions	 by	government	to	teacher	unions	on	parent/teacher	ratios	“in	a	bid	to	secure	their	fifteen	 votes”,	 and	 to	 the	 public	 service	 on	 a	 pilot	 childcare	 project.	 Even	 Dáil	opposition	 leaders,	 who	 had	 encouraged	 ICTU’s	 dissenters	 before	 but	 now	baulked	at	the	consequences,	urged	delegates	to	vote	to	continue	with	the	PNR.21			
																																																								19		 ICTU	Special	EC	mtg.	01/02/90,	item	1831.	ICTU	Archive:	EC	minutes,	and	information	from	former	Northern	Ireland	CPI-affiliated	union	leader	20		 “stormy	affair”,	II,	07/02/90;	ICTU	Special	EC	mtg.	07/02/90,	item	1832.	ICTU	Archive:	EC	minutes.	North/south	delegations	were	MSF,	printers	(NGA),	building	trades	(UCATT)	and	bakers	(BFWAU)	21		 “undermine	it”,	Haughey	in	Dáil	15/12/89;	“outstanding	characteristic”,	Haughey	in	Dáil	07/02/90;	“secure	their	vote”,	II	07/02/90;	childcare	concession,	EH	07/02/90;	opposition	leaders,	Dáil,	07/02/90	
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	 At	 the	 conference,	 the	 PNR,	 the	 press	 reported,	 “withstood	 a	 massive	onslaught”.	Anti-PNR	unions	sensed	a	final	chance	to	reverse	partnership	before	it	 consolidated.	The	confrontation	was	 raw	and,	unusually,	while	 recording	 the	proceedings,	ICTU	never	published	them.	Speaker	after	speaker	from	small,	craft,	and	British-based	unions,	as	well	as	sectionalist	ones	like	the	IMETU	and	IDATU,	denounced	the	PNR	as	a	“sell-out”,	advocating	withdrawal	and	a	resumption	of	“traditional”	militancy.	While	 expressed	 in	 left-wing	 rhetoric,	 their	 case	 was	 a	very	 material	 one.	 “The	 only	 solution	 to	 low	 pay	 is	 more	 pay”,	 achieved	 by	militancy	rather	than	national	agreements,	argued	one,	while	another	called	for	“differentials”,	 “eroded”	 by	 central	 agreements,	 to	 be	 restored.	 Another	complained	 that	 “while	 …	 containing	 wage	 claims	 in	 the	 private	 sector”,	 with	workers	 “nailed	 to	 the	 cross”,	 the	 PNR	 “provided	 far	 greater	 flexibility	 in	 the	Public	 Service”:	 ICTU	 had	 been	 “captured”	 by	 the	 public	 sector,	 its	 character	utterly	 changed.	 Industrial	 relations	 reforms	 would	 destroy	 the	 basis	 of	 the	union	movement,	as	would	removing	craft	union	control	of	apprentice	training.22			 Pro-partnership	leaders	reiterated	their	essentially	political	case	for	the	PNR,	and	 the	 need	 for	 ICTU	 to	 honour	 agreements.	 Their	 own	 delegations	 were	mandated	 to	 back	 the	 motion,	 though	 some,	 not	 least	 the	 then	 ITGWU,	 had	supported	the	PNR	 in	1987	only	by	a	slim	majority.	But	 leaders	such	as	Attley,	Flynn	 and	 Cassells	 were	 no	 less	 “left-wing”	 than	 the	 PNR’s	 opponents	 who	sought	to	monopolise	socialist	virtue,	and	both	sides	argued	their	case	as	in	the	“working	 class	 interest”.	 The	 PNR,	 said	 Flynn,	 was	 “modifying	 the	 market	 by	means	 of	 a	 trade	 union	 input	 to	 social	 and	 economic	 policy”.	 Attley	 attacked	sectionalism	and	an	“ideological	block”	against	pursuing	a	“national	consensus”.	The	PNR’s	social	gains	and	its	benefits	for	the	low-paid	were	indisputable,	with	the	 tax/pay	 formula	 delivering	 take-home	 increases	 of	 8	 per	 cent,	 which	 for	many	 could	 never	 have	 been	 achieved	 through	 free	 bargaining.	 The	 ATGWU’s	Mick	 O’Reilly	 would	 later	 bluntly	 sum	 up	 the	 “left”	 position:	 “Our	 view	 of	consensus	…	is	that	we	should	be	striving	for	a	consensus	with	the	Left”	against	“the	consensus	of	government	and	the	New	Right”.23	
																																																								22		 “massive	onclaught”,	IT,	09/02/90;	quotes	from	40-pp.	report,	not	circulated,	‘Special	Delegate	Conference.	Programme	for	National	Recovery,	Liberty	Hall,	8	February	1990’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1	23		 ‘Special	Delegate	Conference	…’	08/02/90;	“our	view	of	consensus”,	ICTU	ADC	1990	
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	 Freeman’s	 appeal	 to	 Northern	 delegates	 attending	 not	 to	 vote	 was	 mostly	heeded,	 crucially	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	 large	ATGWU	and	AUE,	but	 the	bakers	 and	MSF	refused.	A	Socialist	Worker	activist	representing	the	anti-PNR	Derry	Trades	Council	urged	all-out	opposition	 to	 “the	Tory	government”	 (in	Dublin!)	by	 “the	organised	 working-class”	 but	 was	 interrupted	 mid-sentence	 by	 one	 delegate	asking	 sarcastically:	 “is	 the	 [northern]	 delegate	 speaking	 on	 the	 PNR?”	 The	Executive	motion	to	continue	with	the	agreement	on	condition	of	full	delivery	by	the	end	of	the	year	was	carried,	mainly	by	SIPTU	and	the	public	service,	but	by	a	slim	56	per	cent	majority.	 If	Northern	ATGWU/AUE	delegates	had	voted,	and	if	the	CP-led	Belfast	Council	had	attended,	it	would	have	been	defeated.			 In	 one	way,	 however,	 the	 “special	 delegate	 conference”	 (SDC)	 strengthened	Congress.	Despite	the	deep	divide	over	partnership,	both	wings	were	committed	to	maintaining	unity	and	no	union	left	Congress	because	of	the	vote.	There	was	a	widespread	if	unspoken	view	that	the	positions	adopted	by	many	amalgamated	unions	were	 the	 result	 of	 undemocratic	 procedures,	 John	Tierney	 of	MSF	 later	admitting	to	Pádraig	Yeates	that	many	of	his	southern	members	were	frustrated	at	 the	 anti-agreement	 decisions	 imposed	 on	 them.	 The	 SDC	 mandate	strengthened	Congress’s	leverage	within	social	partnership	and	the	institution	of	special	conferences	itself	was	reinforced	as	a	democratic	 instrument.	Following	the	 SDC,	 the	 Executive	 scheduled	 another	 such	 conference	 for	 September	 to	decide	on	whether	to	enter	talks	on	a	further	Programme	and	“the	issues	which	should	be	covered	in	any	such	negotiations”,	and	yet	another	for	February	1991	to	vote	on	the	outcome	of	 those	negotiations.	The	system	of	SDCs	and	member	balloting	represented	a	democratic	participation	and	ratification	process	which	Cassells	rightly	described	as	“almost	unique	in	Europe”	among	trade	unions.24			 The	 February	 1990	 Special	 Delegate	 Conference	 was	 the	 high-point	 of	 the	anti-partnership	revolt,	if	far	from	the	end	of	it.	But	it	convinced	pro-partnership	leaders	 that	 if	 the	 programme	was	 delivered	 the	 system	 of	 social	 partnership,	with	a	government	committed	to	its	institutionalisation,	could	be	consolidated.	
	
																																																									24		 ICTU	EC	mtg.	21/02/90,	ICTU	Archive,	EC	minutes;	Tierney	to	Yeates,	interview,	Yeates	Papers;	“almost	unique”,	ICTU	ADC	1990:	33-4	
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System	consolidates:	local	pay,	apprentices	and	industrial	relations			 		 The	more	pragmatic	than	ideological	base	for	the	wider	support	for	the	anti-PNR	Left	revealed	by	the	ICTU	special	conference	would	need	to	be	addressed	if	social	partnership	was	to	succeed.	Some	such	issues	were	not,	however,	readily	amenable	to	solution.	Neither	government	nor	employers	were	yet	prepared	to	countenance	local	pay	“flexibility”	or	profit-sharing,	Finance	warning	that	it	had	been	 the	 “proliferation”	 of	 “so-called	 productivity	 agreements”	 that	 had	undermined	the	1970s	NWAs,	and	there	was	also	“an	understandable	reluctance	among	employers	 to	 introduce	…	profit-sharing	 schemes”.	Government	heeded	Finance’s	 advice,	 but	 in	 its	 1990	budget	 did	 soften	 the	 regulations	 on	workers	redeeming	 shares	 under	 such	 schemes.	 More	 importantly,	 it	 also	 decided	 to	resolve	 public	 pay	 anomalies	 and	 implement	 the	 hours-of-work	 agreement	 to	counter	 union	 discontent.	 Dates	 and	 rates	 for	 the	 deferred	 phases	 of	 special	awards	were	now	finally	set,	and	implementation	of	the	39-hour	week	from	mid-1990	was	conceded	across	the	public	service,	with	the	private	sector	following.25		 ICTU’s	pay	strategy	was	to	consistently	raise	minimum	rates	and	through	the	pay/tax	 formula	 achieve	 income	 increases	 sufficient	 to	 deflect	 demands	 from	strong	private	sector	groups	for	local	“flexibility”	without	upsetting	this	formula.	It	also	sought	to	divert	local	union	negotiating	power	towards	profit-sharing	and	the	objectives	of	the	“new	trade	unionism”.	Cassells	described	this	at	ICTU’s	main	conference	in	July	1990	as	local	“flexibility	…	not	just	in	a	narrow,	old	fashioned	sense”,	 i.e.	 more	 pay,	 but	 rather	 participation	 in	 company	 decision-making	 to	direct	 profits	 towards	 re-investment	 and	 job	 creation”.	 This	 “industrial	democracy”	 approach	 fell	 on	 deaf	 ears,	 however,	 as	 private	 sector	 unions	vehemently	opposed	it.	Unions,	as	they	saw	it,	were	“losing	credibility”,	and	was	local	pay	flexibility	not	just	the	corollary	of	“special	claims”	in	the	public	service?	Companies,	they	claimed,	should	be	divided	between	“profit-makers”	and	“loss-makers”,	 with	 workers	 in	 the	 former	 freed	 to	 extract	 greater	 wages.	 While	motions	seeking	a	return	to	a	“free	hand”	in	local	bargaining,	which	would	have																																																									25		 On	“flexibility”	and	profit	sharing,	D/Finance,	‘Treatment	of	Profit	Sharing	Schemes	under	the	PNR’,	encl.	with	N.T.	O’Gorman,	D/Finance,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	21/11/89:	‘Re:	ICTU	meeting	with	Taoiseach’,	24/11/89,	DTA:	S25862-D;	on	budget	reforms,	public	pay	and	hours	of	work,	LGPSU,	Dublin	Health	Services,	Branch	Bulletin,	n.d.	[May	90],	ILHS-Archive:	LGPSU	Box	2;	Dignam	to	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn],	18/07/90,	‘Summary	Report	last	Meeting	-	Hours	of	Work’,	DTA:	S25857-Z8	
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ended	 the	 PNR,	were	 defeated,	 several	 seeking	 some	 level	 of	 local	 “flexibility”	within	 national	 agreements	 passed	 decisively.	 This	 was	 a	 rejection	 of	 ICTU’s	“new	 unionism”	 based	 on	 “worker	 participation”,	 but	 it	 was	 telling	 that	 the	desire	was	 for	 reform	 rather	 than	 abolition	 of	 partnership	 pay	 determination.	Future	ICTU	pay	strategy	would	have	to	take	this	on	board,	and	did.26		 If	ICTU’s	rebels	won	this	victory	on	pay	strategy,	though	by	reforming	rather	than	overturning	it,	they	lost	in	two	other	areas	important	to	social	partnership	and	new	unionism,	which	won	majority	support	among	affiliated	unions.			 First	 was	 reform	 of	 the	 apprenticeship	 system	 from	 the	 old	 craft	 union-controlled	 model	 towards	 a	 Austro-German-inspired	 systematic	 state-certified	qualification	system.	Ahern,	with	both	ICTU	and	CII	support	and	input,	proposed	a	 general	 opening	 of	 apprenticeships,	 certified	 qualifications	 instead	 of	 “time	served”,	the	promoting	of	women	in	non-traditional	skills,	and	social	partnership	rather	than	individual	crafts	exercising	oversight.	Apprenticeships	had	declined	drastically	 in	 the	 1980s	 and,	 after	 considerable	 internal	 rancour,	 the	 ICTU	Executive	decided	by	a	small	majority	to	support	the	reform.	At	the	1990	ICTU	conference,	 craft	 unions	 made	 a	 last	 stand,	 desperately	 seeking	 to	 defend	 the	indefensible.	Following	heated	debate,	conference	decisively	backed	reform.27		 Second	was	Ahern’s	industrial	relations	reform	bill,	the	most	radical	change	in	industrial	 relations	 since	 1906,	 designed	 to	 eliminate	 unofficial	 action	 and	sectional	 disputes	 that	 closed	 industries,	 while	 strengthening	 central	 union	authority.	 The	 reform	had	 been	 delayed	 in	 1988-89	 by	 government’s	minority	position,	but	Ahern	now	progressed	 it,	 accepting	many	amendments	 suggested	by	 ICTU.	While	 quibbling	 over	minor	 points,	 Congress	welcomed	 it	 as	 a	major	pro-union	modernisation	providing	the	basis	for	stable	industrial	relations	“well	into	 the	 next	 century”	 with	 “none	 of	 the	 extreme	 characteristics	 of	 its	 British	counterpart”.	 The	 proposed	 conciliation	 system	 would	 prevent	 disputes	escalating	to	all-out	conflict,	ICTU’s	role	in	approving	all-out-pickets	was	given	a	statutory	 basis,	 and	 its	 stipulation	 of	 secret	 ballots	 for	 all	 industrial	 action	accorded	 with	 good	 union	 practice	 anyway.	 Anti-PNR	 unions	 attacked	 the																																																									26		 “new	trade	unionism”,	ICTU	1990g;	Cassells	and	critics,	ICTU	ADC	1990:	45-57	27		 apprenticeship	plan,	FÁS	1990;	Executive	debate,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	20/06/90;	conference	debate,	ICTU	ADC	1990:	115-8	
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undercutting	of	sectional	power,	the	curtailing	of	picketing	and	requirements	for	secret	ballots,	and	Workers	Party	TDs	encouraged	opposition	by	stoking	fears	of	wide-scale	court	intrusion	into	disputes,	but	as	with	apprenticeship	reform,	they	were	defending	 the	 indefensible	 and	were	again	decisively	defeated.	Claims	by	sectional	 unions	 that	 the	 bill	 would	 “emasculate	 the	 collective	 power	 of	 this	movement”	by	constraining	sympathetic	action,	with	workers	saying	“we	may	as	well	 not	 be	 in	 unions”,	 fell	 on	 deaf	 ears.	 It	was	 certainly	 true	 that	 as	with	 the	apprenticeship	bill,	 the	reform	would	destroy	much	of	the	armoury	of	sectional	unionism,	but	it	enhanced	the	position	of	the	general	workforce	and,	apart	from	not	conceding	statutory	trade	union	recognition,	met	most	ICTU	demands.28		 The	 disruptive	 power	 of	 anti-PNR	 unions	 was	 weakened	 further	 by	 the	Executive	deciding	to	restrict	voting	on	future	agreements	to	the	representatives	of	memberships	directly	effected,	North	or	South,	though	amended	on	Northern	insistence	to	refer	only	 to	matters	of	pay	and	conditions.	Voting	rights	of	 trade	councils	 on	 pay	 agreements	 were	 also	 curtailed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 preventing	double-voting.	The	growing	hegemony	of	pro-partnership	leaders	was	reflected	in	the	failure	of	anti-PNR	figures	such	as	John	Tierney	of	MSF	and	Seán	Redmond	of	the	IMETU,	both	seasoned	left	leaders,	to	be	elected	to	the	Executive.29		 Following	the	ICTU’s	February	1990	special	conference,	the	CRC	resumed	its	role	 as	 the	 administrative	 driver	 of	 social	 partnership,	 with	 the	 “Secretariat	Group”	 re-formed	 and	 the	 CRC	 meticulously	 tracking	 implementation	 of	commitments	by	departments.	Pursuing	its	new	mandate,	ICTU	sought	a	meeting	with	Haughey	“to	ensure	that	commitments	arising	from	the	recent	review	of	the	Programme	…	are	implemented	between	now	and	the	end	of	1990”.	Ó	hUiginn’s	staff	relentlessly	pressured	departments	for	time-scales	on	various	initiatives	as	sought	by	 ICTU,	 and	Haughey	 reiterated	his	 intent	 to	deliver	on	 commitments.	The	CRC	also	resumed	its	problem-solving	role	in	often	fraught	conflicts,	such	as	on	pensions	reform.	ICTU	sought	statutory	provision	for	member	trustees,	which	the	 FIE	 (as	 FUE	 had	 been	 renamed)	 vigorously	 opposed,	 but	 again,	 acting	 as																																																									28		 ICTU	welcome	IR	Bill,	ICTU	AR	1990	45-6,	ICTU	1990g	and	ADC	1990	106-8;	“claims	by	sectional	unions”,	ICTU	ADC	1991:	33;	“stoking	fears”,	Rabbitte	and	Gilmore	1990;	benefits,	ICTU	EC	mtg.	18/09/90,	item	1955;	also	Gunnigle	et	al.	1999:	62-71	29		 agreement	on	northern	votes,	ICTU	Special	EC	mtg.	09/04/90,	item	1832;	trades	councils,	ICTU	ADC	1990:	33-8;	Tierney	and	Redmond,	ICTU	ADC	1990	appendix,	‘Election	of	the	Executive	Council’	
	 273	
arbiter	for	the	state,	Ó	hUiginn	intervened,	in	this	case	on	ICTU’s	side,	urging	the	Pensions	 Board	 to	 concede	 member	 trustees	 “on	 a	 voluntary	 basis”	 until	 a	review	in	three	years	assessed	the	need	for	statutory	provision.	FIE	relented.30		 By	 autumn	 1990,	 ICTU	 had	 consolidated	 its	 agenda	 internally	 against	 the	dissident	 opposition,	 and	 through	 the	 CRC	was	 ensuring	 programme	 delivery.	The	 only	 substantial	 issue	 on	 which	 it	 would	 have	 to	 seek	 a	 reconfiguring	 of	partnership	agreements	was	 some	mechanism	 to	meet	private	 sector	 local	pay	flexibility,	the	one	issue	still	generating	significant	support	for	anti-PNR	motions.			
Strategic	shift:	the	Haughey/ICTU	deal	on	the	“semi-states”				 Apart	 from	 local	 pay,	 the	 state	 companies	 were	 also	 an	 issue	 of	 potential	conflict	between	government	and	the	unions.	With	ICTU	the	state	sector’s	main	champion,	 the	PNR,	 following	much	 contraction	under	 the	FitzGerald	 coalition,	had	 agreed	 expansion	 through	 joint	 ventures,	 new	 subsidiaries,	 international	consultancies	and	private	capital	 input,	and	 in	1987-9	many	such	new	projects	had	 been	 initiated,	 with	 Haughey	 urging	 companies	 on	 in	 their	 ambitions.	Existing	 boards	were	 incorporated	 on	 the	 Telecom	model	 and	 new	 companies	and	state	bodies	created,	including	Coillte,	Teagasc	and	FÁS,	with	others	planned	for	sectors	such	as	the	marine.	“My	Government”,	Haughey	assured	the	ITGWU,	“believe	 in	 the	 value	 of	 a	 sound,	 viable	 State	 sector	 …	 to	 create	 employment,	contribute	to	the	national	economy	and	provide	an	effective	and	efficient	service	…	 Our	 approach	 is	 pragmatic,	 not	 ideological”.	 It	was	 a	message	 he	 reiterated	throughout	 1989.	 The	 new	 coalition,	 on	 Haughey’s	 insistence	 and	 despite	 the	PDs’	privatising	zeal,	committed	to	support	a	“viable	and	profitable	commercial	semi-State	 sector”	with	any	 changes	 to	 “ownership	 structures”	 subject	 to	prior	“consultation	with	the	social	partners”.31		
																																																								30		 On	CRC	dynamic	and	Haughey	commitment,	O’Sullivan	to	Secretary,	‘Subject:	Meeting	with	Mr	P	Cassells	and	Ms	P	O’Donovan,	ICTU,	on	2	March	1990’,	01/03/90,	and	‘Report	of	Meeting	with	ICTU	on	2	March	1990’,	02/03/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z4;	On	pension	reform	dispute,	O’Sullivan	to	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn],	‘Subject:	Agenda	Item	9	–	Pensions	Bill	–	Appointment	of	member	trustees’,	25/04/90	and	D/Social	Welfare,	‘Pensions	Bill	1990.	Issue	of	Providing	members	with	statutory	rights	in	relation	to	the	appointment	of	trustees’,	20/04/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z4;	‘CRC.	Summary	Report	of	25th	Meeting,	26	April	1990’,	and	h/w	notes	25th	CRC	mtg.,	26/04/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z4;	‘CRC.	Summary	Report	of	26th	Meeting	24	May	1990’,	DTA:	S25857-Z6	31		 Haughey,	‘Speech	at	a	dinner	to	mark	winding	up	of	the	ITGWU’,	29/12/89,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	repeats	message,	Dáil	12/12/89;	coalition	commitment,	PfG	1989	
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	 With	sweeping	de-nationalisation	in	Britain	and	the	fall	of	socialism	in	Eastern	Europe,	leading	economists	began	agitating	for	wholesale	privatisation.	Fine	Gael	harried	 Haughey	 for	 hesitating	 on	 privatisation	 while	 UCD	 Professor	 Frank	Convery	 declared	 it	 the	 new	 “international	 trend,	 …	 an	 idea	 whose	 time	 has	come”.		The	Irish	economy	at	independence	had	been	“dominated	by	a	relatively	small,	mainly	 Protestant,	 business	 oligarchy”,	 and	 state	 companies	 had	 broken	this,	 “creating	 a	 business	 class	 among	 the	 Catholic	 community”.	 Government	should	unleash	 this	potential	 through	privatisation.	Haughey	was	not	averse	 to	this	 view,	 having	 told	 his	 1989	 party	 Árd	 Fheis	 of	 the	 need	 to	 liberate	“professional	 skills	 locked	up	uselessly	 in	out-dated	structures”.	Even	 left-wing	economists	 noted	 how	 the	 state	 sector	 was	 “spawning	 entrepreneurs”,	 with	former	 state	managers	 emerging	as	 global	business	 leaders.	 Convery	proposed	also	incentivising	workers	to	support	privatisation	through	employee	shares.32			 Finance’s	 1990	 budget	 planning	 proposed	 raising	 “at	 least”	 £50m	 towards	reducing	the	national	debt	by	a	sale	of	“state	assets”.	The	PDs	had	championed	this,	 O’Malley’s	 “catchword”	 being	 to	 “roll	 back	 the	 state”,	 but	 Haughey	 had	ensured	 this	 did	 not	 feature	 in	 the	 Programme	 for	 Government.	 Senor	 civil	servants,	however,	supported	the	idea,	with	the	proposal	to	cabinet	–	in	part	to	meet	PNR	pay	and	tax	commitments	–	the	initiative	of	Seán	Cromien,	secretary	of	Finance.	Concerned	that	an	ICTU	initiative	at	CRC	level	on	the	state	sector	might	“jeopardise”	the	plan,	he	reminded	Ó	hUiginn	how	they	had	both	been	present	at	meetings	at	which	Haughey	himself	“on	several	occasions”	had	“spoken	in	favour	of	asset	disposal	 for	 the	benefit	of	 the	Exchequer,	mentioning	State	companies,	and	 pressed	 that	 the	 matter	 be	 pursued	 expeditiously”.	 In	 fact	 what	 Haughey	referred	to	were	unused	properties	such	as	CIÉ’s	Temple	Bar	site,	 for	which	he	created	a	public/private	joint	venture	to	develop	as	a	“cultural	quarter”.33		 Public	 opinion	 was	 acclimatised	 to	 a	 privatisation	 offensive	 by	 statements	from	ministers	 favouring	state	companies	being	 included	 in	“assets”	 to	be	sold.	This	 followed	 immediately	on	the	narrow	victory	of	 ICTU	 leaders’	at	 its	special	conference.	SIPTU	denounced	 the	 “speculation”	as	 “entirely	at	odds	with	…	 the																																																									32		 “wholesale”,	Convery	and	McDowell	1990;	Fine	Gael	“harried”,	Dáil	12/12/89;	Convery	in	Sunday	
Independent	18/03/89;	“outdated	structures”,	Haughey	1989;	“economists”,	Sweeney,	P.,	2004:	20-7;		33		 Seán	P.	Cromien,	Sec,	D/Finance,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	D/Taoiseach,	29/02/90,	DTA:	S25862-F;	PD	position,	O’Malley,	D.	2014:	168;	“unused	properties”,	‘State	Papers’,	Irish	Times	29/12/2017		
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PNR”.	Reynolds	exacerbated	growing	distrust	by	stating	that	the	“restructuring”	of	Irish	Life	-	the	only	such	commitment	in	the	PfG	–	would	see	the	state	retain	only	 a	minority	 34	 per	 cent	 holding	 as	 a	 “golden	 share”	 to	 protect	 the	 “public	interest”.	 Talks	 were	 also	 announced	 with	 foreign	 investors	 on	 Irish	 Steel,	 to	ensure	its	“future	and	the	maintenance	of	its	employment”.	Within	government,	and	 in	 tune	 with	 Convery’s	 urgings,	 privatisation	 proposals	 often	 came	 from	state	 companies	 themselves,	 including	GSH,	who	argued	 that	 resources	 to	 save	and	expand	it	could	not	be	generated	internally.	Irish	Sugar	executives	were	part	of	a	committee	that	proposed	floating	half	that	company	and	Aer	Lingus	leaders	proposed	that	its	structure	be	changed	to	“facilitate	future	disposal”.34			 Finance	 warned	 Haughey	 that	 “whatever	 about	 the	 past”,	 state	 companies	“must	 operate	 and	 plan	 for	 the	 future	 on	 strictly	 commercial	 lines”	 and	 this	should	not	be	diluted	by	commitments	on	employment	to	ICTU.	The	final	budget	plan,	Cromien	told	Ó	hUiginn,	“assumes	that	£62.5	million	will	accrue	…	from	the	sale	of	equity	in	State	companies”,	specifically	GSH,	Irish	Sugar	and	the	TSB	and	ICC	banks.	Cabinet	 agreed	 that	 these	 “be	disposed	of	 in	 such	a	manner	and	on	such	a	scale”	as	necessary	to	achieve	this.	He	believed	ICTU	were	planning	to	get	the	CRC	to	seek	a	White	Paper	on	semi-states,	which	would	“put	the	entire	1990	Budget	strategy	at	risk”.	Ó	hUiginn	must	prevent	CRC	proposals	that	“jeopardise	Government’s	ability	to	raise	the	sums	referred	to	…	or	delay	the	process”.35		 Congress	demanded	that	the	state	retain	its	majority	holding	in	Irish	Life	and	demanded	 to	 meet	 Haughey	 on	 the	 whole	 issue	 of	 “the	 future	 for	 State	companies”.	Decisions	 should	be	 suspended	pending	 that,	 or	 it	would	be	 “very	difficult	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 commence	 negotiations	 of	 a	 further	 Programme”.	The	ICTU	Executive	published	a	policy	position,	Public	Enterprise	and	Economic	
Development,	 which,	 while	 welcoming	 expansion	 through	 joint	 public/private	ventures	 and	 claiming	 that	 semi-states	 could	 drive	 a	 large-scale	 indigenous	sector	expansion	given	the	failings	of	private	enterprise,	demanded	that	the	state																																																									34		 Ed	Browne,	SIPTU,	to	Taoiseach,	21/02/90,	DTA:	S25862-F;	‘Govt.	Statement’	[no	title,	re	Irish	Steel],	09/03/90,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	D/Labour,	‘Briefing	Material	on	Great	Southern	Hotel	(GSH)	Group’,	n.d.	(fax	26/03/90);	D/Finance,	‘Possibility	of	Sale	of	certain	State	bodies:	present	position’,	n.d.	[26/03/90],	DTA:	S25862-F	35		 “Finance	warned	Haughey”,	D/Finance,	‘State	Companies	and	Job	Creation.	Background	Note’,	encl.	with	N.T.	O’Gorman,	D/Finance,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	21/11/89,	‘Re:	ICTU	meeting	with	Taoiseach’,	24/11/89,	DTA:	S25862-D;	“final	budget	plan”,	Cromien	to	Ó	hUiginn,	29/02/90,	DTA:	S25862-F		
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retain	majority	shareholdings,	and	equity	sales	be	exclusively	for	re-investment.	It	proposed	the	White	Paper	Cromien	had	warned	of	and	 insisted	on	an	end	to	“secret	talks”	with	“bankers,	stockbrokers	and	consultants”.	It	had	the	support	of	the	CII	which,	while	favouring	commercialisation,	had	many	state	companies	in	membership	and	championed	them	against	perceived	state	discrimination,	as	in	the	 case	 of	 Aer	 Lingus/Ryanair.	 This	 had	 led	 the	 IFA	 to	 accuse	 CII	 of	 being	 a	“prisoner	of	the	state	sector”	and	even	of	refusing	Ryanair	CII	membership.36			 Cromien	 urged	 Haughey	 to	 be	 devious.	 While	 being	 open	 with	 ICTU	 about	plans	 for	 Irish	Sugar	and	other	bodies	 to	which	 the	unions	were	already	privy,	“they	 should	 not	 know	 of	 the	 possibility	 in	 relation	 to	 ICC	 and	 TSB”.	 Also,	 the	state	had	 to	retain	a	 free	hand	 to	reduce	 the	national	debt	 through	asset	sales.	Consultation	with	unions	must	not	mean	giving	them	“a	virtual	veto	power”,	nor	should	he	commit	to	retain	worker	directors	in	“restructured”	companies,	as	the	“the	 state	 cannot	 bind	 other	 …	 owners”.	 Partial	 privatisation	 would	 boost	employment	anyway,	and	was	“a	policy	now	being	 followed	not	only	 in	 the	so-called	 capitalist	 countries	 but	 in	 socialist	 and	 communist	 states	 as	 well”.	Cromien’s	memo	was	supported	by	extensive	documentation	from	departments	arguing	 for	 privatisation	 of	 “assets”	 within	 their	 remit	 and	 discounting	 ICTU’s	arguments.	The	central	aim	of	meeting	Congress	must	be	to	use	nuances	in	their	position	 to	 “advance	 the	 degree	 of	 acceptance	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 privatisation	shown	in	the	ICTU	document”.	Congress	was	facing	a	formidable	onslaught.37		 As	ever,	Ó	hUiginn	was	optimistic.	On	equity	sales	to	reduce	the	national	debt,	he	 recommended	 reformulating	 this	 as	 sales	 “contributing	 to	 the	 growth	 and	development	 of	 the	 economy”.	 In	 general	 Haughey	might	 commit	 to	 the	 state	retaining	majority	shareholdings,	but	suggest	full	sales	where	necessary	to	save	enterprises	 which	 would	 otherwise	 have	 to	 close,	 such	 as	 Irish	 Steel,	 and	 in	“strategic”	cases	retaining	a	“golden”	share	“to	protect	the	public	interest	against	undesirable	ownership”.	The	overriding	goal	for	Ó	hUiginn	was	a	strategy	agreed																																																									36		 “Congress	demanded”,	Cassells	to	Taoiseach,	14/03/1990,	and	Taoiseach	to	Cassells	ICTU,	16/03/90,	DTA:	S25862-F;	Public	Enterprise,	ICTU	1990d;	seeks	White	Paper,	CRC	‘Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’,	h/w	notes,	n.d.	[mtg.	28/06/89],	DTA:	S26122-A;		position,	Power,	CII,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	and	to	Ahern,	‘Re:	PRSI	Exemption’,	13/10/89,	DTA:	S25857-X;	refuses	Ryanair,	h/w	notes	of	18th	CRC	mtg	21/09/89,	DTA:	S25857-W	37		 Cromien	memo	and	documentation,	‘Steering	Note’,	attch’d	with	Robert	Carey,	[pvte]	Secretary	[to	M/Finance],	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	26/03/90,	and	“advance	acceptance”,	R.J.	Curran,	D/Finance,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	D/Taoiseach,	27/03/90,	DTA:	S25862-F	
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with	ICTU,	which	he	was	convinced	was	attainable:	“It	would	be	possible,	in	the	light	of	their	submission,	to	reach	agreement	…	on	principles	which	would	apply	to	the	sale	of	some	or	all	of	the	State’s	holding	in	State	companies”.38		 The	meeting	on	27	March	1990	–	one	of	the	most	extraordinary	of	the	PNR	era	-	was	 attended	 by	 a	 formidable	 array	 of	Ministers,	 officials	 and	 union	 leaders.	Even	 John	Carroll	 attended,	 the	austere	SIPTU	President	who	had	not	officially	met	government	since	1987,	when	he	had	been	instrumental	in	engineering	the	PNR	 with	 Haughey.	 ICTU	 reiterated	 its	 core	 “principles”	 on	 state	 industry,	warning	 of	 the	 “credibility	 problem”	 it	 faced	 with	 members	 complaining	 that	unilateral	 state	action	proved	 “there	was	no	value	 in	 the	 consensus	approach”.	Haughey	repeated	his	concern	for	a	successful	state	sector,	disregarding	much	of	what	Cromien	had	advised.	He	had	no	intention	of	interfering	with	Aer	Lingus	(“a	star	 performer”)	 or	 any	 successful	 company.	 B&I	 and	 Irish	 Steel	 were	 special	cases,	 failed	private	ventures	nationalised	 for	 strategic	 reasons,	but	 should	not	necessarily	remain	so.	 Irish	Sugar’s	 function	was	changing	due	to	new	CAP	and	Single	Market	rules	and	would	require	a	new	structure	and	purpose.	He	gave	“a	solemn	assurance”	that	 the	Irish	Life	decision,	necessitated	by	 legal	constraints	in	 operating	 abroad,	was	 neither	 a	 “precedent”	 nor	 “a	model	 for	 restructuring	other	 State	 companies”,	 and	 agreed	 that	 some	 companies	 had	 potential	 to	become	“large	scale	indigenous	companies”,	but	monetary	strategy	dictated	this	could	 only	 occur	 through	 private	 capital	 involvement.	 Selling	 equity	 to	 reduce	the	national	debt	was	not	a	government	“aim”,	 though	“loss	makers”	should	be	considered.	 Carroll	 intervened	 forcefully	 in	 Haughey’s	 support,	 insisting	 only	that	 “essential	 services”	 and	 “strategic”	 companies	 remain	 in	 state	 ownership.	Haughey	 promised	 full	 consultation	 and,	 to	 the	 undoubted	 horror	 of	 Finance,	met	ICTU’s	White	Paper	demand	half-way	by	proposing	that	CRC	draft	common	“principles”	 for	policy	 towards	 the	 sector.	 ICTU	was	 greatly	 relieved,	 declaring	the	 “Taoiseach’s	 pragmatic	 stance”	 “comforting”,	 accepting	 that	 Irish	 Steel	 and	
																																																								38		 Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn]	to	Taoiseach,	‘ICTU	Meeting	on	Private	Involvement	in	State	Companies’,	26/03/90,	DTA:	S25862-F	
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Verolme	could	be	sold	off	to	survive,	and	welcoming	Haughey’s	proposal	that	the	CRC	draft	a	set	of	principles	for	future	state	policy	on	the	sector.39				 Finance	was	outraged	 at	Haughey’s	 concessions.	Nevertheless,	 following	 the	meeting,	Congress	publicly	endorsed	the	principle	of	selling	equity	-	apart	from	“strategic	services”	–	where	this	was	necessary	to	maintain	employment,	enable	expansion	 or	 ensure	 future	 viability,	 and	 in	 private,	 as	 Ó	 hUiginn	 reported,	agreed	 to	 restructurings	 commencing	 “even	while	 the	 [CRC]	Working	 Party	 is	sitting”,	which	would	“enable	sales	to	go	ahead”.	Cassells’	only	condition	was	that	the	CRC	“principles”	be	finalised	an	agreed	“well	in	advance	of	negotiations	on	a	further	programme”.	The	Haughey-ICTU	“deal”	epitomised	social	partnership	as	understood	by	both	Haughey	and	union	 leaders,	and	Carroll’s	 intervention	was	key	to	facilitating	the	compromise.	ICTU’s	concessions	on	private	investment	and	equity	 sales	 were	 reciprocated	 by	 Haughey’s	 commitment	 to	 retain	 majority	shareholdings	 in	 successful	 companies	 and	 to	 the	 CRC	 setting	 future	 policy	principles.	In	the	Dáil,	Labour	and	ex-Workers’	Party	leaders	suspected	a	secret	deal	had	been	reached	to	facilitate	“privatisation”,	while	Fine	Gael	worried	that	a	compromise	had	been	agreed	preventing	it.	In	a	sense,	they	were	both	right.40				 The	CRC	“working	party”	convened	immediately,	collating	restructuring	plans	from	 companies	 and	 drafting	 “principles”	 for	 policy	 on	 the	 sector.	 Individual	unions	continued	to	be	involved	in	restructuring	at	Bord	na	Móna	and	GSH,	and	buyers	were	found	for	the	distressed	Verolme	Dockyard,	enabling	production	to	resume	 and	 leveraging	 IDA	 supports.41	There	was	 often	 conflict,	 as	 at	 Bord	 na	Móna	 over	 developing	 or	 selling	 off	 cut-away	 bogs,	 or	 at	 Irish	 Sugar	 over	alternative	employment	for	workers	in	plants	earmarked	for	closure.	Plans	by	An	Post	 led	 to	 conflict	 and	 even	 strike	 action,	 and	 in	 June,	 just	 before	 its	 annual	
																																																								39		 ‘Report	of	Meeting	of	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance,	I&C	and	Labour	with	representatives	of	ICTU,	27	March	1990’,	and	h/w	notes	of	the	meeting,	DTA:	S25862-F	40		 ‘Joint	Government/ICTU	Statement’,	27/03/90,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	Cromien,	Sec	D/Finance,	to	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	04/04/90;	Ó	hUiginn	‘Note’	[to	Taoiseach],	30/04/90:	‘CRC	meeting	26/04/90’;	O’Sullivan	[to	Ó	hUig],	h/w	note	of	tel.	conversation	with	Cassells,	27/03,	and	note	Cassells,	‘For	attn.Pat	O’Sullivan:	Issues	for	inclusion	in	Statement	following	meeting	this	afternoon’,	27/03/90,	DTA:	S25862-F;	opposition	reaction,	Dáil	01/05/90	41		 ‘Working	Group	on	State	Companies’,	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	26th	Meeting,	24	May	1990’,	DTA:	S25857-Z6;	ICTU	AR	1990:	70;	D/Labour,	‘Briefing	Material	on	Great	Southern	Hotel	(GSH)	Group’,	n.d.	(fax	26/03/90),	DTA:	S25862-F;	Dáil	08/02/90;	Reynolds,	‘Address	by	the	M/Finance	to	announce	sale	of	Verolme	Dockyard	to	Damen	Shipyards	of	Holland’,	29/06/90,	GIS:	D/Finance	
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conference,	 ICTU	even	withdrew	 “temporarily”	 from	 the	CRC	Working	Party	 in	protest	at	the	Broadcasting	Bill	establishing	commercial	competition	to	RTE.42		 	Anti-PNR	 unions	 mobilised	 against	 the	 Executive’s	 new	 position,	 but	partnership	 leaders	 robustly	defended	 it,	Attley	 stating	 that	he	had	 “absolutely	no	 doubt”	 about	 government’s	 “hidden	 privatisation	 agenda”,	 but	 in	 Britain	obdurate	union	opposition	had	 failed,	and	state	 industry	was	being	dismantled	wholesale	across	eastern	and	even	western	Europe.	“Do	we	want	to	go	down	the	same	road?”	 Irish	 state	 companies	had	been	haemorrhaging	employment	 since	1980	 and	 “if	we	 don’t	 do	 something	 they	will	 simply	wither	 away”.	 To	 ensure	semi-states	 survived	 as	 “a	 vehicle	 for	 development	 and	 job	 creation”	 required	embracing	outside	 investment,	and	 if	unions	opposed	this,	 “we	will	simply	 lose	the	debate”.	The	conference	endorsed	the	new	policy	by	a	narrow	majority.43		 Haughey	for	his	part	held	government	to	the	“understanding”	he	had	reached	with	 Congress,	 and	 privatisation	 as	 envisaged	 by	 Finance	 was	 halted.	Government,	he	told	his	party’s	Árd	Fheis,	was	not	“engaged	in	any	programme	of	 systematic	 privatisation”.	 While	 there	 “may”	 be	 equity	 sales	 to	 reduce	 the	“crippling	 national	 debt”,	 such	 decisions	 would	 only	 be	 reached	 if	 of	 “overall	benefit	to	the	national	economy”,	the	formulation	Ó	hUiginn	had	proposed.44			 The	CRC	finalised	its	proposed	“principles”	on	state	companies	in	September,	recommending	 continued	 expansion	 through	 subsidiaries,	 private	 equity	 and	export	 ventures,	 and	 allowing	 distressed	 companies	 be	 sold	 to	 secure	 their	viability.	 The	 key	 criterion	 was	 business	 success	 and,	 tellingly,	 no	 “majority”	condition	on	retained	state	holdings	was	sought.	The	restructuring	of	Irish	Sugar	as	a	privatised	 international	 food	company,	 later	Greencore	plc,	proceeded,	but	with	 the	state	 retaining	45	per	cent.	To	Congress’s	 satisfaction,	Great	Southern	Hotels	was	sold,	not	to	private	bidders	but	to	Aer	Rianta,	another	state	company,	and	ICTU	agreed	a	plan	with	Finance	for	B&I	to	be	sold	to	Irish	Ferries,	a	former	subsidiary	of	Irish	Shipping.	A	“viability	plan”	for	Irish	Steel	retained	it	in	public	
																																																								42		 ICTU	AR	1990:	70;	ICTU	ADC	1990:	91-3;	Ray	Burke,	‘Address	to	Annual	Conference	of	CWU’,	Cork,	18/05/90,	and	‘Minister	urges	Communication	Workers	to	face	challenges	of	competition	and	change’,	18/05/90,	GIS:	D/Justice	and	Comm.;	‘Working	Group	on	State	Companies’,	in	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	27th	Meeting,	21	June	1990’,	DTA:	S25857-Z7	43		 ICTU	ADC	1990:	91-103	44		 Haughey,	‘Taoiseach’s	address	to	Fianna	Fáil	Ard	Fheis’,	07/04/90,	DTA:	S25858-Z3	
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ownership,	 and	plans	 to	 sell	 off	 CIÉ	Tours	were	 abandoned.	 The	 only	 closures	were	of	defunct	entities	such	as	the	Joint	Hospitals	Services	Board.45			 When	 the	 Irish	 Sugar	 plan	was	 announced,	The	Irish	Times,	 no	 doubt	 to	 the	satisfaction	of	both	Haughey	and	ICTU,	editorialised	that	it	was	“now	well	placed	to	 become	 one	 of	 the	 leaders	 in	 the	 food	 sector”.	 “With	 the	 State	 as	 the	most	significant	shareholder	but	with	stock	market	participation	and	scrutiny,	a	model	of	public	and	private	partnership	may	perhaps	develop	which	offers	a	healthier	basis	 for	 promoting	 national	 champions”	 than	 the	 “alliance	 between	 the	 state	and	a	very	private	company”	had	proven	in	the	“problematic”	Goodman	case.46		 Reynolds,	 considered	 a	 particularly	 strong	 advocate	 of	 private	 enterprise,	defended	 state	 companies,	 urging	US	 investors	not	 to	 shun	but	 engage	 in	 joint	ventures	 with	 them.	 Selling	 state	 companies	 would	 only	 occur	 where	“warranted”	 as	 government	 saw	 “the	 State	 sector	 continuing	 as	 an	 important	influence	 on	 the	 Irish	 economy”.	 While	 Haughey	 had	 pioneered	 semi-state	commercialisation,	 and	 insisted	 on	 commercial	 criteria,	 his	 reputation	 as	 a	disciple	of	privatisation	has	no	basis.	He	agreed	to	the	“principles”	produced	by	the	 CRC,	which	were	 incorporated	 verbatim	 into	 the	 follow-on	 agreement,	 the	PESP,	and	would	govern	state	policy	on	the	sector	for	the	next	decade.47		 The	restructuring	of	Irish	Sugar	involved	undoubted	insider	trading	by	senior	executives,	 leading	to	a	major	scandal	 in	which	Haughey	forced	them	to	resign.	Related	though	unfounded	accusations	were	made	in	the	case	of	UCD’s	purchase	of	Carysfort	College	and	the	purchase	by	Telecom	of	new	headquarters.	Haughey	was	not	 involved	 in	 these	 transactions,	and	publicly	 forced	 those	 implicated	 to	resign,	 but	 a	 hostile	media	 continued	 to	 insinuate	 his	 central	 role	 in	 a	 corrupt	“golden	circle”	enriching	 itself	at	 the	public’s	expense.	Spring,	 in	an	outburst	of	moral	outrage,	spoke	of	an	“evil	spirit	that	controls	one	political	party”,	a	“cancer	…	 eating	 away	 at	 our	 body	 politic”	 threatening	 “to	 corrupt	 the	 entire	 political	system”.	The	“virus	which	has	caused	that	cancer”	was	the	Taoiseach,	Charles	J.	Haughey.	 In	 reality,	 these	 various	 “affairs”	 were	 arguably	 inevitable	consequences	of	state-sector	commercialisation	and	the	business	relationships	it																																																									45		 ‘Public	Enterprise	–	Progress	Report’:	ICTU	EC	mtg.	19/09/90,	item	1986;	ICTU	AR	1991:	53-5	46		 IT	26/10/90	47		 Reynolds,	‘Address	to	the	Sheridan	Circle’,	Washington,	25/09/90,	GIS:	D/Finance;	reputation,	Sweeney	2004;	“Principles”	in	ICTU	AR	1991:	53-4	and	PESP,	Section	V	(89-90),	1991	
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created,	 a	 policy	 endorsed	 by	 all	 Dáil	 parties.	 While	 Haughey	 was	 certainly	acquainted	with	many	of	 those	 involved,	not	only	have	 figures	such	as	Michael	Smurfit	continually	denied	unethical	behaviour	and	never	been	prosecuted,	but	no	direct	involvement	by	Haughey	has	ever	been	established.48		 Even	 if	 overshadowed	 by	 this	 political	 theatre,	 ICTU’s	 agreement	 with	Haughey	on	the	semi-states	was	a	major	achievement,	guaranteeing	for	a	decade	a	strong	role	in	economic	development	for	an	expanding	state	sector.	ICTU	had	few	 illusions	 about	 state	 companies,	 and	 in	 its	 planning	 for	 a	 post-PNR	agreement	distinguished	internally	between	the	“good	ones”	and	the	“disasters”,	focusing	 its	 expansion	 plans	 on	 the	 former.	 It	 combined	 this	 realism	 with	 a	strategy	of	deepening	worker	participation	at	board	and	sub-board	level,	a	great	expansion	 of	 which	 it	 achieved	 under	 PNR/PESP,	 and	 established	 sectoral	networks	 of	 worker	 directors	 and	 business	 management	 training	 for	 them.	Another	new	strategy	first	floated	by	Cassells	to	resolve	problems	at	TEAM	Aer	Lingus	saw	ICTU	trade	cooperation	in	restructuring	for	employee	shareholdings,	a	strategy	that	would	expand	in	the	following	years.49		
	
Planning	the	transition:	towards	a	new	Agreement			 The	major	 dramas	 and	 crises	 of	 social	 partnership	during	1990	occurred	 in	the	Government-ICTU	relationship	because,	by	and	large,	the	other	stakeholders	had	come	to	terms	with	the	new	system,	having	secured	their	interests	within	it.			 For	employers,	fears	of	union	indiscipline	on	pay	had	proven	unfounded	and	the	 economic	 take-off	 and	 growing	 profitability	 had	 obviated	 their	 previous	obsessive	 determination	 to	 prevent	 minimum	 PNR	 pay	 rates	 becoming	 an	established	“norm”	across	 industry.	PNR	rates	were	now	widely	conceded.	The	tax/pay	 formula	 had	 delivered	 take-home	 pay	 increases	 of	 over	 7	 per	 cent,	 of	which	over	half	was	contributed	by	 the	state	 through	 tax	reform.	The	PNR	pay	system,	Turlough	O’Sullivan	of	FIE	recalled,	had	proven	to	be	a	“no	brainer”.	The	business	 lobby,	CII,	enthusiastically	engaged	 in	 the	economic	planning	afforded																																																									48		 “scandals”,	Ryle-Dwyer	1992:	152-60;	Spring	in	Ryle-Dyer	1992:	149-50	49		 “good	ones/disasters”,	ICTU,	h/w	notes,	“Pay	Negotiations”,	Oct.	1990,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	“participation”,	ICTU,	‘Specific	areas	for	discussion	with	Government	on	a	PESD’,	18/10/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	‘PESD,	Working	Group	on	Semi	States	1990’,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG	[Folder	4050-8];	ICTU	AR	1991:	53;	Cassells	in	‘Conference	on	profit/gain	sharing’,	IRN	Report,	15/11/90;	Sweeney	2004	
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by	 partnership,	 influencing	 Irish	 EEC	 and	 FDI	 strategy	 and	 co-shaping	 the	programmes	 of	 the	 NDP	 through	 large	 social	 and	 infrastructural	 programmes,	private	sector	participation	in	structural	fund-financed	projects	and	the	opening	to	 pursue	 radical	 regulatory	 liberalisation	 under	 the	 Single	 Market.	 Liam	Connellan,	warning	of	international	pressures	on	the	economy	and	with	Britain,	“our	 largest	 trading	 partner”,	 in	 “near	 recession”	 as	 Sterling	 “plummeted”,	praised	 “the	 consensus”	 of	 the	 PNR	 for	 creating	 “a	 climate	 of	 confidence	 and	stability”,	its	impact	“more	pronounced	each	year”.50		 Farming	 bodies	 for	 their	 part	 depended	 on	 government	 to	 minimise	 CAP	reform	 at	 EC	 level	 and	 tax	 reform	 at	 home,	 and	 made	 their	 peace	 with	partnership	 as	 the	 framework	 for	 pursuing	 policy	 goals.	 With	 their	 scope	 for	manoeuvre	thus	limited,	Haughey	gave	some	of	their	demands	short	shrift.	When	they	complained	of	“inequities”	for	farmers	in	proposed	inheritance	tax	reforms,	he	 suggested	 they	 “submit	details	of	 cases	 to	 illustrate	 their	points”,	 and	when	they	warned	 that	 applying	 property	 tax	 to	 farms	 “would	 raise	 the	 question	 of	IFA’s	 continued	 participation	 in	 the	 PNR”,	 he	 directed	 them	 to	 the	 Expert	Committee	 on	 local	 taxes.	 When	 they	 sought	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 business	expansion	 scheme	 to	 farms,	 he	 retorted	 that	 “IFA	 might	 consider	 such	 farm	enterprises	 establishing	 as	 companies,	 thus	 qualifying	 in	 principle	 for	 the	Scheme”,	as	mushroom	farms	had	done.	The	IFA	had	little	option	but	to	stay	and	fight	its	corner	within	partnership.51			 The	high-point	of	the	Haughey	government	was	its	widely	praised	Presidency	of	the	then	12-member	EC	in	January-June	1990.	Haughey	used	it	to	promote	the	Irish	partnership	model,	which	he	described	to	EC	leaders	as	“a	socio-economic	policy	consensus,	unique,	I	think,	in	Europe”,	showcase	Ireland	as	a	serious	and	successful	 state,	 and	 pursue	 the	 NESC	 strategy	 of	 close	 alignment	 with	 the	Franco-German	EMU	project	and	social	model	to	maximise	regional	 investment	distribution	under	the	Delors	Plan.	His	role	was	epitomised	in	his	leadership	on																																																									50		 PNR	rates	generally	conceded,	ICTU	1990g	;	“no	brainer”,	Interview	Turlough	O’Sullivan;	CII	“worked	the	planning	system”,	Connellan,	CII,	to	Teahon,	‘CRC	Job	Creation	Committee’,	15/01/90,	and	CII,	‘Proposal	to	Create	Additional	Third	Level	Places	in	Private	Educational	Institutions’,	DTA:	S25857-Z1;	Connellan	“warning”,	CII,	‘Address	by	Liam	Connellan,	Director	General,	CII,	at	Bray	Chamber	of	Commerce’,	23/04/90,	Power	Papers,	Sligo	IT	Archive	51		 ‘Report	of	Meeting	of	Taoiseach	and	Ministers/F,	A&F	and	Env.	with	Deputation	from	IFA’	04/10/89,	DTA:	S25899-B	[folder:	‘EEC	Aspect’]	
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German	 unification,	 which	 reaped	 rich	 dividends	 for	 Ireland.	 A	 British	 TUC	leader,	addressing	the	ICTU,	marvelled	at	the	influence	Irish	unions	had	achieved	in	national	policy	and	praised	Ireland’s	EC	Presidency	which,	“spurred	on	by	this	Congress”,	 had	adopted	a	progressive	 social	policy	 agenda.	Referring	 to	Ahern,	she	said,	“I	don’t	think	you	really	appreciate	how	refreshing	it	was	to	be	able	to	talk	 with	 a	 person	 in	 power	 with	 such	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	 interdependence	between	economic	success	and	social	progress”.52			 Despite	 ICTU’s	 internal	conflicts,	Haughey	and	his	circle	 repeatedly	declared	their	 desire	 to	 achieve	 a	 successor	 agreement	 and	 institutionalise	 social	partnership:	 “we	 need	 only	 look	 to	 …	 Germany	 with	 its	 long	 tradition	 of	consensus	to	see	the	value	of	harnessing	all	interests	…	for	the	common	good”,	he	told	the	ITGWU.	While	addressing	new	issues,	any	new	deal	should	continue	the	“principles”	of	the	PNR.	Social	partnership,	he	told	his	Árd	Fheis,	was	“a	national	pearl	of	great	price”	which	“we	must	hold	onto”.	Ahern,	warning	that	as	a	“small	open	economy	…	we	cannot	afford	any	domestically	generated	policy	mistakes”,	and,	using	ICTU’s	proposed	title,	advocated	a	new	“programme	for	economic	and	social	development”	(PESD)	continuing	the	“basic	principles”	of	the	PNR.53			 In	 preparing	 for	 the	 September	1990	 special	 conference	 (SDC)	 to	 decide	 on	whether	 to	 enter	 talks	 on	 a	 successor	 agreement,	 ICTU	 leaders	 exploited	government	eagerness	for	a	positive	outcome	to	have	outstanding	issues	under	the	 PNR	 resolved	 and	 had	 the	 CRC	 issue	 another	 Progress	 Report	 on	 the	“achievements	of	 the	PNR”.	At	 the	 ICTU	Executive	 they	 secured	a	decision	 that	only	delegates	representing	memberships	in	the	Republic	could	attend	and	vote.	ICTU	identified	its	priorities	as	further	tax	reform,	the	expansion	and	reform	of	public	 services,	 a	 range	 of	 equality	 policies,	 a	 “major	 assault	 on	 long-term	unemployment”	 and,	 critically,	 some	 limited	 local	 pay	 bargaining.	 Government	assisted	 them	by	meeting	demands	on	 “unresolved	 issues”,	making	 last-minute	concessions	 on	 teacher	 recruitment	 and	 reforms	benefiting	 part-time	workers.																																																									52		 “promotes	partnership”,	Haughey,	‘Address	to	the	European	Round	Table	at	Dromoland	Castle’,	13/05/90,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	“rich	dividends”,	Eamon	Delaney,	‘German	support	for	Irish	on	Brexit	is	payback	time	to	British’,	Irish	Central,	08/04/19;	TUC	leader,	ICTU	ADC	1990:	87-8	53		 Haughey	on	successor	programme,	Dáil,	15/12/89;	speech	to	ITGWU,	Haughey,	‘Speech	at	dinner	to	mark	winding	up	of	the	ITGWU,	29/12/89,	GIS:	D/Taois	;	to	Árd	Fheis,	Haughey,	‘Taoiseach’s	address	to	Fianna	Fáil	Árd	Fheis’,	07/04/90,	DTA:	S25858-Z3;	Ahern,	‘Speech	to	annual	conference	of	CPSU,	Tralee’,	19/05/90	and	‘Speech	at	annual	conference	of	MSF	Union’,	10/03/90,	GIS:	D/Labour	
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The	 SDC	 gave	 ICTU	 a	 strong	 70	 per	 cent	mandate	 (218/114)	 to	 enter	 talks.	 A	further	SDC	in	February	1991	would	decide	on	the	proposals	that	emerged.54		 With	 this	mandate	 and	 a	 government	 keen	 for	 a	 new	programme,	 Congress	drafted	an	ambitious	agenda,	 stipulated	 the	 joint	policy	 “working	groups”	with	government	which	 should	 be	 formed	 and	 the	 structures	 of	 a	 new	 “PESD”,	 and	sought	 a	 meeting	 with	 Haughey.	 The	 day	 before	 this	 meeting,	 it	 published	 its	plan,	 Ireland	 1990-2000:	 A	 Decade	 of	 Development,	 Reform	 and	 Growth.	 This	accepted	a	continuation	of	the	monetary	and	macro-economic	framework	of	the	PNR,	 but	 focused	 also	 on	 “underdeveloped”	 “social	 rights”	 and	 institutional	weaknesses:	 “we	 have	 a	 big	 State	 but	 a	 weak	 State”.	 It	 advocated	 a	 10-year	framework	with	 successive	 3-year	 agreements	 under	 it.	 The	 aim	 should	 be	 to	achieve	EC	standards	of	living,	a	“total	restructuring	of	our	social	services”	and	“a	modern	efficient	social	market	economy	…	similar	to	Germany”,	at	that	time	the	model	European	social	democracy,	to	which	Haughey	too	aspired.55			
Completing	the	blueprint:	NESC	and	the	10-year	“PESP”		 Negotiations	 and	 policy	 formation	 for	 the	 new	 agreement	 progressed	similarly	to	1987	through	joint	policy	groups	and	bilateral	government/partner	meetings.	As	in	1987	ICTU	initiated	and	determined	much	of	the	structure.	But	it	was	also	different,	in	stakeholder	input	being	far	more	organised	and	concerted,	party	 political	 opposition	 mooted	 or	 blunted,	 and	 employers,	 business	 and	farmers	 fare	 more	 willing	 to	 engage.	 Government	 proposals	 to	 continue	 the	“principles”	 of	 the	 PNR	 and	 its	 macro-economic/industrial/social	 policy	structure,	 though	 with	 some	 new	 socio-economic	 aims,	 was	 widely	 accepted.	ICTU	 established	 a	 17-member	 “negotiating	 team”	 which,	 unlike	 1987,	 and	 as	leverage	 towards	 securing	 a	 local	 pay	 clause,	 included	 representatives	 of	 anti-
																																																								54		 ICTU	EC	mtg.	12/09/90,	item	1955.	ICTU	Archive:	EC	minutes.	‘CRC.	Summary	Report	of	28th	Meeting	19/07/90’,	h/w	notes	of	CRC	mtg.	19/07/90,	and	O’Donovan	ICTU	to	Dignam	D/Taoiseach,	13/07/90,	and	Dignam	to	Secretary	[Ó	hUiginn],	18/07/90,	re	‘Item	3	–	Unresolved	issues	under	the	Programme’,	DTA:	S25857-Z8;	Corr.	ICTU/TUI/CRC,	inc.	Ó	hUig	to	Fitzpatrick	TUI	6/09,	and	Fitzpatrick	to	Cassels	26/09/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	CRC,	‘Programme	for	National	Recovery:	Summary	of	Achievements’,	Sept.	1990,	and	Ahern	to	Cassells,	18/09/90,	with	h/w	note:	“Confidential”,	S25857-Z9;	ICTU,	‘Executive	Council	to	seek	approval	to	open	talks	on	new	Programme’,	n.d.	[19/09/90]:	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2	55		 ICTU	proposals,	Cassells	to	Haughey,	28/09/90.	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2	and,	‘Congress	to	seek	early	meeting	with	Government’,	IT	27/09/90;	Ireland	1990-2000,	ICTU	1990h;		
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PNR	craft	unions	who	had	been	outside	the	1987	talks.	 It	 formed	a	range	of	 its	own	policy	sub-groups	of	ICTU	officers	and	trainers	to	compile	policies.56			 Haughey	 welcomed	 ICTU’s	 “concept	 of	 a	 ten-year	 strategy	 within	 which	programmes	for	a	period	of	years	would	be	agreed”,	as	well	as	its	proposals	for	the	structure,	issues	and	even	name	of	the	putative	agreement.	He	met	employer	groups	 and	 farmers	 too,	 who,	 as	 with	 ICTU,	 declared	 in	 joint	 statements	with	government	 their	 “general	 agreement	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 new	programme	and	 a	 commitment	 to	 seek	 successfully	 to	 negotiate	 one”.	 Though	 not	 a	negotiating	partner,	the	CII	also	urged	that	a	new	deal	be	achieved.57			 As	Rory	O’Donnell	later	remarked,	an	essential	“glue”	of	partnership	on	which	all	else	rested	was	a	realistic,	workable	deal	on	pay.	The	FIE’s	primary	objective	was	to	keep	costs	to	business	 low,	with	“a	sensible	arrangement	on	pay”	based	on	continued	“tax	relief”.	It	would	accept	an	agreement	“on	the	right	terms”,	but	any	initiative	on	worker	participation	in	company	decision-making	must	involve	a	 voluntary	 framework,	 and	 it	 would	 accept	 no	 restrictions	 on	 “contract	workers”.	 This	was	 a	 response	 to	 ICTU	who	 again	 sought	 a	 national	minimum	wage,	restrictions	on	employers	pressurising	workers	to	become	self-employed	“contractors”,	and	a	clause	enabling	some	degree	of	additional	local	bargaining.58			 Government’s	 eagerness	 for	 an	 agreement	 saw	 it	 set	 the	 pace	 on	 pay,	committing	 early	 to	 forgo	 a	 pay	 pause,	 and	 agreeing	 to	 a	 similar	 approach	 to	“special	 awards”	 as	 under	 the	 PNR,	 though	 again	 with	 certain	 conditions	 and	deferrals.	Internally	it	planned	for	a	public	pay	bill	increase	of	9	per	cent	in	1991.	ICTU,	 facing	 “very	 high	 expectations”	 due	 to	 the	 “build	 up”	 of	 special	 claims,	accepted	government’s	phasing	proposals	linked	to	budgetary	constraints,	given	its	concession	on	a	pay	pause.	The	final	package	would	depend	on	its	tax	aspect,	and	on	this	 the	ritual	budget	dance	was	played	out,	Reynolds	warning	of	 “little																																																									56		 ‘Membership	of	Negotiating	Group	on	a	PESD’;	‘PESD	-	First	Meeting	of	Negotiating	Group	on	02/10/90,	Agenda’,	n.d.;	‘Specific	Areas	for	discussion	with	Government	on	a	PESD’,	n.d.;	Cassells,	‘to	Each	Member	of	the	Negotiating	Group,	Re.	Meeting	with	Government	Monday	8	Oct.	1990’,	03/10/90;	[Cassells],	‘Meeting	with	Government/Briefing	Notes	for	President’,	n.d.	[for	mtg.	08/10/90];	ICTU,	‘[Press]	Briefing	on	Negotiations	on	PESD’,	08/10/90;	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2	57		 Haughey	“welcomes”,	Dáil,	31/10/90;	meetings,	‘Joint	Government/ICTU	Statement’,	08/10/90,	‘Joint	Government/CII,	FIE	and	CIF	Statement’,	08/10/90;	‘Joint	Government/IFA,	ICOS,	ICMSA,	Macra	na	Feirme	Statement,	10/10/90,	in	GIS:	D/Taoiseach,;	Haughey	to	Cassells,	03/10/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	CII,	Quarterly	Review,	Oct.	1990;	‘Compensation	for	oil	hike	not	on:	CII’,	Irish	Independent,	19/10/90	58		 O’Donnell	and	Thomas	1998:	132;	FIE	Bulletin,	Nov.	1990;	ICTU,	internal,	‘Pay	and	Conditions	of	Employment’,	n.d.,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1	
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room	for	…	reductions”,	ICTU	threatening	that	without	“radical	tax	reform”	there	would	be	“no	pact”,	farming	organisations	complaining	of	pubic	pay	undermining	the	 national	 finances,	 and	 Haughey	 intervening	 to	 “pledge”	 “significant”	 tax	reform.	 A	 crucial	 change	 was	 linking	 public	 pay	 to	 a	 modernisation	 process,	introducing	 performance	 management	 that	 would	 develop	 over	 subsequent	years.	 Civil	 service	 unions	 welcomed	 this	 major	 structural	 reform	 and	 traded	cooperation	with	it	for	consultative	structures	and	“workplace	partnerships”.59			 On	 private	 sector	 pay	 ICTU	 noted	 how	 local	 arrangements	 for	 “add-on”	bonuses,	 productivity	 “allowances”,	 VHI	 benefits	 and	 service	 pay	 were	proliferating	in	strong	companies	under	the	PNR	as	direct	pay	rises	were	limited	under	 its	 terms.	These	benefits	 tended	 to	nullify	 the	catch-up	effect	of	 flat	 rate	increases	for	the	 lower	paid	 in	weaker	employments.	 It	continued	nevertheless	to	seek	a	national	minimum	wage	and,	short	of	that,	an	extension	of	JLCs	and	a	“voluntarily	agreed”	minimum	with	a	“Low	Pay	Unit”	to	monitor	pay	levels,	and	unions	 having	 recourse	 to	 the	 Labour	 Court	 for	 increases	 for	workers	 earning	below	this.	 ICTU	prioritised	a	 local	bargaining	clause,	both	to	meet	demands	of	workers	 in	 stronger	 industries	 and	 maintain	 shop-floor	 union	 activity.	 Any	arrangement,	 it	 decided	 internally,	 should	 ensure	 “maximum	 continuous	 local	involvement	in	negotiations	over	the	period	of	the	new	programme”.	Employers,	reversing	their	1987	position,	were	mainly	concerned	not	to	suppress	wages	but	prevent	 a	 costs	 spiral	 from	 local	 bargaining,	 and	 ICTU	 believed	 they	 would	accept	a	local	clause	“capped	in	some	way”.	Government	had	urged	employers	to	be	 prepared	 to	 concede	 some	 local	 bargaining	mechanism.	 A	 pay	 formula	was	finally	agreed,	combining	percentage	and	minimum	flat	rates	and	conditional	on	competitive	 conditions.	 It	 also	 allowed,	 “exceptionally”,	 for	 one-off	 additional	local	claims,	capped	at	3	per	cent	of	pay	costs	over	the	period	of	the	PESP.	Both																																																									59		 Plans	for	public	pay,	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Working	Group	with	ICTU	on	Pay	and	Conditions.’	01/12/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG;	ICTU	“expectations”,	Doc.,	no	title,	PSEU	to	ICTU,	17/11/90,	‘for	Public	Service	Committee’,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG,	‘Public	Service	Pay.	Position	at	end	of	meeting	on	05/12/90’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1	and	John	O’Dowd,	CPSU,	‘To	each	branch.	Re:	Pay	Aspects	of	PESD’,	16/01/1991,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	on	Reynolds,	ICTU,	IFA	and	Haughey	interventions,	‘IFA/ICMSA	views	in	relation	to	Macro-Economic	Stability	in	the	new	PESD’,	28/11/90,	O’Sullivan,	D/Taoiseach,	‘Working	Group	with	ICTU	on	Pay	and	Conditions’,	01/12/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG;	‘Tax	reform	or	no	pact:	unions’,	Irish	Independent,	19/10/90;	‘ICTU	warns	tax	reform	needed	in	economic	plan’,	Irish	Times,	19/10/90;	‘New	deal	will	include	tax	reform	pledge	–	Taoiseach’,	Irish	Independent,	22/10/90;	on	“performance”	system,	PSEU	to	ICTU,	doc.	on	pay	strategy,	no	title,	30/11/90,	and	‘Memorandum	of	Understanding	on	the	Operation	in	the	Public	Sector	of	Clause	[X]	of	the	Agreement	on	Pay	which	forms	part	of	the	PESD’,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG;	PESP,	Annex	1	to	Appendix	A	
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employers	 and	 government	 rejected	 a	 statutory	 NMW,	 but	 agreed	 to	 the	Employer-Labour	 Council	 investigating	 acceptable	minimum	 levels,	 and	 to	 the	Labour	Court	taking	these	“into	consideration”	in	assessing	claims.60			 The	non-pay	aspects	of	the	programme	were	drafted	in	joint	working	groups,	as	in	1987,	with	tax	reform	again	to	the	fore.	Their	proposals	fed	into	a	“central	team”,	headed	by	Kirwan	for	ICTU	and	Ó	hUiginn	for	government.	The	CII	were	again	 active,	 submitting	 industrial	 policy	 and	 competitiveness	 proposals.	 The	framework	of	the	PESP,	while	anticipated	in	ICTU’s	Decade	of	Development,	was	provided	by	the	new	report	agreed	by	the	social	partners	at	the	NESC,	A	Strategy	
for	the	Nineties.	In	1989	Haughey	had	requested	it	to	produce	a	strategic	study	as	the	basis	for	a	post-PNR	agreement,	as	its	1986	Report	had	been	for	the	PNR.	The	new	 strategy	was	drafted	by	NESC	 economist,	 Rory	O’Donnell,	 and	negotiating	each	 chapter	 dominated	 the	 NESC	 agenda	 throughout	 1990.	 A	 consensus	emerged	 on	 a	 10-year	 programme	 continuing	 the	 monetary/industrial	 policy	framework	of	 the	PNR	but	adding	a	 radical	programme	of	 structural	 reform	to	modernise	social	provision	and	policy-making	and	service	delivery	institutions.61			 In	 addition	 to	 a	 study	 to	 underpin	 a	 post-PNR	 agreement,	 Haughey	 also	strengthened	the	NESC,	upgrading	the	civil	service	presence	when	appointing	a	new	council	 in	 summer	1989	by	having	department	 secretaries	 rather	 than,	as	heretofore,	assistant	secretaries,	represent	government.	 In	a	 further	 innovation	he	 invited	 the	 European	 Commission	 to	 appoint	 an	 advisory	 “observer”	 to	 the																																																									60		 On	“add-ons”,	ICTU,	memo,	no	title,	re	low	pay/NMW,	n.d.	[Nov.	90],	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG,	Barbara	Kelly,	SIPTU,	to	Bill	Attley,	‘Post-PNR	(30th	Round)	Settlements’,	17/12/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG	and	ICTU	EC	mtg.	18/09/90,	item	1955;	“low	pay”	strategy,	ICTU,	‘Working	Group	on	Pay	and	Conditions.	Low	Pay.	Proposals	for	a	National	Minimum	Wage’,	23/11/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	“continuous	local	involvement”,	[Cassells],	‘Mtg.	with	Government/Briefing	Notes	for	President’,	n.d.	[08/10/90],	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	“capped	in	some	way”,	‘Working	Group	on	Pay/Conditions,	Briefing	Note	for	Meeting’	of	23/11/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	“government	urges	employers”,	‘Conclusions	of	Inter-Departmental	Committee	Meeting	on	8	December	1989	re.	Point	12	of	ICTU	Plan’,	DTA:	S25857-Y;	“capped	at	3	per	cent”,	ICTU,	‘Meeting	on	Pay	and	Conditions,	17	Dec.	1990	-	Statement	by	Chris	Kirwan’,	17/12/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PWG	and	PESP,	Appendix	A;	“take	into	consideration”,	ICTU	AR	1991:	43	61		 ‘On	negotiation	system	and	working	groups,	‘ICTU.	Negotiations	on	PESD’	-	Response	to	ICTU	Framework	for	Discussions,	Broad	Outline	of	Issues,	Establishment	of	Working	Groups,	18/10/90,	ICTU,	‘Negotiations	on	PESD.	Working	Group	on	Tax	Reform’,	n.d.	[Oct.	1990],	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1,	ICTU,	‘Negotiations	on	PESD	-	WG	on	Tax	Reform’,	n.d.	[22/10/90],	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2,	ICTU	Press	Release,	‘No	Tax	Reform,	No	Programme’,	18/10/90;	on	CII	activity,	CII,	papers	for	Working	Groups	on	‘Competitiveness	and	Economic	Slowdown’	and	‘Economic	Cohesion	and	Regional	Development’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1,	[Cassells],	‘Meeting	with	Government/Briefing	Notes	for	President’,	n.d.	[08/10/90],	and	PSEU	[i.e.	Dan	Murphy]	to	ICTU,	‘PNR4	–	Structure	of	Discussions’,	15/10/90;	Decade,	ICTU	1990h	and	
Strategy	for	Nineties,	NESC	1990;	on	O’Donnell’s	role,	NESC	Council	Minutes,	16/06/89	and	27/07/90	and	‘Council	Meeting	17/11/89,	Briefing	for	Chairman’,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3	(Correspondence);	“consensus	emerges”,	NESC	Council	Meeting	17/11/89,	Briefing	for	Chairman’,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3	(Corr.)	and	‘Update	on	Workprogramme’,	21/12/90,	NESC	Archive,	Box	3c,	‘Meetings’	
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NESC.	Delors	nominated	a	figure	from	his	own	cabinet,	Joly	Dixon,	considered	his	“right-hand	 man	 on	 EMU”.	 These	 moves	 by	 Haughey	 further	 institutionalised	social	 partnership	 by	 integrating	 the	 top	 echelons	 of	 the	 state	 with	 the	 social	partners	in	the	planning	structure.	The	alliance	between	government	and	social	partners,	 Haughey	 declared,	 was	 “one	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 instruments	 of	progress	 this	 country	 has	 ever	 known”,	 an	 alliance	 “in	 effect	 between	government	 and	 people”.	 The	 significance	 of	 these	moves	was	 not	 lost	 on	 the	opposition,	 with	 John	 Bruton	 criticising	 them	 in	 the	 Dáil,	 especially	 the	appointment	 of	 Dixon	 and	 departmental	 secretaries	 who	 would	 now	 have	 to	answer	to	the	body	as	in	breach	of	the	Council’s	own	constitution.62			 The	NESC’s	470-page	Strategy	for	the	Nineties	was	completed	in	October	1990.	It	 advised	 continuing	 the	 monetary/fiscal	 “principles”	 of	 the	 PNR,	 with	 some	refinement,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 industrial	 strategy	 of	 growing	 selected	 large-scale	indigenous	companies,	especially	 in	the	food	sector,	 targeting	high	value-added	FDI	 and	 supporting	 start-ups.	 As	 Cliff	 Taylor	 noted,	 in	 this	 the	 NESC	was	 “re-visiting	territory	over	which	it	has	tramped	many	times	before”.	On	Europe	it	re-iterated	its	recommendations	in	Ireland	in	the	EEC	for	a	close	alliance	supporting	rapid	 integration,	 with	 large	 scale	 regional	 transfers	 to	 ensure	 “balanced”	growth,	 rapid	 implementation	 of	 policy	 changes	 required	 for	 EMU,	 and	 the	defence	of	national	interests	in	areas	such	as	farming	and	VAT	harmonisation.63			 The	 novel	 aspect	 of	 Strategy	 for	 the	Nineties,	however,	 was	 its	 far-reaching	proposals	 for	 structural	 reform,	 to	 be	 implemented	 over	 a	 decade,	 enhancing	state	 planning	 capacity	 and	 service	 delivery.	 Its	 proposals	 included	 a	 semi-autonomous	health	executive	agency	(later	 the	HSE),	re-structuring	the	Central	Bank	 to	 broaden	 its	 representational	 base,	 and	 a	 board	 to	 plan	 the	 national	finances	(later	 the	NTMA),	as	well	as	structural	changes	to	 improve	the	quality	and	 delivery	 of	 educational,	 industrial,	 social,	 labour	 market	 and	 local	government	 systems.	 It	 listed	 its	 policy	modernisation	 and	 social	 equity	 goals	and	proposed	keeping	tax	cuts	moderate	while	shifting	focus	to	widening	the	tax	base.	It	also	supported	a	strengthened	role	for	semi-state	industries,	with	further																																																									62		 On	Joly,	en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joly_Dixon	(accessed	20/03/19);	“most	powerful	instruments”,	Haughey,	‘Speech	at	Cáirde	Fáil	President’s	Dinner’,	04/12/1990,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	Bruton	in	Dáil,	30/01/91	63		 Taylor	in	Irish	Times	26/10/90;	NESC	view	in	NESC	1989	
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commercialisation,	 and	 privatisation	 where	 appropriate,	 and	 “area	 based	strategies”	to	tackle	long-term	unemployment	and	poverty.	It	also	recommended	strengthening	 “consensus-forming	 arrangements”	 to	 underpin	 partnership	 and	vitiate	 “populist	 policies”,	 and	 appealed	 for	 Ireland	 to	 look	 to	 successful	 small	states	 such	 as	 Austria,	 Denmark	 and	 Finland	 for	 appropriate	 models	 of	institutional	 reform,	 re-focusing	 “policy-learning	 and	 development	 towards	them,	and	away	from	more	traditional	points	of	comparison”,	i.e.	Britain.			 With	 the	NESC	report	as	 the	 framework,	 the	working	groups	of	government	and	 social	 partners	 fleshed	 out	 the	 details	 of	 a	 “Partnership	 for	 Economic	 and	Social	Progress”	(PESP).	The	result	was	bulkier	and	nearly	three	times	as	long	as	the	 PNR.	 As	 well	 as	 macro-economic	 principles	 and	 industrial	 strategies,	 it	covered	tax	reform,	employment	and	training,	agriculture,	combating	long-term	unemployment,	 and	 legislative	 reform.	 It	 continued	 the	 PNR	 target	 of	 20,000	new	 jobs	 per	 year,	 further	 tax	 compliance	 and	 enforcement	 measures,	 and	programmes	 to	 combat	 the	black	economy,	 expand	 the	welfare	 system,	 reform	the	health	service,	and	provide	for	disabled	people.	It	also	promised	a	Child	Care	Bill,	 improved	patient	and	consumer	rights	–	a	PD	priority	–	as	well	as	controls	on	drug	costs,	expanded	educational	provision	-	especially	 in	 further	education	and	 access	 for	 disadvantaged	 groups	 -	 expanded	 youth	 services,	 parental	involvement	 in	education,	measures	on	homelessness,	 increased	social	housing	(including	 through	 “innovative”	housing	association),	 traveller	accommodation,	strengthened	private	rented	tenants’	rights,	reform	of	the	legal	system,	overseas	aid,	 a	 second	 Council	 for	 the	 Status	 of	 Women,	 amendments	 to	 employment	equality	 legislation,	 a	 childcare	 initiative,	 a	 roads/transport	 plan,	 tourism,	marine	 development,	 an	 environmental	 action	 programme,	 arts	 and	 culture	initiatives,	new	apprenticeship	schemes,	horticulture	and	forestry	strategies	and	rural	 development.	 It	 also	 included	 a	 special	 section	 on	 the	 semi-states,	incorporating	the	CRC	“principles”	drafted	following	the	historic	Haughey/ICTU	deal	of	March	1990,	a	chapter	on	the	“EC	Dimension”,	and	the	establishment	of	local	partnership	companies	for	high-unemployment	areas.64	
																																																								64		 “flesh	out	details”,	working	group	papers	and	notes	of	discussions,	in	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1,	PN-2	and	PESP-PWG;	“final	form”,	PESP	1991	
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	 The	PESP	was	an	extraordinarily	detailed	programme,	far	more	so	than	either	the	PNR	or	the	Programme	for	Government.	Unlike	the	PNR,	it	incorporated	the	draft	 pay	 agreements,	 but	 maintained	 the	 mechanism	 of	 the	 Central	 Review	Committee	 (CRC)	 and	 committed	 to	 await	 the	 NESC’s	 review	 of	 partnership	institutions	before	proposing	changes	to	the	structures	of	participative	planning.		 ICTU	 strengthened	 its	 hand	 in	 the	 talks	 by	 again	 joining	 forces	 with	 the	Combat	Poverty	Agency	and,	with	the	support	of	other	“poverty”	NGOs,	issuing	a	joint	 programme	with	 CPA	 for	 “an	 all	 out	 effort	 …	 to	 wipe	 out	 the	 scandal	 of	poverty	in	Ireland	before	the	end	of	the	decade”.	This	centred	on	Commission	on	Social	 Welfare	 recommendations,	 a	 national	 minimum	 wage,	 a	 National	 Anti-Poverty	 Strategy	 and	 a	 “major	 assault	 on	 long-term	 unemployment”	 through	“area-based	 strategies”	 and	 a	 “Community	 Development	 Programme”.	 All	 of	these	would	ultimately	be	achieved,	by	1997,	though	some	already	in	the	PESP.65			 ICTU	also	attempted,	less	successfully,	to	build	political	support	for	the	PESP.	While	 Fine	 Gael	 expressed	 support	 for	 “the	 overall	 approach	 outlined	 by	Congress	as	a	basis	 for	discussion”,	 it	sought	reform	of	the	partnership	process	itself,	 especially	 “some	 format	…	 to	 involve	 the	 Parliamentary	 Opposition	 as	 a	normal	 feature	 of	 this	 process”	 so	 that	 agreed	 strategies	 could	 continue	“regardless	 of	 changes	 of	 government”.	 This	 at	 least	 indicated	 that	 while	 Fine	Gael	sought	structural	reforms,	it	no	longer	opposed	social	partnership	per	se.66			 The	 ICTU	Executive	endorsed	the	 final	draft	and	recommended	 it	 in	 January	1991	balloting	by	member	unions.	A	 special	 conference	on	21	February	would	decide	its	final	position.	While	endorsement	procedures	varied	between	unions,	with	some	craft	groups	relying	solely	on	an	executive	decision,	the	large	general	and	 public	 service	 unions	 organised	 secret	 ballots.	 The	 executive	 of	 the	 new	60,000-member	public	service	union,	IMPACT,	formed	by	a	fusion	of	the	LGPSU	and	 UPTCS	 (and	 later	 the	 IMETU),	 agreed	 by	 large	 majority	 to	 recommend	acceptance	of	 the	PESP	as	 it	offered	 the	 “best	achievable”	 terms,	preserved	 the																																																									65		 On	the	ICTU-CPA	alliance,	Press	Release,	‘ICTU	meets	Combat	Poverty	Agency	on	Government	Talks:	Broad	Agreement	on	what	is	needed	to	tackle	poverty’,	09/10/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2,	ICTU,	h/w	notes,	‘PESD’,	n.d.	(Oct.	1990),	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1,	‘ICTU.	Specific	areas	for	discussion	with	Government	on	a	PESD’,	18/10/90;	ICTU,	‘Working	Group	on	Jobs,	Meeting	with	Government,	24	Oct	1990’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2,	and	ICTU,	‘Working	Group	on	Social	Services	-	Health,	Meeting	with	Government,	23/10/90.	Agenda’,	‘Negotiations	on	a	PESD,	Working	Group	on	Social	Services,	31/10/90’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1	66		 Jim	Mitchell	TD	to	Cassells,	17/10/90;	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2	
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“freedom	to	pursue	grade	claims”	and	progressed	many	“Trade	Union	social	and	economic	 aspirations”.	 Its	 members	 voted	 by	 over	 70	 per	 cent	 in	 favour,	 a	majority	 replicated	 in	 other	 public	 sector	 unions.	 In	 often	 difficult-to-organise	workplace	or	union	hall	ballots,	SIPTU	members	voted	60:40	per	cent	in	favour	on	a	50	per	 cent	poll.	The	 largest	unions	 thus	 committed	 to	 the	 ICTU	position.	Opposition	unions	such	as	the	ATGWU	urged	a	“no”	vote	on	traditional	grounds,	craft	unions	rejected	it,	and	a	“grass	roots”	movement	also	rallied	opposition.67			 In	the	Dáil,	and	in	some	contrast	to	when	the	PNR	first	faced	union	ballots	in	1987	and	a	 special	 conference	on	 continuing	with	 the	programme	 in	February	1990,	 this	 time	opposition	 leaders,	while	quibbling	with	government	economic	policy	and	aspects	of	the	partnership	system,	called	for	the	PESP	to	be	endorsed.	Labour’s	Ruairi	Quinn,	 though	not	his	party	 leader,	Dick	Spring,	who	remained	silent,	urged	support	for	both	the	NESC	plan	and	the	PESP.	Again	in	contrast	to	1987	and	1990,	the	ICTU,	at	its	special	conference	in	February	1991,	achieved	an	overwhelming	majority	of	224:109,	or	nearly	70	per	cent,	for	the	PESP.68			
	 A	 last	 minute	 hiccup,	 as	 always,	 provided	 for	 some	 final	 drama.	 In	recommending	 acceptance	 of	 the	 PESP,	 ICTU	 made	 this	 conditional	 on	 “a	satisfactory	 outcome”	 to	 a	 stand-off	 with	 the	 CIF	 over	 the	 application	 of	 the	PESP’s	 local	 bargaining	 clause	 in	 the	 construction	 industry.	 Building	 industry	leaders	complained	of	 ICTU’s	 “most	extraordinary	decision”	which	put	 it	 in	 the	“invidious	position”	of	being	responsible	for	the	fate	of	the	entire	agreement.	As	with	the	CIF’s	similar	last	minute	hesitation	in	1987,	it	finally	relented,	however,	and	a	special	“memorandum	of	understanding”	between	the	ICTU	and	CIF	on	the	application	of	the	local	bargaining	clause	was	appended	to	the	PESP.69																																																											67	 ICTU	recommendation,	ICTU	Special	EC	mtg.	17/01/91,	items	2059-61,	ICTU	Press	Release,	‘Programme	for	Economic	Progress	[sic]:	ICTU	Executive	Recommends	Acceptance’,	17/01/91,	and	Cassells	‘To	Each	Affiliated	Union	in	the	Republic’,	‘Notice	of	Special	Delegate	Conference,	Thursday	21	February	1991’,	21/01/91,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	IMPACT	and	public	service	position,	‘Minutes	of	Meeting	of	Joint	Executives	(LGPSU/UPTCS)’,	16/01/91,	‘Minutes	of	Inaugural	Meeting	of	CEC’,	04/02/91,	‘Minutes	of	Special	Meeting	of	CEC’,	18/02/91,	and	‘IMPACT:	Ballot	on	PESP_’,	n.d.	[January	1991],	IMPACT	Archive:	Meetings	of	the	CEC;	SIPTU	ballot,	Croke,	‘Trade	Union	Membership	Participation	in	Collective	Bargaining’,	IRN	Report,	14.01.1993;	opposition	unions	and	“grass	roots”	movement,	M.	O’Reilly,	Secretary,	ATGWU,	‘To	all	Members,	Branch	11/90’,	04/02/91,	and	anon.,	‘Trade	Unionists	and	Unemployed	Against	the	Programme’	[leaflet],	08/12/90,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2			68		 Ruairi	Quinn	in	the	Dáil,	19/02/91;	ICTU	vote,	ICTU	AR	1991:	48-9	69		 ICTU	Press	Release,	‘Programme	for	Economic	Progress:	ICTU	Executive	Recommends	Acceptance’,	17/01/9,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	Thomas	Reynolds,	Managing	Director,	CIF,	to	Peter	Cassells,	21/01/1991,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-2;	ICTU-CIF	“memorandum	of	understanding”,	PESP,	Annex	2	to	Appendix	A	
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Chapter	11	
Metamorphosis:	Economic	and	political	
consequences	of	the	PNR/PESP		
Prototype	Tiger:	towards	an	“economic	miracle”	
		 A	pre-planned	 transformation	of	 the	 Irish	economy	was	 implemented	under	the	 Haughey	 governments	 of	 1987-92,	 establishing	 the	 essential	 features,	trajectory	and	much	of	the	detail	of	the	economy	of	the	following	decade.	As	in	the	 previous	 critical	 transitions	 of	 the	 1930s	 and	 1960s,	 a	 maturing	 policy	consensus	 was	 adopted,	 adjusted	 and	 implemented	 by	 an	 activist	 Fianna	 Fáil	leadership.	 National	 economies	 can	 be	 steered	 by	 government	 policy,	 but	 will	necessarily	be	co-shaped	by	semi-autonomous	factors	such	as	inherited	financial	and	agricultural	 structures,	or	external	events	 such	as	 changes	 in	 international	trade	rules.	This	was	no	less	true	in	1987-92	than	in	the	earlier	transformations.				 The	PESP,	agreed	during	the	dramatic	events	immediately	following	the	fall	of	the	 Berlin	 Wall,	 re-committed	 to	 the	 PNR	 economy	 model,	 adding	 a	 10-year	frame	of	structural	transformation.	Given	the	new	global	turbulence	it	stated	its	“overriding	principle”	to	be	reducing	the	debt/GNP	ratio	to	75	per	cent	of	the	EC	average	 and	 “closing	 the	 gap”	 with	 EC	 living	 standards	 by	 2000.	 Consistent	progress	 towards	 these	 goals,	 it	 said,	 would	 boost	 business,	 consumer	 and	market	 “confidence”,	 driving	 investment.	 Ambitious	 infrastructure	 expansion	would	be	assisted	both	by	the	EC	and	the	private	sector.	It	backed	speedy	EMU,	though	balanced	by	policies	to	“suit	Ireland’s	social	and	economic	needs”.		 The	emerging	global	environment	impacted	immediately	on	the	“Irish	model”.	Ministers,	 including	 from	 the	PDs,	now	 fully	 in	 support	of	Haughey’s	 economic	strategy,	urged	firms	to	“grasp	the	immediate	opportunities”	opening	in	Eastern	Europe,	 especially	 through	 joint	 ventures	 with	 the	 mostly	 German	 companies	active	 there	 but,	 as	 Reynolds	 presciently	 noted,	 EMU	 might	 “well	 prove	 even	more	momentous”.	Ministers	portrayed	Ireland	as	the	EC	state	most	supportive	of	“expediting”	EMU,	insisting	that	the	“German	situation	not	delay	EMU”,	the	EC	“speed	up	…	integration	[to]	provide	a	stable	environment	in	a	changing	world”,	
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and	urging	that	global	trade	barriers	be	dismantled:	“As	a	small	and	totally	open	economy”,	 Ireland	needed	 “continuing	growth	 in	world	 trade	and	 the	on-going	integration	of	national	economies	into	the	global	economy”.1		 Monetary	 policy	 reduced	 the	 exchequer	 borrowing	 requirement	 (EBR)	 in	1990	to	a	fifth	of	its	1986	peak,	and	initially	the	industrial	policy	focus	of	the	PNR	was	maintained.	“The	main	focus	and	objective	of	Industrial	Policy”,	Industry	and	Commerce,	now	led	by	PD	minister	Des	O’Malley,	reiterated,	“is	to	build	strong,	internationally-trading	indigenous	industries”.	Despite	the	changes	of	1988-89,	it	still	saw	FDI	as	ancillary	to	this	objective,	providing	higher-value	production	and	“linkages”	to	Irish	firms.	Start-ups,	 though	only	with	export	potential,	would	be	supported	and	semi-states,	though	only	if	private	capital-led,	assisted	to	expand.2			 But	expanding	indigenous	export	industries,	the	“main	objective”	of	the	PNR,	became	the	Sorgenkind	of	national	policy,	as	described	in	chapter	8,	even	where	it	was	delivering	successes.	Despite	“a	vast	range	of	incentives	and	programmes”,	an	 internal	 analysis	 concluded,	 “the	 lack	 of	 innovation,	 limited	 management	capability	 and	 absence	 of	 good	 projects	 were	 constraining	 development”.	 It	would	 be	 “some	 years”	 before	 growth	 in	 the	 food	 sector	 would	 deliver	employment	 dividends.	 The	 Department	 bluntly	 titled	 another	 report	 “Poor	Response	from	Private	Sector	to	Job	Creation”.	The	problems	besetting	the	beef	industry,	described	in	chapter	8,	were	further	compounded	in	1990	by	the	BSE	crisis	 and	 the	Gulf	War.	Government	 secured	EC	 concessions	on	market	 access	and	 emergency	 intervention	 to	 prevent	 the	 industry	 collapsing,	while	 the	 CRC	established	 a	 crisis	 group	 on	 the	 industry,	 inducing	 government	 to	 provide	“working	capital”	and	increase	agency	supports	to	companies	facing	insolvency.3																																																												1		 “grasp	opportuntities”,	Des	O’Malley,	‘Speech	at	a	Forum	on	Economic	and	Trade	Links	with	Eastern	Europe’,	01/03/90	and	“more	momentous”,	Reynolds,	‘Address	to	IMI	National	Management	Conference,	Killarney’’,	28/04/90,	GIS:	D/I&C;	“expediting	EMU”,	Haughey,	‘Speech	by	the	Taoiseach	at	the	presentation	of	the	Sunday	Independent/Ulster	Bank	Business	of	the	Year	Awards’,	15/02/90,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	D/Finance,	‘Address	…	to	the	Committee	on	Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs	and	Industrial	Policy	of	the	European	Parliament,	Dublin	Castle,	28/02/90,	GIS:	D/Finance,	Reynolds,	‘Address	to	ETUC	at	Brussels’,	05/03/90,	GIS:	D/Finance	and	‘Address	to	Annual	Meeting	of	IMF	and	World	Bank	at	Washington’,	26/09/90,	GIS:	D/Finance.			2		 National	borrowing	“peak”,	Reynolds,	‘Address	to	the	closing	dinner	of	the	Annual	Conference	of	the	CII’,	23/02/90,	GIS:	D/Finance;	industrial	policy,	‘Brief	for	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	ICTU	23/1/1990,	‘ICTU	Plan,	Sharing	the	Benefits	-	Major	Review	of	Industrial	Policy’,	DTA:	S25862-F			3		 “vast	range	of	incentives”,	D/I&C,	‘Brief	for	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	ICTU	23/1/1990	-	Major	Review	of	Industrial	Policy’,	DTA:	S25862-F;	“poor	response”,	Paul	Bates,	D/I&C,	to	D/T,	encl.:	‘Poor	Response	from	Private	Sector	to	Job	Creation’,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25862-D;	CRC	on	beef	industry,	Cassells	to	Ó	hUiginn,	30/08/90,	and	‘Summary	Reports’	of	the	CRC	“Working	Group	on	the	Beef	Industry”,	Sept.-Oct.	1990,	
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	 A	further	problem	for	the	PNR	strategy	was	the	unanticipated	form	exporting	industries	took	in	exploiting	the	opening	global	economy.	Few	Irish	global	firms	had	existed	before	1987	but	many	now	emerged,	notably	in	dairy	foods	through	the	newly	incorporated	co-ops,	in	manufacturing	through	firms	like	Smurfit	and	Glen	 Dimplex,	 in	 construction	 through	 CRH	 and	 Sisk,	 and	 a	 range	 of	 others	 in	services.	 But,	 contrary	 to	 national	 strategy,	 and	 despite	 unprecedented	 state	supports,	 these	 new	 companies,	 as	 described	 in	 chapter	 8,	 were	 tending	 to	expand	through	“restructuring”	at	home	and,	by	exploiting	new	capital	openings,	through	profit-“off-shoring”	and	acquisitions	abroad.	While	contributing	to	value	growth,	 they	 were	 delivering	 little	 new	 employment.	 The	 sector	 also	 suffered	growing	reputational	damage	from	accusations	of	a	“culture”	of	corruption.	What	had	been	a	core	NESC	strategy	of	preferential	state	backing	for	promising	firms	was	increasingly	under	attack	as	“crony	capitalism”.4		 In	 this	 context	 of	 uneven	 performance,	 government	 examined	 its	 policy	options.	Haughey	admitted	in	late	1989	that	depending	on	large-scale	indigenous	industry,	while	successful	in	contributing	to	growth,	had	proved	“disappointing”	in	creating	jobs.	As	the	IDA	had	already	noted	the	previous	year,	it	was	more	the	neglected	small	 industry	sector,	mostly	new	service-focused	start-ups,	 that	was	demonstrating	 a	 “surprising	buoyancy”	 and	 “running	ahead	of	 expectations”	 in	both	expansion	and	new-job	creation,	accounting	for	a	quarter	of	all	jobs	growth.	The	 presence	 in	 cabinet	 of	 the	 PDs,	 champions	 of	 small	 business,	 assisted	 a	return	 to	supporting	 the	sector,	not	 least	 reforming	company	 law	 in	 its	 favour.	But	 it	was	 the	 previously	 downplayed	 FDI	 sector	which,	 following	 several	 key	government	policy	changes,	would	re-emerge	as	the	real	driver	of	growth.5			 As	already	noted,	FDI	had	performed	poorly	since	1980,	even	contracting	 in	the	mid-decade	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 the	 1950s.	 As	 the	 NESC	 and	 ESRI	 had	concluded	 in	 1982,	 from	 reports	 such	 as	 Telesis	 produced	 under	 Haughey’s	National	Understanding	of	the	time,	this	was	due	to	the	laissez-faire	FDI	strategy																																																																																																																																																															D/A&F,	‘CRC	-	Beef	Industry	Problems’,	11/09/90,	and	D/A&F	Note,	‘Draft	-	Outline	of	the	Current	State	of	the	Irish	Beef	Industry’,	D/A&F.	‘Outline	of	Paper	on	Beef	Industry’,	n.d.	(Sept.	1990),	and	Oifig	an	Aire	Talmhaiochta	agus	Bia,	‘Memorandum	for	Government	-	Farm	Income	Situation’,	12/09/90,	and	‘Summary	Report	of	Second	Meeting	on	Beef	Industry’,	19/09/90,	all	in	DTA:	S26694			4		 “culture”,	O’Toole	1994			5		 “disappointing”,	Haughey	in	Dáil	24/10/89;	IDA	assessment,	White,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N;	PD	effect,	O’Malley,	D.	2014:	184-6	
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of	the	Whitaker	era	having	run	its	course,	with	basic-production	firms	attracted	during	that	time	withdrawing	as	protectionist	benefits	ended.	Telesis	described	these	 FDI	 firms	 as	 having	 proved	 costly,	 unreliable	 and	 unsustainable,	 and	advocated	the	strategy	change	to	“picking	winners”	in	the	domestic	sector.	With	new	FDI	slowing	in	the	1980s	to	what	the	IDA	called	a	“trickle”,	the	1986	NESC	report	adopted	Telesis’s	proposals,	and	the	PNR	as	a	consequence	focused	on	the	potential	 of	 large	 indigenous	 industry,	 treating	 FDI	 as	 an	 ancillary	 element	though	targeting	it	to	high-end	sectors	to	drive	production	quality	and	linkages.	In	 line	with	 the	PNR	 focus,	 I&C	under	Reynolds	 initially	 scaled	 back	 attracting	new	FDI	in	favour	of	improving	export	capacity	among	the	900	FDI	firms	“still	in	Ireland”.	A	dominant	view	of	FDI	as	volatile	persisted,	and	after	Eastern	Europe	“opened”	 in	1989,	many	 feared	a	 further	exodus,	 this	 time	eastwards,	with	 the	CII	making	the	case	for	increased	business	incentives	to	counter	the	threat.6			 Haughey	and	the	Way	Forward	group,	however,	had	never	been	convinced	of	this	“ancillary”	view	of	FDI	and	while	fostering	large-scale	indigenous	industries,	continued	in	1987	to	champion	FDI,	much	to	the	IDA’s	relief.	FDI	revived	in	1988,	the	 EC	 attributing	 a	 new	 “substantial	 inward	 flow	 of	 capital”	 to	 the	 policy	stability	provided	by	the	PNR.	Besides	small	start-ups,	FDI	soon	proved	the	other	major	new-job	creator,	with	 the	 IDA	reporting	4,700	new	 jobs	 in	 the	sector	by	October,	 a	 net	 increase	of	 2,700,	with	 even	 existing	 companies	 in	 the	 Shannon	Zone	 expanding	 despite	 the	 imminent	 end	 of	 its	 special	 status.	 The	 IDA	 told	government	that	the	“criticism	of	overseas	industry”	had	proven	“misplaced”	and	Haughey	leveraged	his	“partnership”	with	Delors	to	secure	Commission	approval	to	 replace	 the	 zero	 export	 tax	 rate	with	 a	 low	 10	 per	 cent	 corporation	 tax	 on	manufactured	exports,	applicable	at	least	to	2000,	and	to	apply	the	same	rate	at	the	 IFSC.	 It	 was	 the	 immediate	 success	 of	 the	 changed	 focus	 of	 the	 IFSC	 to	managed	 funds	 in	 late	1988,	exploiting	an	early	reform	 in	capital	opening,	 that	proved	a	 turning	point.	While	 the	 IFSC,	 lampooned	by	political	 opponents	 as	 a	
																																																										6		 on	Telesis	and	1980s	strategies	see	chapter	7;	“trickle”	and	“still	in	Ireland”,	D/I&C,	‘Progress	in	the	Provision	of	Jobs’,	27/05/88,	DTA:	S25857-E;	CII	demands,	CRC,	‘Summary	Report	of	24th	Meeting’	12/03/90’,	h/w	notes	of	CRC	meeting	12/03/90,	and	IDA,	‘Developments	in	Eastern	Europe	–	Impact	on	Mobile	Industrial	Investment’,	for	CRC,	25/04/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z4			
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”white	elephant”,	still	only	involved	a	few	firms	employing	less	than	200,	it	now	began	to	grow,	achieving	2,000	employees	and	funds	of	over	£20bn	by	1992.7		 The	debate	on	EEC	strategy	at	the	NESC	in	1988	further	drove	policy	change.	The	CII	argued	that	while	EMU	opened	opportunities	for	exporting	industries,	it	could	generate	much	greater	FDI	if	Ireland	positioned	itself	as	“a	gateway	to	the	Single	 Market”	 for	 mobile	 investment,	 incentivising	 it	 through	 low	 taxes	 and	profit	repatriation	facilitated	by	double-taxation	rules,	and	by	liberalising	capital	movement	 ahead	 of	 competitor	 states,	 an	 approach	 Tony	 Ryan	 of	 GPA	 had	already	urged	 in	1987.	Haughey	had	 sensed	 the	potential	 of	 such	a	 strategy	 in	1986	 when	 observing	 the	 reaction	 of	 Irish-American	 financiers	 to	 Dermot	Desmond’s	proposal	for	the	IFSC.	The	same	policy	change	in	late	1988	which	led	to	 the	 “wave”	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 centre	 in	 early	 1989	was	 now	 also	 applied	 to	general	FDI	policy,	with	the	IDA	soon	reporting	how	FDI	“surged”	in	response	to	it	promoting	Ireland	as	a	“key	location	in	preparation	for	…	the	Single	Market”.	By	mid-1989,	I&C	predicted	a	“potentially	significant	surge”	in	inward	capital.8			 In	 the	 critical	 year	 to	 early	 1990,	 as	 the	 global	 economy	 opened,	 the	 IDA	brought	in	a	range	of	top	FDI	companies	on	the	basis	of	what	Reynolds	called	this	“unique	selling	point”,	including	Fujitsu,	Motorola	and	Isotec.	But	it	was	a	further	policy	change	proposed	by	inward	investors	themselves	that	completed	the	new	government	 FDI	 formula.	When	 Apple,	 the	 first	 US	 computer	 firm	 to	 locate	 in	Ireland,	employing	1,500	workers	and	contractors	in	Cork,	but	now	struggling	to	survive	 against	 rivals,	 threatened	 in	 1990	 to	 relocate	 to	 Singapore	 as	 the	 zero	export	rate	expired,	Haughey	and	his	officials	stretched	regulations	to	their	limit																																																											7		 “never	convinced”,	see	chapter	6;	“IDA’s	relief”,	interview	Pádraig	White;	EC	view,	‘President	Delors	on	the	Economic	and	Social	Development	of	Ireland	within	the	EC’,	28/10/88,	GIS:	D/Taois.;	on	new	FDI,	IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	and	D/I&C.	’20,000	Target	…	Progress	Report	of	Mid-Year’,	August	1988,	DTA:	S25857-G;	on	Shannon,	Bates,	D/I&C,	to	CRC,	Nov.	1989,	DTA:	S25862-D;	“misplaced”,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N	on	EC	approval	of	tax	rate,	D/I&C,	‘Review	of	Industrial	Performance	1990’,	n.d.	[Nov.	1989],	DTA:	S25862-D	and	David	Hanna	(IDA)	in	h/w	notes	of	CRC	mtg.	26/05/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z6;	on	IFSC	1988	“turnaround”,	see	chapter	7,	and	post-1989	IFSC	growth,	Reddan	2008				8		 	“gateway”,	Connellan	CII	to	Danaher,	NESC,	29/09/88,	‘Council	Meeting	16/12/88’,	NESC	Archive,	Box	2,	also	‘Address	by	Liam	Connellan	…	at	Bray	Chamber	of	Commerce’,	23/04/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z6;	“double	taxation”,	Con	Power,	‘US	Tax	and	Investment,	Four	Key	Issues’,	CII	Newsletter,	03/10/89;	GPA	proposal,	Peter	Denison-Edson,	Senior	VP,	GPA	Corp.	Affairs	Japan,	to	Dermot	Desmond	11/06/87,	DTA:	S25150-A;	FDI	“surged”,	IDA,	News	Release,	‘IDA	review	of	1988	and	outlook	for	1989’,	05/01/89	and	Minister	Ray	Burke,	‘PNR	Recovery	Job	Target	Exceeded	in	1988:	End-Year	Statement	on	Industry	Performance’,	29/12/88,	GIS:	D/I&C;	single	market	strategy,	‘Effects	of	Internal	Market	in	Inward	Investment’	encl	with	h/w	note,	from	Lonergan,	D/I&C,	to	Ó	hUiginn,	10/05/89,	DTA:	S25857-R;	“significant	surge”,	Seán	Dorgan	in	h/w	notes	of	CRC	‘Sub-Group	on	Job	Creation’,	28/06/89,	DTA:	S26122-A	
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to	 retain	 the	company.	They	agreed	 to	combine	 low	 tax	and	profit	 repatriation	with	 Apple	 investing	 its	 intellectual	 property	 (IP)	 in	 a	 “parent	 company”	 in	 a	non-tax	jurisdiction.	Profits	could	be	“repatriated”	to	this	entity	and	IP	royalties	offset	against	tax.	Apple	would	remain	in	Ireland,	quadrupling	its	workforce	over	the	 following	 decade,	 and	 the	 same	 package	 was	 offered	 to	 other	 technology	companies,	 laying	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 sector’s	 European	 base	 concentrating	 in	Ireland.	Government,	Ahern	told	the	CII,	also	secured	a	loosening	of	EC	double-	taxation	 rules	 “against	 considerable	 resistance	 from	states	with	 concerns”,	 and	convinced	the	US	to	defer	tax	repatriation	reform	for	a	decade.9			 The	 new	 strategy	 was	 soon	 vindicated	 following	 an	 EC-US	 agreement	 that	removed	 restrictions	 on	 microchip	 wafer	 technology	 transfer	 when	 the	 IDA	secured	its	“biggest	ever	investment	in	Irish	electronics”,	by	global	market	leader	Intel,	 with	 the	 promise	 of	 2,500	 jobs.	 The	 sector	 surged	 after	 this,	 and	would	soon	spawn	Irish	offshoots.	By	1993,	100,000	or	half	of	all	manufacturing	 jobs,	and	two-thirds	of	corporation	tax	income,	was	accounted	for	by	the	FDI	sector.	In	tandem	with	 the	new	FDI	 focus	 and	 to	 complement	 it,	 the	PESP	 inaugurated	 a	radical	expansion	of	third	level	technical	training	and	a	widening	of	access	to	it.	In	1990	Haughey	boasted	how	the	World	Competitiveness	Report	“rated	Ireland	first	 among	developed	countries	 in	 its	 ready	availability	of	 skilled	 labour”.	The	value	chain	began	 to	change,	with	employment	 in	software	exceeding	5,000	by	1991,	five	times	its	1985	level,	and	already	accounting	for	IR£600m	in	exports.10		 ICTU	 was	 not	 uncritical	 of	 this	 development,	 demanding	 that	 government	curb	low-tax	profit	repatriation	and	off-shoring	by	Irish	companies.	But	the	IDA	warned	government	that	 incentive	costs	and	“high	levels	of	repatriated	profits”	should	be	accepted	given	the	“actual	economic	activity”	and	“value	added	within	Ireland”	 they	 generated.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 therefore	 urged	 Haughey	 to	 resist	 ICTU’s	demands,	saying	FDI	was	now	the	best	hope	for	growing	corporate	revenue,	and																																																										9		 new	1989	FDI	companies,	CRC	1990;	“selling	point”,	Reynolds,		‘Address	at	a	seminar	on	the	Dublin	IFSC	organised	by	the	FSIA	and	IDA	in	Tokyo’,	14/05/90,	GIS:	D/Finance	Apple	“deal”,	Cliff	Taylor	and	Ian	Kehoe,	‘Apple	got	tax	deal	in	1990’,	Sunday	Business	Post,	26/05/2013;	‘A	deal	made	in	1991	paved	the	way	for	Apple's	current	tax	issue’,	Business	Insider,	30/08/2016;	Ireland	lobbies	EC,	Ahern,	‘Address	to	National	Council	Luncheon	of	the	CII’,	12/09/90,	GIS:	D/Labour	10		 On	Intel,	Haughey	in	the	Dáil	15/12/89,	Ahern,	‘Speech	to	Dublin	Chamber	of	Commerce’,	24/01/90,	GIS:	D/Labour,	O’Malley,	‘Intel	to	commence	£200m	microchip	wafer	fabrication	plant’,	07/06/90,	and	‘Biggest	ever	investment	in	Irish	electronics’,	03/10/89,	GIS:	D/I&C;	“rated	Ireland”,	‘Speech	by	the	Taoiseach	at	presentation	of	the	Sunday	Independent/Ulster	Bank	Business	of	the	Year	Awards’,	15/02/90,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	value	chain	and	software,	Power	2009:	198	
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“every	modern	open	economy	has	to	accept	the	problem	of	 international	profit	flows	…	All	that	can	be	done	is	to	remove	domestic	impediments	to	the	retention	of	such	profits	and	…	encourage	domestic	investment”.11		 As	Irish	industry	now	began	to	move	up	the	“value	chain”,	driven	by	FDI	firms,	basic	production	in	the	sector,	such	as	at	Dell,	Impact	and	Digital,	would	move	to	Asia	 or	 Eastern	 Europe,	 but	 such	 “losses”	were	 compensated	 by	 higher	 value-added	new	FDI	and	domestic	enterprises.	This	process	also	drove	a	rapid	growth	of	R&D	in	both	FDI	and	indigenous	companies,	rising	from	38	to	85	per	cent	of	the	EU	average	between	1985	and	1995,	surpassing	even	the	Netherlands.	Irish	long-term	 FDI	 strategy	 had	 thus	 essentially	 been	 put	 in	 place	 and	 already	delivering	dividends	by	1991.	A	pre-Keynesian	economy	was	being	successfully	re-engineered	as	a	financialised	one	at	the	forefront	of	the	global	economy.	What	was	occurring	was,	in	Con	Power’s	word,	nothing	short	of	a	“metamorphosis”.12		 The	 Industrial	 Policy	 Review	 sought	 by	 ICTU	 during	 the	 PNR	 review	 and	agreed	 in	 the	 PESP	 in	 1991	would	 result	 in	 the	 Culliton	Report	 of	 1992,	 often	portrayed	as	a	PD	initiative	as	it	appeared	under	Des	O’Malley	as	Minister	of	I&C.	But,	 with	 FDI	 policy	 now	 set,	 the	 PD	 influence	 certainly	 strengthened	 the	 re-orientation	of	strategy	in	Culliton	towards	small	business	start-ups.	The	change	of	focus	would	lead	to	a	spitting	of	the	IDA,	with	indigenous	industry,	start-ups	and	exporting	hived	off	 to	 “Enterprise	 Ireland”	 and	 its	 local	 enterprise	boards,	and	the	IDA	re-structured	to	focus	solely	on	attracting	further	FDI.13		 The	accord	 reached	by	Haughey	with	 ICTU	on	state	 industry	 in	March	1990	incorporated	that	sector	into	the	new	strategy,	likewise	setting	the	pattern	of	its	development.	Private	capital	input	led	to	expansions,	successes	and	failures.	No	actual	state	strategy	of	privatisation	was	adopted	until	the	1997	FF-PD	coalition,	in	 again	 changed	 global	 conditions,	 opted	 for	 such	 a	 course.	 Haughey,	 and	Reynolds	after	him,	kept	strictly	to	the	agreement	reached	with	ICTU	in	1990.		
																																																								11		 ICTU	demands,	ICTU	1989f	;	IDA	on	“repatriated	profits”,	on	“repatriated	profits”,	IDA	Ireland,	‘Review	of	IDA’s	Three	Business	Areas,	1988,’	05/01/89,	DTA:	S25857-N;	Ó	hUiginn	opposes	ICTU	demands,	‘Briefing	Material	for	Meeting	between	Taoiseach	and	Ministers	for	Finance,	I&C	and	Labour	with	Executive	Council,	ICTU,	23/01/90	-	Position	in	Relation	to	ICTU	30	Point	Plan’,	DTA:	S25862-F	12		 On	R&D	expansion,	Barry,	Bradley	and	O’Malley	1999:	54;	“metamorphosis”,	Power	2009	13		 Culliton	1992;	“PD	initiative”,	O’Malley,	D.	2014:	184;	on	IDA/EI,	IDA	AR	1993	
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	 This	emergent	new	economy	had	many	consequences	 for	social	partnership.	Intel	was	the	first	major	FDI	firm	to	insist	on	a	non-union	policy,	and	with	new	service	start-ups	also	outside	of	 traditional	union	territory,	 the	most	 important	sectors	of	the	economy	were	destined	to	develop	without	 little	union	presence.	This	accelerated	the	trend,	already	identified,	for	the	role	of	social	partnership	in	economic	policy	co-determination	to	decline	in	favour	of	welfare	state	building.			 In	 1990	 Haughey	 told	 his	 Árd	 fheis	 how	 the	 Irish	 recovery	 was	 being	“increasingly	 spoken	of	 internationally	 as	 a	minor	 economic	miracle”,	 and	 told	his	party	elite	that	as	a	result	“we	have	earned	a	new	respect	and	status	for	our	country	 among	 the	 nations	 of	 Europe	 and	 the	 world”.	 “Our	 achievements	 in	economic	management	 and	 success	 in	 transforming	 the	 economic	 outlook	 are	constantly	acclaimed	abroad”.	Fianna	Fáil	should	take	credit	for	this	and	“speak	out	 loudly	 about	 the	 miracle	 their	 Government	 brought	 about”.	 Given	 the	absence	of	a	supportive	media,	this	would	prove	a	forlorn	hope14	
	
Template	for	a	Social	and	Developmental	State						 The	enduring	economic	model	that	took	shape	in	1989-91	was	accompanied	by,	and	interdependent	with,	the	start	of	a	transformation	of	the	welfare	state.			 The	 PESP	 was	 unprecedented	 in	 its	 breath	 of	 policy	 goals	 across	 all	 socio-economic	areas.	No	comparable	all-encompassing	social	partnership	programme	existed	elsewhere	in	Europe,	apart	perhaps	from	the	initial	agreements	in	1930s	Sweden	 and	 post-WW2	 Austria.	 European	 “neo-corporatist”	 bargaining	 was	largely	 confined	 to	 pay	 and	 related	 aspects	 of	 economic	 and	 welfare/labour	policy.	 The	 PESP	 set	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 whole	 of	 Irish	 social	 policy	development	 for	a	generation.	The	expansion	of	 the	 institutional	state	 initiated	under	the	PNR	was	specified	in	detail	in	the	PESP,	setting	principles	of	equality	of	 access,	 quality	 development	 and	 citizen	 empowerment	 within	 a	 public-private-voluntary	delivery	model,	in	a	further	conceptual	break	from	the	British	Beveridge	model.	Even	 local	government	reform,	usually	 identified	with	a	 later	period,	 extending	 local	 competences	 and	mobilising	 civil	 society	 participation,	was	 initiated	 in	 this	period,	 through	 the	 “Advisory	Expert	Committee”	of	1990.																																																									14		 “minor	economic	miracle”,	Taoiseach’s	address	to	Fianna	Fail	Ard	Fheis,	07/04/90,	DTA:	S25858-Z3;	“new	respect”,	‘Speech	at	the	Cáirde	Fáil	Dinner’,	04/12/1990,	DTA:	S25858-Z10	
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Though	 not	 specified	 in	 the	 PESP,	 it	 would	 develop	 in	 tandem	 with	 it.	 The	restructuring	of	the	welfare	state	and	the	beginnings	of	a	National	Anti-Poverty	Strategy,	 as	proposed	by	CPA	and	 ICTU,	 also	began	under	 the	PESP,	 as	did	 the	performance-management	 and	 open-recruitment	 model	 in	 the	 public	 services.		Aspects	 of	 the	 sweep	 of	 institutional	 reform	 agreed	 in	 the	 PESP	 were	 to	experience	 bottlenecks	 and	 delays,	 such	 as	 the	 HSE,	 NTMA,	 NRA	 and	 social	housing	models	it	proposed,	but	most	would	eventually	be	realised.15			 That	 comparative	 studies	 of	 European	 partnership	 systems	 view	 the	 Irish	model	as	a	puzzle	 in	 its	multiple	outlier	characteristics,	 is	hardly	surprising,	as	partnership	 was	 always	 about	 much	 more	 than	 purely	 economic	 or	 labour	market	 management.	 It	 organised	 the	 “factors	 of	 production”	 to	 initiate	 a	transformation	 of	 the	 economy,	 with	 incomes	 as	 a	 central	 “glue”,	 but	 also	transforming	the	welfare	state	to	an	enabling	factor	in	economic	expansion.	The	PESP	stated	its	objective	as	to	“transform	Ireland	by	…	2000	into	an	economy	of	an	advanced	type	providing	significantly	higher	standards	of	 living	and	greater	economic	and	social	equity”,	with	these	mutually	inter-dependent.	The	PNR	and	PESP	 expanded	 welfare	 state	 transfers,	 but	 also	 reformed	 it	 profoundly.	 As	Haughey	and	Cassells	correctly	asserted	in	this	regard,	the	“Irish	model”	was	not	only	“unique	in	the	history	of	the	state”	but	“probably	in	Europe”.16		 The	 1990	 NESC	 report	 underpinning	 the	 PESP	 critiqued	 the	 debilitating	effects	 on	 institutional	 development	 and	 long-term	 planning	 of	 “populist”	politics.	 Indeed,	 political	 scientists	 had	 long	 identified	 the	 electoral	 system	 as	facilitating	 an	 avoidance	 of	 unpopular	 decisions	 and	 an	 obstacle	 to	 policy	innovation.	 Dermot	 McCarthy,	 long-time	 Director	 and	 later	 chair	 of	 the	 NESC,	regarded	partnership	as	probably	a	necessity	given	the	 limitations	of	“electoral	parliamentarism”,	as	it	enabled	“a	much	wider	set	of	stakeholders”	to	be	engaged	in	 shaping	 and	managing	 the	 “economic,	 structural	 and	 social	 change”	 Ireland	urgently	required	but	had	been	prevented	from	achieving	due	to	the	“limitations	of	the	…	traditional	rubric	of	parliamentary	government”.	Haughey’s	impatience	with	bureaucratic	atrophy	and	political	populism	was	in	the	radical	Fianna	Fáil																																																									15		 On	later	local	government	reform,	Dept.	Environment	1996	16		 Multiple	“outlier”,	Baccaro	and	Simoni	2006;	welfare	state,	Carey	2007;	“glue”,	O’Donnell	and	Thomas	1998;	“transform	Ireland”,	PESP	VIII	(9);	Cassells	in	ICTU	ADC	1990:	33-4	and	Haughey	in	‘Address	by	Taoiseach	to	the	European	Round	Table	at	Dromoland	Castle’,	13/05/90,	GIS,	D/Taoiseach	
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mould.	PR	had,	after	all,	been	imposed	by	the	hostile	1920	Government	of	Ireland	Act	to	prevent	strong	government	emerging.	De	Valera,	Lemass	and	Haughey	had	all	championed	its	reform.	The	PNR/PESP	partners	regarded	social	partnership	as	essential	to	overcome	these	and	other	inherited	institutional	weaknesses.17	
	
Thus	far	…	:	setting	limits	to	partnership	institutions		
		 In	reviewing	their	respective	roles	in	1988,	the	NESC	and	CRC	had	concluded	that	 a	 benefit	 of	 consensus	 policy-making	 by	 the	 NESC	 was	 that	 it	 gave	 the	political	 sphere	 options	 which	 it	 could	 take	 or	 leave.	 But	 finalising	 the	 NESC	report,	Strategy	for	the	Nineties,	as	the	basis	for	the	PESP	was	delayed	by	a	failure	by	the	Council	to	reach	consensus	on	two	key	points.	One	was	property	taxes	and	the	other,	ironically,	partnership’s	own	“future	institutional	arrangements”.18			 The	NESC’s	Strategy	for	the	Nineties	was	reported	in	detail	almost	alone	by	the	
Irish	Times,	which	editorialised	that	as	a	consensus	strategy	by	government	and	social	 partners,	 it	would,	 “like	 a	 new	Programme	 for	Development”,	 “be	 looked	back	on	in	years	to	come	as	a	significant	step	forward	in	policy	formation”.	It	also	praised	 the	 “radicalism	 of	 the	NESC”	 in	 “contemplating”	 a	 land	 tax	 to	 increase	land	use	instead	of	trying	“to	maintain	the	maximum	number	of	holdings”.19			 It	 was	 the	 report’s	 section	 on	 tax,	 a	 draft	 of	 which	 was	 leaked	 before	publication,	that	dominated	what	Ó	hUiginn	described	as	the	media’s	“distorted”	coverage.	The	Independent,	with	an	editorial	entitled	“Wrong	Tax”,	declared	“the	day	the	tax	burden	is	lightened	will	be	a	long	time	in	coming	if	the	NESC	advice	is	heeded”.	 Appealing	 to	 populist	 sentiment,	 it	 further	 opined:	 “The	 kind	 of	 tax	reform	most	people	are	looking	for	is	simple:	it	is	one	which	would	leave	people	with	 enough	 of	 their	 own	 earned	 incomes	 to	 dispose	 of	 as	 they	 wish”.	 The	influential	Business	&	Finance,	describing	the	NESC	as	“the	official	talking	shop	of	economic	pressure	groups”	and	 the	 report	as	a	 “return	of	 the	spending	 lobby”,	
																																																								17		 “populist	policies”,	NESC	1990:	459	and	Murphy,	M.	2006:	92;	McCarthy	in	McCarthy,	D.	2006:	76;	Haughey	on	multiple-seat	STV	system,	interview	Haughey	2005		18		 “options”,	CRC,	‘Functions,	Membership	and	Work	Programme	of	the	CRC,	SDC	and	NESC’,	n.d.	[Sept.	1988],	DTA:	S25857-I;	“institutional	arrangements”,	NESC	1990	19		 “Like	a	new	Programme”,	IT	editorial	26/10/90;	“radicalism	of	NESC”,	IT	editorial	13/10/90	
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demanded	 radical	 income	 tax	 cuts	 funded	 by	 further	 reductions	 in	 spending,	suggesting	“perhaps	we	should	start	by	abolishing	the	NESC”.20			 Dáil	opposition	leaders,	capitalising	on	Haughey’s	weakening	position	as	crisis	rocked	 the	 presidential	 election,	 denounced	 what	 they	 misrepresented	 as	NESC’s,	 and	 hence	 government’s,	 back-peddling	 on	 tax	 reform.	 In	 response,	various	ministers	rushed	to	disown	the	NESC	“proposals”,	denying	any	plans	for	property	 taxes	 and	 describing	 service	 charges	 as	 a	matter	 for	 the	 new	 expert	committee	on	local	government.	In	fact	the	NESC	did	not	“propose”	such	reforms	but	simply	suggested	they	be	discussed	as	instruments	for	widening	the	tax	base.	When	 launching	 the	 report,	 Ó	 hUiginn	 explained	 that	 recommendations	 to	restrain	tax	cuts	and	widen	the	tax	base,	including	through	property/land	taxes,	income-adjusted	local	charges	and	the	abolition	of	mortgage	and	VHI	reliefs,	had	been	dropped	due	to	opposition	from	farming	bodies	and	the	building	industry.21		 The	PESP	therefore,	while	continuing	with	income	tax	cuts,	extending	the	tax	base	 and	 improving	 compliance,	 did	 not	mention	 property	 taxes,	 and	 tellingly	committed	to	“promoting	owner	occupation	as	the	 form	of	 tenure	preferred	by	most	 people”.	 When	 in	 1987	 cabinet	 had	 discussed	 the	 most	 radical	 cuts,	 a	property/land	 tax	 had	 been	 raised	 but,	 with	 Finance	 advice	 on	 its	 doubtful	impact,	 had	 dismissed	 it	 as	 politically	 inopportune.	 The	 controversy	 over	 the	NESC	 report	 nevertheless	 demonstrated	 that	 however	 interdependent	 the	structural	 reforms	 proposed	 by	 NESC,	 party	 politics	 would	 determine	 their	selective	use.	The	opposition	by	interests	and	parties	to	property	and	land	taxes	and	 tax	 reliefs	 meant	 that	 reforms	 that	 might	 have	 shaped	 a	 very	 different	evolution	of	property	markets	over	a	decade	later,	were	prevented	at	birth	by	a	political/media	“consensus”	fully	independent	of	social	partnership.22		 Another	 telling	 incident	 was	 ICTU’s	 failure	 to	 achieve	 NESC	 consensus	 on	developing	partnership	 structures.	 In	 1987,	with	Ó	hUiginn’s	 –	 i.e.	Haughey’s	 -	support,	 ICTU	had	suggested	a	study	of	 “comparative	 institutions”	 in	European	countries	 that	 accounted	 for	 their	 socio-economic	 success.	 Its	 own	 view,	 later																																																									20		 “distorted”,	NESC	minutes,	23/11/90;	“Wrong	Tax”	and		“kind	of	reform”,	Irish	Independent	13/10/90;	“talking	shop”,	Business	&	Finance	01/11/90	21		 Opposition	attacks	and	ministers’	denials,	Irish	Independent	13/10/90,	Irish	Times	16/10/90;	“Ó	hUiginn	explained”,	Irish	Times	26/10/90;	original	NESC	proposals,	ICTU	AR	1991:	55	22		 “owner	occupation”,	PESP	IV	(79);	1987	cabinet	and	D/Finance	view,	‘State	Papers’,	IT	29/12/2017	
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outlined	 in	Decade	of	Development,	was	 that	 Ireland	 should	 replicate	 countries	such	 as	Germany,	 Austria	 and	 Finland	which	 had	 “more	 developed	 economies,	higher	 living	 standards	 and	 lower	 unemployment,	 achieved	 through	 National	Programmes	 agreed	 centrally	 but	 implemented	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	 worker	participation	 and	 involvement	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 individual	 company”.	 ICTU’s	aim,	with	which	Haughey	sympathised,	was	to	achieve	“a	modern	efficient	social	market	economy	…	similar	to	Germany”.23			 “Institutionalism”	was	much	discussed	by	the	NESC,	with	Katzenstein’s	views	heavily	influencing	its	1986	report.	As	already	seen,	the	question	of	“appropriate	institutions”	 for	 Irish	 partnership	 had	 already	 dogged	 that	 report,	 with	employers	unwilling	 to	 support	 strong	specific	 recommendations.	When	a	new	council	 was	 being	 appointed	 in	 1989,	 NESC’s	 secretary	 suggested	 that	 J.J.	 Lee,	about	 to	publish	his	major	 if	pessimistic	 institutionalist	 study,	 Ireland	1910-85,	be	considered	for	appointment.	In	the	event	he	wasn’t,	and	fortuitously	perhaps	as	he	was	to	emerge	as	a	prominent	critic	of	social	partnership	for	its	“hold	over	the	 next	 government”	 and	 its	 “emasculation	 of	 the	 Dáil”.	 But	 the	 suggestion	illustrated	the	prominence	given	to	institutional	thinking	by	the	NESC.24			 The	 study	 now	 proposed	 by	 ICTU	 was	 suspected	 by	 employers	 and	 civil	servants	as	a	union	stratagem	to	commit	the	NESC	to	Austrian-style	corporatism,	and	the	council	became	bogged	down	wrangling	over	its	terms	of	reference.	The	study,	 “The	 Irish	 Economy	 in	 Comparative	 European	 Perspective”,	 was	 finally	allowed	proceed,	contracted	out	 to	Norwegian	political	economist,	Lars	Mjøset.	Its	findings	were	to	have	informed	a	PESP	section	on	partnership	structures,	and	to	mollify	critics,	NESC	had	even	agreed	that	besides	“corporatist”	states,	it	also	study	Switzerland	as	a	“liberal	business”	model.	But	the	study	was	to	be	delayed	by	disagreements	of	interpretation,	and	would	not	appear	until	1992.25				 NESC’s	 report	 to	 underpin	 the	 PESP,	 Strategy	 for	 the	Nineties,	 reflected	 this	stalemate,	suggesting	simply	a	need	for	stronger	institutions	to	redress	Ireland’s	“very	 poor	 system	 of	 innovation”.	 It	 noted	 that	 institutions	 in	 successful																																																									23		 ICTU	1990h	24		 Lee	1989;	proposed	for	NESC,	Danaher	(Sec.)	to	Chairman	[=	Ó	hUiginn],	28/07/1989,	NESC	Archive:	‘Ireland	and	the	EEC’,	Box	3;	Lee	on	partnership,	Sunday	Tribune	19	and	26/01/97	25		 Mjøset	1992;	debated	at	NESC,	Danaher	to	NESC	members,	26/09/90,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3c	‘Meetings’;	NESC	Council	Minutes,	17/11/89;	‘Update	on	Workprogramme’,	21/12/90	and	Danaher	to	NESC	members,	26/09/90,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3c,	‘Meetings’;	NESC	Council	Minutes,	01/10/90	
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countries	 had	 evolved	 in	 specific	 socio-political	 contexts	 that	 could	 not	 be	“transplanted”	 to	 Ireland,	 and	proposed	 that	 further	 consideration	of	 the	 issue	await	Mjøset’s	study.	ICTU	did	however	succeed	in	having	the	terms	of	reference	for	 the	 Mjøset	 study	 included	 in	 the	 PESP,	 with	 a	 commitment	 to	 review	 its	findings.	 The	 question	 of	 “appropriate”	 institutions	 would	 remain	 unresolved,	and	Mjøset’s	report	would	prove	to	be	a	largely	academic	exercise.26			 The	inability	of	the	NESC	to	agree	on	future	institutions	at	this	formative	stage	meant	 that	 the	 structures	 of	 social	 partnership	 would	 develop	 in	 an	 ad-hoc	rather	than	planned	manner,	with	significant	initiatives,	such	as	the	founding	of	the	NESF	in	1993	and	the	later	broadening	of	the	NESC,	the	result	more	of	party	political	and	government	tinkering	than	concerted	institution	building.	Mjøset’s	report	when	 it	 appeared	 ironically	 did	 find	 that	 the	 source	 of	many	 countries’	success	was	indeed	their	“corporatist”	“consensus”-seeking	institutions.		 A	need	for	deeper	partnership	structures	thus	remained	the	preference	of	one	partner,	the	ICTU,	rather	than	a	consensus	of	NESC,	and	on-going	disputes	over	“worker	 participation”,	 central	 to	 ICTU	 strategy,	 would	 continue	 to	 dog	 social	partnership.	Through	its	alliance	with	government,	ICTU	secured	a	considerable	extension	of	such	structures	in	the	semi-state	and	pubic	sector,	but	in	the	private	sector	 employers	 continued	 to	 resist	 any	 intrusion	 into	 management	 or	shareholder	prerogative,	conceding	only	talks	on	“voluntary	participation”.27			 ICTU	hoped	that	Delors’	“Social	Europe”	would	provide	leverage	on	this	issue,	especially	given	a	commitment	in	the	SEA	to	revive	EC-level	“social	dialogue”	as	part	of	the	Single	Market	project.	This	led	Delors	to	establish	an	EC-level	union/	employer	“steering	group”	on	training	policy	in	1989,	the	first	such	cooperation	in	a	decade,	but	it	made	little	headway.	Haughey	and	Ahern	promised	ICTU	that	Ireland	 would	 support	 the	 “Social	 Charter”	 but,	 following	 a	 meeting	 with	Mitterand,	Haughey	also	stated	that	member	states	should	be	free	to	apply	it	as	in	 accordance	with	 their	 own	 traditions.	 He	 also	met	 ICTU	 requests	 to	 confer	with	the	ETUC	and	Ahern	delivered	major	social	policy	initiatives	under	the	Irish	EC	 Presidency.	 But,	 noting	 that	 differences	 between	 member	 states	 meant	 an	intended	Commission	directive	on	worker	directors	was	unlikely	to	proceed,	the																																																									26		 “await	Mjøset’s	study”,	NESC	1990,	Ch.	15;	Terms	of	Reference,	PESP,	X;	remains	academic,	Begg	2016	27		 PNR	VI	(4)	
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Department	 of	 Labour	 advised	 government	 that	 while	 it	 might	 proceed	 with	participatory	structures	as	agreed	for	the	public	sector,	it	should	meet	employer	objections	by	supporting	only	a	“voluntary	and	agreed”	approach	to	participation	in	private	industry,	as	was	then	agreed	in	the	PESP.28		 As	a	 result,	 following	a	 review	by	a	high-level	 “Civil	 Service	Efficiency	Audit	Group”	 involving	 the	 state,	 unions	 and	 business	 leaders,	 and	 with	 Reynolds’	support,	 a	 performance	 management/pay	 system	 and	 open	 recruitment	 were	trialled	and	Ahern	“fully	committed”	to	support	“participative	councils”	in	public	service	bodies.	Under	the	PNR,	worker	directors	were	elected	in	additional	semi-state	companies	and	sub-board	councils	were	established	in	24	of	36	bodies.	But	there	was	 little	progress	 in	private	 industry.	The	PNR	“Advisory	Committee	on	Worker	 Participation”	 of	 ICTU,	 FIE	 and	 experts	 from	 the	 IPA	 and	 IPC,	recommended	 “enabling	 legislation”	 for	 worker	 representation	 in	 larger	companies	on	 the	German	model,	but	 the	FIE	dissented,	 insisting	 in	a	minority	report	on	a	 “purely	voluntary	approach”	on	an	 individual	 company	basis.	 ICTU	used	the	PNR	“review”	of	January	1990	to	again	progress	talks	on	the	Committee,	arguing	that	participation	would	enhance	cooperation	in	competitiveness.	Ahern	sided	with	 the	 ICTU,	urging	 “a	 change	of	 attitude	on	 the	part	of	management”:	“The	 demand	 for	 greater	 employee	 involvement	 is	 undoubtedly	 growing	throughout	 industry,	 and	 unless	 it	 is	 met,	 this	 motivation	 will	 not	 be	forthcoming”.	 He	 assured	 ICTU	 he	 was	 “fully	 committed	 to	 the	 principle”	 and	wanted	 “the	consensus	approach	at	national	 level	 translated	 to	 the	 level	of	 the	enterprise”,	 but	 advised	 “a	 voluntary	 rather	 than	 legislative	 approach”.	 In	May	1990	he	revived	talks	on	participation	in	the	private	sector	on	this	basis.29	
																																																								28		 SEA,	Art.	118b;	ETUC-UNICE	“steering	group”,	O’Dowd	1992;	Fajertag	and	Pochet	1997;	Government	on	“Social	Charter”,	D/Labour,	‘Briefing	for	Taoiseach’s	meeting	with	ICTU	on	24	Nov.’,	and	‘EC	Charter	of	Fundamental	Social	Rights	of	Workers’,	DTA:	S25862-D;	Haughey’s	preference,	Dáil,	24/10/89;	Haughey/Ahern	commitments,	ICTU	EC	meeting.	21/02/90,	item	1851;	D/Labour	advice,	D/Labour,	‘CRC,	ICTU	Item	no.	28:	Worker	Participation’,	[Nov.	1989],	DTA	S25857-Y	29		 System	“trialled”	in	public	service,	Reynolds,	‘Address	to	IMI	National	Management	Conference’,	28/04/90,	GIS:	D/Finance,	and	‘Speech	at	the	launch	of	The	Civil	Service	Observed	by	Dr	CH	Murray	at	the	IPA’,	07/06/90,	GIS:	D/Finance;	public	sector	boards,	ICTU	AR	1991	56;	Ahern	position,	‘Speech	at	annual	conference	of	the	PSEU’,	27/04/90,	GIS:	D/Labour;	on	“Advisory	Committee”	report,	ICTU	AR	1991:	55;	PNR	“review”,	CRC	1990,	ICTU	1990h;	Ahern	“sides	with”	ICTU,	‘Conference	in	Kilmainham	on	profit/gain	sharing’,	IRN	Report,	15/11/90;	“fully	committed”,	‘Meeting	[Minister	and	D/Labour	with	ICTU]	30	March	1990’,	DTA	S25857-Z4;	Ahern,	‘Speech	at	annual	conference	of	PSEU’,	27/04/90,	GIS:	D/Labour;	“revived	talks”,	Ahern,	‘Speech	at	annual	conference	of	MSF,	10/03/90,	GIS:	D/Labour	and	ICTU	EC	meeting.	16/05/90,	item	1921	
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	 ICTU	in	public	described	the	achievement	of	“workplace	democracy”	as	one	of	its	main	priorities,	complaining	that	“Irish	employers’	attitudes	…	lag	far	behind	the	 practice	 in	most	 European	 countries”.	 But	 it	 faced	 a	major	 obstacle	 in	 the	widespread	 indifference	 to	 the	 subject	 in	 its	 own	 ranks,	which	 a	 leading	 study	described	 as	 “marked	 by	 apathy”.	 Debates	 at	 its	 1990	 conference	 on	 pay	bargaining,	and	the	purely	formal	adoption	of	the	“new	trade	unionism”	strategy,	had	shown	that	pay	and	sectional	advantage	remained	the	main	concerns	of	both	pro-	 and	 anti-PNR	 unions,	 for	 all	 their	 left-wing	 rhetoric.	 Talks	 on	 “voluntary	participation”	 continued	 in	 the	 negotiations	 on	 PESP,	 with	 one	 of	 ICTU’s	 first	inputs	 a	 proposed	 “Framework	 Agreement”	 for	 an	 evolutionary	 process,	extending	 to	 shareholdings.	 Cassells	warned	 that	 an	 agreement	 “would	 not	 be	worth	having	without	 this”.	Employers	held	 to	a	menu	of	different	approaches,	including	 new	 “corporate	 cultures”	 motivating	 employees	 through	 individual	autonomy	 and	 share	 options	 rather	 than	 formal	 European-style	 participative	structures.	The	PESP	agreed	that	“participative	arrangements”	be	trialled	in	the	public	 sector,	 in	 combination	 with	 performance	 systems,	 and,	 for	 the	 private	sector,	a	“Joint	Declaration”	by	ICTU/FIE	merely	outlining	a	menu	of	options.30			 The	 outcome	of	 these	 conflicts	 on	 land	 tax,	 future	 institutions	 and	workers’	participation	in	companies	revealed	the	political	constraints	preventing	a	deeper	partnership	system.	The	institutions	of	partnership	would	remain	provisional,	or	expanded	only	through	ad	hoc	measures	such	as	the	NESF	or	committees	within	the	NDP.	A	similar	restraining	outside	influence	on	the	institutional	consolidation	of	social	partnership	was	the	critical	role	of	party	political	conflict.	
	
Party	politics:	the	(partial)	demise	of	anti-corporatism	
		 Post-WW2	 governments	 involving	 Fine	 Gael	 were	 notable	 for	 their	discontinuation	of	tripartite	structures.	Socio-economic	planning	was	invariably	returned	 “in	 house”	 and	 tripartite	 bodies	 side-lined	 or	 down-graded	 to	 an	advisory	 role.	 Elite	 socio-economic	 policy	 bodies,	 notably	 the	 ESRI,	 were	preferred.	 Labour,	 which	 might	 have	 been	 expected	 to	 champion	 tripartitism,																																																									30		 ICTU	complaint,	ICTU,	Congress	News,	No.	2,	July	1990;	“marked	by	apathy”,	Gunnigle	et	al.	1999:	316;	“Cassells	warns”,	‘Draft	Framework	Agreement	on	Worker	Participation’	in	‘Staff	Meeting’	22/10/90	-	PESD’,	ICTU	Archive:	PN-1;	“not	worth	having”,	Cassells	in	IRN	Report,	43:90,	15/11/90;	employer	views,	‘Industrial	Relations	Conference’,	FIE	Bulletin,	Nov.	1990;	PESP	compromise,	PESP	IX	(7)-(10)	
	 307	
was	ever	wary	of	union	power,	preferring	statist	planning	with	advisory	social	partner	input.	It	was	instrumental	in	establishing	many	agencies	with	a	tripartite	element,	 but	 each	 government	 involving	 Labour	 ended	 in	 bitter	 party/union	conflict.	 More	 left-wing	 parties,	 such	 as	 Clann	 na	 Poblachta	 and	 later	 the	Workers’	 Party,	 tended	 to	 promote	 community	 participation	 rather	 than	tripartite	 policy-making,	which	 they	 criticised	 as	 undemocratic.	 In	 the	 decades	from	1945,	Fianna	Fáil	remained	the	sole	champion	of	a	radical	tripartitism.		 Fine	 Gael	 and	 Labour	 opposed	 the	 PNR	 in	 1987	 but,	 following	 its	 role	 in	stabilising	the	economy	and	its	growing	public	acceptance,	accommodated	to	it.	In	1989	Fine	Gael	undertook	if	elected	to	continue	the	PNR	but	modified	to	de-couple	policy-making	 from	pay	determination,	 and	 government	policy	primacy	over	 the	 NESC.	 Tripartite	 forums	 would	 be	 made	 “transparent”	 through	 Dáil	oversight	 and	 party	 political	 involvement.	 Labour	 proposed	 replacing	 the	 PNR	with	 a	 traditional	 statist	 approach,	 though	 now	 described	 as	 “participative	planning”.	Either	option	if	implemented	would	have	collapsed	the	PNR	system.31			 The	 1990	 “left”	 revolt	 in	 the	 ICTU	 threatening	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 PNR	forced	 a	 further	 change	 in	 opposition	 party	 positions,	 as	 they	 urged	 union	members	 to	 vote	 to	 maintain	 the	 agreement,	 though	 continued	 to	 propose	“reforms”	 to	 it.	 The	 government’s	 successful	 European	 strategy,	 reflected	 in	Brussels’	support	for	the	NDP	and	a	successful	Irish	Presidency,	consolidated	the	system	 and	 reinforced	 its	 public	 acceptance,	 and	 this	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	enthusiastic	endorsement	of	the	PESP	by	all	of	its	partners,	not	least	the	70	per	cent	 union	 vote	 accepting	 it.	 Opposition	 critiques	 became	 muted,	 reduced	 to	minor	proposals	for	adjustments.	Garret	FitzGerald,	a	commentator	again	in	The	
Irish	Times,	 criticised	 partnership	 for	 usurping	 parliamentary	 government	 and	while	the	PESP	was	being	negotiated	Dukes	again	demanded	a	role	for	the	Dáil	in	the	process.	Jim	Mitchell	called	for	the	NESC,	and	even	the	CRC,	to	be	expanded	with	groups	representing	youth	and	“the	poor”,	who	had	“as	much	right	to	be	at	the	conference	table	as	the	farmers,	unions	and	employers”.32	
																																																								31		 Fine	Gael	1989;	Labour	Party	1989	32		 FitzGerald	articles	quoted	in	McGinley	1999;	Dukes	on	role	for	the	Dáil,	Dáil	19/06/90;	Mitchell	on	youth	and	“poor”,	Dáil	28/11/89;	“at	the	table”,	Dáil	14/03/90	
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	 Haughey’s	authority	was	damaged	 in	 the	Presidential	election	of	1990	as	he	was	humiliatingly	forced	to	sack	his	Tánaiste	while	continuing	to	support	him	as	candidate.	 He	 was	 further	 weakened	 by	 Lenihan’s	 subsequent	 defeat.	 His	position	was	finally	fatally	undermined	as	the	Goodman	“affair”	escalated	and	a	succession	of	real	and	construed	scandals	 in	semi-state	boards	ensued.	He	was	soon	a	Taoiseach	on	sufferance,	finally	being	forced	to	resign	in	February	1992,	when	he	departed	quoting	Othello	that	he	had	“done	the	State	some	service”.33		 When	NESC’s	key	report	appeared	in	October	1990,	it	had	been	lauded	by	the	
Irish	Times	as	a	departure	on	a	par	with	Lemass’s	Programmes	for	Development.	But	 with	 the	 presidential	 election	 crisis	 instigated	 by	 a	 faux	 pas	 by	 Lenihan,	opposition	 leaders	used	 the	report	 to	attack	Haughey,	denouncing	aspects	of	 it	and	questioning	the	legitimacy	of	the	NESC	itself.	The	furore	over	the	NESC’s	tax	“proposals”	 has	 already	 been	 described.	 Ó	 hUiginn	 complained	 of	 “distorted”	press	 coverage	 and	 of	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 council’s	 report	 being	 eclipsed	 by	 the	“controversial	political	events	taking	place	at	the	time	of	its	official	release”.34		 John	Bruton,	 now	a	 contender	 for	 the	 Fine	Gael	 leadership,	 demanded	 from	the	 NESC	 how	 it	 had	 arrived	 at	 its	 property	 tax	 proposals,	 and	 challenged	 its	study	 of	 consensus	 institutions:	 “In	 a	 democracy	 legitimacy	 ultimately	 stems	from	 the	 ballot	 box”	 and	 a	 “consensus”	 that	 excluded	 “elected	 political	representatives”	was	not	“a	genuine	consensus”.	Programmes	that	extended	over	the	 electoral	 cycle	 eroded	 parliamentary	 autonomy	 and	 bound	 incoming	governments.	NESC’s	mandate	should	be	trimmed,	and	the	council	expanded	to	include	 politicians	 “as	 full	 members	 or	 observers”.	 In	 the	 Dáil	 he	 attacked	Haughey’s	 appointment	 of	 an	 EC	 “observer”	 and	 department	 secretaries	 as	 in	breach	 of	 the	 NESC	 constitution,	 and	 repeated	 FitzGerald’s	 criticism	 that	partnership	threatened	the	“sovereignty	of	parliament”,	presenting	it	“with	a	fait	accompli	negotiated	outside	this	house”.	Other	front	bench	Fine	Gael	TDs	warned	that	 partnership	 had	 become	 “a	 Fifth	 Estate	 or	 third	 house”,	 “more	 influential	than	the	elected	Houses”	and	pre-ordaining	their	legislative	functions.35																																																										33		 Haughey	in	Ryle-Dwyer	1993,	Maume	2007	34		 IT	editorial,	IT	26/10/90;	Ó	hUiginn	in	NESC	Council	Minutes,	23/11/90	35		 Bruton	to	Secretary,	NESC,	01/02/91,	Tony	McCashin,	Acting	Sec.,	NESC,	to	Bruton,	01/02/91,	and	Bruton		to	McCashin,	11/02/91,	in	‘Additional	Material	Relating	to	Correspondence		with	Mr	John	Bruton	TD’,	NESC	Archive:	Boxes	3	and	3c;	Bruton,	Jim	Mitchell	and	Alan	Shatter	in	the	Dáil	30/01/91		
	 309	
	 Bruton’s	 critique	 formed	 the	most	 substantial	 and	 sustained	 criticism	of	 the	partnership	system.	Preparing	the	ground	for	an	alternative	government	moved	Labour	 to	re-align	 towards	Fine	Gael’s	position	and	both	parties	 to	refine	 their	critique.	 Quinn,	 closest	 among	 the	 Labour	 leadership	 to	 ICTU	 and	 chair	 of	 the	ICTU-PLP	 “Liaison	Committee”,	 had	 applauded	 the	NESC	 report	 and	 supported	union	 endorsement	 of	 the	 PESP.	 But	 he	 now	 demanded	 that	 partnership	 be	moved	away	from	“secretive”	meetings	in	“smoke	filled	rooms”.	Rather	than	the	CRC,	a	Dáil	Committee,	“subject	to	democratic	scrutiny”,	should	oversee	delivery	of	 agreements.	 When	 the	 Industrial	 Relations	 Bill	 was	 being	 debated,	 he	criticised	 as	 “a	 negation	 of	 the	 functions	 of	 this	 house”	 talks	 on	 amendments	“behind	closed	doors”	with	social	partners.	He	demanded	that	a	Dáil	committee	oversee	 and	give	 the	PESP	 “some	democratic	underpinning”.	 Fine	Gael	 and	ex-Workers’	Party	leaders	rushed	to	support	Quinn.	Bruton	suggested	his	proposed	Dáil	Committee	also	be	involved	in	negotiating	programmes,	as	otherwise	these	would	tie	the	“legislative	output	of	this	House	into	a	concordat	in	which	[it]	has	no	part”.	Rabbitte	supported	this	idea,	even	suggesting	the	CRC	be	restructured	to	include	politicians	to	“allow	for	a	more	public	appraisal	of	progress”.36		 This	 emerging	 joint	 opposition	 position,	 whether	 opportunist	 or	 idealistic,	prefigured	 reforms	 later	 attempted	 by	 various	 coalitions.	While	 further	 bodies	such	 as	 the	 NESF	 would	 be	 established	 by	 the	 Rainbow	 government	 and	 the	NESC	 expanded	 under	 a	 later	 FF-PD	 coalition,	 pay	would	 stubbornly	 remain	 a	central	part	of	agreements	and	ideas	for	involving	politicians	in	the	oversight,	let	alone	negotiation	of	agreements,	would	come	to	naught.37			 Haughey	 defended	 the	 system	 against	 its	 critics.	 He	 conceded	more	 groups	might	be	involved,	though	only	if	agreed	by	the	existing	social	partners,	and	was	not	averse	to	a	Dáil	Committee	discussing,	though	not	negotiating,	programmes.	Normal	government	 involved	proposals	 to	 the	Dáil	often	 formed	beforehand	 in	discussion	with	concerned	interests,	he	said,	and	Treaties	also	only	came	before	the	Dáil	 for	 ratification	when	 already	drafted.	 The	NESC	was	not	 a	 negotiating	body	and	 its	 reports	were	public.	Partnership	agreements	were	 subject	 to	Dáil	ratification,	 as	 were	 legislative	 measures	 proposed	 in	 them.	 Negotiations,																																																									36		 Quinn	applauds	NESC/PESP,	Dáil	19/02/91;	“democratic	underpinning”,	Dáil	06/02/91	37		 “glue”,	O’Donnell	and	Thomas	1998	
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already	 “complex	 enough”,	 would	 be	 “quite	 impossible”	 if	 Bruton’s	 “additional	political	dimension”	were	added.		If	that	had	been	attempted	in	1987	“we	would	never	 have	 got	 an	 agreement”.	 As	 if	 to	 illustrate	 his	 point,	 the	 Dáil	 thereupon	descended	into	a	disorderly	tumult.38		 As	 Haughey’s	 authority	 waned,	 ministers	 began	 to	 revert	 to	 pre-1987	practices,	 “requesting”	 the	 NESC	 to	 undertake	 minor	 or	 politically	 sensitive	studies	 on	 their	 behalf,	 such	 as	 a	 review	 of	 a	 postal	 service	 viability	 plan.	 But	Haughey’s	defence	of	partnership	emboldened	the	system	and	at	ICTU	insistence	the	 request	 from	 the	 minister	 for	 An	 Post	 was	 rejected	 by	 the	 NESC	 as	“undermining”	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Council.	 The	 council	 proceeded	 to	 adopt	 a	programme	of	work	 focused	solely	on	strategic	 issues.	 It	also	rejected	Bruton’s	criticisms,	responding	that	the	NESC	did	not	infringe	parliamentary	autonomy	as	“the	Council	 as	 such	 is	not	 involved	 in	negotiations	which	 lead	 to	Programmes	such	as	the	PESP”.	For	it	to	be	an	effective	forum,	it	required	confidentiality,	and	would	“not	welcome	participation	by	representatives	of	political	parties”.39			 The	NESC	thus	weathered	the	crises	that	preceded	Haughey’s	resignation,	and	would	survive	until	1997	without	being	restructured.	But	party	conflict	involving	much	 point-scoring	 and	 pedantry	 weakened	 the	 political	 legitimacy	 of	 social	partnership.	 Despite	 converging	 pragmatic	 cross-party	 acceptance	 of	 it,	 the	critiques	accusing	it	of	lacking	democratic	legitimacy	showed	that	there	was	little	political	 appetite	 outside	 Fianna	 Fáil’s	 leadership	 circle	 for	 any	 further	embedding	 of	 a	 “corporatist”	 system.	 These	 conflicts	 also	 demonstrated	 the	continued	primacy	of	party	politics	in	determining	the	remit	of	the	system.	
	
Social	partnership	and	equality	politics:	a	case	study		 The	 PESP	 presented	 social	 partnership	 as	 the	mechanism	 for	 a	 decade-long	structural	 make-over	 of	 the	 state	 and	 economy,	mobilising	 stakeholders	 in	 its	implementation.	 It	 was	 all-encompassing,	 extending	 to	 areas	 few	 would	 have	regarded	 as	 concerns	 of	 “collective	 bargaining”.	 This	 was	 Garret	 FitzGerald’s																																																									38		 Haughey	in	Dáil	30/01	and	06/02/91	39		 On	NESC	work-programme,	D.	McCarthy,	Director,	NESC	to	Council	Members,	22/02	and	20/03/91,	Cassells	to	McCarthy,	05/03/91	and	McCarthy	‘NESC’s	Workprogramme’,	15/03/91,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3c	‘Meetings’	and	Council	Minutes,	15/03/91;	NESC	rejects	Bruton’s	criticisms,	Tony	Cashin,	secretary	NESC,	to	Bruton	15/03/91,	Council	Minutes	15/02/91,	NESC	Archive:	Box	3c	
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casus	 belli	 in	 his	 criticisms	 of	 the	 system.	 In	 contrast,	 Haughey	 suggested	 the	social	partners	extend	its	parameters	even	further,	 including	to	proposals	 from	the	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 (LRC)	 established	 to	 tackle	 contentious	 areas	 of	social	policy	such	as	family	planning,	equality,	children,	and	marital	breakdown.	ICTU	welcomed	the	suggestion,	but	other	partners	were	more	cautious,	and	the	PESP	incorporated	only	a	 few	LRC	recommendations,	such	as	on	prison	reform	and	children’s	rights.	But	a	deliberately	vaguely-worded	section	of	the	PESP	left	open	a	way	for	partnership	to	play	a	role	in	enabling	social	reform.	This	section	examines	this	in	its	role	in	the	beginnings	of	reform	towards	gay	rights.40			 The	progressive	liberalisation	of	Irish	society	on	“social	issues”	from	the	early	1960s	was	 abruptly	 halted	 in	 1981	 by	 a	well-organised	 conservative	 counter-offensive	targeting	the	divisive	issues	of	abortion	and	divorce,	but	in	fact	aimed	at	 reversing	 what	 it	 called	 the	 entire	 “liberal	 agenda”.	 The	 vulnerability	 of	politicians	under	the	PR-STV	system	was	exploited	to	cower	and	silence	them.41			 Haughey	had	regarded	liberalisation	as	a	corollary	of	modernisation,	reflected	in	his	1960s	reforms	benefitting	women,	his	establishing	of	the	two	Commissions	on	 the	 Status	 of	 Women	 and	 even	 his	 “Irish	 solution”	 partially	 legalising	contraception	 in	 1979.	 Fianna	 Fáil	 had	 been	 a	 liberalising	 party	 in	 the	 1960s	until	 Fine	 Gael	 adopted	 a	 more	 liberal	 stance,	 culminating	 in	 FitzGerald’s	“Constitutional	Crusade”	of	1981.	Fianna	Fáil	also	retained	a	certain	anti-clerical	appeal,	 deriving	 from	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Treaty	 conflict.	 Lemass	 once	 said	 that	however	 devout	 the	 electorate,	 he	 found	 a	 “political	 advantage	 in	 having	 a	certain	anti-clerical	 tinge”,	 something	 to	which Haughey	was	also	not	averse	 to	appealing.	When	a	 Fine	Gael	TD	demanded	 the	 inclusion	of	 the	 “Conference	of	Major	Religious	Superiors”	 in	social	partnership,	Haughey	retorted	 that	he	was	“always	a	bit	doubtful”	of	any	group	with	“‘major’	and	‘superior’	in	its	title”.42		 The	 abortion/divorce	 conflict	 and	 the	 way	 it	 was	 framed	 presented	 Fianna	Fáil,	 then	 struggling	 to	 retain	 its	 “dominant	 party”	 status,	 with	 a	 dilemma,	leading	Haughey	to	align	with	the	majority	anti-reform	position.	The	party	was																																																									40		 On	partnership	and	the	Law	Reform	Commission,	Haughey,	‘Speech	at	the	Cáirde	Fáil	President’s	Dinner’,	04/12/1990,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach;	ICTU,	‘Meeting	on	Pay	and	Conditions,	17/12/90,	1990	-	statement	by	Chris	Kirwan,	President’,	ICTU	Archive:	PESP-PW	41		 On	the	PLAC/SPUC	campaign	targeting	TDs,	see	O’Reilly	1992	42		 Lemass	in	a	taped	interview	with	Dermot	Ryan,	UCD	Archive	P311;	Haughey	in	Dáil	14/03/90	
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not	 innately	 “illiberal”,	 and	 had	 enacted	many	 liberal	 reforms,	 but	 by	 1985	 its	illiberal	 image	 had	 reached	 a	 nether	 with	 its	 rejection	 of	 Barry	 Desmond’s	contraceptive	 reform	 bill,	 precipitating	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 PDs.	 The	 law	 on	homosexuality,	while	open	to	abuse	by	the	Gardaí,	had	never	been	enforced	as	in	Britain	 and	 Fianna	 Fáil’s	 approach	 to	 public	 sensitivities	 had	 been	 reflected	 in	President	Childers’	gesture	at	the	funeral	in	1978	of	popular	actor,	Micheál	Mac	Liammóir,	when,	as	Richard	Dunphy	describes	it,	he	“very	publicly	accorded”	his	lover,	Hilton	Edwards,	“the	respects	due	to	a	widow”.	In	the	late	1980s,	Haughey	sought	an	escape	from	Fianna	Fáil’s	entrapment	as	the	illiberal	party.	He	viewed	the	 LRC	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	 further	 cautious	 liberalisation	 free	 from	 fractious	political	 divisions,	 and	 believed	 this	 could	 be	 assisted	 by	 the	 “consensus”	 of	social	 partnership.	 Mary	 Robinson’s	 presidential	 victory	 demonstrated	 the	substantial	 public	 desire	 for	 liberal	 change	 if	 framed	 in	 equality	 terms	 and	Haughey,	when	appointing	the	LRC,	excluded	clerical	interests	entirely	from	it.43			 Gay	rights	reform	in	the	early	1990s	presents	an	interesting	example	of	how	politics,	 social	 partnership	 and	 liberal	 reform	 interacted.	 Gay	 rights	 first	achieved	wide	public	attention	when	the	European	Court	in	1988	upheld	David	Norris’s	 case	 that	 the	 Irish	 courts,	 in	 defending	 the	 1867	 act	 criminalizing	“homosexual	 acts”	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Constitution’s	 “Christian	 values”,	 had	breached	his	human	rights.	The	Law	Reform	Commission	proposed	giving	effect	to	 the	 ruling	 by	 abolishing	 the	 act	 rather	 than	 reforming	 it	 as	 in	 Britain,	 and	legislating	 for	 legal	 equality.	 Haughey,	 welcoming	 this,	 committed	 in	 1990	 to	implement	 the	 recommendation,	 as	 “Fianna	 Fáil	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 changing	needs	of	our	modern	society	and	ready	to	respond	sensitively	to	them”.44		 In	 the	 event,	 with	 his	 authority	 waning,	 the	 reform	 was	 deferred	 as	 the	Catholic-conservative	 faction	 supporting	Reynolds’	 bid	 for	 the	 leadership	 came	to	the	fore	in	Fianna	Fáil.	It	was	eventually	enacted	by	Geoghegan	Quinn	in	1993	under	 Reynolds’	 Fianna	 Fáil-Labour	 coalition.	 The	 reform	 was	 shaped	 by	 an	assiduous	campaign	led	by	activists	through	the	unions	and	social	partnership.	
																																																								43		 “dominant	party”,	McGraw	and	O’Malley	2018;	“precipitate	PDs”,	O’Malley,	D.	2014:	149-55;	Mac	Liammóir	funeral,	Dunphy	1997:	261;	Robinson	strategy,	Finlay	1998;	“illiberal”	image	and	LRC,	Dunphy	1997:	254	44		 LRC	proposals,	Dunphy	1997:	253;	Haughey	response,	‘Speech	by	Taoiseach	at	Cáirde	Fáil	President’s	Dinner’,	04/12/1990,	GIS:	D/Taoiseach	
	 313	
	 The	 gay	 community	 had	 been	 an	 invisible	minority,	 and	 the	 opprobrium	 in	which	 elite	 circles	 held	 it	 was	 such	 that	 that	 perpetrators	 of	 homophobic	violence,	including	murder,	were	often	treated	lightly	by	“understanding”	judges.	Publicly	gay	activists	were	few,	but	they	included	a	left	wing	circle	who	were	also	trade	unionists.	The	first	“National	Gay	Conference”	was	held	in	Cork	in	1981	in	the	ITGWU’s	Connolly	Hall,	typically,	in	terms	of	Irish	social	bonds,	because	Ger	Philpott,	 the	 son	 of	 Cork	 ITGWU	 leader	 Taghd,	 was	 “himself	 a	member	 of	 the	[Gay	Rights]	Collective”.	This	event	marked	a	coming-out	of	the	community,	and	established	 the	 unions	 as	 an	 ally	 in	 securing	 their	 rights.	 Kieran	 Rose,	 a	pioneering	activist	and	LGPSU	member,	urged	the	community	to	pursue	reform	through	 ICTU’s	advocacy	of	 social	equality	and	 the	equal	 treatment	of	workers	and	 citizens,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 separate	 identity.	 This	 won	 over	 the	 LGPSU	president,	Tom	Brogue,	a	“left	wing	Catholic	hugely	sympathetic	to	us”,	and	“the	great	fixer”	Phil	Flynn,	who	sympathised	with	gay	liberation.45			 The	LGPSU	was	the	first	union	to	address	the	issue,	adopting	in	1982	Rose’s	motion	 to	 amend	 employment	 law	 to	 include	 “sexual	 orientation”	 among	 the	grounds	of	discrimination.	With	the	support	of	Flynn	and	Brogue,	and	from	two	other	unions,	where	fellow	activists	had	also	won	support,	Rose	had	the	LGPSU	position	adopted	by	ICTU,	where	a	speech	by	Flynn	secured	its	acceptance.46			 Many	union	leaders	remained	cautious	but	in	1985	Flynn	convinced	the	ICTU	Executive	to	action	its	policy	with	a	workshop	on	gay	equality,	which	led	to	what	Dunphy	 calls	 the	 “radical”	 policy,	 Lesbian	 and	 Gay	 Rights	 in	 the	 Workplace:	
Guidelines	for	Negotiators,	 the	 first	ever	on	such	an	 issue.	This	 initiative	 led	the	EEA	and	the	ICCL	to	now	also	take	up	the	issue	of	employment	equality.	ICTU’s	equality	officer,	Patricia	O’Donovan,	promoted	the	Guidelines	with	unions	and	in	1988	UPTCS	secured	a	first	agreement	under	it	prohibiting	discrimination	in	the	civil	service	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation.	This	was	followed	in	1990	by	the	Incitement	to	Hatred	Act,	the	first	law	to	include	“sexual	orientation”	in	its	terms,	and	to	the	LRC	proposing	that	this	be	extended	to	employment	law	generally.47																																																									45		 Interview,	Kieran	Rose		46		 LGPSU	initiative,	Rose,	www.linkedin.com/pulse/lesbian-gay-right-work-1-kieran-rose;	LGPSU	Cork	conference,	Irish	Independent,	Cork	Examiner	14/05/82;	Flynn	speech,	Rose	Interview	47		 “radical	policy”,	Dunphy	1997:	252;	Guidelines,	ICTU	1986;	O’Donovamn	role,	O'Donovan,	ICTU,	to	D/Labour,	26.11.1986,	O'Donovan		to	affiliated	unions,	05.01.	1987;	on	EEA,	Meehan	(EEA)	to	Rose,	
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	 Rose’s	activists	had	formed	the	“Gay	and	Lesbian	Equality	Network”	(GLEN)	in	1988	to	advance	this	agenda,	working	closely	with	ICTU	on	the	Guidelines.	It	also	convinced	 the	 FIE	 to	 concede	 the	 principle	 and	 declare	 that	 employers	would	welcome	 “legal	 clarity”.	 The	 equality	 approach	 was	 boosted	 by	 the	 Robinson	Presidential	campaign,	which	had	been	built	around	the	theme	of	social	equality.	These	 developments	 formed	 the	 background	 to	 Haughey’s	 suggestion	 to	negotiators	 that	 they	 include	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 proposals	 in	 the	 PESP.	Continued	 de	 jure	 criminalisation,	 however,	 meant	 civil	 servants	 cautioned	against	 a	 “partnership”	 approach	 and	 the	 eventual	 equality	 provisions	 in	 the	PESP	 only	 focused	 on	 women	 and	 disabled	 people.	 But	 a	 brief	 clause	 was	included	which	opened	the	way	for	a	general	review	of	equality	legislation.48			 The	issue	was	progressed	not	only	at	social	partnership	policy	level,	but	also	in	 its	 practice.	 Gay	 activists	 secured	 for	 an	 SES	 project,	 “Gay	 Health	 Action”,	addressing	HIV.	As	a	project	sponsor	recalled,	Department	of	Labour	officials	had	advised	 against	 it	 after	 forceful	 intervention	 “at	 the	 highest	 level”	 from	 the	Department	of	Justice	opposing	it	as	state	“endorsement	of	homosexuality”.	But	at	the	SES	monitoring	committee,	which	included	sympathetic	union	figures	like	the	ITGWU’s	Des	Geraghty,	Ahern	“told	the	civil	servants	to	get	real,	and	no	more	was	heard	of	opposition	to	the	[project]	being	approved”.49		 This	progress	 through	partnership	 led	Labour,	 strongly	 lobbied	by	GLEN,	 to	re-frame	its	1991	Equal	Status	Bill	to	include	“sexual	orientation”.	When	this,	as	an	opposition	bill,	failed,	ICTU	complained	to	ministers	of	the	“inordinate	delay”	in	legislating	gay	law	reform	since	the	ECHR	ruling.	Progress	further	stalled	after	Haughey’s	 departure	 when	 Reynolds,	 embroiled	 in	 renewed	 conflict	 over	abortion,	resisted	GLEN/ICTU	lobbying	to	take	action	on	it.50			 But	 change	 came	 the	 following	 year	 with	 the	 Fianna	 Fáil-Labour	 coalition.	While	 Labour’s	 equality	 agenda	was	 an	 important	 factor,	 those	who	 reformed																																																																																																																																																															08.05.1986,	Rose	Archive	and	Rose	2018;	on	civil	service	agreement,	Interview	Kieran	Rose	and	Civil	Service	Circular	12/88,	Rose	Archive;	LRC	recommendation,	Dunphy	1997:	253	48		 FIE	statement	in	GLEN,	‘Resource	Materials	on	Lesbian/Gay	Law	Reform’	1992,	Rose	Archive;	PESP	“review”,	PESP	IX	49		 Cathal	Kerrigan,	email	18/03/19	50		 On	Labour	bill,	Rose,	www.linkedin.com/pulse/equal-status-bill-1990-kieran-rose/;	“inordinate	delay”,	Cassells	to	M/Justice,	24.05.1991,	Rose	Archive;	Reynold’s	inaction,	Phil	Flynn	to	M/Lab	Brian	Cowan,	re	Unfair	Dismissals	Act,	08.04.92;	GLEN,	‘Resource	Material	on	Lesbian/Gay	Law	Reform’	1992	and	GLEN,	‘Unfair	Dismissals	Act’,	1992;	UPTCS,	‘Unfair	Dismissals	Act	Resource	Pack’	1992,	in	Rose	Archive	
	 315	
labour,	services	and	homosexuality	law	were	two	women	originally	appointed	by	Haughey,	Mary	O’Rourke	at	the	Department	of	Labour	and	Geoghegan	Quinn	at	Justice.	O’Rourke	 immediately	 initiated	a	 “sweeping	update”	of	equality	 law,	as	proposed	under	PESP,	adding	 “sexual	orientation”	as	a	 “ground”	 in	all	 relevant	laws.	Geoghegan	Quinn	followed	suit,	and	after	meeting	a	GLEN	delegation	that	included	 the	 mother	 of	 a	 gay	 man	 who	 made	 an	 emotional	 appeal	 for	 full	equality,	 opted,	 to	 the	 “amazement”	 of	 activists	 and	 public	 alike,	 to	 abolish	homosexual	law	entirely	in	favour	of	sexual	equality,	without	the	constraints	on	privacy	and	age	of	consent	introduced	in	Britain.	This	occurred	after	GLEN	urged	her	to	ignore	the	“puritan	British”	approach	and	legislate	“a	true	Irish	solution”.	This	“nationalist”	approach	appealed	to	Fianna	Fáil,	easing	the	path	to	reform.	As	one	activist	noted,	“two	Irish	mothers	had	decided	the	issue	between	them”.51			 Gay	 politics	 would	 continue	 to	 progress	 through	 social	 partnership,	 first	through	recognition	of	gay	socio-economic	disadvantage	through	a	partnership-endorsed	 CPA	 project	 and	 then	 through	 the	 Equality	 Authority	 and	NESF.	 The	development	 of	 the	 Irish	 “equality”-based	 social	 state	 initiated	 through	partnership	 had	 resulted	 in	 progressive	 gay	 rights	 reform,	 leading	 to	 other	progressive	 social	 reforms	 that	 would	 transform	 Ireland	 into	 a	 European	equality	leader.	The	issue	illustrates	the	complex	inter-relationship	that	evolved	from	1988	between	politics,	partnership	and	reform,	replicated	in	many	areas.52		
	
Unruly	offspring:	partnership	and	the	politics	of	poverty		
		 Community	groups	and	campaigning	NGOs	were	to	achieve	a	significant	role	in	 partnership	 politics,	 making	 the	 1990s	 a	 “golden	 era”	 of	 “community	development”.	Chapter	8	describes	their	emergence	as	players	under	the	PNR	in	1987-8	through	ICTU’s	alliance	with	the	sector	and	Haughey’s	acceptance	of	it	as	a	driver	of	local	institutional	change,	piloting	local	partnership-type	initiatives	in	1988.	This	role	was	 institutionalised	 in	 the	drafting	phase	of	 the	PESP	 through	initiatives	 under	 the	 EC	 co-funded	 NDP,	 and	 strongly	 legitimised	 by	 Mary	Robinson’s	 election	 as	 President.	 The	 “community	 and	 voluntary”	 sector	 was																																																									51		 O’Rourke’s	“sweeping	update”,	interview	Kieran	Rose;	“true	Irish	solution”,	Chris	Robson,	‘What	we	really	want	from	Máire	Geoghegan	Quinn’,	Gay	Community	News,	April	1993;	“two	Irish	mothers”,	quoted	in	Dunphy	1997:	255-6	52		 On	GLEN	projects	and	NESF/EA	involvement,	interview	Rose,	email	from	Eoin	Collins,	01/04/19,	O'Carroll	and	Collins	1995,	Equality	Authority	2002	and	NESF	2003	
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without	 parallel	 in	 Europe,	 reflecting	 inadequacies	 of	 inherited	 institutions	 in	Ireland.	 The	 PESP	 further	 institutionalised	 the	 sector,	 through	 the	 welfare	budget	forums,	extending	pilot	IRD	projects	and	initiating	local	“partnerships”.53			 What	emerged	was	an	institutional	departure	which	would	influence	later	EC	policy,	the	IRD	projects	becoming	a	model	for	its	“LEADER”	Programme.	In	1990,	before	the	PESP,	Delors	had	supported	an	initiative	proposed	by	Ahern	under	the	Irish	Presidency	 for	a	 “generously	 funded”	additional	EC	“Special	 Initiative”	 for	projects	to	combat	urban	unemployment,	with	“a	large	degree	of	discretion”	for	“local	operators”	 in	designing	and	 implementing	 them.	Ahern	also	 launched	an	EC	research	programme	on	local	development.	Among	the	Irish	projects	selected	under	 “Poverty	3”	was	PAUL	 in	Limerick,	 chaired	by	Professor	 Joyce	O’Connor,	which	 combined	 statutory	 and	 community	 groups,	 including	 the	 local	 ICTU	Centre,	 in	 a	 programme	 of	 “integrated	 measures	 to	 tackle	 poverty”.	 Ahern	described	“the	basis	of	the	strategy”	as	a	“concerted	integrated	effort”	by	“local	groups	[working]	in	partnership	with	State	agencies”.54		 Under	 the	 PESP,	 local	 “area	 based	 partnership	 companies”	 were	 piloted	 on	this	 basis,	 encompassing	 welfare,	 education,	 employment,	 SES	 and	 enterprise	projects.	 Boards	 representing	 communities,	 state	 agencies	 and	 social	 partners	were	 established,	 assisted	 by	 a	 national	 co-ordinating	 body	 meeting	 in	 the	Department	 of	 the	 Taoiseach.	 If	 successful,	 the	 initiative	 would	 be	 rolled	 out	nationally.	 Following	 ratification	 of	 the	 PESP,	 Congress	 sought	 their	 speedy	establishment	 and	 the	 CRC	met	 community	 bodies	 to	 form	 the	 national	 body.	Twelve	 such	 partnership	 companies	 –	 including	 PAUL	 in	 Limerick	 and	 three	consortia	 in	 Dublin	 -	 were	 established,	 with	 Paddy	 Teahon	 of	 the	 Taoiseach’s	Department	co-ordinating	the	initiative.55			 Official	bodies	resisted	conceding	authority	to	such	groups	and	even	ICTU	had	initially	not	envisaged	community-led	projects,	but	rather	consortia	of	agencies,																																																									53		 “golden	era”,	Seánai	Lambe,	in	interview	with	Dublin	Inner	City	Group;	“pilot	projects”,	Section	VI/19	54		 Role	of	“Poverty	3”,	Kelleher	and	O’Neil	2018;	on	Delors	and	Ahern’s	initiatives,	‘Conclusion	of	EC	Social	Affairs	Council	meeting	in	Dublin’,	02/03/90,	GIS:	D/Labour	and	Gerard	Collins,	‘Address	to	European	Parliament’,	16/01/90,	GIS:	D/Finance;	“research	programme”,	Ahern,	‘Speech	to	open	Leda	Programme	Conference’,	21/03/90,	Ahern,	‘Speech	at	opening	of	ERGO	Seminar	on	action	to	combat	long-term	unemployment’,	15/05/90,	and	‘EC	Council	of	Social	Affairs,	Brussels’,	29/05/90,	GIS:	D/Labour;	on	PAUL	alliance,	Woods,	‘Minister	launches	Limerick	EC	Poverty	Project	to	tackle	unemployment’,	10/01/90,	GIS:	D/Social	Welfare;	“basis	of	the	strategy”,	Ahern,	‘Speech	to	open	Leda	Programme	Conference’,	21/03/90,	GIS:	D/Labour		55		 “replicated”,	PESP	VIII;	ICTU	initiatives,	ICTU	AR	1991:	14,	51	
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public	 services	and	social	partners,	with	 the	 “community”	 represented	by	 local	ICTU	 representatives.	The	Department	of	 the	Taoiseach	ensured	a	 community-led	 structure,	 however,	 and	 used	 Brussels’	 interest	 in	 a	 “high	 degree	 of	 local	involvement”	 to	 force	 agency	 cooperation,	 with	 Teahon,	 at	 meetings	 with	 the	Commission,	often	backing	local	leaders	against	civil	service	resistance.	Haughey	was	 also	 involved	 directly,	 coaxing	 authoritative	 figures	 to	 take	 on	 board	chairmanships	to	ensure	leverage	with	the	state	agencies.	These	included	Mark	Hely	Hutchinson,	retired	ceo	of	the	Bank	of	Ireland	who	had	previously	headed	the	Enterprise	Group	under	the	1981	“Understanding”,	at	Dublin	Inner	City,	and	Pádraic	 White,	 just	 retired	 from	 the	 IDA,	 at	 Dublin	 Northside.	 Community	activists	 rather	 than	 officials	 were	 recruited	 as	 managers,	 and	 put	 on	 senior	salary	scales	to	enhance	their	authority	in	dealing	with	public	officials.56			 The	 partnerships	 were	 to	 have	 a	 chequered	 history	 and	 their	 effectiveness	was	impaired	when	official	resistance	in	1992	successfully	reversed	the	pooling	of	agency	budgets	under	them	envisaged	in	the	PESP.	But	they	proved	successful	in	 mobilising	 communities	 and	 combining	 local	 groups	 and	 agencies	 in	 many	innovative	 projects	 tackling	 social	 problems.	 Many	 significant	 innovations	reforming	 welfare	 and	 labour	 market	 services,	 such	 as	 income	 disregards,	women’s	 programmes,	 back-to-work	 schemes	 and	 the	 Local	 Employment	Service,	 would	 emerge	 from	 them.	 They	 enhanced	 social	 inclusion	 in	marginalised	 communities,	 and	 an	 OECD	 evaluation	 described	 them	 as	pioneering	 a	 form	 of	 “participative	 democracy”	 of	 “potentially	 international	significance”.	From	the	mid-1990s	they	were	extended	nationwide,	contributing	to	the	introduction	of	locally	delivered	services	and	local	government	reform.57		 ICTU	 again	 worked	 in	 alliance	 with	 campaigning	 organisations,	 notably	 the	CPA,	 in	negotiating	the	PESP,	with	the	Hierarchy	assisting	by	promising	ICTU	a	“Pastoral	on	Social	Justice”.	Catholic	social	theory	remained	a	powerful	influence,	with	Archbishop	Kavanagh	of	Dublin,	whose	brother	had	been	an	FWUI	official,	a	strong	advocate	of	partnership.	Government	continued	the	pre-	and	post-budget																																																									56		 Initial	ICTU	concept,	CRC	Sub-Grp	on	Job	Creation,	‘Report	to	CRC,	October	1989’,	DTA:	S26122-E,	Cassells	to	Teahon,	12/01/90,	DTA:	S25857-Z1	and	ICTU	ADC	1990:	56-7;	leveraging	Brussels	insistence	on	“local	involvement”,	h/w	notes	18th	CRC	mtg.	21/09/89,	DTA:	S25857-W;	Teahon	at	Commission	meetings,	David	Connolly,	in	interview	Dublin	Inner	City	Group;	Haughey	interventions,	Interviews	with	Pádraig	White	and	Dublin	Inner	City	Group	57		 Local	partnership	achievements	and	“participative	democracy”,	McCashin,	2004:	211,	Sabel	1996	
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consultative	 “forums”	 initiated	under	PNR,	and	 instituted	 the	systematic	grant-aiding	of	voluntary	bodies.	At	EC	 level	ministers	show-cased	 the	 “unique”	 Irish	State/NGO	 collaboration	 in	 “delivering	 social	 services	 and	 combating	 poverty”	and	the	PESP	committed	to	further	systematise	this	relationship	though	a	White	Paper	on	the	sector,	an	initiative	often	wrongly	attributed	to	a	later	period.58			 The	 ICTU-NGO	 alliance	 had	 its	 tensions,	 as	 noted	 in	 chapter	 8.	 While	 it	strengthened	 Congress’s	 hand	 with	 government,	 ICTU	 remained	 wary	 of	 the	sector’s	 growing	 influence	and	 some	 ideas	gaining	 favour	within	 it,	 notably	Fr.	Healy’s	“basic	income	for	all”	as	an	alternative	to	pursuing	full	employment.	ICTU	rejected	this	“post-industrial	definition	of	labour	and	work”	and	a	future	“world	without	work”.	Healy’s	“Social	Justice	Office”	and	youth	organisations	such	as	the	NYCI,	with	Fine	Gael	support,	demanded	a	role	 in	partnership	negotiations	and	even	on	the	CRC.	Ó	hUiginn	advised	Haughey	to	resist	this,	as	ICTU	was	adamant	that	 partnership	 not	 be	 “diluted”	 and	 the	 CRC	 remain	 confined	 to	 the	 “main”	social	partners.	The	changes	sought	by	Healy	and	the	NYCI	were	partly	conceded	by	 later	 governments,	 resulting,	 as	 ICTU	 leaders	 saw	 it,	 in	 social	 partnership	becoming	 “swamped”,	 with	 hard-headed	 policy	 debate	 at	 the	 NESC	 and	 other	forums	being	displaced	by	“idealistic	speeches	and	impossiblist	demands”.59		 As	 the	 unemployed	 organisation,	 the	 INOU,	 also	 gained	 momentum,	 it	 too	sought	a	“voice”	in	partnership,	proposing	a	“National	Forum	on	Unemployment”	similar	 to	 the	 New	 Ireland	 Forum.	 Union	 leaders	 lent	 support	 publicly	 to	 the	concept	but,	again	fearing	“dilution”	and	another	“talking	shop”,	and	suspecting	the	 INOU	 of	 not	 being	 an	 “authentic”	 voice	 of	 the	 unemployed,	 urged	 that	 the	forum	 be	 confined	 to	 parties	 and	 the	 “main	 Social	 Partners,	 i.e.	 trade	 unions,	employers	 and	 farmers”,	 with	 “views”	 being	 elicited	 from	 other	 “interested	groups”.	 The	 Haughey	 governments	 therefore	 resisted	 the	 proposal,	 though	 it	was	 later	realised	 in	weaker	 form	in	the	NESF	established	under	the	Reynolds-Labour	coalition.	Haughey’s	government	involved	the	new	sector	 in	other	ways	short	 of	 a	 direct	 role	 in	 partnership,	 through	 Woods’	 consultative	 forums,																																																									58		 ICTU-CPA	alliance,	ICTU	and	CPA	1990e;	“pastoral”,	ICTU	AR	1990:	59;	Kavanagh	role,	Interview	with	John	Sweeney;	grant-aiding	voluntary	sector	and	White	Paper,	Ahern,	‘Address	to	the	ETUC	Press	Group’,	28/06/90,	GIS:	D/Labour	59		 Healy	and	“minimum	income”,	Ward	1997:	247-8;	ICTU	position,	ICTU	ADC	1989:	44-5;	seek	role	on	CRC,	Mitchell	in	Dáil	14/03/90;	Ó	hUiginn	advice,	‘Briefing’	for	Taoiseach	for	replies	to	PQs,	14/03/90,	DTA:	S25858-Z2;	“swamping”,	interviews	with	ICTU	leaders	
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Ahern’s	appointment	of	 INOU	 figures	 to	project	boards	and	 the	sector’s	 role	 in	the	 local	 partnerships.	 Irish	 NGOs	 became	 sector	 leaders	 at	 EC	 level,	 where	Ireland	 came	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 pioneering	 an	 innovative	 form	 of	 state-NGO	interaction.	This	growing	prestige	saw	the	INOU	to	the	fore	in	founding	both	the	EC-wide	 “European	 Network	 of	 the	 Unemployed”	 and	 the	 “European	 Anti-Poverty	 Network”.	 Both	 were	 given	 a	 rare	 and	 much	 coveted	 policy	“consultative”	status	with	the	Commission	by	Jacques	Delors.60		 ICTU	also	hoped,	conversely,	to	revive	its	fading	local-level	influence	through	its	 NGO	 alliance,	 urging	 trades	 councils	 and	 ICTU	 unemployed	 centres	 to	 be	active	in	 local	campaigns	and	on	the	new	local	partnership	boards.	While	some	activists	 took	up	 this	 challenge,	 this	 ICTU	ambition	was	never	 realised,	despite	the	Left	dominating	the	union	movement	at	 this	 level.	Despite	enormous	union	memberships,	 the	 pool	 of	 officials	 and	 activists	 interested	 in	 such	 local	involvement	 proved	 small,	 and	 even	 the	 unemployed	 centres	 soon	 faded	 from	the	 prominent	 local	 role	 ICTU	 had	 envisaged	 for	 them.	 Indeed,	 Left	oppositionism	continued	to	dog	the	movement	locally	as	well.	While	ICTU	at	CRC	level	 sought	 a	 significant	 expansion	 of	 the	 SES	 programme,	 it	 was	 to	 be	embarrassed	 by	 left-wing	 unions	 blocking	 schemes	 in	 Cork	 and	 Dublin	 city	councils.	This	 involved	the	strongly	anti-PNR	union,	the	IMETU,	which	opposed	SES	as	 threatening	 job	displacement	despite	 a	monitoring	 committee	 involving	ICTU	overseeing	it.	Even	direct	interventions	by	Ahern	with	Dublin	and	Cork	city	managers	and	Cassells	with	the	IMETU	failed	to	end	the	impasse	until	1992.61			 The	 local	 partnership	 and	 community	 development	 structures	 would	 face	similar	political	hostility	as	the	overall	partnership	system,	especially	from	TDs	jealous	 of	 their	 intermediary	 role	 between	 constituents	 and	 the	 state	 being	usurped	 by	 the	 new	 local	 institutions.	 But	 government’s	 fostering	 of	 the	community	sector,	which	initiated	two	decades	of	innovative	local	development,	transformed	 local	 public	 services,	 inevitably	 leading	 to	 the	 sector	 ultimately	being	 formally	 included	 in	 social	 partnership,	 a	 process	much	 analysed	 in	 the																																																									60		 INOU	“forum”,	Allen,	M.	1998:	288-92;	ICTU	proposals,	ICTU	ADC	1990:	43-4;	“inauthentic”,	interview	O’Donovan;	INOU’s	EC	role,	INOU	Bulletin,	June	1990,	also	information	from	Robin	Hannan,	Tony	Monks	61		 Exhorting	a	local	union	role,	Des	Geraghty	in	ICTU	ADC	1989:	60-1;	on	ineffectiveness	and	fading	of	union	local	involvement,	interviews	with	Inner	City	activists;	on	IMETU	blocking	SES,	h/w	notes	‘CRC	on	16/11/89’,	DTA:	S25857-Y,	‘Employment	Scheme	runs	into	Trade	Union	flak’,	Business	&	Finance,	03/05/90	and	D/Labour,	‘Government	Action	on	Employment’,	27/09/89,	DTA:	S25862-D	
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literature.	But	the	basis	for	the	sector’s	growth	and	the	Europe-wide	prestige	it	attained	had	been	instigated,	with	ICTU	support,	by	the	Haughey	circle	already	in	1987-88	and	systematised	by	1990,	with	he	himself	often	intervening	directly	in	shaping	 it.	 A	 movement	 with	 its	 origins	 in	 a	 community	 challenge	 to	 state	institutional	dysfunction	was	thus	channelled	through	social	partnership	to	help	achieve	 institutional	 reform.	 Despite	 its	 often	 stormy	 relationship	 with	 that	system,	 the	 sector	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 re-formatting	 of	 Ireland’s	 social	services	and	local	government	system.62			 This	chapter	has	attempted	to	demonstrate	the	constrained	dynamics	of	social	partnership	 as	 it	 began	 to	 consolidate	 as	 a	 new	 institutional	 paradigm.	 It	 also	demonstrates	 the	 comprehensive	 societal	 impact	 of	 the	 new	 institutions,	 from	shaping	economic	policy	and	the	structures	of	the	social	state	to	influencing	the	emergent	 equality	 revolution	 that	would	 become	 central	 in	 Irish	 politics.	 	 The	economy	 would	 not	 finally	 take-off	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 radical	 expansion	 of	employment	until	after	1993,	but	the	trajectory	of	that	take-off	and	the	structural	transformation	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 that	 would	 follow	 was	 already	 clearly	 on	course	by	1991.			 	
																																																								62		 “TDs	usurped”,		Kelleher	and	O’Neill	2018;	on	the	community	sector	in	partnership,	Adshead	2011	and	sources	cited	there	
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Conclusions		 This	 thesis	 contends	 that	 the	 social	 partnership	 system	 initiated	 in	 1987	proved	 a	 key	 institutional	 factor	 enabling	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 Irish	economy	from	one	of	Western	Europe’s	poorest	to	one	of	 its	top	performers	 in	little	 over	 a	 decade.	 This	 was	 a	 policy	 paradigm	 shift,	 as	 profound	 as	 that	 of	1959-63,	 recasting	 the	 economy	within	 a	 few	 years	 to	 a	 new	model,	 its	 future	characteristics	 clearly	 established	 by	 1991	 and	 the	 economic	 take-off	 on	 that	basis	 indisputable	 from	 1993.	 Charles	 Haughey	 was	 the	 central	 figure	 in	 that	transformation,	 the	 political	 innovator	 who	 oversaw	 a	 socio-economic	turnaround	through	tight	control	of	government	and	a	working	alliance	with	key	social	forces.	A	modernising	nationalist,	in	1987-91	he	finally	realised	a	strategic	approach	he	had	developed	over	two	decades	in	conjunction	with	business	and	union	circles	and	had	several	times	previously	attempted	to	achieve.			 This	thesis	fills	an	important	gap	in	the	literature	on	social	partnership.	Many	studies	have	appeared	on	 specific	 aspects	of	 it,	 and	an	extensive	 literature	has	appeared	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 later	 role	 in	 policy	 making.	 There	 have	 been	comparative	 studies	 with	 European	 models	 of	 “corporatism”,	 whose	 main	conclusion,	however,	has	been	the	multiple	“outlier”	quality	of	what	occurred	in	Ireland,	 requiring	 explanation	 in	 the	 specific	 domestic	 cultural-political	 factors	that	shaped	it.	In	the	absence	of	a	detailed	history	of	partnership,	many	studies	have	 been	 hampered	 by	 an	 inadequate	 evidential	 base	 on	 its	 inception,	 pre-history	 and	 formative	 early	 years.	 This	 study	 seeks	 to	 provide,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	rarely	examined	sources,	a	detailed	tracing	of	the	politics	of	partnership	and	the	role	of	human	political	agency	in	its	evolution.			 The	 thesis	 refers	 to	 academic	 theories	 on	what	 explains	 paradigm	 shifts	 in	institutions,	 and	 how	 innovative	 forces	 achieve	 –	 or	 fail	 to	 achieve	 -	 profound	institutional	change	at	moments	of	crisis	and	uncertainty.	The	severe	economic	situation	of	the	1980s	was	not,	ultimately,	the	core	problem	being	addressed	in	the	 1987	 departure	 but	 rather	 the	 contingent	 event	 that	 enabled	 a	 long-pre-planned	 institutional	paradigm	 to	be	affected	 in	 socio-economic	policy	 and	 the	structures	of	policy	making.	 In	 such	processes	of	 radical	 change,	 agent-centred	theories	are	more	appropriate	 than	structuralist	analyses,	while	preceding	and	
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subsequent	institutions	in	equilibrium	are	arguably	more	amenable	to	structure-centred	path	dependency	approaches.	It	is	therefore	the	innovative	process	that	is	 traced	 in	 this	 thesis,	 as	 the	 multiple	 streams	 of	 policy-making,	 social	 force	interaction	and	political	innovation	converged	at	a	moment	of	crisis.	It	identifies	how	plausibility	for	a	major	policy	departure	–	especially	with	cautious	opinion	leaders	 among	 business	 and	 unions,	 political	 parties	 and	 the	 media	 –	 was	achieved	 in	 this	 case	 by	 a	 policy	 innovator	 securing	 authoritative	 government	power.	It	was	Haughey’s	convincing	control	over	party,	government	and	the	state	apparatus	 in	 1987	 that	 accounts	 for	why	 the	 radical	 institutional	 departure	 of	social	partnership,	 for	which	there	was	only	weak	precedent,	achieved	success,	in	contrast	to	his	earlier	similar	initiatives.			 The	 thesis	 explores	 the	 corporatist/anti-corporatist	 dichotomy	 that	 shaped	alternate	governments	 in	 Ireland	 in	a	consistent	pattern	 from	the	1920s	 to	 the	2000s.	 The	 particular	 form	 in	 which	 Irish	 party/social	 interest	 relationships	developed	 pre-dated	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 state.	 But	 political	 factors	surrounding	the	birth	of	the	Free	State	determined	that	while	the	two	dominant	parties	that	emerged	cannot	easily	be	characterised	on	a	left/right	basis,	a	clear	socio-economic	 divide	 nevertheless	 soon	 separated	 them.	 A	 developmental	alliance	of	rural	and	urban	social	forces	formed	the	base	of	one,	Fianna	Fáil,	with	its	high	risk-taking	instinct,	while	a	reactive	alliance	of	more	conservative	forces	formed	that	of	the	other,	what	became	Fine	Gael.	A	small	Labour	Party,	founded	by	 the	 Irish	 Trade	 Union	 Congress	 before	 the	 state	was	 established,	 espoused	“social	democracy”.	But,	breaking	from	the	unions,	Labour	developed	a	peculiar	but	persistent	hostility	to	corporatism	as	a	mere	Fianna	Fáil	propaganda	ploy.	Its	focus	 instead,	 usually	 in	 Fine	 Gael-led	 coalitions,	 would	 centre	 on	 expanding	state	welfare	 provision,	 rather	 than	 economic	 strategy.	 In	 this	 it	 differed	 from	social	 democratic	 parties	 elsewhere,	 which	 championed	 corporatism,	 an	anomaly	mainly	explicable	by	Irish	Labour’s	electoral	marginality.			 As	a	minister	and	Taoiseach,	Lemass	portrayed	business,	unions	and	farming	bodies	 as	 productive	 forces	 in	 their	 own	 right	 to	 be	 “harnessed”	 in	 a	 national	economic	endeavour.	Fine	Gael	on	the	other	hand	viewed	them	as	mere	“interest	groups”	 to	 be	 contained,	 and	 when	 in	 power	 downgraded	 and	 marginalised	
	 323	
tripartite	planning	bodies	such	as	the	NESC,	minimised	central	bargaining	to,	at	best,	 pay	 agreements,	 and	 restored	 policy-making	 to	 the	 sole	 preserve	 of	government.	 While	 accepting	 consultative	 input	 from	 “social	 partners”,	 Fine	Gael/Labour	 repeatedly	 dispensed	 with	 systems	 of	 structured	 cooperation,	preferring	for	policy	guidance	the	input	of	“independent”	economic	experts,	but	without	achieving	notable	economic	success	as	a	result.	Fianna	Fáil	remained	the	sole	 champion	 of	 a	 radical	 corporatism,	 though	 itself	was	 consistently	 divided	between	corporatist	minimalists	and	maximalists.		 There	were	 also	 important	divisions	within	 social	 interests.	 In	business,	 the	strong-sector	 lobby,	CII,	which	had	evolved	 from	the	1930s	state-oriented	FIM,	inherited	a	close	relationship	with	the	state,	and	was	often	a	willing	participant	in	corporatist	 strategies.	Older	Anglo-Irish	commercial/financial	 interests	were	more	 detached	 and	 a	 recurrent	 problem	 for	 state	 policy,	 while	 strictly	“employer”	 organisations,	 representing	 the	 mass	 of	 small	 businesses	 and	domestic	or	British-market	dependent	exporters,	were	sceptical	or	even	hostile,	often	having	to	be	cajoled	by	government	into	tripartite	arrangements.	Farming	bodies,	 while	 opposed	 to	 union	 influence	 over	 state	 policy,	 ultimately	 needed	government	 as	 an	 ally	 to	 contain	 EEC	 or	 other	 policy	 threats,	 and	 tended	 to	comply,	however	reluctantly,	with	tripartitism	when	it	was	in	the	ascendant.	This	pattern	 of	 state/interest	 relations	 also	 illustrates	 how	 the	 state,	 rather	 than	major	economic	interests,	formed	the	main	driver	of	the	Irish	economy.			 Trade	 unions,	 which	 in	 European	 terms	 organised	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	workers,	were	also	divided,	again	along	a	historic	fault-line.	In	their	case	it	was	one	 between	 nationalist/republican-aligned	 general	 and	 pubic	 service	 sectors	versus	 a	 more	 British-socialist	 oriented	 sectional,	 craft	 and	 Left	 wing	 that	regarded	corporatism	as	an	unwelcome	regimentation	of	 labour	market	power	and,	 ideologically,	 as	 “class	 collaboration”.	 Though	 both	 sides	 portrayed	 their	approach	 in	 socialist	 terms,	 i.e.	 as	 in	 the	 general	 working	 class	 interest,	 the	conceptual	 fault-line	 remained	 a	 fundamental	 one,	 producing	 an	 almost	monotonously	predictable	2:1	divide	on	 the	 issue,	 though	at	moments	of	 crisis	this	ratio	could	inverse.	Unresolved	aspects	of	the	larger	national	question	could	also	intervene,	in	an	asymmetric	manner,	to	exacerbate	this	internal	division	or	
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undermine	cooperation	with	government,	as	happened	the	relationship	between	the	hegemonic	national-oriented	union,	 the	 ITGWU,	and	 the	Lynch	government	following	 the	 latter’s	 volte	 face	on	Northern	 policy	 in	May	 1970.	 This	 factor	 is	central	 to	understanding	several	 turning	points	 in	the	state/union	relationship,	not	least	the	powerful	position	of	trust	Haughey	achieved	with	the	unions.			 Haughey,	a	political	rather	than	business	innovator,	was	the	central	figure	in	a	nationalist	 modernising	 circle	 espousing	 a	 specific	 socio-economic	 approach	from	 the	 late	 1950s.	 This	 led	 in	 1982	 to	 the	 “Way	Forward”	 plan	 that	 laid	 the	basis	for	the	ultimately	successful	social	partnership	of	1987.	Although	this	plan	represented	 a	 departure	 for	 Haughey	 in	 that	 it	 initially	 proposed	 a	 unilateral	state	strategy,	he	was	convinced	by	German	social	democratic	chancellor,	Helmut	Schmidt,	with	whom	he	was	allied	at	EC	level,	to	persuade	his	circle	to	embed	it	in	a	social	partnership	framework,	as	he	had	his	previous	initiatives.			 Analyses	 of	 Haughey’s	 role	 in	 Ireland’s	 economic	 modernisation	 have	 been	overshadowed	 by	 an	 excessive	 focus	 on	 his	 personal	 finances,	 and	 how	 his	“lifestyle”	 was	 supported	 by	 donations	 from	 a	 few	 wealthy	 people.	 Haughey’s	close	relationship	with	some	entrepreneurial	circles	was	certainly	 important	 in	influencing	his	 private-sector	driven	 approach	 to	 economic	modernisation,	 but	little	 evidence,	 as	 opposed	 to	 inferences,	 has	 ever	 emerged	 to	 support	 a	 claim	that	he	was	politically	“corrupt”,	 i.e.	provided	political	 favours	for	this	personal	financial	 support.	This	 thesis	 contends	 that	his	personal	 financial	 relationships	were	of	 little	consequence	to	his	social	partnership	agenda,	and	are	referred	to	only	 where	 relevant.	 There	 are	 also	 other	 aspects	 of	 Haughey’s	 politics	 only	briefly	 touched	on,	 such	 as,	 apart	 from	 their	 EC	dimension	 that	was	pertinent,	innovations	by	him	in	foreign	policy,	or	in	other	areas.	The	thesis	focuses	on	his	role	 in	shaping	the	major	socio-economic	departure	of	his	era,	which	 it	 finds	 is	quite	adequately	explicable	in	political	and	policy	development	terms.			 The	1987	Programme	for	National	Recovery	 (PNR)	was	a	key	event	 initiating	both	a	partnership	 system	and	 the	 subsequent	 economic	 take-off.	 It	 integrated	budget	strategy,	social	reform,	industrial	development	and	pay	determination	for	the	first	time	in	a	tightly	interdependent	structure.	By	providing	real	wage-value	growth	through	its	pay/tax	formula,	expanding	welfare,	legislating	for	industrial	
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relations	 and	 other	 reforms	 to	 establish	 industrial	 peace	 and	 promote	 labour	quality,	promoting	a	private	sector	dynamic	in	its	economic	strategies,	exploiting	opening	 opportunities	 such	 as	 in	 capital	 liberalisation	 and	 involving	 the	 social	partners	 in	 core	 policy-making	 and	 economic	 management,	 it	 generated	intangible	 capital	 strengthening	 total	 factor	 productivity	 and	 enabling	 the	economic	take-off,	as	was	immediately	recognised	by	both	the	OECD	and	EC.	The	thesis	 contends	 that	 these	 TFP	 factors	 played	 a	 far	 greater	 role	 than	 hitherto	recognised	in	producing	the	“Irish	economic	miracle”.			 Haughey,	 together	 with	 pro-partnership	 union	 and	 business	 leaders,	 was	determined	not	 only	 that	 the	PNR	 succeed,	 but	 that	 it	 be	 institutionalised	 as	 a	“permanent	way	 of	managing	 our	 affairs”.	 His	 sole	 precondition	 in	 negotiating	his	1989	coalition	with	the	“neo-liberal”	PDs	was	that	the	PNR	be	continued	and	partnership	 become	 an	 enduring	 system.	 Structures	 initiated	 under	 the	 PNR	were	refined	and	completed	first	in	a	dramatic	PNR	review	process	in	1990	and	then	 in	 the	 successor	 Programme	 for	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Progress	 (PESP)	 of	1991.	 The	 PESP	was	 a	 10-year	 plan	 which	 in	 addition	 to	 fine-tuning	 the	 PNR	model,	 initiated	 an	 institutional	 transformation	 of	 the	 social	 state,	 consciously	conceived	 as	 a	 convergence	 towards	 the	 “German	model”.	 This	 arose	 from	 yet	another	 NESC	 strategy	 report	 Haughey	 had	 initiated.	 Subsequent	 3-year	agreements	 in	 the	 1990s,	 while	 introducing	 new	 elements,	 were	 essentially	subsets	of	the	10-year	PESP	plan.	After	1992	the	system	would	be	tweaked	and	tinkered	with,	sometimes	with	negative	effects,	but	not	changed	fundamentally.		 The	“social	peace”	or	pay	bargaining	aspect	of	partnership	has	too	often	been	narrowly	interpreted	as	its	central	feature.	The	thesis	elucidates	the	key	power	shift	 that	 occurred	 within	 trade	 unionism	 from	 sectional	 to	 general	 interests,	which	 came	 to	a	head	 in	 conflicts	over	apprenticeship,	 industrial	 relations	and	other	input	reforms	that	laid	the	basis	for	a	general	working	class	benefit	in	the	subsequent	 economic	 expansion.	 The	 industrial	 relations	 aspect,	 described	 by	critics	 as	 a	 “Faustian	 bargain”,	 was	 important	 in	 the	 political	 exchange	 of	partnership,	but	not	its	primary	driver.	The	thesis	contends	that	primary	driver	to	have	been	a	common	project	to	overcome	a	deep	problem	of	both	social	and	economic	“underdevelopment”,	 its	aims	framed	as	achieving	standards	of	 living	
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and	 services	 equal	 to	 those	 of	 the	 best-performing	 small	 open	 European	economies	as	a	result	of	their	post-war	developmental	transformation.1			 The	thesis	reveals	the	3-stage	plan	of	Haughey’s	circle	 in	1987	to	realise	the	1982	 Way	 Forward	 strategy.	 This	 entailed	 an	 initial	 half-year	 free	 hand	 to	achieve	a	radical	monetary	adjustment,	 followed	by	 industrial	policy	 initiatives	pre-empting	 the	 PNR	 but	 tailored	 to	 facilitate	 a	 partnership	 agreement,	 and	finally	 that	partnership	agreement	 itself,	 the	 “PNR”,	 framing	 the	 immediate	but	also	the	planned	longer-term	goals	and	governance	of	the	strategy.	The	3-stage	plan	was	almost	identical	to	what	had	been	attempted	in	1982	but	had	failed	due	to	Haughey’s	insufficient	control	over	government	and	policy	formation.			 Haughey’s	strategy	was	a	high-risk	political	gamble,	his	reputation	dependent	on	 its	 success.	 It	 required	 in	 turn	 the	memberships	of	partner	organisations	 to	ratify	 it	 -	 far	 from	 a	 foregone	 conclusion.	 Successful	 ratification	 was	 barely	achieved	and	would	remain	a	precarious	and	unpredictable	variable	for	several	years.	The	 intense	political	 exchange	within	 social	partnership	during	1987-91	was	 reflected	 in	 the	 extraordinary	 policy	 output	 of	 government	 and	 partner	organisations	–	especially	the	ICTU	and	CII	–	and	in	the	no	less	than	seven	highly	charged	ICTU	national	conferences	and	the	intense	Dáil	conflict	of	those	years.				 The	partnership	alliance	of	1987,	as	noted,	was	not	based	primarily	on	solving	immediate	 economic	 problems,	 but	 rather	 addressing	 problems	 which	 the	Lemass-era	initiatives	ultimately	had	not	resolved.	An	ambitious,	internationally	trading	business	class	and	a	 functional	policy	system	had	failed	to	emerge,	and	many	 foreign	 assembly	 industries	 attracted	under	1960-80	planning	withdrew	in	 the	 1980s.	 The	 brief	 Haughey	 governments	 of	 1980-82	 initiated	 a	 policy	revolution	 targeting	 these	 structural	 deficiencies,	 reconfiguring	 the	 National	Understanding,	 centralising	 policy	 power	 in	 the	 Department	 of	 the	 Taoiseach	and	reviving	the	NESC	as	a	strategy-making	body.	Even	J.J.	Lee	–	no	admirer	of	Haughey	–	was	impressed	by	the	resulting	policy	output,	“the	first	serious	debate	on	 industrial	 policy	 for	 more	 than	 twenty	 years”.	 The	 focus	 of	 Haughey’s	strategy,	including	the	work	of	the	NESC,	was	to	resolve	the	hiatus	in	which	the	economy	found	itself	after	the	Lemass-era	departure	had	run	its	course,	with	the																																																											1	 “Faustian	bargain”,	D’Art	and	Turner	2011	
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aim	of	finding	a	coherent	strategy	to	replace	it.	This	had	emerged	by	1982,	as	The	
Way	Forward,	but	could	only	be	implemented	from	1987.2					 The	strategic	agenda	of	social	partnership	gave	it	its	deeply	political	character.	This	 can	 be	 summarised	 as	 the	 oft-repeated	 achieving	 of	 “average”	 European	standards	of	living	and	institutional	and	economic	success	comparable	to	that	of	other	 “small	 European	 open	 economies”.	 The	 institutional	 aspect	 included	structures	 to	 reproduce	 “concerted”	 policy-making	 as	 in	 those	 states,	 i.e.	 a	system	of	 integrated	state/economy	strategy-production.	 It	was	 this	 consensus	goal,	the	thesis	argues,	rather	than	the	pay/tax	bargaining	formula,	that	provided	the	 real	 “glue”	 of	 social	 partnership,	 and	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 this	 consensus	began	to	dissolve	and	partnership	to	lose	its	common	sense	of	purpose	precisely	as	that	primary	goal	was	over-achieved	by	the	early	2000s.			 The	structures	and	policies	of	post-1987	social	partnership	were	remarkably	similar	to	what	certain	political	and	interest	circles	had	proposed	since	the	late	1940s	to	drive	an	economic	and	industrial	development.	These	involved	national	strategy	being	agreed	by	state	and	 industry	 interests	 through	a	 central	 council	(later	the	NIEC/NESC),	a	centralised	coordinating	role	for	government,	an	agreed	fiscal/monetary	 framework,	 integrated	medium-term	planning,	sectoral	growth	strategies,	 an	 enabling	 –	 rather	 than	 passive	 -	 welfare	 state,	 business/labour	economic	power-sharing	and	agreement	on	resource	allocation.	In	1987-91	such	an	 institutional	 departure	was	 finally	 achieved	 through	 the	PNR,	with	 strategy	formation	 by	 the	 NESC,	 policy	 coordinated	 centrally	 in	 the	 Department	 of	 the	Taoiseach,	 and	 monitoring	 of	 implementation	 by	 a	 tripartite	 “Central	 Review	Committee”	 (CRC).	 The	 Lynch/O’Donoghue	 First	 National	 Understanding	 had	lacked	all	of	these,	despite	the	unions	seeking	them.	But	they	had	been	inherent	in	 Haughey’s	 first	 1970	 initiative	 and	 more	 fully	 in	 his	 attempted	 1980-82	departure.	How	the	concepts,	management	structures	and	policies	implemented	from	 1987	 were	 realised	 and	 how	 opportunities	 presented	 by	 the	 critical	juncture	of	1987-91	enabled	 their	 realisation	 form	 the	heart	of	 this	 study.	The	issue	of	 labour/capital	economic	power-sharing	is	also	examined,	and	its	wilful	prevention	in	industry	identified	as	a	critical	institutional	limitation.																																																											2		 Lee	1989:	504	
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	 Haughey’s	EC	strategy	was	inspired,	combining	-	as	urged	by	the	NESC	though	already	inherent	in	his	own	1980-82	plan	-	a	maximalist	European-integrationist	position	 aligned	 to	 the	 core	 pro-integration	 powers,	 particularly	 Germany.	Disparate	EC	Structural	Fund	inputs	were	framed	in	a	novel	form	as	a	“National	Development	 Plan”,	 itself	 an	 innovation	 in	 EC	 terms,	 integrated	with	 the	 PNR,	and	subordinated	to	the	PNR’s	social	partnership	system.	This	enthused	Delors,	at	 that	 time	 facing	 strong	 anti-integration	 opposition,	 and	 resulted	 not	 only	 in	Ireland	securing	the	highest	rate	and	per	capita	 level	of	structural	 intervention	but	also	a	range	of	regulation	exemptions	enabling	the	Irish	private	sector-led	or	co-funded	 PNR	 model	 to	 be	 substantially	 expanded.	 The	 Ireland-Commission	alliance	formed	to	drive	the	NDP,	described	by	Delors	himself	as	“unique	in	the	history”	 of	 the	 EC,	 would	 become	 the	 model	 for	 EC	 assistance	 to	 emerging	member	economies.	Haughey	cemented	the	alliance	through	several	imaginative	personal-political	 initiatives,	 notably	 on	 German	 unification	 during	 the	 1990	Irish	Presidency,	itself	a	high-point	of	his	years	as	Taoiseach.			 A	distinguishing	feature	of	Ireland’s	social	partnership	was	how	it	integrated	a	liberal-economic	 but	 state-dirigiste	 mixed-economy	 model	 with	 substantial	social-state	 expansion	 and	 social	 reform.	 This	 integrated	 linkage	 was	 insisted	upon	 by	 ICTU	 in	 particular,	 but	 was	 in	 fact	 integral	 to	 Haughey’s	 essentially	social	democratic	philosophy.	Through	the	PNR	of	1987,	a	model	deepened	and	completed	by	 the	PESP	of	1991,	 a	 long-term	programme	of	 social/institutional	transformation,	 strategic	 planning	 innovation,	 employment	 growth,	 expanded	private	 and	 state	 enterprise,	 a	 remodelling	of	 social/educational	provision	and	an	 equality-based	 approach	 to	 social	 reform	 was	 set	 in	 train.	 The	 combined	economic/social	policy	strategy,	with	a	mixed	economy	developing	by	exploiting	the	 global	 opening,	 high-regulation,	 and	 an	 expanding	 enabling	 welfare	 state,	was	consciously	conceived	as	a	realisable	answer	to	Ireland’s	challenges	arising	from	 late	 industrialisation.	 It	 was	 also	 conceived	 as	 an	 alternative	 route	 to	modernity	and	growth	to	the	“monetarist”	or	social-state	contraction	strategies	adopted	 elsewhere	 and	 espoused	 in	 Ireland	 by	 many	 opposed	 to	 social	partnership	 and	 still	 wedded	 to	 a	Whitaker-style	 state-guided	 but	 laissez	 faire	development	paradigm.	Despite	significant	but	ultimately	minority	opposition	to	the	strategy	within	business	and	union	circles,	the	key	institutions	of	partnership	
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–	 the	 NESC	 and	 CRC	 –	 ensured	 its	 structural	 viability,	 long-term	 policy	perspective	and	the	delivery	of	its	programmes’	commitments.		 The	government/partnership	strategy	proved	flexible	and	open	to	innovation,	quickly	 evolving	 to	 exploit	 opportunities	 for	 industrial	 restructuring,	 new	policies	at	EC	level	in	support	of	the	Single	Market	and,	especially,	opportunities	presenting	 through	 a	 newly	 global	 financial	 system.	 Problems	 in	 the	 domestic	industrial	 sector	 were	 overcome	 by	 the	 state-dirigiste	 policy	 system	 changing	priorities	 and	 direction.	 The	 thesis	 establishes	 many	 of	 the	 details	 of	 the	emerging	economic	model	and	how	essential	sectoral	and	other	modifications	to	it	were	engineered	during	the	decisive	1987-91	period.						 As	 the	 economic	model	was	proving	 successful	 and	beginning	 to	 assume	an	autonomous	dynamic,	 especially	 from	 late	1990,	but	 job	 creation	had	as	yet	 to	overtake	attrition	in	declining	industries	and	demographic	pressures	continued	to	expand	the	labour	force,	social	state	innovation	became	an	ever	more	urgent	concern	of	 partnership.	High	 skills	 loss	 through	 emigration	 and	 geographically	concentrated	 deprivation	 emerged	 as	 singular	 challenges	 to	 state	 and	 society.	The	 shift	of	 focus	 to	 these	areas	and	away	 from	core	economic	 strategy	would	inaugurate	 a	 certain	mission	 drift	 that	 would	 later	 become	more	 pronounced.	Nevertheless,	many	 novel	 initiatives	 developed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 social	 crisis	through	 the	dual	 economic/social	 strategy	of	 social	partnership	would	become	one	of	its	defining	characteristics,	making	it	a	model	of	international	significance.	This	was	particularly	so	as	social	partnership	had	seemed	so	counter-intuitive	at	a	 time	 when	 other	 states	 were	 retreating	 from	 or	 dispensing	 entirely	 with	“corporatism”,	let	alone,	as	in	Ireland,	ambitiously	extending	its	functions.			 This	 thesis	 contends	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 social	 partnership	 in	 1987	represented	 an	 institutional	 rupture,	 and	 that	 the	 economic	 transformation	achieved	in	the	1990s	“Irish	miracle”	cannot	be	explained	without	understanding	the	 key	 role	 social	 partnership	 played	 in	 enabling	 it.	 It	 does	 not	 argue	 that	partnership	per	se,	or	alone,	caused	the	economic	take-off,	but	does	contend	that	the	 two	processes	were	 inextricably	 interlinked	and	mutually	 reinforcing,	with	key	 elements	 of	 the	 latter	 enabled	 through	 the	 frameworks	 provided	 by	 the	former.	 It	 also	 argues	 that	 in	 the	 short	 period	 of	 1987-91	 virtually	 all	 major	
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economic	and	social	policy	aspects	of	the	later	“Celtic	Tiger”	were	initiated,	their	course,	trajectory,	and	even	many	of	their	details,	clearly	established.	In	arguing	this,	 the	thesis	reveals	key	policy-making	events	shaping	 initiatives	such	as	 the	IFSC	and	urban	renewal	programmes,	the	inspired	strategy	adopted	towards	the	EU,	 as	well	 as	 key	 changes	 in	 sectoral	 policy	 towards	 indigenous	 industry,	 the	semi-states	 and	 FDI	 that	 drove	 the	 ultimate	 take-off.	 It	 also	 traces	 parallel	decisions	taken	that	shaped	the	social	state	that	emerged	through	partnership.			 The	 thesis,	 in	 theoretical	 terms,	 identifies	 the	 multiple	 streams	 in	 politics,	political	and	interest	relations,	historical	and	cultural	precedents,	and	exogenous	and	 domestic	 factors	 that	 converged	 to	 enable	 the	 institutional	 departure	 in	economic	and	political	policy	of	social	partnership	in	1987-91.	It	establishes	the	primacy	 in	 that	 institutional	 rupture	 of	 political	 agency,	 i.e.	 the	 critical	 role	 of	dominant	figures	and	leaders.	While	the	analysis	of	politics	and	political	process	can	be	pursued	scientifically,	politics	itself,	and	especially	leadership,	is,	as	Hans	Morgenthau	famously	put	it,	“an	art,	and	not	a	science,	and	what	is	required	for	its	mastery	is	not	the	rationality	of	the	engineer	but	the	wisdom	and	the	moral	strength	of	the	statesman”.	The	thesis	charts	the	role	of	political	leadership	and	even	 statesmanship,	 alongside	 that	 of	 the	 “engineers”	 as	 well	 as	 structural	factors,	in	shaping	the	departure	of	1987-91.3			 The	 thesis	 contends	 that	 Haughey’s	 role	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 social	transformation	 initiated	 in	 1987-91	 was	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	 Lemass	 in	 the	previous	decisive	paradigm	shift	of	1959-63.	Yet	while	Lemass’s	Programmes	for	
Expansion	 are	 accorded	 near	 iconic	 paradigm-changing	 status	 in	 the	 dominant	historical,	 political	 and	 economic	 literature,	 the	 transformative	Programme	 for	
National	 Recovery	 and	 Programme	 for	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Progress	 agreed	under	Haughey’s	 leadership	 are	unjustifiably	passed	over	 as	 largely	 irrelevant.	The	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 challenge	 this,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 also	 fundamentally	challenge	dominant	narratives	explaining	both	 the	 “Haughey	era”	and	 the	 Irish	economic	take-off.																																																												3		 Morgenthau	1946:	introduction			
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Appendix	A	
Membership	of	the	Central	Review	Committee,	1990		
(The	following	was	the	membership	per	Feb.	1990.	There	were	only	minor	changes	
during	1987-92,	traceable	in	the	attendance	record	in	Appendix	C)	1	
		
Government	Departments	
Chair:	 Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn,	Sec.	D/Taoiseach	
Agriculture	and	Food:	 Thomas	Arnold,	Chief	Economist	
Finance:	 Noel	T.	O’Gorman,	Asst.	Secretary	
Industry	and	Commerce:	 Seán	Dorgan,	Asst.	Secretary	
Labour:	 Kevin	Bonner,	Asst.	Secretary	
Taoiseach:	 Paddy	Teahon,	Asst.	Secretary		 Colm	Regan,	Special	Devpt.	Projects	Advisor		
Confederation	of	Irish	Industry	(CII)	Liam	Connellan,	Director	General	Con	Power,	Director	of	Economic	Policy	Dr.	Andrew	O’Boyle,	Director	of	Industrial	Policy		
Confederation	of	Irish	Industry	(CII)	Thomas	Reynolds,	Managing	Director	George	Hennessy,	Economist	
Federation	of	Irish	Employers	(FIE)	John	Dunne,	Director	General	James	O’Brian,	Director	
Irish	Co-Op.	Org.	Society	(ICOS)	John	Tyrrell,	Director	General	Séamus	O’Donoghue,	Director	
	
Irish	Farmers	Association	(IFA)	Allan	Gillis,	President	Michael	Berkery,	General	Secretary	
Mancra	na	Feirme	(MnF)	Larry	Fallon,	President	Tony	Garahy,	Chief	Executive	
Irish	Congress	of	Trade	Unions	(ICTU)	William	Attley,	ICTU	Exec.	&	Joint	Gen.	Pres.,	SIPTU	Edmond	Browne,	ICTU	Exec.	&	Pres.,	SIPTU	Phil	Flynn,	ICTU	Exec.	&	Gen.	Sec.,	LGPSU	Gerry	Quigley,	ICTU	Exec.	&	Gen.	Sec.,	INTO	Peter	Cassells,	General	Secretary,	ICTU	Patricia	O’Donovan,	Asst.	Gen.	Sec.,	ICTU	
	
																								CRC	Secretariat		Patrick	O’Sullivan,	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	Derek	Dignam,	Department	of	the	Taoiseach		
																																																										1	 Membership	from:	Central	Review	Committee	1990:	25-6.	First	names	have	been	substituted	for	initials	in	the	original		
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Acronyms	and	abbreviations	
	 ACOT		 An	Chomhairle	Oiliúna	Talamhaíochta	[Agricultural	Training	Council]		AEU	 Amalgamated	Engineering	Union	AFF	 An	Foras	Forbartha	[Research	and	Development	Agency]	AFT	 An	Foras	Talúntais	[Lands	Agency]	AGEMOU	 Automobile,	General	Engineering	and	Mechanical	Operatives’	Union	AHSC	 Association	of	Higher	Civil	Servants	AIA		 Anglo-Irish	Agreement	(1985)		ALCE		 Adult	Literacy	and	Community	Education	Scheme		AnCO	 An	Chomhairle	Oiliúna	[National	Training	Council]	AR	 Annual	Report	ASTI		 Association	of	Secondary	Teachers	in	Ireland	ASTMS	 Association	of	Scientific,	Technical	and	Managerial	Staffs	ATGWU	 Amalgamated	Transport	and	General	Workers’	Union	AUEW		 Amalgamated	Union	of	Engineering	Workers	BATU	 Building	and	Allied	Trades	Union	BFWAU		 Bakery	and	Food	Workers	Amalgamated	Union	 	B&ICO	 British	and	Irish	Communist	Organisation	
BJIC	 British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	BSE	 Bovine	Spongiform	Encephalopathy	[“Mad	Cow	Disease”]	C&A	 Conciliation	and	Arbitration	Service	CAP	 Common	Agricultural	Policy			--	 Community	Action	Programme	CBF		 Córas	Beostoic	agus	Feola	[=	Irish	Livestock	and	Meat	Board]	CBI	 Confederation	of	British	Industry	CHDDA		 Customs	House	Docklands	Development	Authority		CIDB	 Construction	Industry	Development	Board	CIÉ	 Córas	Iompar	Éireann	(=	Irish	National	Transport	Board)	CIF	 Construction	Industry	Federation	CII	 Confederation	of	Irish	Industry	CIO	 Committee	on	Industrial	Organisation	CIU	 Congress	of	Irish	Unions	CIU-CC	 Congress	of	Irish	Unions	–	Central	Council	CMS		 Committee	of	Ministers	and	Secretaries	CORI		 Conference	of	Major	Religious	Superiors		CPGB	 Communist	Party	of	Great	Britain	COIG	 Church	of	Ireland	Gazette		CORI		 Conference	of	Religious	of	Ireland	
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CPA	 Combat	Poverty	Agency	CPI	 Communist	Party	of	Ireland	CPNI	 Communist	Party	Northern	Ireland	CPSSU		 Civil	and	Public	Services	Staff	Union	CRC		 Central	Review	Committee		CSET	 Comhlucht	Siuicre	Eireann	Teo	[=	Irish	Sugar	Co.]	CTT	 An	Córas	Tráchtála	[Irish	Export	Board]	CUI		 Communications	Union	of	Ireland	CYTP		 Community	Youth	Training	Programme	D/	 Department	of		DDA	 Dublin	Diocesan	Archive		DEPD		 Department	of	Economic	Planning	and	Development		Dept.	I&C	 Department	of	Industry	and	Commerce	Dept.	T.	 Department	of	the	Taoiseach	DFA		 Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	DL	 Democratic	Left		DSP	 Democratic	Socialist	Party	EBR	 Exchequer	Borrowing	Requirement	EC	 European	Council				--	 European	Community			--	 Executive	Council	(ICTU)	EDD	 Economic	Development	Division	(formerly	Branch),	Dept.	Finance	EEC	 European	Economic	Community	EETPU	 Electrical,	Electronic,	Telecommunications	and	Plumbing	Union	EFTA	 European	Free	Trade	Association	EIB	 European	Investment	Bank	ELC	 Employer	Labour	Conference	EMS	 European	Monetary	System	EMU	 European	Monetary	Union	EPA	 Environmental	Protection	Agency	ERDF	 European	Regional	Development	Fund	ERO	 Employment	Regulation	Order	(Labour	Court)	ERP	 European	Recovery	Programme	ERU		 Environmental	Research	Unit	(Dept.	of	the	Environment)	ESB	 Electricity	Supply	Board	ESF		 European	Social	Fund		ESRI	 Economic	and	Social	Research	Institute	ETU	 Electrical	Trade	Union	EU	 European	Union	
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FÁS	 An	Foras	Áiseanna	Saothair	(Employment	and	Training	Authority)		FDI	 Foreign	Direct	Investment	FF	 Fianna	Fáil	FIM	 Federation	of	Irish	Manufacturers	FIE	 Federation	of	Irish	Employers	FII	 Federation	of	Irish	Industries	FT	 Foir	Teoranta	(Industrial	Rescue	Agency)		FUE	 Federated	Union	of	Employers	FUGE	 Federation	Union	of	Government	Employees	FWUI	 Federated	Workers’	Union	of	Ireland	(also:	WUI)	GDP	 Gross	Domestic	Product	GIS	 Government	Information	Service	GLEN	 Gay	and	Lesbian	Equality	Network	GNP	 Gross	National	Product	GS	 General	Secretary	GSO	 Government	Stationary	Office		H&W	Exec.	Health	and	Welfare	Divisional	Executive	(LGPSU/IMPACT)	IAOS	 Irish	Agricultural	Organisation	Society	IBOA	 Irish	Bank	Officials’	Association	ICEU		 Irish	Customs	and	Excise	Union		ICMSA	 Irish	Creamery	Milk	Suppliers	Association	ICOS	 Irish	Cooperative	Organisation	Society	(Farming	Coops)	ICTU	 Irish	Congress	of	Trade	Unions	ICTU-ADC	 ICTU:	Proceedings	of	the	Annual	Delegate	Conference	ICTU-AR	 ICTU:	Annual	Report	of	the	Executive	Council	ICTU-EC		 ICTU	Executive	Council		IDA	 Industrial	Development	Authority	(IDA	Ireland)	IEA	 Institute	of	European	Affairs	IEC	 Irish	Employers	Confederation	IFA	 Irish	Farmers’	Association	IFSC	 International	Financial	Services	Centre	IFUT	 Irish	Federation	of	University	Teachers	IHSB	 Irish	Hospital	Services	Board	
II		 The	Irish	Independent	IIEA		 Institute	for	International	and	European	Affairs	IIRS	 Institute	for	Industrial	Research	and	Standards	ILHS&A		 Irish	Labour	History	Society	Library	and	Archive		IMETU	 Irish	Municipal	Employees	Trade	Union	IMI	 Irish	Management	Institute	
	 341	
IMPACT	 Irish	Municipal,	Professional	and	Civil	Trade	Union	 	INO	 Irish	Nurses	Organisation	INOU		 Irish	National	Organisation	of	the	Unemployed		INP&DTU	 Irish	National	Painters	and	Decorators	Trade	Union	INPC		 Irish	National	Petroleum	Corporation	Int.	 Interview	INUVGATA	Irish	National	Union	of	Vintners,	Grocers	and	Allied	Trades	Assistants	INTO	 Irish	National	Teachers	Organisation	
IP		 The	Irish	Press		IPA	 Institution	of	Public	Administration	IPC	 Irish	Productivity	Centre	IPS	 Irish	Political	Studies	IPU		 Irish	Print	Union	IR	 Industrial	Relations	IRA	 Irish	Republican	Army	IRD		 Integrated	Rural	Development	
IRNR		 Industrial	Relations	News	Report	
IT			 The	Irish	Times	ITGWU	 Irish	Transport	and	General	Workers’	Union	ITUC	 Irish	Trade	Union	Congress	JLC	 Joint	Labour	Committee	(Labour	Court)	
JSSISI		 Journal	of	the	Statistical	and	Social	Inquiry	Society	of	Ireland	LEADER	 Liaison	Entre	Actions	de	Développement	de	l'Économie	Rurale	[=	EC	rural	economic	development	programme]	LG	Exec.	 Local	Government	Divisional	Executive	(LGPSU/IMPACT)	LGPSU	 Local	Government	and	Public	Services	Union	LRC	 Labour	Relations	Commission	[of	Labour	Court]			--	 Law	Reform	Commission	
LS		 Limerick	Socialist		LTU	 Long-term	unemployment	MNF		 Macra	na	Féirme	(Young	Farmers’	Movement)	MPGWU	 Marine	Port	and	General	Workers	Union	MSF	 Manufacturing,	Science	and	Finance	Union	NABCO		 National	Association	of	Building	Co-operatives	NADCORP	National	Development	Corporation	NAI	 National	Archives	of	Ireland	NBU	 National	Busmen’s	Union		NCCAP		 North	City	Centre	Community	Action	Programme	NDC	 National	Development	Corporation	
	 342	
NDP	 National	Development	Plan	NEC	 National	Executive	Council	NEETU	 National	Electrical	and	Engineering	Trade	Union	[?]	NESC	 National	Economic	and	Social	Council	NGA	 National	Graphical	Association	NIEC	 National	Industrial	and	Economic	Council	NMW	 National	Minimum	Wage	NPB	 National	Planning	Board	NUJ	 National	Union	of	Journalists	NUT&GW	 National	Union	of	Tailors	and	Garment	Workers	NWA	 National	Wage	Agreement	OECD	 Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	OEEC	 Organisation	for	European	Economic	Cooperation	OPW	 Office	of	Public	Works	[of	D/Finance]	P2000	 Partnership	2000	for	Inclusion,	Employment	and	Competitiveness.	PAYE	 Pay	As	You	Earn	(Payroll	Tax)	PCW	 Programme	for	Competitiveness	and	Work	PDs	 Progressive	Democratic	Party	PEP	 Political	and	Economic	Planning,	London	PESP	 Programme	for	Economic	and	Social	Progress	PLAC	 Pro-Life	Amendment	Campaign	PNR		 Programme	for	National	Recovery		PPF	 Programme	for	Prosperity	and	Progress	PRSI	 Pay	Related	Social	Insurance	PSEU	 Public	Service	Executives	Union	PSMD		 Public	Service	Management	and	Development	Section,	Dept.	Labour	PTR	 Pupil-Teacher	Ratio	PTWU	 Postal	and	Telecommunications	Workers’	Union	PUTUO	 Provisional	United	Trade	Union	Organisation	RTC	 Regional	Technical	College	RTÉ	 Radio	Telefís	Éireann	(=	Irish	National	radio	and	Television)	SDLP		 Social	Democratic	and	Labour	Party	SEA	 Single	European	Act,	1986	SES	 Social	Employment	Schemes	SFADCo		 Shannon	Foreign	…	Development	Company	SFWP	 Sinn	Féin	The	Workers’	Party	SIPTU	 Scientific,	Industrial,	and	Professional	Trade	Union	SME	 Small	and	Medium	Enterprises	SPUC	 Society	for	the	Protection	of	the	Unborn	Child	
	 343	
SRTC			 Sligo	Regional	Technical	College	SSBs	 State-Sponsored	Bodies/Semi-State	Bodies	
ST		 The	Sunday	Tribune	SWM	 Socialist	Workers	Movement		 	T2016	 Towards	2016.	Ten-Year	Framework	Social	Partnership	Agreement		TASS	 Transport	Salaried	Staff	Association	TCD	 Trinity	College	Dublin	TFP	 Total	Factor	Productivity	TUC	 Trade	Union	Congress	
TUI		 Trade	Union	Information	(Irish	Congress	of	Trade	Unions)	UCD	 University	College	Dublin	UCATT	 Union	of	Construction,	Allied	Trades	and	Technicians	UCD	 University	College	Dublin		UNICE	 Union	of	Industrial	and	Employers’	Confederations	of	Europe	UPTCS		 Union	of	Professional	and	Technical	Civil	Servants	VEC	 Vocational	Education	Committee	VET	 Vocational	Education	and	Training	VPTP		 Vocational	Preparation	and	Training	programmes	VTOS	 Vocational	Training	Opportunity	Scheme	WCL	 Waterford	Chrystal	Ltd.		WG	 Working	Group	WP	 The	Workers	Party	(formerly	Sinn	Féin	and	SFWP,	subsequently	DL)	WUI	 Workers’	Unions	of	Ireland	(also:	FWUI)	 						
	 344	
References		
ARCHIVAL	SOURCES	AND	PRIVATE	PAPERS		
Note	 on	archival	 references:	 Some	 series	 of	minutes	much	 quoted	 in	 this	 study,	notably	those	of	ICTU’s	Executive	Council	and	of	the	NESC	Council,	are	referenced	simply	by	the	dates	of	such	meetings,	and	occasionally	the	agenda	item.	The	ICTU-EC	minutes	up	to	February	1987	are	in	the	NAI	and	from	March	1987	in	the	ICTU	Archive,	 as	 detailed	 below.	 Other	 material	 from	 these	 sources,	 including	 hand-written	notes	of	meetings	(“h/w	notes”)	on	which	minutes	are	based,	are	given	full	archival	 references,	 as	 is	 all	 material	 from	 other	 archives,	 and	 minutes	 of	 CRC	meetings,	cabinet	and	other	organisations.		 charlesjhaughey.ie	 Haughey	family	website	archive		Cook	Papers	 Papers	of	Senan	Cook,	formerly	ATGWU,	Waterford	Glass	DCA	 Dublin	City	Archive:	CPI	 Records	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Ireland		DCU	 Dublin	City	University	Archive:	B&ICO	 British	&	Irish	Communist	Collection		DDA	 Dublin	Diocesan	Archive:		AB8-B	 Papers	of	Archbishop	J.C.	McQuaid		DTA	 Department	of	the	Taoiseach	Archive	1984-97:	OHP	 Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn	Private	Papers	S25150-A		 IFSC.	Development.	Feb.-June	1987		S25281-D	to	E				PNR.	Development,	1987	 	S25306		 IFSC.	Development.	1987-91		S25857-A	to	Z9		PNR-CRC,	mtgs./secretariat,	1987-90	S25858-A	to	Z9	PNR,	Follow-Up,	Oct.	1987	–	Jan.	1991	S25861-A	 PNR	1987.	Prep.:	Talks	with	Farm	Orgs.	S25862-A	 PNR	1987.	Rev./Mon.	Cttee.	ICTU.	Dec.	‘87	S25862-D		 Govt.	officials	mtg.	with	ICTU,	08.11.1989		S25862-E	 Taoiseach-ICTU	mtgs.,	Nov.-Dec.	‘89		S25862-F	 Taoiseach-ICTU	mtg.	23.01.1990	S25862-G		 Taoiseach-ICTU	mtg.	27.03.1990		S25865-A	to	C		 PNR.	State	Sponsored	Bodies	S25870C	 Mtg.	w.	ICTU	18/5/1988,	27/5/88	S25871	 PNR	1987.	Prep.:	Mtgs.	Govt.-ICTU	on	Pay	S25874	and-75		PNR.	Prep.:	Mtgs.	Govt-CII-FUE,	1987	S25899-A	to	C	PNR.	Central	Review	Cttee.	-	EEC	Aspect	S26122-A	to	F		CRC.	Sub-Grp	Job	Creation	1989	S26462			 CRC	Sub-Grp	Unemploy.	Persons	Disability	
	 345	
S26694		 CRC	Wkng	Grp/Beef	Industry,	Sept-Dec.	‘90	Flynn	Papers	 Papers	of	Phil	Flynn,	former	GS,	LGPSU/IMPACT,	Pres.	ICTU	Geraghty	Papers	 Papers	of	Des	Geraghty,	former	Pres.,	SIPTU,	Vice-Pres.	ICTU	GIS	 Government	Information	Service:		 	 Press	releases	on	behalf	of	Ministers/Depts.,	1980-94		ICTU	Archive	 Archive	of	the	Irish	Congress	of	Trade	Unions:	EC	 Minutes	of	ICTU	Exec.	Council	mtgs.,	1987-	GS-	 Records	of	the	General	Secretary:	PA-1a	 Pay	Agrmt.,	National	Pay	Talks	–	Pay.	1987	PA-1b	 Pay	Agrmt.,	inc.	SDC	17/11/87		PA-1d	 Pay	Agrmt.,	PNR	1987-90	PN	1-2	 Partnership	Negotiations,	1987-2000	PESP-PWG		 PESP	Pay/Conditions	Wrkng.	Group,	1990	ILHS	Archive		 Irish	Labour	History	Society	Library	and	Archive:	O’Shannon	 Cathal	O’Shannon	Papers		Cardiff	 Paddy	Cardiff	Papers	LGPSU-	 Records	of	LGPSU	inc.	mins.	CEC,	Exec.	Board,	H&W	and	LG	Div.	Execs.,	1970-90	IMPACT	Archive	 Archive	of	IMPACT	Trade	Union	(now	Fórsa):	CEC	 Meetings	of	Central	Exec.	Cttee.	1991-99	NAI	 National	Archives	of	Ireland:	CIU	 Council	of	Irish	Unions,	Central	Cncl.,	Boxes	105-6	PUTUO	 Prov.	United	T.U.	Org.,	Central	Cncl.,	Boxes	105-6	ICTU	EC	 ICTU	Executive	Council	mtgs.,	1959-87.	(Boxes	106-11,	G4/82/44-49	–	G4/84/1)	TAOIS.	 Records	of	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	NLI	 National	Library	of	Ireland	IQA	 Irish	Queer	Archive	O’Brien	 Papers,	William	O’Brien,	ITGWU	gen.	sec.	1916-59	NESC	Archive	 National	Economic	and	Social	Council	Archive:	Boxes	1-14	 Correspondence,	records,	Council	minutes	(inc.	h/w	notes)	and	papers	of	NESC,	1976-99	Rose	Archive	 Papers	of	Kieran	Rose,	former	director	GLEN	SIPTU	Archive	 SIPTU	College	Archive:	Publications,	misc.	records,	articles,	papers,	circulars	(SIPTU	Devpt.	Div.	records	were	disastrously	lost	in	2014)	Sligo	IT	Archive	 Sligo	Institute	of	Technology	 	Power	 Papers	of	Con	Power,	CII	chief	economist	1978-93	
	 346	
UCD	Archive	 University	College	Dublin	Archive	P150	 De	Valera	Papers	P175	 Whitaker	Papers	P176	 Fianna	Fáil	Papers	P180	 Tony	Heffernan	Papers	(Workers’	Party)	P311	 Lemass	interviews	w.	Dermot	Ryan,	1967-9	WikiLeaks	 www.wikileaks.org,	online	archive:	US	diplomatic	cables,	Ireland	1966-2014.		Yeates	Papers		 Records/interviews	of	Pádraig	Yeates,	historian,	on	partnership			
	
INTERVIEWS	WITH	AND	INFORMATION	FROM	WITNESSES		
[Note	on	interviews:	Interviews	are	referenced	in	footnotes	simply	by	“Int.”	or	
“Interview	with”,	and	interviewees’	names,	with	first	name/initial	where	needed.	
Some	anonymous	interviews	were	held	and	these	are	identified	as	“anon.”]	Ahern,	Bertie	 Interview	of	12.02.2016.	Former	Minister,	leader	of	Fianna	Fáil	and	Taoiseach	(1997-2008)		Attley,	Bill	 Interview	of	26.06.2015.	Former	Gen.	Sec.,	FWUI,	SIPTU,	ICTU	President,	member	of	Labour	Party,	NESC,	EESC	etc.		Begg,	David	 Interview	of	…..2016.	Former	Gen.	Sec.,	CWU	and	ICTU,	ceo	Concern,	Board	member	Central	Bank	and	Irish	Times	Trust	Brett,	Eoin	 Interview	of	17.04.2017.	Former	Fianna	Fáil	activist	and	colleague	of	Charles	Haughey	in	the	FCA	Broderick,	Larry	 Statement	at	ICTU	seminar,	Nov.	2016.	Gen.	Sec.,	IBOA,	Financial	Services	Union,	ICTU	EC	member		Bruton,	John	 Telephone	conversation	of.	Former	leader,	Fine	Gael,	Taoiseach	(1994-96),	EU	Ambassador	to	the	US	Calendar,	Roisín	 Interview	of	19.04.2013.	Former	economist	ITGWU,	SIPTU,	former	B&ICO,	Workers’	Party,	advisor	to	Min.	SW	de	Rossa	Cassells,	Peter		 Interview	of		09.05.2015.	Former	General	Secretary,	ICTU,	member	of	NESC,	CRC,	NCPP		Connolly,	David	 Interview	of	21.02.2018.	Former	manager	Dublin	Inner	City	Partnership,	former	SIPTU	organiser	Creedon,	Michael		Information	from	period	with	Centre	for	Social	Justice	and	as	manager,	Ballymun	Job	Centre		Flynn,	Phil	 Interview	of	20.11.2013.	Former	Gen.	Sec.,	LGPSU,	IMPACT,	President	ICTU,	former	Vice-President,	Sinn	Féin	Geraghty,	Des	 Interview	of	19.04.2013.	Former	Nat.	Sec.	ITGWU,	President	SIPTU	and	ICTU,	Workers’	Party	MEP		Hannan,	Robin	 Information	given,	2015-16.	Former	Director,	EAPN	Ireland	Haughey,	Charles	2005.	Notes	of	an	interview	with	Dr.	Eoin	O’Malley,	kindly	made	available	to	the	author		
	 347	
Inner	City	Group	 Group	interview	of	21.02.2017	with	David	Connolly,	Seánie	Lambe,	Kathleen	O'Neill	and	Mick	Rafferty	McCarthy,	Dermot		Interview	of	28.05.2013.	Former	Sec.	Gen.,	D/Taoiseach,	Sec.	to	Govt.,	2001-12,	Director	(1991-01),	Chair	(2001-16)	NESC	McCarthy,	Stephen		Interview	of	10.07.2014.	Former	ICTU	Industrial	Officer		McLoone,	Peter	 Interview	of	20.06.2013.	LGPSU	official,	IMPACT	general	secretary,	ICTU	Executive		Mansergh,	Martin	Interview	of	16.12.2015.	Former	diplomat,	Special	Advisor	to	Taoisigh	Charles	Haughey	and	Bertie	Ahern	Nugent,	Kate	 Interview	of	15.02.2016.	Former	constituency	secretary	to	Charles	Haughey	O’Connell,	Maurice		Telephone	conversation	of	28.06.2013.	Former	chairman,	Central	Bank	of	Ireland.	O’Donovan,	Patricia		Interview	28.05.2019.	Former	“EEC	Officer”,	Equality	Officer,	Asst.	Gen.	Sec.	(1989-99),	ICTU,	then	ILO	Ó	hUiginn,	Pádraig		Interview	of	24.03.2015.	Former	Sec.	Gen.,	D/Taoiseach	(1982-94)	and	Sec.	to	Government	(1987-94).	NESC,	CRC,	IFSC	O’Leary,	Jim	 Interview	of	22.12.2016.	Former	econ.	advisor	to	Taoiseach	G.	FitzGerald,	NESC	economist,	Benchmark.	Cttee,	Davy’s,	AIB		Ó	Raghallaigh,	Feargas			Information	of	Oct.	2010.	Former	ITGWU	official,	RTÉ	journalist,	special	advisor	to	Minister	Pat	Rabbitte		O’Riordan,	Manus	Note	of	a	conversation	of	10.10.2015.	Former	Head	of	Research,	ITGWU,	SIPTU,	member	NESC;	B&ICO	(1971-82)		O’Sullivan,	Turlough	Interview	of	21.12.2016.	Former	DG	of	FUE	and	IBEC	Power,	Con	 Interview	of	19.12.2016.	Former	economist	CII/IBEC,	N.U.	monitoring	cttee.,	CRC,	NESC,	econ.	advisor	D/Taoiseach		Rose,	Kieran	 Interview	of	14.03.2019.	Former	director	GLEN,	Impact	activist,	Dublin	city	planner,	board	member	Equality	Authority	Sammon,	Frank	 Interview	of	26.07.2013.	Former	director,	(Jesuit)	Centre	for	Faith	and	Justice		Swift,	John	 Interview	20.05.1984.	Former	bakers’	union	leader,	Pres.	ICTU		Teahon,	Paddy			 Interview	[awaited].	Former	Asst.	Sec.,	Sec.	Gen.,	D/	Taoiseach,	Chair,	NESC	Toner,	Bill	 Interview	of	27.01.2017.	Former	lecturer	College	of	Industrial	Relations,	director	Jesuit	Centre	for	Social	Justice		White,	Pádraic	 Interview	13.05.2013.	Former	ceo	IDA,	chair	Northside	Partnership,	Intertrade	Ireland,	etc.		
PRESS	SOURCES	
Business	and	Finance	(B&F)	(Dublin)	
CII	Newsletter	(Dublin:	Confederation	of	Irish	Industry)	
Comment	(Dublin:	B&ICO)	
Cork	Examiner	(Cork)	
	 348	
Daily	Star	(Dublin)	
Economist	(London)	
Evening	Herald	(Dublin)	
FUE	Bulletin	(Dublin:	Federated	Union	of	Employers)	
Gay	Community	News	
Hibernia	(Dublin)	
IRN	Report	(Industrial	Relations	News	Report,	Dublin)	
Irish	Communist	(Dublin:	B&ICO)	
Irish	Examiner	(formerly	Cork	Examiner)	
Irish	Independent	
Irish	People		(Dublin:	SFWP)		
Irish	Political	Review		
Irish	Press	(Dublin)	
Irish	Socialist	(Dublin:	CPI)	
Irish	Times	(Dublin)	
Labour	Comment	(Cork)	
Liberty	(Dublin:	ITGWU/SIPTU)	
Limerick	Socialist	(Limerick	Socialist	Organisation)	
Magill	(Dublin)		
New	Hibernia	(Dublin)		
Reporter	(LGPSU)	
Sunday	Business	Post	(Dublin)	
Sunday	Independent	(Dublin)	
Sunday	Tribune	(Dublin)	
Trade	Union	Information	(Dublin:	ICTU)	
	
BIBLIOGRAPHY		
Note	on	 secondary	 source	 references:	Only	 secondary	 sources	 referenced	 in	 the	text	 are	 listed	 here.	 In	 footnotes	 they	 are	 identified	 by	 author,	 date	 and,	 where	necessary,	page	numbers.	Many	newspaper,	journal	and	magazine	articles	referred	to	in	the	text	are	not	listed	separately	here.	Where	not	listed	here,	the	full	reference	for	such	articles	is	given	in	the	relevant	footnote.		Adshead,	Maura:			--	 2011.	‘An	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework	Approach	to	the	Rise	and	Fall	of	Social	Partnership’,	Irish	Political	Studies,	26	(1):	73-93			--	 2005.	‘Europeanization	and	changing	patterns	of	governance	in	Ireland’.	Public	Administration	83.1:	159-178.	Aldous,	Richard.	2014.	Tony	Ryan.	Ireland’s	Aviator.	Gill	&	Macmillan	Allen,	Kieran:			--	 2000.	The	Celtic	Tiger:	The	myth	of	social	partnership	in	Ireland.	Manchester	
	 349	
University	Press			--	 1997.	Fianna	Fáil	and	Irish	labour:	1926	to	the	present.	Pluto	Press			Allen,	Mike.	1998.	The	Bitter	Word.	Ireland’s	Job	Famine	and	its	Aftermath.	Poolbeg	An	Bord	Glas.	1988.	A	Programme	for	the	Development	of	Horticulture.	An	Bord	Glas	Angster	Julia,	1999:	‘The	Westernization	of	the	German	Labor	Movement.	Cultural	Transfer	and	Transnational	Network	Politics	in	the	1940s	and	1950s’.	German	Historical	Institute,	http://www.ghi-di.org/conpotweb/,	accessed	15.10.2015	Archer,	Margaret	S.	2003.	Structure,	agency	and	the	internal	conversation.	Cambridge	University	Press		Arnold,	Bruce.	2006.	Charles	Haughey.	His	Life	and	Unlucky	Deeds,	Irish	Independent		Avdagic,	Sabina,	Martin	Rhodes,	and	Jelle	Visser,	eds.	2011.	Social	pacts	in	
Europe:	Emergence,	evolution,	and	institutionalization.	OUP	Avellaneda,	Sebastian	D.,	and	Niamh	Hardiman.	2010.	‘The	European	context	of	Ireland's	economic	crisis’.		Economic	and	Social	Review	41.4:	473-500	Baccaro,	Lucio,	and	Sang-Hoon	Lim.	2007.	‘Social	pacts	as	coalitions	of	the	weak	and	moderate:	Ireland,	Italy	and	South	Korea	in	comparative	perspective’.	European	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	13.1:	27-46.	Baccaro,	Lucio	and		Marco	Simoni,	2008,	‘Policy	Concertation	in	Europe:	Understanding	Government	Choice’,	Comparative	Political	Studies,	October		Barry,	Frank.	1999.	‘Irish	Growth	in	Historical	Perspective’,	in	Barry,	Frank	(ed.)	1999:	25-44	Barry,	Frank,	ed.	1999.	Understanding	Ireland's	economic	growth.	Springer	Barry,	Frank,	John	Bradley,	and	Eoin	O’Malley.	1999.	‘Indigenous	and	foreign	industry:	characteristics	and	performance’,	in	Barry,	Frank,	ed.	1999:	45-74	Baumgartner,	Frank	R.,	and	Bryan	D.	Jones.	1993.	Agendas	and	instability	in	
American	politics.	University	of	Chicago	Press	Begg,	David.	2016.	Lost	in	Transition:	How	Ireland	and	Three	Other	Small	Open	
Economies	Responded	to	Europeanisation	1987-2013.	Springer	Bennett,	Andrew,	and	Colin	Elman.	2006.	‘Complex	causal	relations	and	case	study	methods:	The	example	of	path	dependence’.	Political	analysis	14.3:	250-267	Berger,	Peter	L.,	and	Thomas	Luckmann.	1966.	The	social	construction	of	reality:	
A	treatise	in	the	sociology	of	knowledge.	Penguin	Bew,	Paul:			--	 Ellen	Hazelkorn,	Henry	Patterson.	1989.	The	dynamics	of	Irish	politics.	Lawrence	&	Wishart			--	 and	Henry	Patterson,	1982,	Sean	Lemass	and	the	Making	of	Modern	Ireland	
1945-66.	Gill	&	Macmillan	Bielenberg,	Andy	and	Ryan,	R.,	2012.	An	economic	history	of	Ireland	since	
independence	(Vol.	149).	Routledge.		
	 350	
Blackwell,	John	and	Brian	Nolan.1989.	‘Low	Pay:	The	Irish	Experience.	ESRI	Project	on	Income	Distribution,	Poverty,	and	Usage	of	State	Services.	Working	Paper	No	15.	Presented	at	Combat	Poverty/ICTU	Conf.	13/12/89’	Blythe,	Mark:			--	 2013.	Austerity:	The	history	of	a	dangerous	idea.	Oxford	University	Press				--	 2002.	Great	transformations:	Economic	ideas	and	institutional	change	in	the	
twentieth	century.	Cambridge	University	Press	Blythe,	Mark,	Oddny	Helgadottir	and	William	Kring.	2016.	‘Ideas	and	historical	institutionalism’,		Oxford	handbook	of	historical	institutionalism:	142-162.	Bond,	Larry:			--	 1993b.	‘Ireland	in	the	EC:	Labour	market,	Poverty’,	Ó	Cinnéide	1993:	21-35			--	 1993a.	‘Further	EC	Integration	and	Social	Policy’,	in	Ó	Cinnéide	1993:	82-89	Bord	Fáilte.	1988	(Mar.).	Developing	for	Growth.	A	Framework	Development	Plan	
for	Irish	Tourism.	Bord	Fáilte	Bradley,	Dan.	1988.	Farm	Labourers:	Irish	Struggle	1900-1976.	Belfast:	Athol.		Brady,	Conor.	2005.	Up	with	the	Times.	Gill	&	Macmillan	Braatoy,	Bjarne.	1939.	The	New	Sweden.	A	Vindication	of	Democracy.	Nelson		Breen,	Richard,	Damien	F.	Hannan,	David	Rottman,	and	Christopher	Whelan.	1990.	 Understanding	Contemporary	Ireland:	 State,	Class	and	Development	in	
the	Republic	of	Ireland.	Manchester	University	Press	Brennan,	Peter.	2008.	Behind	Closed	Doors:	the	EU	negotiations	that	shaped	
modern	Ireland.	Blackhall	Brock,	Catherine,	1966.	The	Work	of	the	NIEC	(1963-1966).	NIEC	Occasional	Publication	No.	2,	Pr.	9090,	Sept.	1966.	GSO	Brown,	Terence.	2015.	The	Irish	Times.	150	Years	of	Influence.	Bloomsbury.	Brown,	Tony,	2012,	Something	worth	working	for:	the	emergence	of	the	1973	
Social	Action	programme,	IIEA		Browne,	Dr.	Ivor:		 2009.	Music	and	Madness.	CUP	Browne,	M.H.	1965.	‘Labour	and	Incomes	Policy	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland’,	BJIC,	3:1,	Mar.	1965	Browne,	Vincent		2006.	‘Phil	Flynn:	From	pariah	to	insider’,	15	March	2006,	http://politico.ie/archive/phil-flynn-pariah-insider.	Accessed	20.06.17	Bullock,	Alan.	1977.	Report	of	the	committee	of	inquiry	on	industrial	democracy.	Vol.	6706.	HM	Stationery	Office	Burns,	Jennifer.	2009.	Goddess	of	the	market:	Ayn	Rand	and	the	American	right.	Oxford	University	Press	Cairney,	Paul.	2013-19.	‘Politics	and	Public	Policy’,	papers,	available	at	https://paulcairney.wordpress.com	Callan,	T.,	et	al.	1989.	Poverty,	Income	and	Welfare	in	Ireland.	ESRI		Campaign	for	Social	Justice	in	Northern	Ireland.	1969.	Northern	Ireland.	The	
Plain	Truth.	Issued	by	the.	Castlefields,	Dungannon.	15th	June	1969	Carey,	Sophia.	2007.	Social	Security	in	Ireland	1939-1952.	The	Limits	to	Solidarity.	Irish	Academic	Press	
	 351	
Castle,	Barbara.	1969	(Jan.),	In	Place	of	Strife:	A	policy	for	Industrial	
Relations.	LAB	44/69		Central	Bank	of	Ireland:			--	 Quarterly	Review	Central	Review	Committee	(PNR/PESP):					--	 1990	[Feb.].	Programme	for	National	Recovery.	Progress	Report	by	the	
Central	Review	Committee.	Stationary	Office				--	 1989	[Feb.].	Framework	Agreement	on	Hours	of	Work			--	 1988	[Dec.].	Programme	for	National	Recovery.	Progress	Report	on	Job	
Creation.	Stationary	Office	Chabanet,	Didier,	and	Frédéric	Royall.	2009.	"Economic	recession	and	the	mobilization	of	the	unemployed:	France	and	Ireland	compared”.	French	
Politics	7	(3-4):	268-293	Chambers,	Anne.	2015.	T.K.	Whitaker:	Portrait	of	a	Patriot.	Doubleday	Chubb,	Basil:			--	 1992.	FIE:	The	Federation	of	Irish	Employers,	1942-1992.	Gill	&	Macmillan			--	 1982	(2nd).	The	Government	and	Politics	of	Ireland.	Longman			--	 1969.	‘Industrial	Democracy:	Its	Background	and	Implications’,	Studies,	58:	230	(Summer	1969),	135-145		Clifford,	Angela:			--	 2009.	The	Arms	Conspiracy	Trial.	Ireland,	1970:	The	Prosecution	of	Charles	
Haughey,	Captain	Kelly	and	Others.	Belfast:	A	Belfast	Magazine			--	 1983.	Poor	Law	in	Ireland.	The	Development	of	the	British	Welfare	State	and	
Social	Welfare	in	Ireland.	Belfast:	Athol	Clifford,	Brendan.	1997.	The	Cork	Free	Press	in	the	context	of	the	Parnell	Split.	
The	Restructuring	of	Ireland	1890-1910.	Aubane	Historical	Society	Clifford,	Geertz.	1973.	‘Thick	description:	Toward	an	interpretive	theory	of	culture’,	in	ibid.,	The	interpretation	of	cultures.	Basic	Books:	3-30	(also	2003	in	Culture:	critical	concepts	in	sociology,	1:	173-96)	Cody,	Séamus,	John	O'Dowd,	and	Peter	Rigney.	1986.	The	parliament	of	labour:	
100	years	of	the	Dublin	Council	of	Trade	Unions.	DCTU	Collins,	Stephen	2012.	‘Labour	and	Europe:	from	No	to	Yes’,	in	Daly,	O’Brien,	Rouse	eds.	2012:	154-64	Collins,	Thomas.	1989	[Feb.].	Community	Enterprise:	A	Critique.	Paper	Read	at	
Combat	Poverty	Seminar.	CPA	Combat	Poverty	Agency	(CPA):			--	 AP	-	Annual	Reports	of	the	Combat	Poverty	Agency.	CPA	1987-93.			--	 1995,	Poverty.	Lesbians	and	Gay	Men.	The	Economic	and	Social	Effects	of	
Discrimination			--	 1989	[Dec.].	Poverty	–	An	Agenda	for	the	90s.	Pre-Budget	Submission	of	the	
Combat	Poverty	Agency			--	 1989	[Sept.].	Towards	a	Funding	Policy	for	Community	Development			--	 1989	[Feb.].	Collins,	Thomas:	Community	Enterprise:	A	Critique.	Paper	Read	
at	Combat	Poverty	Seminar	
	 352	
		--	 1987.	Action	on	Poverty	Today	Committee	on	Industrial	Organisation	(CIO).	1965	(April),	Survey	of	Industry.	
Final	Report,	Pr.	8082.	GSO	Compston,	Hugh.	2003.	‘Beyond	corporatism:	A	configurational	theory	of	policy	concertation’.	European	Journal	of	Political	Research,	42.6:	787-809.	Confederation	of	Irish	Industry	(CII):			--		 1987	(June).	Industrial	Policy	for	the	1990s			--	 1986.	Growth	Industries	with	Employment	Potential,	CII	8th	Annual	Careers	
in	Industry	Conf.,	in	association	with	IGC,	Dublin,	19/09/86			--	 1979-93:	CII	Annual	Report	Conference	of	Major	Religious	Superiors	(CORI).	1989.	Must	the	Poor	Always	
Wait?	CORI	Connolly,	Frank.	2014.	Tom	Gilmartin.	The	Man	Who	Brought	Down	a	Taoiseach	
and	Exposed	the	Greed	and	Corruption	at	the	Heart	of	Irish	Politics.	Gill	&	Macmillan		Cordova,	Efren.	1986.	‘From	full-time	wage	employment	to	atypical	employment’,	International	Labour	Review,	11-12/1986	Cronin,	Anthony.	1997.	‘Haughey	was	part	of	a	drama	of	Shakespearean	proportions.’	Sunday	Independent,	13/07/1997		Congress	of	Irish	Unions	(CIU)	1946,	Proceedings	of	the	Annual	Conference.	CIU		Convery,	Frank	J.,	and	Moore	McDowell	eds..	1990.	Privatisation:	Issues	of	
Principle	and	Implementation	in	Ireland.	Gill	&	Macmillan		Cook,	Senan	(1992).	Colliding	with	the	Reality	of	Business	Survival.	The	Story	of	
the	Strike.	2	vols.	[unpub.:	Waterford	Wedgewood]	Croke,	Norman	A.	1993.	‘Trade	Union	Membership	Participation	in	Collective	Bargaining’,	IRNR,	2,	14.01.1993	Crowley,	Niall:			--		 2013.	‘Lost	in	austerity:	Rethinking	the	community	sector’.	Community	
Development	Journal	48.1:	151-157			--	 2010.	Empty	promises:	Bringing	the	equality	authority	to	heel.	A.	&	A.	Farmar	Culliton,	James	A..	1992.	A	Time	for	Change:	Industrial	Policy	for	the	1990s.	Report	
of	the	Industrial	Policy	Review	Group.	DSO		Culpepper,	Pepper	D.,	and	Aidan	Regan.	2014.	‘Why	don't	governments	need	trade	unions	anymore?	The	death	of	social	pacts	in	Ireland	and	Italy’.	Socio-
Economic	Review	12.4:	723-745.	D'Art,	Daryl,	and	Thomas	Turner.	2011.	‘Irish	trade	unions	under	social	partnership:	a	Faustian	bargain?’	Industrial	Relations	Journal	42,	2:	157-73	Dáil	Debates.	http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates	Daly,	Mary	E.	1994.	‘Women	and	Trade	Unions’,	in	Nevin	ed.	1994:	106-16	Daly,	Paul,	Rónán	O’Brien	and	Paul	Rouse	eds.	2012.	Making	the	difference?	The	
Irish	Labour	Party	1912-2012,	The	Collins	Press.	Delaney,	Enda	(2001).	Accidental	Diplomat.	My	Years	in	the	Irish	Foreign	Service	
1987-1995.	New	Island	Book	
	 353	
Dell,	Edmund.	1997.	The	Chancellors:	A	History	of	the	Chancellors	of	the	
Exchequer,	1945-90.	HarperCollins		Delors,	Jacques.	1988	[May].	Speech	at	the	ETUC	Vth	Statutory	Congress,	
Stockholm.	Minutes	of	the	12988	Congress.	ETUC	Democratic	Socialist	Party	(DSP).	1982.	Platform.	DSP	Department	of	Agriculture	and	Food			--	 1988	(Jan.).	Annual	Review	and	Outlook	for	the	Agricultural	and	Food	
Industry.	Dept.	Agriculture	Department	of	Economic	Planning	and	Development	(DEPD):			--	 1979b.	National	Understanding	for	Economic	and	Social	Progress			--	 1979a	(Jan.).	Programme	for	National	Development	1978-1981.	Dublin	:	GSO			--	 1978a	(Jan.).	National	Development	1977-80.	Dublin	:	GSO			--	 1978b	(June).	Development	for	full	Employment.	Dublin	:	GSO	Department	of	Education:			--	 1980.	White	Paper	on	Educational	Development.	GSO	Department	of	Finance:			--	 2006/2003.	Budget	and	Economic	Statistics.	GSO	Department	of	Industry	and	Commerce:			--	 1964.	National	Wage	Recommendation.	GSO			--	 1957.	Joint	Agreement	on	Guiding	Principles	relating	to	Wages	Claims	and	
the	Present	Economic	Situation.	GSO			--	 1952.	Agreement	on	Wages	Policy.	GSO			--	 1948.	Joint	Statement	on	Principles	to	be	Observed	in	the	Negotiations	for	the	
Adjustment	of	Wages.	GSO	Department	of	Labour:			--	 1989a.	Guidelines	for	Employee	Participation.	Dept.	Labour			--	 1989b.	Case	Studies	in	Employee	Participation.	Dept.	Labour			--	 1988.	Workers’	Participation	(State	Enterprises)	Bill.	Dept.	Labour			--	 1980	(March).	Worker	Participation.	A	Discussion	Paper.	Dept.	Labour	Department	of	the	Environment,	1996.	Better	Local	Government	–	A	Programme	
for	Change.	GSO	Desmond,	Barry:			--	 2009.	No	Workers'	Republic.	Reflections	on	Labour	and	Ireland,	1913-1967.			--	 2000.	Finally	and	in	Conclusion:	A	Political	Memoir,	New	Island	Book	Devine,	Francis,	and	Jack	McGinley	(eds),	2019,	Left	Lives	in	Twentieth	Century	
Ireland,	Vol.	2,	Umiskin	Press	Devine,	Francis			--	 and	John	Smethurst.	2017.	Historical	Directory	of	Trade	Unions	in	Ireland.	ILHS			--	 2009.	Organising	History.	A	Centenary	of	SIPTU.	Gill	&	Macmillan	
Dictionary	of	Irish	Biography	(http://dib.cambridge.org/)	Donaghey,	Jimmy,	and	Paul	Teague.	2005.	‘The	persistence	of	social	pacts	in	Europe’.	Industrial	Relations	Journal	36.6:	478-493.	
	 354	
Dooge,	Jim	and	Ruth	Barrington	eds.	1999.	A	Vital	National	Interest:	Ireland	in	
Europe	1973-1998,	Institute	of	Public	Administration.		Dooley,	Séamus,	2019.	‘The	Accidental	Official:	Jim	Eadie,	1929-‘,	in	Devine	and	McGinley	eds.	2019:	159-74	Dorr,	Donal,	1992.	Option	for	the	Poor.	A	hundred	years	of	Vatican	social	teaching.	Gill	&	Macmillan	Dorr,	Noel.	2010:	Ireland	and	the	United	Nations.	Memories	of	the	Early	Years,	IPA	Dølvik,	Jon	Erik.	1999.	An	emerging	island?	ETUC,	social	dialogue	and	the	
europeanisation	of	the	trade	unions	in	the	1990s.	ETUI	Duffy,	Kevin.	1990.	The	Industrial	Relations	Act	1990.	A	User’s	Guide.	ICTU	Dunphy,	Richard:			--	 1997.	‘Sexual	identities,	national	identities:	the	politics	of	gay	law	reform	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland’,	Contemporary	Politics,	3	(3):	247-65			--	 1995.	The	making	of	Fianna	Fáil	power	in	Ireland,	1923-1948.	Clarendon	and	Oxford	University	Press.		Ebbinghaus,	Bernhard	2002.	‘Trade	Unions’	Changing	Role:	Membership	Erosion,	Organizational	Reform	and	Social	Partnership	in	Europe’.	Industrial	
Relations	Journal.	33	(5):	465-83	Ebbinghaus,	Bernhard,	and	Philip	Manow,	eds.	2004.	Comparing	welfare	
capitalism:	Social	policy	and	political	economy	in	Europe,	Japan	and	the	USA.	Routledge	EC	Commission	(i.e.	Commission	of	the	European	Communities):			--	 1990b.	Promotion	of	Employee	Participation	through	Profits	and	Enterprise	
Results	(PEPPER	Report).	European	Commission			--	 1990a.	Second	Survey	on	State	Aids	in	the	European	Community	in	the	
Manufacturing	and	Certain	Other	Sectors,	SEC	(90)	1165/3.	European	Commission.	10/07/90.			--	 1988d.	‘Proposal	for	a	Council	Decision	establishing	a	Medium-Term	Community	Action	Programme	to	foster	the	Economic	and	Social	Integration	of	the	Least	Privileged	Groups	(21/12/88),	COM	(88)	826			--	 1988c,	Social	Dimension	of	the	Internal	Market,	SEC	(88)	1148,	Bxl,	14/09/88			--	 1988b.	Community	Charter	of	the	Fundamental	Rights	of	Workers.	European	Commission			--	 1988a.	The	Future	of	Rural	Society.	European	Commission			--	 1987b.	Making	a	Success	of	the	Single	European	Act.	European	Commission			--	 1987a.	Annual	Report	of	the	European	Commission			--	 1985.	Completing	the	Internal	Market.	White	Paper	from	the	Commission	to	
the	European	Council	at	Milan	on	28	and	29	June	1985.	COM	(85)	310	final.	14/06/85			--	 1975.	‘Employee	Participation	and	Company	Structure	in	the	European	Community’	(Supp	8/75	1975)	Bulletin	of	the	European	Communities	15		Economic	and	Social	Research	Institute	(ESRI):				--	 Quarterly	Economic	Commentary	
	 355	
		--	 1987.	Medium	Term	Review	1987-1992.	ESRI		Employer-Labour	Conference	(ELC).				--	 1970-77.	National	Wage	Agreement.	ELC	English,	Richard.	2004.	Armed	Struggle.	The	History	of	the	IRA.	Pan	Books	Equality	Authority:			--	 2002.	Implementing	Equality	for	Lesbians,	Gay	Men	and	Bisexuals.	EA		European	Council.	Council	of	the	European	Communities:				--	 1975-92.	‘Conclusions	of	the	proceedings	of	the	European	Council’,	www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/	1992-1975/			--	 1989.	‘Resolution	of	29/09/	89	on	combating	social	exclusion’,	89/C	277/01			--	 1986.	Single	European	Act.	Official	Journal	of	the	European	Communities.	No.	L	169/4.	29/06/1987.	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html	European	Trade	Union	Confederation	(ETUC):			…	 1988	(Feb.).	The	European	Social	Dimension.	ETUC	Evans,	Bryce.	2011.	Seán	Lemass:	democratic	dictator.	Collins	Press		Fajertag,	Giuseppe,	and	Philippe	Pochet	eds..	1997.	Social	Pacts	in	Europe.	ETUI/OSE	Fanning,	Ronan,	1990.	‘The	Genesis	of	Economic	Development’,	in	John	F.	McCarthy	ed.	1990:	74-111.	FÁS.	1990.	Apprenticeships.	A	New	Approach.	Discussion	Document.	Dublin	Federated	Workers’	Union	of	Ireland	(FWUI),	Annual	Reports	for	the	General	
Executive	Council,	1970-1989	Feldman,	Gerald.	1966.	Army,	Industry,	and	Labor	in	Germany	1914-1918.	Princeton	University	Press	Ferriter,	Diarmaid.	2005.	The	Transformation	of	Ireland	1900-2000.	 Profile	Books		Fianna	Fáil:			--		 1989b.	National	Recovery	–	The	Next	Phase.	General	Election	Manifesto	
		--	 1989a	(Feb.).	Leading	with	Confidence.	Presidential	Address	to	the	56th	
Fianna	Fáil	Ard	Fheis	by	An	Taoiseach,	Charles	J.	Haughey	TD,	25/02/1989			--	 1987.	Manifesto:	Programme	for	National	Recovery			--	 1982.	Manifesto:	The	Way	Forward			--	 1977:	Manifesto:	Action	Plan	for	National	Reconstruction		Fine	Gael:				--	 1989.	Putting	the	Nation	First.	Election	’89			--	 1987.	Election	Manifesto			--	 1966.	Policy	for	a	Just	Society.	Fine	Gael	Finlay,	Fergus.	1998,	Snakes	and	Ladders.	New	Island	Books		Finn,	Tomás.	2012.	Tuairim,	Intellectual	Debate	and	Policy	Formulation	in	Ireland.	Manchester	University	Press.		FitzGerald,	Garret:			--	 2005.	Ireland	in	the	World.	Further	Reflections.	Mercier	
	 356	
		--	 1991.	All	in	a	Life.	An	Autobiography,	Gill	&	Macmillan				--	 1968.	Planning	in	Ireland.	A	PEP	Study.	IPA/PEP			--	 1961.	State	Sponsored	Bodies.	IPA	Fitz	Gerald,	John			--	 2000.	‘The	story	of	Ireland’s	failure	–	and	belated	success’,	in	Nolan,	Brian,	O'Connell,	and	Whelan,	eds.	2000:	27-57			--	 1999.	‘Wage	Formation	and	the	Labour	Market’,	in	Barry,	Frank	(ed.)	1999:	137-66	Fogarty,	M.P.,	D.	Egan,	W.J.L.	Ryan.	1981.	Pay	Policy	for	the	1980s.	FUE	Foster,	R.	F.:				--	 2007.	Luck	and	the	Irish:	A	Brief	History	of	Change	1970-2000.	Allen	Lane			--	 1988.	Modern	Ireland.	Viking	Frieden,	J.A.,	2007.	Global	capitalism:	Its	fall	and	rise	in	the	twentieth	century.	Norton	&	Company.	Gallagher,	Michael:			--	 1985.	Political	parties	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	Manchester	Univ.	Press			--	 	and	Michael	Marsh.	2004.	"Party	membership	in	Ireland:	the	members	of	Fine	Gael”.	Party	Politics	10.4:	407-425.	Garvin,	Tom:			--	 2004.	Preventing	the	Future:	Why	was	Ireland	so	Poor	for	so	Long?,	Gill	&	Macmillan			--	 1981.	‘The	growth	of	faction	in	the	Fianna	Fáil	Party	1966-1980’,	
Parliamentary	Affairs,	34:	110-22	Geary,	John:			--	 2006.	‘Employee	Voice	in	the	Irish	Workplace:	Status	and	Prospect’,	in	Peter	Boxall,	Peter	Haynes	and	Richard	Frieman	eds.:	Employee	Voice	in	the	
Anglo-American	World.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press				--	 2001.	With	W.K.	Roche.	‘Multinationals	and	Human	Resources	Practices	in	Ireland:	A	Rejection	of	the	“New	Conformance”	Thesis’.	The	International	
Journal	of	Human	Resource	Management.	12	(1):	109-27	Gerring,	John.	2006.	Case	study	research:	Principles	and	practices.	Cambridge:	CUP		Gilligan,	Robbie,	2011:	Tony	Gregory.	The	O’Brien	Press	Girvin,	Brian:			--	 1994,	‘Trade	unions	and	economic	development’	in	Nevin	ed.	1994:	117-32.			--	 and	Murphy,	Gary	eds.,	2005.	The	Lemass	era:	politics	and	society	in	the	
Ireland	of	Seán	Lemass.	University	College	Dublin	Press.				--	 and	Roland	Sturm	eds..	1986.	Politics	and	Society	in	Contemporary	Ireland.	Aldershot:	Gower	Goethe,	Johann	Wolfgang.	1976	[1828].	Faust.	Der	Tragödie.	Erster	Teil.	Reclam	Government	of	Ireland:		--	 2006.	Towards	2016.	Ten-Year	Framework	Social	Partnership	Agreement	
2006-2015.	Dept.	Taoiseach	
	 357	
		--	 2003.	Sustaining	Progress.	Social	Partnership	Agreement	2003-2005.	Dept.	Taoiseach			--	 1999.	Programme	for	Prosperity	and	Progress.	Dept.	Taoiseach			--	 1996.	Partnership	2000	for	Inclusion,	Employment	and	Competitiveness.	Stationary	Office			--	 1994.	Programme	for	Competitiveness	and	Work.	Stationary	Office			--	 1991.	Programme	for	Economic	and	Social	Progress.	Stationary	Office			--	 1989	[Nov.].	EUROPEN.	Think	Ahead	–	Act	Now.	1992	and	the	Construction	
Sector.	A	Report	of	the	European	Bureau	of	the	Dept	of	the	Taoiseach			--	 1987b.	Programme	for	National	Recovery.	Stationary	Office			--	 1987a.	Proposals	for	a	Public	Service	Pay	Agreement,	[10]	October	1987			--	 1986.	Report	of	the	Review	Body	on	High	Remuneration	in	the	Public	Service	(Gleeson	Report),	Report	No.	2.	24	November	1986			--	 1984	(Oct.).	National	Economic	Plan:	Building	on	Reality	1984-1987.	GSO			--	 1980	(July).	Second	National	Understanding	for	Economic	and	Social	
Progress			--	 1969.	Third	Programme	for	Economic	and	Social	Development.	GSO			--	 1963a	(Feb.).	White	Paper,	Closing	the	Gap	(Incomes	and	Output).	GSO			--	 1963b.	Second	Programme	for	Economic	Expansion,	1963-1970.	GSO			--		 1958.	Programme	for	Economic	Expansion	1959-63,	GSO	Graham,	David	and	Peter	Clarke.	1986.	The	New	Enlightenment:	the	rebirth	of	
liberalism.	MacMillan.	Gramsci,	Antonio.	1971.	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks,	edited	and	translated	by	Q.	Hoare	and	G.	Nowell	Smith.	Lawrence	&	Wishart			Greaves,	C.	Desmond.	1982.	The	Irish	Transport	and	General	Workers'	Union:	The	
Formative	Years,	1909-1923.	Vol.	1.	Gill	and	Macmillan	Grote,	Jürgen	R.,	and	Philippe	C.	Schmitter.	1999.	‘The	Renaissance	of	National	Corporatism:	unintended	side-effect	of	European	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	or	calculated	response	to	the	absence	of	European	Social	Policy?’,	in	Transfer:	European	Review	of	Labour	and	Research	5.1-2:	34-63.	Group	of	Socialist	Economists	[Paul	Sweeney,	Eoin	O’Malley,	Alan	Matthews].	1983.	Jobs	and	Wages.		Gunnigle,	Patrick,	Gerard	McMahon,	and	Gerard	FitzGerald.	1999.	Industrial	
Relations	in	Ireland:	Theory	and	Practice.	(2nd	ed.)	Gill	&	Macmillan.	Hall,	Peter	A.				--	 1997.	‘The	role	of	interests,	institutions,	and	ideas	in	the	comparative	political	economy	of	the	industrialized	nations’,	in	Comparative	politics:	
Rationality,	culture,	and	structure	:	174-207			--	 and	Daniel	W.	Gingerich.	2009.	‘Varieties	of	capitalism	and	institutional	complementarities	in	the	political	economy:	An	empirical	analysis’.	British	
journal	of	political	science	39.3:	449-482.			--	 and	Kathleen	Thelen.	2009.	‘Institutional	change	in	varieties	of	capitalism’.	Socio-economic	review	7.1:	7-34			--	 and	David	Soskice.	2003.	‘Varieties	of	capitalism	and	institutional	change:	A	
	 358	
response	to	three	critics’.	Comparative	European	Politics	1.2:	241-250.	Halligan,	Brendan:			--	 2014.	‘Frank	Cluskey	the	Larkinite	Leader’,	in	McGinley	ed..	2014:	120-34	Hanley,	Brian,	and	Scott	Millar,	2009,	The	Lost	Revolution:	The	Story	of	the	Official	
IRA	and	the	Workers’	Party.	Penguin		Hardiman,	Niamh:			--	 2006.	‘Politics	and	Social	Partnership:	Flexible	Network	Governance’,	in	Economic	&	Social	Review	37.3			--	 2002.	From	conflict	to	co-ordination:	Economic	governance	and	political	innovation	in	Ireland.	West	European	Politics,	25	(4):	1-24.			--	 2000.	‘Social	partnership,	wage	bargaining,	and	growth’,	in	Nolan,	Brian,	O'Connell,	and	Whelan,	eds.	2000:	286-309			--	 1994,	‘Pay	Bargaining:	Confrontation	and	Consensus’,	in	Nevin	ed.	1994:	147-158.			--	 1992.	‘The	State	and	Economic	Interests:	Ireland	in	Comparative	Perspective’,	in	J.	H.	Goldthorpe	and	C.	T.	Whelan	eds.,	The	Development	of	
Industrial	Society	in	Ireland.	OUP			--	 1988.	Pay,	Politics	and	Economic	Performance	in	Ireland	1970-1987.	Clarendon							--	 and	Stephen	Lalor,	1984:	‘Corporatism	in	Ireland:	An	Exchange	of	Views.’	
Administration,	32:1:	76-88	Harris,	Noel,	1973.	Challenge	to	Irish	Trade	Unionism	-	National	Wage	
Agreements.	ASTMS	Hastings,	Tim,	Brian	Sheehan	and	Padraig	Yeates,	2007,	Saving	the	Future:	How	
Social	Partnership	Shaped	Ireland’s	Economic	Success,	Blackhall	Publishing;		Haughey,	Charles	J.				--	 2013,	‘Social	Partnership’,	paper	written	with	Pádraig	Ó	hUiginn	c.	2005.	www.charleshaughey.ie,	accessed	20.11.2013.			--	 1989.	Leading	with	Confidence.	Presidential	Address	to	the	56th	Fianna	Fáil	
Árd	Fheis	by	An	Taoiseach,	Charles	J.	Haughey	TD,	25	February	1989.				--	 1986.	The	spirit	of	the	nation:	the	speeches	and	statements	of	Charles	J.	
Haughey	(1957-1986),	ed.	Martin	Mansergh.	Mercier	Press	
[see	also	numerous	individual	speeches	and	papers	referenced	in	the	footmnotes]	Healy,	Seán,	and	Brigid	Reynolds	eds.	1998.	Social	Policy	in	Ireland.	Principles,	
Practice	and	Problems.	Oak	Tree	Press	Hemerijck,	Anton.	2013.	Changing	welfare	states.	OUP		Honohan,	Patrick				--	 1999.	‘Fiscal	adjustment	and	disinflation	in	Ireland:	Setting	the	macro	basis	of	economic	recovery	and	expansion’,	in	in	Barry,	Frank,	ed.	1999:	75-98			--	 1991.	‘Monetary	Union’,	in	O’Donnell	ed.	1991,	49-86			--	 and	Brendan	Walsh.	2002.	‘Catching	up	with	the	leaders:	the	Irish	hare’.	Brookings	Papers	on	Economic	Activity,	no.	1:	1-77	
	 359	
		--	 and	Gavin	Murphy.	2010:	“Breaking	the	Sterling	Link:	Ireland’s	Decision	to	Enter	EMS”,	IIIS	Discussion	Paper	No.	317,	February	2010		Horgan,	John:			--	 1997,	Seán	Lemass.	The	Enigmatic	Patriot,	Gill	&	Macmillan		--		 1986.	Labour:	the	price	of	power.	Gill	&	Macmillan.	Industrial	Development	Authority	(IDA	Ireland):			--	 1988.	Moving	Towards	the	90s	--	 1988	(Jan.).	Your	Partners	in	Development			--	 1987.	A	Future	in	Food.	Strategy	for	the	Food	and	Drink	Industry	1988-1992.				--	 1986.	Annual	Report			--	 1978.	IDA	Industrial	Plan	1978-1982	Industrial	Policy	Review	Group	(Culliton	Group)	1992.	A	Time	for	Change:	
Industrial	Policy	for	the	1990s.	GSO	International	Labour	Office	(ILO,	Geneva):			--	 2019.	Edward	Phelan	and	the	ILO.	The	life	and	views	of	an	international	
social	actor.	ILO			--	 1973.	Collective	Bargaining	in	Industrial	Market	Economies.	ILO	Irish	Business	and	Employers	Federation	(IBEC):			--	 1997.	Social	Policy	in	a	Competitive	Economy	Irish	Congress	of	Trade	Unions	(ICTU):			--	 ADC	-	Report	of	Proceedings.	Annual	Delegate	Conference.	1959-91			--		 AR	-	Reports	of	Executive	Council	for	the	year	1959-60	to	1990-91.	1960-91			--	 BDC	-	Report	of	Proceedings.	Biennial	Delegate	Conference.	1993-2014			--	 BR	–	Biennial	Reports	of	the	Executive	Council	for	the	years	1991-93	to	2013-
14.	1993-2014			--		 Trade	Union	Information.	1960-88			--	 2009b.	There	is	a	Better	Fairer	Way	(10-Point	Plan)				--	 2009a.	Draft	Framework	for	a	Pact			--	 1992k	[Nov.].	Structural	Funds.	Opportunity	for	Jobs	and	Growth			--	 1990j	[Dec.].	The	Industrial	Relations	Act	1990.	A	User’s	Guide.	By	Kevin	
Duffy,	Assistant	General	Secretary,	ICTU			--	 1990h	[Oct.].	Ireland	1990-2000:	A	Decade	of	Development,	Reform	and	
Growth			--	 1990g	(July).	Congress	News.	No.	2			--	 1990f	[June].	Low	Pay	and	a	Legal	Minimum	Wage:	Ireland	Out	of	Step.	A	
Report	on	Counties	with	a	Legal	Minimum	Wage			--	 1990e	[June]	(with	Combat	Poverty	Agency).	Low	Pay	–	The	Irish	
Experience.	ICTU-IPA			--	 1990d	[Mar.].	Public	Enterprise	and	Economic	Development.	A	Policy	
Statement	of	the	Executive	Council	on	Privatisation			--	 1990c	[Feb.].	Implementation	of	the	Single	European	Act:	A	Trade	Union	
Response.	ICTU	Northern	Ireland	Committee	
	 360	
		--	 1990b	[Feb.].	The	Programme	for	National	Recovery	in	Review	[Background,	
Strategy,	Shortcomings]			--	 1990a	[Jan.].	Trade	Union	Priorities	for	the	Irish	Presidency			--	 1989f	[Nov.].	A	New	Phase	for	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery	-	
Sharing	the	Benefits			--	 1989e	[July].	Trade	Unions	and	Change:	Discussion	Document			--	 1989d	[July].	Congress	News.	Nos.	1	and	2			--		 1989c.	Low	Pay.	The	Irish	Experience.	Papers	from	the	National	Conference	
on	Low	Pay,	organized	by	the	Combat	Poverty	Agency	and	the	Irish	Congress	
of	Trade	Unions	and	held	in	Dublin	on	December	13,	1989.	CPA/ICTU			--		 1989b.	Poverty,	Unemployment	and	the	Future	of	Work.	Report	of	the	Joint	
Conference	with	Combat	Poverty	Agency			--	 1989a	[Feb.].	Campaign	on	Low	Pay			--	 1988c	[Nov.].	Information	Bulletin.	Make	Europe	Work	for	Us:	ICTU	Seminar	
on	the	Completion	of	the	Internal	Market	–	1992.	[Information	Bulletin.	Make	
Europe	Work	for	Us:	Oct.	28,	1988]			--	 1988b	[Oct.].	Completion	of	the	Internal	Market	–	1992	[Information	
Bulletin.	Make	Europe	Work	for	Us,	28	Oct.	1988]			--	 1988a	[July].	Report	on	Low	Pay			--	 with	FUE	and	CIF.	1987.	‘Proposals	for	an	Agreement	between	the	ICTU,	the	FUE	and	the	CIF’,	October	1987			--	 1987b	[June].	Programme	for	Progress	–	Equality	Report			--	 1987a	[Jan.].	Privatisation.	Why	Trade	Unionists	are	Opposed	to	the	
Privatisation	of	Publicly	Owned	Companies			--	 1986b	[Sept.].	Public	Enterprises	–	Everybody’s	Business			--	 1986a.	A	Plan	for	Work			--	 1984.	Confronting	the	Jobs	Crisis.	Framework	for	a	National	Plan			--	 1977.	Industrial	development	and	job	creation:	Papers	and	Proceedings	of	
the	ICTU	Summer	Course	'77,	University	College,	Galway,	11-15	July	1977.				--	 1976	[Sept.].	‘ICTU	Statement	at	Tripartite	Conference’,	27	September	1976,	TUI,	Winter	1976-77:	25-6			--	 1976	[July].	Economic	and	social	planning:	Proceedings	of	the	ICTU	summer	
course	'76,	Johnstown	Castle,	Co.	Wexford,	18-23	July	1976	Irish	Cooperative	Organisation	Society	(ICOS):			--	 1987	(July).	Strategy	for	the	Irish	Dairy	Industry	Irish	Farmers	Association.	1987.		National	Recovery.	The	Role	of	Agriculture	and	
Food	Irish	National	Organisation	of	the	Unemployed	(INOU):	--	 1989.	There’s	Work	to	be	Done	Irish	Productivity	Centre	(IPC).	1980.	Employee	Communications.	IPC	Labour-Management	Service	Irish	Trade	Union	Council	(ITUC),	1949.	A	Common	Loyalty	–	The	Bridge	to	Unity.	
An	Address	by	James	Larkin	T.D.	to	the	55th	Annual	Meeting	of	the	Irish	Trade	
Union	Congress,	27th-29th	July	1949.		
	 361	
Irish	Transport	and	General	Workers’	Union	(ITGWU),	Annual	Reports	1960-89:		James,	Harold	2012.	Making	the	European	Monetary	Union.	The	Role	of	the	
Committee	of	Central	Bank	Governors	and	the	Origins	of	the	European	
Central	Bank.	Harvard	University	Press.	Jacobson,	David,	Peadar	Kirby	and	Deiric	Ó	Broin,	eds.	2006.	Taming	the	Tiger.	Social	Exclusion	in	a	Globalised	Ireland.	TASC/New	Ireland	Joyce,	Joe,	and	Peter	Murtagh.	1983.	The	Boss:	Charles	J.	Haughey	in	Government.	Poolbeg	Press	Jørgensen,	Marianne	W.,	and	Louise	J.	Phillips.	2002.	Discourse	analysis	as	theory	
and	method.	Sage	Judith,	Rudolf	et	al	eds..	1979.	Montanmitbestimmung:	Geschichte;	Idee;	
Wirklichkeit.	Bund	Verlag	Katzenstein,	Peter	J.	1985.	Small	states	in	world	markets:	Industrial	policy	in	
Europe.	Cornell	University	Press.	Keane,	Elizabeth.	2007:	Sean	MacBride	-	A	Life.	Gill	&	Macmillan		Kearney,	Ben.	2000.	‘Matt	Merrigan’,	Saothar,	13-16.		Keena,	Colm	2001.	Haughey's	Millions:	Charlie's	Money	Trail.	Gill	&	Macmillan.		Kelleher,	Patricia,	and	Cathleen	O’Neill.	2018.	‘The	Systematic	Destruction	of	the	Community	Development,	Anti-Poverty	and	Equality	Movement	(2002-2015).	Unite	the	Union	Kelly,	Stephen:				--	 2016.	‘A	Failed	Political	Entity’:	Charles	Haughey	and	the	Northern	Ireland	
Question	1945-92.	Merrion	Press				--			 2013.	Fianna	Fáil,	Partition	and	Northern	Ireland,	1926-1971.	Irish	Acad.	Pr.	Kennedy,	Kieran:				--	 2001.	‘Reflections	on	the	Process	of	Irish	Economic	Growth’,	JSSISI,	XXX:	123-39			--	 1991.	‘Industrial	Development’,	in	Kennedy,	K.	ed.	1991:	75-86			--	 ed.	1991.	From	Famine	to	Feast.	Economic	and	Social	Change	in	Ireland	
1847-1997.	Lectures	on	the	Occasion	of	the	150th	Anniversary	of	the	SSISI.	IPA			--	 1984.	‘Labour	Market	Polices	and	Employment	Growth’,	Paper	delivered	to	the	Dublin	Economics	Workshop,	19-21.10.1984,	www.esri.ie/system/files/media/file-uploads/2012-07/MEMO170				--	 1983.	‘The	Design	of	a	New	Industrial	Strategy’,	JSSISI,	XXIV,	Pt.	5:	34-41	Kenny,	Brian.	2018.	‘A	Long	March:	Sam	Nolan	1930-’,	in	Devine	and	McGinley	eds.	2019:	175-94	Keogh,	Dermot			--	 2008.	Jack	Lynch:	a	biography.	Gill	&	Macmillan.				--	 Finbar	O’Shea,	Carmel	Quinlan	eds.	2004.	The	Lost	Decade.	Ireland	in	the	
1950s.	Mercier	Press	Kerr,	Anthony.	2006.	‘The	Evolution	of	Labour	Law	in	Ireland’.	UCD	Dept.	Law	Kilmurray,	Evanne.	1987.	Fight,	Starve	Or	Emigrate:	a	History	of	the	Unemployed	
Associations	in	the	1950s.	Larkin	Centre	
	 362	
Kingdon,	John.	2003	(3rd).	Agendas,	Alternatives,	and	Public	Policies	.	Pearson		Kirby,	Peadar:			--	 2010.	Celtic	Tiger	in	collapse:	Explaining	the	weaknesses	of	the	Irish	model.	Springer			--	 2009.	‘The	competition	state	-	Lessons	from	Ireland’.	Dept.	Politics,	UL			--	 2002.	The	Celtic	Tiger	in	Distress.	Growth	with	Inequality	in	Ireland.	International	Political	Economy	Series:	Palgrave	Kirby,	Peadar,	and	Mary	Murphy.	2011.	‘Globalisation	and	models	of	state:	Debates	and	evidence	from	Ireland’.	New	Political	Economy	16.1:	19-39.	Klein,	Naomi.	2008.	The	Shock	Doctrine.	The	Rise	of	Disaster	Capitalism.	Penguin		Klein,	Paul	and	Gustavo	Ventura.	2019.	‘Taxation,	expenditures	and	the	Irish	miracle’,	presentation	to	ESRI,	23/05/2019	[slides	available	at	www.esri.ie]		Kratochwil,	Friedrich	V.	1991.	Rules,	norms,	and	decisions:	on	the	conditions	of	
practical	and	legal	reasoning	in	international	relations	and	domestic	affairs.	Cambridge	University	Press		Labour	Party:			--	 1989.	Now	more	than	ever!	Labour’s	Policy	Proposals.	Election	’89	Lane,	Pádraig	G.	1993.	‘The	Land	and	Labour	Association	1894-1914’,	Journal	of	
the	Cork	Historical	and	Archaeological	Society,	98	Lange,	Peter,	and	Paul	Teague	1992,	‘The	politics	of	the	social	dimension’,	in	A.M.	Sbagia	ed.,	Euro-Politics:	Institutions	and	Politics	in	the	“New”	European	
Community.	Brookings	Institute	Larragy,	Joe.	2006.	‘Origins	and	Significance	of	the	Community	and	Voluntary	Pillar	in	Irish	Social	Partnership’,	Economic	&	Social	Review,	37(3):	375-398	Lee,	David.	2010.	‘How	the	TUC	learned	to	love	the	European	Union	and	how	the	affair	turned	out’,	27/11/2010,	on	www.historyandpolicy.org		Lee,	J.J.:			--	 1989.	Ireland	1912–85.	Politics	and	Society.	CUP			--		 1979.	'Aspects	of	corporatist	thought	in	Ireland:	the	Commission	on	Vocational	Organisation,	1939–43’,	in	Studies	in	Irish	history,	presented	to	R.	
Dudley	Edwards,	eds.	Donal	McCartney	et	al.	UCD	Lee,	John	and	Daniel	McConnell.	2016.	Hell	at	the	Gates.	The	Inside	Story	of	
Ireland’s	Financial	Crisis.	Mercier	Lehmbruch,	G.	1984.	‘Concentration	and	the	Structure	of	Corporatist	Networks,’	in	J.	H.	Goldthorpe	ed.,	Order	and	Conflict	in	Contemporary	Capitalism:	
Studies	in	the	Political	Economy	of	Western	European	Nations.	Clarendon	Lemass,	Seán.	1959.	‘The	Role	of	State-Sponsored	Bodies	in	the	Economy’,	
Administration,	7:4	Lenihan,	Conor	2015.	Haughey,	Prince	of	Power.	Blackwater	Press	Local	Government	and	Public	Services	Union	(LGPSU):			--	 1984	(Nov.).	Stark	Reality	Lyne,	Thomas,	1987.	‘The	Progressive	Democrats	1985–87.	Irish	Political	Studies,	2	(1),	pp.107-114.	
	 363	
MacSharry,	Ray,	and	Padraic	White.	2000.	The	Making	of	the	Celtic	Tiger.	The	
Inside	Story	of	Ireland’s	Boom	Economy.	Mercier	McAleese,	Dermot.	1991.	‘Europe	and	the	Wider	World’,	in	Kennedy	ed.	1991,	160-74	McCarthy,	Charles:			--	 1977.	Trade	Unions	in	Ireland	1894-1960.	IPA				--	 1974.	‘The	future	of	National	Pay	Agreements’,	Administration,	22/I			--			 1973.	Decade	of	Upheaval.	Irish	Trade	Unions	in	the	1960s.	IPA			--	 1966.	‘Trade	Unions	and	Christianity’,	Christus	Rex,	20:3:	194-197	McCarthy,	Colm.	1979.	‘Economic	Recovery:	An	Alternative	Path’,	Business	and	
Finance,	30.10.1979	McCarthy,	Dermot,	2006:	‘Contextualising	the	state’s	response	to	global	influences’,	in	Jacobson,	Kirby,	Ó	Broin	eds.,	2006:	74-84	McCarthy,	John	F.	1990b.	‘Ireland’s	Turnaround’,	in	ibid.	ed.	1990:	11-73				--	 ed..	1990.	Planning	Ireland's	future:	the	legacy	of	TK	Whitaker.	Glendale.				--	 1990b.	‘Ireland’s	Turnaround’,	in	ibid.	ed.	1990:	11-73	McCarthy,	Stephen	2013.	‘Sense	of	fatalism	about	Irish	trade	union	movement’,	
The	Irish	Times,	30.08.13	McCashin,	Anthony:			--	 2004:	Social	Security	in	Ireland,	Gill	&	Macmillan				--	 and	O’Sullivan,	E.	2002.	‘The	National	Economic	and	Social	Forum,	Social	Partnership	and	policy	formulation	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland’,	Policy	and	
Politics,	30:	263–279	McCracken,	Paul.	1977.	Towards	Full	Employment	and	Price	Stability.	OECD		McDowell,	Moore:			--	 1987.	‘Privatisation	and	Liberalisation:	A	Survey	of	Some	Issues	in	Economic	Policy’,	JSSISI,	03/12/87			--	 and	Frank	J.	Convery.	1990.	Privatisation.	Gill	&	Macmillan	McGee,	Owen,	2015.	Arthur	Griffith.	Irish	Academic	Press.	McGinley,	Jack	(1999).	‘Neo-corporatism,	new	realism	and	Social	Partnership	in	Ireland	1970-99’,	unpub.	PhD	Thesis,	TCD		McGinley,	Kieran	J.	ed.,	2014.	Cluskey.	The	Conscience	of	Labour.	Umiskin	McGraw,	Sean	and	Eoin	O’Malley	eds.,	2018.	One	Party	Dominance.	Fianna	Fáil	
and	Irish	Politics	1926-2016.	Routledge	MacLysaght,	Edward.	1978.	Changing	Times.	Ireland	since	1898.	Colin	Smythe	Maguire,	Martin:			--	 2017.	‘Civil	Service	Trade	Unionism	in	Ireland,	Part	2,	1922-90’,	open	source	(orig,	Saothar,	2009).				--	 2010.	Scientific	Service.	A	History	of	the	Union	of	Professional	and	Technical	
Civil	Servants	1920-1990.	IPA			--	 2008.	The	Civil	Service	and	the	Revolution	in	Ireland,	1912-1938:	‘Shaking	
the	blood-stained	hand	of	Mr	Collins’.	Manchester	University	Press				--	 1998.	Servants	to	the	Public:	A	History	of	the	Local	Government	and	Public	
	 364	
Services	Union	1901-1990.	IPA	Mair,	Peter:		--	 1992.	‘Explaining	the	absence	of	class	politics	in	Ireland’,	in	Goldthorpe,	J.	H.,	&	Whelan,	C.	T.,	The	development	of	industrial	society	in	Ireland:	383-410.			--	 1987.	The	Changing	Irish	Party	System.	Pinter			--	 1979.	‘The	Autonomy	of	the	Political:	The	Development	of	the	Irish	Party	System,’	Comparative	Politics,	11:4:	445-65			--	 1977.	‘Labour	and	the	Irish	Party	System	Revisited:	Party	Competition	in	the	1920s’,	Economic	and	Social	Review,	9:1:	59-70	Mair,	Peter,	and	Liam	Weeks.	2005.	‘The	Party	System’,	in	John	Coakley	and	Michael	Gallagher,	eds.,	Politics	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland	(4th	ed.)	Routledge	Mangan,	Gerry:			--	 1993d.	‘Social	Protection;	Common	Problems’,	Ó	Cinnéide	ed.	1993:	36-45			--	 1993c.	‘Social	Protection	and	Single	Market’,	ibid.:	46-59			--	 1993b.	‘Convergence	of	Social	Protection	Systems’,	ibid.:	90-106			--	 1993a.	‘Social	Protection	in	Ireland’,	in	ibid.:	107-116	Mangan,	Ita.	1993.	‘The	Influence	of	EC	Membership	on	Irish	Social	Policy	and	Social	Services’,	in	Ó	Cinnéide	ed..	1993:	60-81	Manning,	Maurice.	1970.	The	Blueshirts.	Gill	and	Macmillan	Mansergh,	Martin				--	 ed.,	1986.	The	spirit	of	the	nation:	the	speeches	and	statements	of	Charles	J.	
Haughey	(1957-1986),	Mercier	Press	Martin,	John.	2007.	The	Irish	Times:	Past	and	Present.	BHES	Maume,	Patrick.	2007.	‘Charles	James	Haughey	1925-2006’,	Dictionary	of	Irish	
Biography	(http://dib.cambridge.org/).	CUP/RIA	Meehan,	Ciara.	2017.	A	Just	Society	for	Ireland.	Palgrave		Meenan,	Katherine.	1999.	‘1984	–	the	end	of	Eurosclerosis’,	in	Dooge	and	Barrington	eds.	1999:	55-65	Merrigan,	Matt:			--	 2014.	Eggs	and	Rashers.	Irish	Socialist	Memories.	Umiskin	Press			--	 1989:	Eagle	or	Cuckoo?	The	Story	of	the	Amalgamated	Transport	and	
General	Workers	Union	in	Ireland,	Matmer		Milotte,	Mike,	Sarah	Nelson	and	David	Reed	(1985).	Communism	in	modern	
Ireland:	the	pursuit	of	the	Workers’	Republic	since	1916.	Gill	&	Macmillan	Mitchell,	Arthur:			--	 1974.	Labour	in	Irish	politics,	1890-1930:	the	Irish	labour	movement	in	an	
age	of	revolution.	Barnes	&	Noble.			--	 1995.	Revolutionary	Government	in	Ireland:	Dáil	Éireann,	1919-22.	Gill	&	Macmillan.	Mjøset,	Lars.	1992.	The	Irish	Economy	in	Comparative	European	Perspective.	NESC		
	 365	
Morgenthau,	Hans	J.	1946.	Scientific	man	versus	power	politics.	University	of	Chicago	Press		Morrissey	SJ,	Thomas	J.	2007.	William	O'Brien	1881-1968:	Socialist,	Republican,	
Dáil	Deputy,	Editor,	and	Trade	Union	Leader.	Four	Courts	Press	Murphy,	Gary:				--	 2016.	Electoral	Competition	in	Ireland	since	1987.	The	Politics	of	Triumph	
and	Despair.	Manchester	University	Press			--	 2009.	In	Search	of	the	Promised	Land:	Politics	of	Post-war	Ireland.	Mercier				--	 2009.	‘Interest	groups	in	the	policy-making	process’,	Politics	in	the	Republic	
of	Ireland.	Routledge:	349-380.			--		 2005.	‘From	economic	nationalism	to	European	Union’,	in	Girvin	and	Murphy	eds.	2005:	28-48			--	 2003.	‘”Fostering	a	spurious	progeny?”:	the	Trade	Union	Movement	and	Europe	1957-64’,	Saothar	28			--	 and	John	Hogan,	2008,	‘Fianna	Fáil,	the	Trade	Union	Movement,	and	the	Politics	of	Macroeconomic	Crises,	1970-82,’	Irish	Political	Studies,	23:4	(Dec.	2008):	577-598	Murphy,	Mary.	2006.	‘The	emerging	Irish	workfare	state	and	its	implications	for	local	development’,	in	Jacobson,	Kirby,	Ó	Broin	eds.,	2006:	85-111		Murray,	Peter.	2009.	Facilitating	the	Future?:	US	Aid,	European	Integration	and	
Irish	Industrial	Viability:	1948-73.	UCD		Natali,	David,	and	Philippe	Pochet.	2009.	‘The	evolution	of	social	pacts	in	the	EMU	era:	what	type	of	institutionalization?’,	European	Journal	of	Industrial	
Relations	15.2:	147-166.	National	Economic	and	Social	Council	(NESC):				--	 2009.	Report	118.	Ireland’s	Five-Part	Crisis:	An	Integrated	National	
Response			--	 2005.	Report	113.	The	Developmental	Welfare	State			--	 1999.	Report	105.	Opportunities,	Challenges	and	Capacities	for	Choice			--	 1993.	Report	96.	Strategy	For	Competitiveness,	Growth	And	Employment			--	 1990	(Oct).	NESC	Report	89.	A	Strategy	for	the	Nineties:	Economic	Stability	
and	Structural	Change			--	 1989	(Aug.).	Report	88.	Ireland	in	the	European	Community:	Performance,	
Prospects	and	Strategy			--	 1988	(Nov.).	Report	85.	Redistribution	through	State	Social	Expenditure	in	
the	Republic	of	Ireland	1973-1980			--	 1986	(Nov.).	Report	83.	A	Strategy	for	Development	1986-1990.	Growth,	
Employment	and	Fiscal	Balance			--	 1985.	Report.	The	Financing	of	Local	Authorities			--	 1984	(Oct.).	Report	76.	The	Role	of	the	Financial	System	in	Financing	the	
Traded	Sectors			--	 1982a	[Oct.].	Report	64.	A	Review	of	Industrial	Policy	[Telesis	Report]			--	 1982b.	Report	66.	Policies	for	Industrial	Development:	Conclusions	and	
Recommendations	
	 366	
		--	 1981a	(Feb.).	Report	54:	The	Future	of	the	NESC			--	 1981b	(Sept.).	Report	58:	The	Socio-Economic	Position	of	Ireland	in	the	EEC			--	 1981c	(Oct.).	Report	61:	Irish	Social	Policies:	Priorities	for	Future	
Development			--	 1981e	(Feb.).	Report	60:	Industrial	Policy	and	Development:	A	Survey	of	
literature	for	the	early	1960s			--	 1981d	(Oct.).	Report	62:	Economic	and	Social	Policy	1981:	Aims	and	
Recommendations			--		 1980.	Enterprise	in	the	Public	Sector			--	 1978	(Oct.).	Comments	on	Development	for	Full	Employment	National	Economic	and	Social	Forum	(NESF):			--	 2003.	Report	27.	Equality	Policies	for	Gay	Men	and	Lesbians			--	 1996.	Opinion	4.	Post-PCW	Negotiations:	A	New	Deal?			--	 1994b.	Report	4.	Ending	Long-Term	Unemployment			--	 1994a.	Report	3.	Comm.	on	Social	Welfare:	Outstanding	Recommendations			--	 1993.	Report	1.	Negotiations	on	a	Successor	Agreement	to	the	PESP	National	Industrial	and	Economic	Council	(NIEC):	[publ.:	GSO]			--	 1970.	Report	27.	Report	on	Incomes	and	Prices	Policy			--	 1967.	Report	18.	Full	Employment			--		 1966c.	Report	19.	Report	in	Review	of	Industrial	Progress	1966			--	 1966b.	Report	16.	Comments	on	Investment	for	Education			--	 1966a	Report	15.	Arrangements	for	Planning	at	Industry	Level			--	 1965.	Report	11.	Report	on	the	Economic	Situation	in	1965	Nevin,	Donal				--	 2006.	James	Connolly.	‘A	Full	Life’.	Gill	&	Macmillan			--	 ed..	2006.	James	Larkin	Lion	of	the	Fold.	Gill	&	Macmillan,	with	RTÉ/SIPTU			--	 ed..	1994.	Trade	Union	Century,	Mercier.			--	 ed.	1980.	Trade	Unions	and	Change	in	Irish	Society,	Mercier		Newman,	Jeremiah:			--	 1955.	Co-responsibility	in	industry:	Social	justice	in	labour-management	
relations.	M.H.	Gill.				--	 1966,	‘Industrial	Relations	in	Ireland’,	Christus	Rex,	20:3:	173-193	Nitzsche,	Susan.	2012.	Wertewandel	und	politische	Parteien	in	der	Republik	Irland.	Augsburg:	Wißner-Verlag	Nolan,	Brian,	Philip	J.	O'Connell,	and	Christopher	T.	Whelan,	eds.	2000.	Bust	to	
boom?:	the	Irish	experience	of	growth	and	inequality.	IPA	Ó	Béacháin,	Donnacha	2010.	Destiny	of	the	Soldiers:	Fianna	Fail.	Irish	
Republicanism	and	the	IRA,	1926-73.	Gill	&	Macmillan		O’Brien,	James	F.	1981.	A	Study	of	National	Wage	Agreements	in	Ireland.	Paper	No.	104.	ESRI		O’Brien,	Mark.	2001.	De	Valera,	Fianna	Fáil	and	the	Irish	Press:	The	Truth	in	the	
News?	Irish	Academic	Press	
	 367	
O'Brien,	William,	and	Edward	MacLysaght.	1969.	Forth	the	banners	go:	
reminiscences	of	William	O'Brien.	Three	Candles	O'Carroll,	Ida,	and	Eoin	Collins.	1995,	Lesbian	and	Gay	Visions	of	Ireland.	Towards	
the	21st	Century.	GLEN	Ó	Cinnéide,	Séamus:			--	 1993b.	‘The	Agreement	on	Social	Policy:	A	New	Beginning?’		in	ibid.	ed.	1993:	1-20			--	 1993a.	‘Ireland	in	a	European	Welfare	State’,	in	ibid.,	ed.,1993:	117-146			--	 ed.	1993.	Social	Europe.	EC	Social	Policy	and	Ireland.	IEA	O'Connor,	Emmet:			--	 2019.	‘Persona	Non	Grata:	Andrew	Boyd	1921-2011’,	in	Devine	and	McGinley	eds.	2019:	97-110			--	 2015.	Big	Jim	Larkin:	Hero	and	Wrecker?	UCD	Press			--	 2011.	A	Labour	History	of	Ireland,	1824-2000.	Gill	&	Macmillan			--	 2004.	Reds	and	the	Green:	Ireland,	Russia	and	the	communist	internationals,	
1919-43.	UCD	Press	O’Connor,	Philip:			--	 2017.	‘Beyond	the	Failure	Narrative’,	Dublin	Review	of	Books,	
http://drb.ie/essays/beyond-the-failure-narrative			--	 2014.	‘Irish	Trade	Unions	and	European	Monetary	Integration.	The	logic	of	a	corporatist	strategy’,	MA	thesis	(unpub.),	DCU				--	 2012.	Palestine	in	Irish	Politics.	A	History.	Sadaka			--	 ed.	2009.	Pat	Murphy.	Social	Republican.	Howth	Free	Press			--	 2007.	‘Lifting	the	Boats.	Partnership	and	Progress	in	“Tiger”	Ireland’,	Dublin	
Review	of	Books,	4,	Winter	2007-08,	http://drb.ie/essays/lifting-the-boats	O'Donnell,	Catherine.	(2003).	‘Fianna	Fáil	and	Sinn	Féin:	the	1988	talks	reappraised’.	Irish	Political	Studies,	18	(2),	60-81	O’Donnell,	Rory:			--	 2001.	‘The	future	of	social	partnership	in	Ireland.	Paper	prepared	for	the	National	Competitiveness	Council’.	UCD					--	 and	Damian	Thomas.	1998.	‘Partnership	and	Policy	Making’,	in	Healy	and	Reynolds	eds.	1998:	117-146			--	 1991.	‘EMU	–	Identifying	the	Issues’,	in	ibid.	ed.	1991,	1-48				--	 ed.	1991.	Economic	and	Monetary	Union.	Studies	in	European	Union,	2,	IEA	O’Donovan,	Patricia.	1999.	‘Irish	trade	unions	and	the	EU’,	in	Dooge	and	Barrington	eds.	1999:	43-54.	O’Dowd,	John	ed.,	1989.	Ireland,	Europe	and	1992.	With	Foreword	by	Peter	
Cassells.	CPSSU	O'Dowd,	Liam	ed..	1996.	On	intellectuals	and	intellectual	life	in	Ireland:	
international,	comparative	and	historical	contexts.	Inst.	Irish	Studies,	QUB	O’Gorman,	Noel	T.	and	Thomas	A.	Carroll,	1987.	‘Dilemma	of	Irish	Economic	Development.	Perceptions	on	the	Evolution	of	Ireland’s	Public	Finances	and	Economy	from	the	early	1960s	to	the	mid-1980s’,	JSSISI,	XXV	(Part	4)	
	 368	
O’Hagan,	J.W.,	and	G.J.	Foley.	1982.	The	Confederation	of	Irish	Industry:	The	First	
Fifty	Years	1932-1982.	CII	O’Halpin,	Eunan	2012,	‘Labour	and	the	Making	of	Irish	Foreign	Policy’,	in	Daly,	O’Brien,	Rouse	eds.,	2012:	139-53	O’Mahony,	Flor.	2014.	‘Frank	Cluskey’,	in	McGinley	ed.,	2014:	27-39	O’Malley,	Desmond.	2014.	Conduct	Unbecoming.	A	Memoir.	Gill	&	Macmillan	O'Malley,	Eoin.	2011.	Contemporary	Ireland.	Macmillan		O’Reilly,	Emily.	1992.	Masterminds	of	the	Right.	Attic	Press	Ó	Riain,	Seán:			--	 2014.	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Ireland's	Celtic	Tiger:	Liberalism,	Boom	and	Bust.	CUP			--	 2009.	‘Extending	the	Ethnographic	Case	Study’,	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	
Case-Based	Methods.	SAGE			--		 2004.	The	Politics	of	High-Tech	Growth:	Developmental	Welfare	States	in	the	
Global	Economy.	CUP		Ó	Riain,	S.,	and	P.	O’Connell.	2000.	‘The	Role	of	the	State	in	Growth	and	Welfare’,	in	Nolan,	Brian,	O'Connell,	and	Whelan,	eds.	2000:	310-339	O’Riordan,	Manus:				--	 2019.	‘Lemass	In	The	De	Valera	Era’,	7-part	series,	Irish	Political	Review				--	 2001	(2nd):	The	Voice	of	a	Thinking	Intelligent	Movement.	James	Larkin	
Junior	and	the	Ideological	Modernisation	of	Irish	Trade	Unionism,	ILHS	(1st	ed.,	Saothar	19,	1994:	53-68)			--	 1990.	‘Review	of	the	Programme	for	National	Recovery	and	the	role	of	the	Labour	Court’,	Research	Dept.,	SIPTU,	[unpublished]			--	 1976:		‘Economic	and	Social	Planning:	Two	approaches’,	ICTU	1976:	51-66			--	 1976b:	‘Bullock	Report	on	Industrial	Democracy’,	Liberty,	Sept.	1976			--	 1976a:		‘Worker	Directors	–	The	British	Debate’,	Liberty,	June	1976	O’Toole,	Fintan:			--	 2010.	Ship	of	Fools.	How	Stupidity	and	Corruption	Sank	the	Celtic	Tiger.	Faber			--	 2003.	After	the	Ball.	TASC			--	 1995.	Meanwhile	Back	at	the	Ranch.	The	Politics	of	Irish	Beef.	Vintage	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD):			--	 1991	(June).	Report	on	Ireland			--	 1990	(Dec.).	The	Public	Sector:	Issues	for	the	1990s.	OECD	Department	of	Economics	and	Statistics,	Working	Paper	No.	90			--	 1989	(June).	OECD	Economic	Surveys	1988/89:	Ireland			--	 1988b.	Education	in	OECD	Countries	1986-87.	A	Compendium	of	Statistical	
Information			--	 1988a.	Measures	to	Assist	the	Long-Term	Unemployed.	Recent	Experience	in	
some	OECD	Countries			--	 1985.	Ireland.	Economic	Survey	1984-85			--	 1983.	Ireland.	Economic	Survey	1982-83	
	 369	
		--	 1968.	The	Long-Term	Unemployed	Onuf,	Nicholas,	and	Frank	F.	Klink.	1989.	‘Anarchy,	authority,	rule’.	International	
Studies	Quarterly	33.2:	149-173.	Polanyi,	Karl.	1944.	The	Great	Transformation.	Farrar	&	Rinehart	Power,	Con				--	 2009.	Metamorphosis:	lessons	from	the	formative	years	of	the	Celtic	tiger,	
1979-1993.	Oak	Tree	Press			--	 1988b.	‘A	Pragmatic	Argument	for	Privatisation	in	Ireland’,	in	Mulreany,	M.,	and	L.	St.	John	Dev;in	eds.,	Public	Expenditure	and	the	Private	Sector.	IPA			--	 1988a.	‘Programme	for	National	Recovery.	Pragmatism	&	Action’,	Journal	of	
the	Institute	of	Bankers	in	Ireland.	89:1	[Spring	1988]	
Programme	for	Government			--	 1989.	In	the	National	Interest.	Fianna	Fáil-Progressive	Democrats	
Programme	for	Government	1989-1993		Progressive	Democrats.				--	 1989.	In	the	National	Interest.	Fianna	Fáil-Progressive	Democrats	
Programme	for	Government	1989-1993				--	 1987.	Message	to	the	Irish	People			--	 1997.	Real	Answers,	Not	Idle	Promises	Provisional	United	Trade	Union	Organisation	(PUTUO),	1956,	Planning	Full	
Employment	–	A	Trade	Union	Approach	Puirséil,	Niamh:			--	 2018.	‘Fianna	Fáil	and	the	evolution	of	an	ambiguous	ideology’,	in	McGraw	and	O’Malley	eds.	2018:	49-71			--	 2007:	The	Irish	Labour	Party	1922-73,	UCD		Quinn,	Ruairi,	2005.	Straight	left:	A	journey	in	politics.	Hodder	Headline		Rabbitte,	Pat	and	Éamon	Gilmore.	1990.	Bertie’s	Bill.	The	Workers’	Party	Rafferty,	Mick,	and	Patricia	McCarthy	(eds.).	2019.	Personal	Journeys	in	an	
Unequal	City.	Reflections	of	Community	Activists	on	Social	Changes	in	
Dublin’s	North	Inner	City.	Dublin	NEIC	Rafter,	Kevin			--	 2009.	Fine	Gael:	Party	at	a	Crossroads.	New	Island.			--	 2002.	Martin	Mansergh.	A	Biography.	New	Island	Reddan,	Fiona	(2008),	Ireland’s	IFSC.	A	Story	of	Global	Financial	Success.	Mercier		Regan,	Aidan:			--	 2017.	‘Post-crisis	social	dialogue	and	economic	governance	in	Ireland’,	in	Guardiancich,	Igor,	and	Óscar	Molina	Romo,	eds.	Talking	through	the	crisis:	
social	dialogue	and	industrial	relations	trends	in	selected	EU	countries.	Geneva:	ILO:	151-70				--	 2012,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Irish	Social	Partnership.	The	Political	Economy	of	
Institutional	Change	in	European	Varieties	of	Capitalism.	Rozenberg	Regan,	John	M.	1999.	The	Irish	counter-revolution,	1921-1936:	treatyite	politics	
and	settlement	in	independent	Ireland.	Gill	&	Macmillan.	
	 370	
Reynolds,	Albert	[with	Jill	Arlon].	2009.	My	Autobiography.	Transworld		Rhodes,	Martin.	2001.	‘The	Political	Economy	of	Social	Pacts:	“Competitive	Corporatism”	and	European	Welfare	Reform’,	in		Pierson,	Paul,	The	New	
Politics	of	the	Welfare	State.	OUP:	165-94	Roberts,	Ruaidhri.	1959.	‘Trade	Union	Organisation	in	Ireland’,	JSSISI,	20/2:	93-111		Roche,	William	K.:			--	 2009:	‘Social	Partnership:	From	Lemass	to	Cowen’,	The	Economic	and	Social	
Review,	40:	2:	183–205			--	 1994.	‘Industrial	Relations,’	in	Nevin	ed.	1994,	117-132			--	 and	Joe	Larragy.	1989.	‘The	Trend	of	Unionisation	in	the	Irish	Republic,’	in	T.	Murphy	ed.,	Industrial	Relations	in	Ireland:	Contemporary	Issues	and	Developments.	Dept.	Industrial	Relations,	UCD			--	 and	Joe	Larragy.	1987.	‘Patterns	of	Merger	and	Dissolution	of	Trade	Unions	in	Ireland	since	1940.’	DUES	Bulletin	No.	2.	Dept.	Industrial	Relations,	UCD	Rogers,	Everett	M.	2010.	Diffusion	of	innovations.	Simon	and	Schuster	Rose,	Kieran:			--	 2018.	‘Sylvia	Meehan:	A	Fearless	Champion	of	Equality	for	All’,	Gay	
Community	News,	10/2018				--	 1994.	Diverse	Communities:	The	Evolution	of	Lesbian	and	Gay	Politics	in	
Ireland.	CUP	Royall,	Frédéric.	2009.	‘Political	challengers	or	service	recipients?	Participants	in	Irish	pro-unemployed	organizations’,	in	M.	Guigni	ed.,	The	Politics	of	
Unemployment	in	Europe:	Policy	Issues	and	Collective	Action.	Ashgate	RTE	Documentaries:			--	 2016.	‘P.J.	Mara:	a	legacy’,	broadcast	16	and	24/05/2016	 	Ryle	Dwyer,	T.,	2005.	Haughey's	Forty	Years	of	Controversy.	Mercier	Press		Sabel,	Charles.	1996.	Ireland.	Local	Partnerships	and	Social	Inclusion.	Paris:	OECD	Scharpf,	Fritz	W.	2002.	‘The	European	social	model’.	JCMS	40,	4:	645-670	Schregle	Johannes.	1975.	Restructuring	of	the	Irish	Trade	Union	Movement.	
Memorandum	submitted	to	the	ICTU.	ILO	Sectoral	Development	Committee.	1985	(April).	Report	and	Recommendations	on	
the	Beef	Industry.	SDC	Report	No.	7	Sekhon,	J.	S.,	Box-Steffensmeier,	J.	M.,	Brady,	H.	E.,	&	Collier,	D.	2008.	The	Oxford	
Handbook	of	Political	Methodology.	OUP	Sexton,	J.J.	1988,	Long-Term	Unemployment,	Its	wider	labour	market	effects	in	the	
countries	of	the	European	Community,	Eurostat	Sinn	Féin	the	Workers’	Party.	1978.	The	Irish	Industrial	Revolution,	Repsol	Smyth,	Sam.	1997.	Thanks	a	million	big	fella.	Blackwater	Press	Smurfit,	Michael.	2014.	A	Life	Worth	Living:	the	Autobiography.	Oak	Tree		Sutherland,	Peter	D.,	1999.	‘Completing	the	internal	market	and	competition	policy:	a	personal	account’,	in	Dooge	and	Barrington	eds.	1999:	282-94.	Sweeney,	Bernard.	2014.	‘The	Peoples	Parties’,	Dublin	Review	of	Books,	http://www.drb.ie/essays/the-people-s-parties.	Accessed	20.02.17	
	 371	
Sweeney,	Paul:			--	 2004.	Selling	out?:	privatisation	in	Ireland.	TASC/New	Island				--	 1999.	The	Celtic	Tiger:	Ireland's	continuing	economic	miracle	explained.	Oak	Tree	Press				--	 1990.	The	Politics	of	Public	Enterprise	and	Privatisation.	Tomer		TASC:			--	 2012.	Good	for	Business?	Worker	participation	on	boards	Tansey,	Paul:			--	 2006.	‘Mapping	a	New	Prosperity’,	in	Whittaker,	Andrew	ed.,	2006:	135-8			--	 1998.	Ireland	at	Work.	Oaktree	Press	Taylor,	Paul,	2015.	Heroes	Or	Traitors?:	Experiences	of	Southern	Irish	Soldiers	
Returning	from	the	Great	War	1919-1939.	OUP		Thatcher,	Margaret,				--	 ‘Speeches,	Interviews	and	other	Statements’,	Margaret	Thatcher	Foundation,	https://www.margaretthatcher.org	Thornley,	David.	1964.	‘The	End	of	an	Era’,	Studies,	Spring	1964:	1-17	Thornley,	Yseult,	ed.	2008.	Unquiet	Spirit.	Essays	in	Memory	of	David	Thornley.	Liberties.	Treacy,	Matt,	2012,	The	Communist	Party	of	Ireland,	1921-2011,	Vol.	1.	Treacy		Turner,	Tom,	Daryl	D’Art	and	Michelle	O’Sullivan.	2013.	Are	trade	unions	still	
relevant?	Union	recognition	100	years	on.	Orpen	Press	Von	Prondzynski	Ferdinand.	1992.	‘Ireland	Between	Centralism	and	the	Market’,	in	Ferner,	Anthony	and	Richard	Hyman	eds.,	Industrial	Relations	in	the	New	
Europe.	Basil	Blackwell	Von	Ranke,	Leopold.	1886.	‘Vorwort’	(Preface)	to	Geschichten	der	romanischen	
und	germanischen	Völker	von	1494	bis	1514	(Histories	of	the	Latin	and	
Teutonic	Peoples	from	1494	to	1514),	available	online	Walsh,	Brendan.	1987.	‘Commercial	State-Sponsored	Bodies’,	Irish	Banking	
Review,	Summer	1987	Walsh,	Pat:				--	 2016.	Resurgence	1969-2016:	The	Catholic	Predicament	in	'Northern	
Ireland'.	BHES			--		 1994.	Irish	Republicanism	and	Socialism.	The	Politics	of	the	Republican	
Movement	1905	to	1994.	Belfast	Historical	and	Educational	Society		Ward,	Seán.	1997.	‘Basic	Income’,	in	Healy	and	Reynolds	eds.	1997:	239-60	Weinz,	Wolfgang.	1986.	‘Economic	development	and	interest	groups,’	in	Girvin	and	Sturm	eds.,	1986:	87-101	Weiss,	Gilbert,	and	Ruth	Wodak,	eds.	2007.	Critical	discourse	analysis.	Palgrave	Macmillan	Wendt,	Alexander			--	 1999.	Social	theory	of	international	politics.	Cambridge	University	Press			--		 1992.	‘Anarchy	is	what	states	make	of	it:	the	social	construction	of	power	politics’.	International	organization	46.2:	391-425.	
	 372	
Whelan,	Bernadette.	2000.	Ireland	and	the	Marshall	Plan.	Four	Courts	Press	Whelan,	Ciara,	Patrick	Walsh	and	Qi	Li.	2007.	‘Jobless	Growth	through	Creative	Destruction:	Ireland’s	industrial	development	path	1972-2003’.	UCD:	Geary	Institute	Discussion	Paper	WP/40/2007	Whelan,	Noel,	2011.	Fianna	Fáil:	A	Biography	of	the	Party.	Gill	&	Macmillan	White,	Padraic	A.	1983.	‘A	concept	of	industrial	development	in	the	1980s',	JSSISI,	XXIV,	Part	V,	51-72	Whittaker,	Andrew	ed.	2006.	Bright,	Brilliant	Days.	Douglas	Gageby	and	The	Irish	
Times.	A&A	Farmar	Whitaker,	Dr.	T.K.:				--	 1976.	‘Planning	Irish	Development’,	in	ICTU	1976:	67-77			--	 1958.		Economic	Development.	Pr.	4803,	Nov.	1958.	D/Finance	Wickham,	James,	1980,	‘The	new	working	class’,	Saothar,	6.	ILHS	WikiLeaks,	https://wikileaks.org			Wikipedia,	https://en.wikipedia.org	 Workers	Party.	1987.	Election	Manifesto		Yeates,	Padraig:			--	 2014.	‘Michael	Collins’s	‘secret	service	unit’	in	the	trade	union	movement’,	
History	Ireland,	3			--	 2008.	‘Craft	workers	during	the	Irish	Revolution,	1919–22’,	Saothar	33	Zehfuss,	Maja.	2002.	Constructivism	in	international	relations:	the	politics	of	
reality.	Cambridge	University	Press		
